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ABSTRACT
In United States v. Fordice (1992), the Supreme Court
Court declared that racially nondiscriminatory admissions and
hiring

policies

alone

failed

to

satisfy

the

state

of

Mississippi's "affirmative duty" to dismantle a previously de
jure

system of

segregated higher education.

However,

the

justices declined to define precisely what the state must do
to satisfy its constitutional obligations,

leaving in its

wake a host of unresolved questions. Of particular concern to
many African Americans is the fact that the future status of
public black universities was left in the balance.
Using a case study approach, this dissertation argues
that

higher

education

desegregation

cannot

be

understood

apart from the Brown decision and the larger struggle of
African Americans to achieve the full rights of American
citizenship. It was found that: (1) though African Americans
have a unique history of slavery and racial segregation, they
have

adhered

to,

and used,

the

same

principles

from

the

Declaration of Independence and the Constitution in their
struggles for equality;

(2) the legal struggles for dese

gregation represent a classic case
blacks in the liberal tradition;

study of the faith of

(3) though both whites and

blacks share the same liberal creed, they have come to their
faith through very different historical paths.

These very

different historical experiences create fundamental
ideological disputes between whites and blacks over the
viii
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legitimate role of the federal government in race policy; (4)
these different historical perspectives complicate the issue
of desegregation in higher education, and particularly the
question of whether black colleges should be publicly
supported or discontinued;

(5) because the Creed purportedly

embodies universal, transcendent truths,

it tends to dele-

gitimize arguments rooted in history or culture - the very
justifications most often relied upon by African Americans
for the continuation of black colleges

(as well

race-based public policies). Consequently,

as other

historical

and

cultural differences between blacks and whites raise basic
questions about whether the American Creed is an adequate
prism with which to view political problems associated with
race.

ix
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court in United States v. Fordice (505 U.S.
717 [1992]) concluded that the state of Mississippi's policy
of nondiscriminatory admissions policies on the basis of race
was insufficient to meet its "affirmative duty"1 to dese
gregate

a previously de jure system of segregated higher

education. The case marked the Supreme Court's first ruling
regarding the remedial policies that states are required to
adopt in order to desegregate systems of higher education;
previous

Supreme

Court

rulings

in

higher

education

desegregation focused on the rights of black Americans to
attend previously all-white, public universities.2 Yet,
the Court failed to articulate clearly an equitable remedy in
the Mississippi case, leaving the parties involved, as well
as other states in similar straits, wrangling over exactly
what a state's "affirmative duty" to desegregate in higher
education actually means.
•The language "affirmative duty" to desegregate is
derived from the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Green
v. School Board of New Kent County (391 U.S. 430
[1968]).
2These include Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. Canada. 305
U.S. 337 (1938), Sipuel v. Board of Regents. 332 U.S. 631
(1948), Sweatt v. Painter. 339 U.S. 629 (1950), McLaurin v.
Oklahoma Board of Regents. 339 U.S. 637 (1950), Frasier v.
Board of Trustees. 134 F. Supp. 589 (M.D. N.C. [1955]), aff'd
per curiam, 350 U.S. 975 (1956), Lucy v. A d a m s . 134 F. Supp.
235 (N.D. Ala. [1955]), aff'd, 228 F. 2d. 619 (5th Cir.
[1955]), cert, denied, 351 U.S. 931 (1955), Florida ex. rel.
Hawkins v. Board of Control. 350 U.S. 413 (1956), Booker v.
Tennessee Board of Education. 240 F. 2d. 689 (6th Cir.) cert,
denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957), and Meredith v. Fair. 305 F. 2d.
343 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962).
1
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The Fordice case represents one more manifestation of
the

continuing

effort

to

implement

the

articulated in Brown v.

Board of Education

[1954]).

Court

The

Supreme

determined

mandate

first

(347 U.S.
that

483

separate

educational facilities for white and black Americans denied
blacks

the

equal protection

guarantees

of the

Fourteenth

Amendment. The decision represented the the climax of a twodecade long legal campaign by the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) which commenced at
the level of graduate and professional education. The NAACP's
objective was to overturn the "separate but equal" doctrine
announced in Plessv v. Ferguson (163 U.S. 537 [1896]) which
provided the constitutional,

as well as legal, bedrock for

the entire system of segregation in the South. The NAACP's
attorneys argued that racial segregation was unconstitutio
nal because it allowed Southern state governments to classify
African Americans as a separate class that received different
and unequal treatment under the law. This principle violated
the basic tenets of American democracy - that every indivi
dual, regardless of race,
entitled to
considered

equal

religion,

protection

a heroic moment

uner

or national origin,
the

in American

law.

Brown

history

is

is now

when

the

nation (through its Supreme Court) reaffirmed its commitment
to its first principles by acting to remedy the most egre
gious violation of them - the treatment of African Americans
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(Myrdal,

1944; Tocqueville,

1988; Kluger,

1975; Wilkinson,

1979; Gerwitz, 1997; Peller, 1997).
Though Brown now enjoys broad ideological consensus, the
specific

measures

necessary

to

fulfill

its

mandate

have

always been the subject of intense controversy. In Brown I I .
the Supreme Court ordered that the federal district courts to
enter

decrees

schooling

and orders that would

"with all deliberate speed"

Education. 349 U.S.
mandate

coupled

294

with

[1955]).

stubborn

eliminate

segregated

(Brown v.

Board of

The vague nature of the

resistance

to

integration

forced the Court to revisit on many occasions the question of
precisely what

Brown required -local school

districts

and

state governments to do. Brown has raised fundamental issues
about the power of federal court judges to craft remedies to
address constitutional violations, particularly in the face
of intense public opposition; in essence, it has often placed
unelected federal judges against the power of elected public
officials and popular majorities.
The attempt to apply Brown to higher education has been
particularly troublesome, particularly in light of the
Supreme Court's conspicuous silence prior to Fordice on the
requirements states must meet in order to dismantle segre
gation

in

higher

education.

Lacking

precedent

from

the

nation's highest court, the task has fallen into the hands of
lower federal court judges.
often

came to radically

Consequently,

divergent

different courts

conclusions

of
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4

proposed conflicting remedies, making the entire enterprise
a rather confusing area of constitutional law. In attempting
to resolve this dilemma, federal judges have tended to look
to

precedents

set

desegregation cases

in

elementary

for guidance

and

in

secondary

the higher

school

education

area.
The

existence of

state-supported,

historically black

colleges and universities further complicates the problem of
defining the remedial measures necessary to eliminate de jure
and de facto segregation in higher education. The question
for courts to resolve is whether, in light of the historical
experience of African Americans,

the maintenance of these

institutions is a necessary requirement for equal educational
opportunity for black Americans to exist,

or if they are

merely the remnants of an unconstitutional system of segre
gated higher education

(Miller, 1982). At issue is whether

these institutions will be continued to be allowed to exist,
or if they must be sacrificed as the necessary price for an
"integrated society" Thus,
universities

the fate of historically black

further politicizes

the

inherently troubling

dilemma of how to craft remedial measures to desegregate in
higher education.
The three principal aims of this dissertation are (1) to
show that the struggle of black Americans for equal educa
tional
overall

opportunity represents
struggle

of

African

a central

component

Americans

to

of the

achieve
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full

equality in American society more broadly and (2) desegre
gation in education is a classic case study in the fidelity
of African Americans to the American Creed (Myrdal,
and

1944),

(3) while the Creed has provided the ideological basis

for the current consensus that racially discriminatory laws
violate fundamental American principles of fairness, it has
been less successful at forging a consensus around the best
means to remedy the effects of centuries of racist practice.
Rather,

it will be shown that though American blacks

and

whites share the same American Creed, different historical
experiences color their perspective on what its policy con
sequences are with respect to the

legitimate role

of the

state in remedying racial discrimination.
To accomplish this, I want to place Brown into a broader
historical context
achieve
Secondly,

full

of the struggle of black Americans

equality

in

all

arenas

of

American

to

life.

I plan to revisit the ruling in Brown with par

ticular attention to how the ruling shaped the debate on
desegregation in general and higher education in particular.
Thirdly, Fordice will be analyzed as a case study in view of
the principles laid down by Brown and its progeny.

I will

concentrate especially on the question of the relevancy of
precedents set in public school cases to the higher education
context.

Fourthly,

the

political,

economic,

and

social

implications of the Fordice ruling will be examined. Finally,
this dissertation will reflect on the Supreme Court's trek
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from Brown to Fordice and assess how core American ideals which undergird American constitutional law in general and
the Brown decision in particular - help and/or hinder the
debate on how best to improve race relations in the United
States.
Conceptual Framework
It will be argued in this dissertation that the struggle
of black Americans to achieve the full rights of American
citizenship in general and the school desegregation battles
in particular cannot be properly understood apart from what
Louis Hartz (1955) calls the "liberal tradition in America."
In

a

nutshell,

Hartz

persuasively

argues

that

what

distinguishes America from Europe is that it lacked a true
feudal and aristocratic past based on notions of rigid class
distinctions and the belief in the inherent right of some to
rule
spoke

others
of

America,

(Tocqueville,

the
with

"state
its

of

1988) . While
nature"

virgin

in

forests

European

liberals

a theoretical
and

bountiful

sense,
natural

wealth, seemed to be the practical fulfillment of Locke. This
reality contributed to the American sense of mission - the
idea that America represented a chance to "make the world
over again"
Thus,

(Hartz, 1955; Davis, 1966; Peterson, 1976).
American democracy assumes the atomistic

indi

vidual as the basis for society, and furthermore assume that
a political system is just to the extent that it assures the
maximum degree of freedom and equality to individuals
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7

dal, 1944; Hartz, 1955; Downs, 1957; Rossiter, 1962; Bellah,
1985; McCullogh, 1991). All of the aforementioned values are
by-products of what is referred to as "The Age of Reason" or
the Enlightenment - the period starting from the late 1600's
when Western man came to view science, technology, and human
reason as essential - and to some degree,

identical - with

human progress (Allen, 1989; McCullough, 1991).
Individualism assumes that people are intellectually and
morally

competent

to

make

choices

about

their

religion,

occupation, politics, and other lifestyle choices apart from
the

influences of class,

and/or

community

family heritage,

(McCullough,

1991).

church,

Much

of

guild,

what

is

generally accepted as democratic theory predicates itself on
the

belief

that

all

of

the

aforementioned

institutions

represent "vices" from the Old World which were to be done
away with in the New. Thus, democracy assumes a measure of
"enlightenment"

within

informed citizenry
1986) .

Public

foundational
1966);

the

as

essential

schools,
for

Cremin,

population,

thus,

perpetuating

1989;

Purpel,

to

have

its

but

sees

survival

come

democratic
1989;

also

to

(Neuman,

be

seen

values

McCullom

v.

an

as

(Dewey,
Board

of

Education. 333 U.S. 203 [1948]). The university, according to
Bloom

(1987),

embodies the concept of the "free market of

ideas" in the same way as the marketplace symbolizes laissezfaire capitalism.
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Moreover, the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown explicitly
acknowledges

the

central

role

that

education

plays

in

determining the life chances of citizens living in a modern
capitalist economy. Access to educational opportunity, thus,
becomes an intricate foundational stone to the realization of
the Lockian birthright. Thus, Chief Justice Warren writes,
"Such

an

opportunity,

where

the

state

has

undertaken

to

provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms"

(347 U.S.

at 493).

Much has been written in

recent years about the transition of the U.S. economy to a
"knowledge economy"
market;

thus,

as

in an increasingly competitive global
this

transformation

accelerates,

the

importance of education, as it relates to creating a highlyskilled

labor

force,

Packer,

1987;

Wilson,

economic
debate

transformations

about

education

rises

the

roles,

exponentially

1978;

1987;

Reich,

are occurring
design,

(Johnston

and

(Chubb and Moe, 1990; Fiske,

1991).

alongside
pedagogy

and

These

a major

of

1991; Purpel,

public
1989;

Reitman, 1992) . One of the central thrusts of this debate is
the question of how best to "fix the schools" in order to
better prepare tomorrow's work force.
Thus, the struggle for racial equality in America cannot
be

properly

understood

apart

from

the

larger

American

political cosmos. As Berlin (1975) shows in his history of
free Negroes, the implications of the beliefs of the American
Revolution - specifically the claim that "all men are created
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equal" - were not lost on black Americans.

Viewed in this

light, black protest in America derives not from a rejection
of what Gumnar Myrdal
rather,

(1944)

calls

"the American

Creed;"

it reflects the sense that the high ideals of the

Enlightenment were being denied to blacks on an equal basis.
Even when

one

looks

at the more

"radical

blacks"

- men

ranging from David Walker to Malcolm X - the basis for their
rage

was

Rather,

not

a rejection

of

the

American

ideal

itself.

the source of their rage stemmed from their sense

that America had not lived up to her principles. Most black
political

leaders,

activists,

and

intellectuals

operate

within the "liberal tradition;" it is the rare soul who would
raise

fundamental questions

about the American

experiment

itself.
Against this backdrop,

the Supreme Court decision in

Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, comes to be seen as a
personification of the American Creed. It is more than simply
the culmination of a two-decade old assault by the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) on
separate and unequal education for blacks. Rather, the choice
by black Americans to pursue their agenda through the courts
presupposes
political

a belief
values

in the correctness of

and

institutions

while

core American
simultaneously

pleading for the extension of rights to those who had been
historically disadvantaged. Furthermore, this basic reality
locates

subsequent

desegregation

battles,

whether
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involve public schools or colleges and universities, within
this broader context of black Americans struggling to enter
the mainstream of American political life and culture.
Literature Review
A search through the database of Dissertation Abstracts
revealed that

no dissertation has been written since the

rendering of the Fordice decision which attempts to analyze
this case in light of the principles set forth in Brown and
the subsequent public school precedents. In fact, a broader
review of the scholarly literature on desegregation issues
showed that there has been very little scholarly attention to
the question of the relevance of principles set in elementary
and

secondary

school

cases

for

higher

education.

The

overwhelming majority of scholarly literature in this field,
whether

it focuses on the public

schools or colleges

and

universities, has consisted of case studies of desegregation
efforts in particular locales, attitudinal surveys of persons
and interest groups involved in the process, and analyses of
specific court decisions as well as speculations about what
these rulings might mean for similarly-situated parties in
the future.
David J. Armor's Forced Justice:

School Desegregation

and the Law (199 5) is the most comprehensive work written in
the

field

to

through the

date.

Armor's

book

takes

us

from Brown

up

1992 Supreme Court ruling in Freeman v. Pitts

(involving the necessary requirements for a school system to
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be declared "unitary") and all the efforts to apply the Brown
mandate in between. Armor's study raises serious questions
about the basic thrust of desegregation efforts; mainly, he
concludes that desegregation has not produced appreciable
educational gains, while its social and political costs have
been

considerable.

However,

Armor's

study

is

confined

to

public school desegregation. He does not include the efforts
to

apply the Brown mandate to colleges

and universities,

which is what my dissertation proposes to do.
More and more of the scholarly literature is "chipping
away"

at the basic holding

in Brown

- that

"separate

is

inherently unequal." Armor's book specifically argues that
this contention,

based on Dr.

Kenneth Clark's famous doll

study, is sociologically unsound. Other authors chisel away
at other aspects of Brown. Steele (1993) makes the case for
race separate schools in Detroit to combat the ills of crime,
unemployment,
predestine
Washburn

poverty,

many

(1994)

and

inner-city
argues,

hopelessness
school

in defense

that

children

seem

to

to

failure.

of historically

black

colleges, that Brown need not be interpreted in the higher
education context in such a way as to equate "racial balance"
with

inequality.

Scott-Brown

integrationist thinking,

(1994)

attacks

conventional

embodied in Brown. as "mythology"

and "unworkable" in higher education, and makes a case for
the use of race consciousness in the making of educational
policy. Williams

(1991) argues that the concept of "color
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blindness"

(a term used by both liberals and conservatives)

as presently defined

in American

jurisprudence

lacks

the

conceptual tools to deal with the dilemmas caused by racial
discrimination. This literature captures a growing sense that
the nation's forty-year experiment with desegregation has
failed, and the time is ripe to reassess some of its basic
assumptions.
The one book that comes closest to what my dissertation
proposes to do is J. Harvie Wilkinson's From Brown to Bakke:
The Supreme Court and School Integration (1954-1978'I (1979) .
Wilkinson's work, written on the twenty-fifth anniversary of
Brown. is a thoughtful
decision,
movement

examination of

the tenets

of

the

as well as its implications on the civil rights
which

followed.

Wilkinson

clearly

raises

basic

questions about the Court's holding in Brown and shows that
the Court's failure to explain why separate is inherently
unequal provides the precursor for future problems in trying
to implement the ruling.
However, Wilkinson is more interested in how Brown set
the table for the problems associated with its implementation
in the public school context as well as other issues coming
out of the civil rights movement - specifically, affirmative
action. My dissertation will focus on how the principles set
forth in Brown laid the foundation for subsequent battles to
desegregate higher education. Moreover, when penned, Wilkin
son writes,

"now is yet too soon to render an accounting of
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all the achievements of the modern Civil Rights Movement.
.

(1979:6).

.

Seventeen years later, we can afford to be

more retrospective about the successes and failures of Brown.
its impact on the civil rights movement,

and the current

debate about race in America.
Lastly, what the literature cited above does not attempt
to do is to link Brown to the basic tenets of the Enlighten
ment itself - democracy,
reason

and/or

critical

role

facilitating

science

the belief in the power of human

to

solve

of education
economic

and

social

problems,

and

in a democracy as well
social

mobility.

Much

as
of

the
in
the

literature on desegregation assumes Brown. thereby leaving it
in somewhat of an historical vaccum. Thus, the struggle of
black Americans to obtain equal educational opportunities is
not seen as part of the larger "liberal tradition" of America
that Hartz describes.

What my dissertation argues

core American political values
son's

bold

statement:

(particularly Thomas Jeffer

"We hold

these

truths

evident that all men are created equal.
reference point
inclusion

in

for the struggles

general

and

is that

for

to be

self-

. .") provided the

of black Americans

school

desegregation

for
in

particular.
Scope and Methodology
The heart of this dissertation will employ a case study
approach of the Fordice decision in Mississippi. The Fordice
case

represents

the

Supreme

Court's

first

full
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regarding the question of the remedial measures states must
enact in order to eliminate the vestiges of a former de jure
system of

segregated higher education.

Theoretically,

the

Mississippi case is also illustrative for two other reasons.
First of all, of the former Confederate states, Mississippi's
history of race relations has had a unique viciousness; this
history still remains a "black eye" on the state's national
reputation

(Williams,

1987).

Thus,

the

struggle

of

black

Mississippians for equal educational opportunities occurs in
a particularly hostile environment.

Secondly, unlike other

states involved in similar legal battles, Mississippi did not
agree to any consent decrees, nor did it make any systematic
efforts to enhance historically black colleges or require
targets

for the hiring of minority

faculty and staff.

In

fact, the state stubbornly refused to enact "race-conscious"
policies; instead, it based its defense on the fact that its
admissions and hiring policies were no longer discriminatory.
Thus, Mississippi is a classic case study in whether facially
neutral policies are sufficient to end racial discrimination
in higher education.
This dissertation will draw on historical evidence, the
political science literature on American political culture,
legal scholarship, and constitutional law precedents to put
the Fordice case in context. In the opening chapter,
rely heavily
paint

a

on Tocqueville,

portrait

of

Hartz,

American

Myrdal

political

I will

and others

to

culture

and
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institutions. Secondly, I will survey the writings of several
prominent

black

political

leaders,

with

the

eye

toward

locating their political ideas within the American political
tradition.

Chapter

Two

traces

the

NAACP's

twenty-year

campaign to overturn Plessv which culminated in Brown. This
chapter includes a survey of the debates which ensued among
legal academics following the Brown decision. This literature
will be particularly helpful in pointing out the premises of
Brown

as

well

as

the

hints

for

future

difficulty

in

clarifying what the decision actually required states to do.
Chapter Three explores significant public

school desegre

gation cases since Brown as well- as discuss how courts have
attempted to apply those principles to the higher education
context.
Chapter Four discusses the historical

development of

higher education in Mississippi to document the creation of
a dual system for blacks and whites. Then, I will turn to the
genesis of the lawsuit itself and the circumstances which
motivated the black plaintiffs to act in the first place. I
will follow the journey of the Mississippi litigation
through

the

Court,

decision in Fordice.

concluding

with

the

Supreme

Court's

I plan to use legal briefs and other

court documents in order to understand the specific legal
arguments made by the parties involved in the litigation.
Finally,

the

chapter

concludes

with

a discussion

of

the

Supreme Court's decision in Fordice and its potential rami
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fications for state-supported black colleges and universi
ties. The plethora of law review articles that were written
following the Fordice ruling shall form an instrumental part
of the analysis and the conclusions on the significance of
this case.
Chapter

Five

attempts

to

demonstrate

how

the

basic

tenets of American political culture inform the debate about
race in general and effect the strategies used by blacks to
pursue equality in particular.
Expectations
I expect to find that the goals and aspirations of the
black plaintiffs who initiated this litigation were very much
in line with one of the most basic ideals of the American
Creed

-

that

of

equality.

I

would

expect

the

original

plaintiffs to have defined equality as meaning obligating the
state

of

Mississippi

opportunities

to

to

black

provide

the

Mississippians

same
as

educational

it

had

always

provided for whites. However, they would interpret Brown as
requiring the state to enhance black colleges to remedy the
effects of past underfunding. Moreover, they would not see
this position as inconsistent with the spirit of Brown.
I also expect there to be a divergence between this
particular

view

of

equality

and

the

interests

of

black

colleges in Mississippi to continue to exist. I particularly
expect

the

educational

United
equality

States

Justice

differently

Department

than

black

to

define

educators
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Mississippi.

I anticipate that United States would be more

interested in racial balance in state universities than in
preserving and strengthening the role of historically black
universities in the state. I also expect the state of Missis
sippi to not challenge the moral and constitutional legiti
macy

of Brown: instead,

the

state would

interpret

it

as

requiring only "colorblind" policies - meaning that measures
to significantly enhance black universities for past state
misconduct are not only unnecessary,

they are unconstitu

tional.
It is expected that the trek from Brown to Fordice will
prove

to

be

a

classic

case

study

in

the

limitations

of

American political culture and institutions to cope with the
problems

associated

consistent

with

documented

the

(Tocqueville
Fiorina,

the

with

race.

work

limitations

[1835]:1988;

of

Such
other

of

a

finding
scholars

American

Huntington,

1968;

would
who

be

have

individualism
Bellah,

1988; McCullough, 1991)).
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CHAPTER 1. THE AMERICAN CREED AND BLACK PROTEST
The American Political Consensus
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
(Declaration of Independence: 1776)
Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal noted that America
"has the most explicitly expressed system of general ideals
in reference to human interrelations" of any other country in
the Western world (1944, 3). Indeed, Thomas Jefferson's words
rank among the most familiar lines penned in the history of
the modern world. The values expressed in the Declaration of
Independence
"American

succinctly

Creed."

ideals of liberty,
all,

forges

a

This

represent
Creed,

justice,

common

what

embodied

equality,

national

Myrdal
in

the

calls

the

political

and opportunity for

identity

out

of

a

vastly

heteorogenous citizenry.
Despite the fact that the United States is a nation of
unbelievable heterogeneity and diversity of cultures,

many

scholars have observed a common political culture in America
(Tocqueville,

[1835]:1988;

Myrdal,

1944;

Hartz,

1955;

Rossiter, 1962; Hoftstadter, 1971; Devine, 1972; Merriman and
Parent, 1983; McCloskey and Zaller, 1984; Parent, 1985). This
unity is remarkable when contrasted with political alter
natives such as fascism and communism which, despite inten
tional, government-sponsored attempts to impose ideological
consensus, have yielded far less impressive results. All of
18
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America's institutions,

ranging from the

Supreme Court to

mass media to churches and schools expound upon the basic
value premises

of

"the American way

of

life."

As

Myrdal

writes:
These ideals of the essential dignity of the
individual human being, of the fundamental equality of
all men, and of certain inalienable rights to freedom,
justice, and a fair opportunity represent to the
American people the essential meaning of the nation's
early struggle for independence. In the clarity and
intellectual boldness of the Enlightenment period these
tenets
were
written
into
the
Declaration
of
Independence, the Preamble of the Constitution, the Bill
of Rights and into the constitutions of the several
states. The ideals of the American Creed have thus
become the highest law of the land. The Supreme Court
pays its reverence to these general principles when it
declares what is constitutional and what is not. They
have been elaborated upon by all national leaders,
thinkers, and statesmen. America has had, throughout its
history, a continuous discussion of the principles and
implications of democracy, a discussion which, in every
epoch, measured by any standard, remained high, not only
quantitatively but also qualitatively. The flow of
learned treatises and popular tracts on the subject have
not ebbed, nor is it likely to do so. In all wars,
including the present one [World War II], the American
Creed has been the ideological foundation of national
morale (1944, 4-5).
This does not mean that the United States has been free
of ideological disagreement. In fact, different conceptions
of

the practical

implications

of

the American

Creed

for

public policy lie at the heart of ideological disputes in
American politics

(Myrdal,

1944;

Hartz,

1955;

Huntington,

1968; Peterson, 1976; McCloskey and Zaller, 1984; McCollough,
1991).

This

chapter

concentrates

on perhaps

the greatest

evidence for the unifying force of the American Creed: the
fact that African Americans, despite their unique history of
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racial oppression and prejudice in America, have historically
adhered to the principles endorsed by the national ethos. The
same Thomas Jefferson who boldly declared the fundamental
equality of all men openly questioned whether blacks were the
moral and intellectual equals of whites;

his trepidations

implied that blacks could be justly excluded from the Lockian
dispensation without

violating

the nation7s basic

creed.

Nevertheless, blacks have often coopted the American values
of liberty and equality to advance political agendas aimed at
securing political,
felt

were

unjustly

social,
denied

and economic rights that they
them.

Consequently,

African

Americans partake in the national religion of Locke, but for
different reasons.
The fact that blacks and whites share the same social
ideals but for different reasons serves as the fountainhead
for political conflict and cultural misunderstandings between
the two groups.

Higher education desegregation provides an

excellent case study of this "clash of cultures" because of
the

existence

of

state-supported

historically

black

universities. Beyond the issue of whether these institutions
can be constitutionally permitted to exist without violating
the

imperative

of

Brown

is

a

deeper

question:

can

the

apparent contradiction between the ideal of a "color-blind
society" and "race-conscious" politics be reconciled under
the umbrella of Lockian individualism?
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The historical roots for America's political consensus
are not hard to find.

"The storybook truth," writes Louis

Hartz, is "that America was settled by men who fled from the
feudal and clerical oppressions of the Old World" (1955, 3) .
In a nutshell,

Louis Hartz persuasively argues

that what

distinguishes America from Europe is that it lacked a true
feudal and aristocratic past based on notions of rigid class
distinctions among men. For Hartz, the key to understanding
what America is lies with understanding what America never
had to he. Unlike Europe, the colonists did not find a deeply
entrenched

landed

aristocracy

and

a

large

"under the thumb" of a ruling class. Instead,
where

land was plentiful and seemingly

peasant

class

in a country

"for the taking,"

America seemed to be the practical fulfillment of the "state
of nature" as conceptualized by Hobbes and Locke.
The American Revolution for Hartz was more a "mopping
up" campaign to destroy "Old World relics" than it is the
creation of an entirely new social order on the ruins of an
older one. To the extent that many of its early settlers saw
America as a safe haven from Europe's vices, the revolution
had already occurred, as John Adams put it, "in the hearts of
men,"

long

(Peterson,

before
1976).

the

first shots

Hartz

observes

were

that

fired at

only

Concord

in eighteenth

century America could Jefferson proclaim the "self-evident
truths" of the fundamental equality of all men and get away
with it; in contrast, European liberals faced the dilemma "of
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explaining how principles could be 'self-evident7 when there
were

obviously

so many people who

did

not

believe

them"

(1955, 58) . Thus, Americans have the luxury of living in a
democratic society "without having to endure a democratic
revolution"

(Tocqueville,

Similarly,

[1835]:1988).

McCloskey and Zaller argue that capitalism

and democracy provide the foundation for what they call the
"American ethos" because both evolved "side by side as part
of a common protest against the petty tyrannies of Old World
monarchism,
(1984,

2).

mercantilism,
Indeed,

both

and

the

remnants

traditions

share

of

feudalism"

common beliefs,

chiefly "a commitment to freedom and individualism,
government,

equality

before

the

law,

and

limited

rational

-

as

opposed to feudal or merely traditional - modes of decision
making" (Ibid, 2-3). Democracy assumes that all citizens have
equal worth and thus have a right to

share

in their

own

governance, either by holding office themselves or by elec
ting others to rule them. It also aims to protect citizens
from arbitrary use of state power and obligates rulers to
observe "due process" of law. All citizens - the rulers and
the ruled - are equal before the law, and specific liberties,
such as freedom of speech, religion, press, assembly, and the
right to petition the government are essential to ensuring
the accountability of the rulers to the ruled (Tocqueville,
[1835]:

1988; Myrdal,

1944; Hartz,

1955; Huntington,

McCloskey and Zaller, 1984; McCullouch, 1991).
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The values of the capitalist creed are equally familiar
to Americans: they include private ownership of the means of
production, profit-seeking by self-interested entrepreneurs,
and the right to unlimited wealth through economic effort
(McCloskey and Zaller,

1984, 2). In its purest form, capi

talism emphasizes competition among different manufacturers,
a minimum

degree

of

government

faire") , market determination
distribution

of

goods.

This

regulation

(or

"laissez-

of both the production
encourages

what

and

Tocqueville

(1988, 506) calls "individualism" by attaching wealth to the
efforts
class

of

individuals,

origin.

Certain

as opposed to
values

derived

family heritage
from

the

or

so-called

"Protestant work ethic," which places a premium on achieve
ment

and

intregal

hard

work,

component

are

of

the

also

thought

to

capitalist creed

constitute
(Weber,

Bell, 1976; McCloskey and Zaller, 1984; McCullough,
The

philosophical

legacy

of

Locke

coupled

an

1976;

1991).

with

the

material abundance of the American continent breathed life
into the "Horatio Alger myth," the idea that any American of
humble

beginnings

could

become

materially

wealthy

and

socially prominent provided he worked hard enough. It is the
interplay

between

the

specifics

development and the politics
calls

the

America's

"liberal
basic

America's

historical

it gives rise to that Hartz

tradition."

liberal

of

Furthermore,

consensus,

socialism

because
has

of

never

enjoyed a strong following in the United States. Part of the

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

24

appeal of Marxism relies on the sense in which an ancient
social contract has been violated - namely,

the peasants'

rights to "common use" of the land (Greene, 1971; Piven and
Cloward,

1982).

However,

in a land where even the poorest

American could realistically dream of becoming a capitalist,
where Jefferson's ideal for democracy is "a nation of small
farmers," where is the attraction in socialism? What is more,
America's Lockian mentality has remained rather resilient in
spite of macroeconomic changes. As Hartz observes:
And even when factory industrialism gained sway after
the Civil War, and the old artisan and cottage-and-mill
mentality was definitely gone, it was still a Lockian
idea fortified by material resources which inspired the
triumph of the job mentality of Gompers rather than the
class mentality of the European worker. The "petitbourgeois" giant of America, though ultimately a triumph
for the liberal idea, could hardly have chosen a better
material setting in which to flourish (1955, 18).
This reality has tended to shape the character of
social

protest

movements

by

the

poor

in

America;

thus,

America produces a Daniel Shays instead of a Karl Marx, or
the

Populist

socialism
Shays'

or

Party

of

the

Bolshevikism

followers

were

1890's

(Hartz,

petty

rather
1955;

capitalist

than

European

Rossiter,
farmers

1962) .

enduring

economic hard times rather than proletarian radicals bent on
revolutionary change.

Similarly,

Rossiter argues that the

populist insurgencies of the 1890's, despite the fear they
inspired

among

Eastern

business

interests,

were

actually

"latter-day Jeffersonians without Jefferson to lead them"
(1962, 90). Never, he argues, did the Grangers,

Populists,
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Greenbackers, or
legitimacy

of

Silver

Democrats

capitalist

economic

directly

challenge

arrangements;

the

instead,

these groups represented small agrarian capitalists who were
being marginalized

by the

industrial capitalism.

encroachment

of

post-Civil

War

In fact, socialism is so thoroughly

"un-American" that it has frequently been used in American
history

by

powerful

interests

to

delegitimize

movements

deemed to pose a threat to the status quo. Even in 1932, the
darkest days of the Great Depression, American voters gave 38
million

votes

to

the

Democrats

and

the

Republicans;

by

comparison, the Socialists garnered less than 1 million and
exactly 102,991 votes went to the Communists (Rossiter, 1962,
92) .
The American attachment to capitalism is so profound
that

political

liberals,

while

they

tend

to

favor

more

government involvement and regulation of business activity,
will

rarely

propose

remedies

fundamentally

capitalist economic arrangements. Rather,

at

odds

with

liberals maintain

that the government's role in the economy is to create "a
more level playing field" in order to allow more individuals
to compete in the marketplace.
At the same time,
biases
observed

against
that

the American Creed embodies strong

undemocratic

democracy

institutions.

teaches

men to

love

Tocqueville
equality

of

condition and to consider it the normal state of affairs.
Therefore,

"amid

general

uniformity,

the

slightest
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dissimilarity
formity,

seems

shocking,

the more unbearable

and the completer the uni
it seems"

(1988,

American political mind," Rossiter writes,
think

in terms

of

class,

order,

673).

"The

"has refused to

aristocracy,

expertise."

Every man is presumed to be the equal, or potential equal, of
all other men.

The egalitarian dimension

of

the American

Creed houses the fuel for social and political movements that
challenge the status quo.
For this reason, the property restrictions on voting and
holding office
despite

the

were

swept

opposition

aside

of

by Jacksonian

old-time

democracy,

luminaries

from

the

Revolutionary era (notably, John Adams, James Madison, James
Monroe,

and

John

Randolph). As

will

be

discussed

later,

democratic traditions launched the common school movement in
direct

opposition

constituted

the

to

the

established

sovereign

promise

bias

of

a

that

education

leisure

class.

Egalitarian impulses provided much of the motive force of the
drive to

abolish slavery;

during the Progressive

era,

it

inspired the political reforms such as the initiative and
split-ticket voting to counteract abuses

in the political

system. Thus, while political conservatives in America have
from time to time feared "too much democracy,"

they have

nonetheless endorsed most of the principles of the democratic
tradition.
The
McCloskey

turbulent
and

politics

Zaller,

of

provide

the

1960's,

further

according

evidence
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presence of a basic American political consensus.

Various

kinds of social and political movements during this period
challenged

traditional

American

political

practices

and

attitudes. The extent to which these movements made lasting
change,

however,

turned on whether their

supported by - or harmonized with

causes could be

- traditional American

values. With regard to the efforts of activists to change the
status quo during that period, McCloskey and Zaller observe
the following:
Their demands for the popular control of
large corporations, for example, made little head
way in the face of traditional American attachment
to capitalism. Their unruly modes of protest mass confrontation, urban guerrilla tactics, and
occasional violence - were often counterproductive
in a society accustomed to the democratic princi
ples of free elections, peaceful debate, and
orderly opposition. To the extent, however, that
the causes championed by the protesters of the
1960s and 1970s were consonant with the values of
the ethos, they helped bring about important
changes. One can argue, in fact, that some of the
"new issues" of the 1960s represented, in reality,
efforts to extend certain values of the tradi
tional ethos to new groups in new contexts. These
issues included a concern for greater equality
(women's rights and racial discrimination), poli
tical dissent
(protests against the nation's
participation in w a r) , personal freedom (abortion
and homosexual rights), and opposition to tradi
tional forms of social control (the countercul
ture) . Long after the atmosphere of confrontation
had dissipated and the era of militancy had subsi
ded, concern for these issues - a concern anchored
in the values of the ethos - remained strong (1984,
5) .
Thus, the Lockian settlement places powerful constraints
on the nature of political discourse in America by granting
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legitimacy to some issues and/or groups while delegitimizing
others. When ideological conflicts do arise in America, they
nevertheless
essentials:

reflect

a

society

in

agreement

on

(1) the belief in the right to property,

the

(2) the

philosophy of economic individualism and the acceptance of
the

economic

virtues

qualities of man,

of

(3)

capitalist

culture

as

necessary

the political equality of all men,

often operationalized as the "one man, one vote" principle,
and

(4)

(freedom

the necessity of ensuring basic political
of

petition,

speech,

right

legitimacy

of

to

religion,
a

fair

resolving

the

press,

trial,
political

etc.),

the

rights

right

and

(5)

disputes

to
the

through

competitive, democratic institutions (Hartz, 1955; Rossiter,
1962; Hofstadter,
and

Zaller,

1984;

1972; Piven and Cloward,
McCullough,

1991).

1971; McCloskey

Instead,

political

questions turn on concrete differences in approach, policy,
and strategies of implementation.
Merriman and Parent (1983) maintain that the American
nexus of democratic and capitalist values produces a "market
mentality" and go on to describe how the national ideology
concretely manifests itself:
The market view sees society as an arena in which
individual competitors vie for things they want.
The things individuals want vary greatly, potenti
ally ranging through the whole range of human
tastes and preferences. The characteristic common
to all these desires and aspirations is the
expectation that a that a proper mixture of skills
and effort will, in a properly functioning market,
lead to their fulfillment. The market does not
guarantee that the individual will get what he or
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she wants, but rather that the individual will
get, and hold, what he or she can earn, given the
talents and energy each possesses and employs. The
expectation that the social marketplace will func
tion predictably and fairly sustains, as nothing
else can, the competitiveness that is so much a
facet of American life (33-34).
By glorifying
only

allows

individual effort,
the

individual

to

the market mentality not
take

pride

in

one's

own

successes, but it provides a ready explanation for failure.
Those who fail in what Hartz calls the "Lockian race" (1955,
219) are assumed to be at fault, due to personal deficiencies
within themselves.
1955,

224) .

This

The result of failure is guilt
legacy

of

the

liberal

(Hartz,

tradition

is

particularly relevant to the question of how scholars and
ordinary citizens explain the continuing unequal economic and
social status of blacks in America.
This dissertation concerns itself with one of the most
powerful deductions

from the Lockian

faith in the centrality of education.

settlement:
This

American

abiding faith

consists of two major dimensions which are noteworthy:
(1)

democratic

capitalism requires

education

in order to

foster the values of citizenship consistent with self-govern
ment,

and

(2)

education

plays

an

indispensable

role

in

equipping citizens with the life skills essential for success
in a market economy. Chief Justice Earl Warren, author of the
Supreme

Court's

opinion

in Brown

v.

Board

of

Education,

articulates this view:
Today, education is perhaps the most important fun
ction of state and local governments. Compulsory school
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attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society. It is required in
the performance of our most basic responsibilities, even
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation
of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument
in awakening a child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportu
nity of an education [italics added]. Such an oppor
tunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it,
is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms.
(347 U.S. 483, 494)
Not only do Warren's words point to the centrality of
education in American life, they also illustrate one critical
reality: with respect to African Americans, the values of the
American Creed have historically not been extended
equal

basis.

Alexis

de

Tocqueville

considered

on an

American

slavery to be the most obvious contradiction of the nation's
concept of liberty and the "most formidable evil threatening
the future of the United States"

(1988,

340). Writing more

than a century later in the context of Jim Crow segregation
in the South and less visible, but very real racial discrim
ination in the North, Myrdal
conclusion.

The

essentially

a

American

ideals

"American

(1944) comes to a similar
dilemma,"

moral

one;

it

of

liberty,

is

a

justice,

as

he

conflict

sees

it,

between

equality,

and

is
the

equal

opportunity for all and its actual treatment of blacks. The
nation's failure to adhere to its principles with respect to
the

treatment

of

African

Americans

has

often

produced

feelings of guilt among white Americans as well as active
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efforts to change practices deemed inconsistent with American
values

(Myrdal,

1944; McCloskey and Zaller,

1984;

Hacker,

1992) .
Not only do these feelings of guilt make whites more
susceptible to appeals for reform than they otherwise might
be, but the the American Creed rationalizes the tradition of
black protest. In fact, there is perhaps no greater testament
to the power of the American Creed than the fact that African
American political discourse has been profoundly shaped by
it. No other group, with the possible exception of native
Americans,

would

be

more

likely

to

reject

outright

the

national synthesis of democratic and capitalist values that
embodies the heart of the American ethos. African Americans
could easily point to the complicity of Lockian individualism
in the defense of slavery, racism, and economic inequality
(Oakes, 1992) . Thus, African Americans theoretically have the
greatest interest in a revolutionary critique on the order of
Marx's critique of European capitalism and in constructing a
social alternative to democratic capitalism.
Yet, with rare exceptions, black political thought fits
squarely within the liberal tradition. This is true despite
the often bitter denunciations of the nation's treatment of
African Americans by black leaders.

Foner

(1984)

contends

that nineteenth-century black political thought, and indeed,
modern black political thought and activism are rooted in
"the

republican

traditions

of

the

eighteenth

century,
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particularly as expressed in the Declaration of Independence
and

the

Constitution"

(60).

Greenstone

(1993)

locates

Frederick Douglass within the same liberal reform tradition
as John Adams and Daniel Webster.
This interpretation, of course, does not enjoy universal
acceptance.

Dawson

(1995)

vehemently

disagrees

with

this

conclusion, suggesting that efforts to locate black political
thought within the broad stream of American liberalism are
simplistic, at best, and, at worst,
Americans.

self-serving by white

He emphasizes the historical examples of black

nationalism and black Marxism as well as specific cultural
differences between blacks and whites to make the point that
African

American

assimilated
ideas.

within

political

discourse

America's

"melting

pot"

not
of

easily

political

Specific attention will be drawn to his case

later section of this chapter.
deny

is

the

existence

of

in a

This dissertation does not

significant

differences

in

the

historical experiences and political culture of black and
white Americans; in fact, it will be argued that these very
differences lie at the heart of the racial chasm in American
politics.

However,

as

I will

show,

the

evidence

for the

conclusion that African Americans have enlisted the American
Creed

in their

pursuit of the goal of

full

inclusion

in

American society is simply too overwhelming to be denied.
Moreover,

I

will

further

demonstrate

that

even

black

nationalism, deemed by Dawson to support the view that black
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political

thought

defies

the

boundaries

of

the

liberal

tradition, in fact owes a significant debt to Lockianism.
With respect to education,

its political significance

has always been readily apparent to black Americans because
of their peculiar history of racial discrimination in the
United

States.

To

a

people

enduring

the

humiliation

of

slavery and racial segregation, education symbolized a "door
to freedom." To the slave masters, on the other hand, their
security rested with keeping the slaves

in ignorance.

As

slavery gave

segregation,

the

way to

a system of racial

denial of equal educational opportunities to the newly freed
slaves and their descendants

formed the bedrock of white

racial hegemony. Thus, education becomes politicized in black
America in a way that distinguishes it profoundly from the
dominant

culture.

It

is

intimately

intertwined

with

the

history of black protest. Black Americans view education as
essential to their hope of full realization of the ideals
enshrined in the American Creed.
In summary,

many

scholars

agree that there

exists a

definite American Creed that unites Americans across class,
regional, religious,

ethnic,

and racial lines.

It provides

the United States with a sense of national mission and is the
rallying cry for all wars. This dissertation argues that the
fact that black political discourse has been largely informed
by the values of the liberal tradition supplies compelling
evidence

for

the

power

of

the

American

Creed.
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Americans, from the times of the American Revolution to the
present day, have repeatedly appealed to liberal values in
their efforts to realize their "Lockian birthrights." The
next

section discusses

rically

applied

how African Americans

individualism

in their

have histo

political

protest

movements and how it leads to political conflict and cultural
misunderstandings with whites. The third section focuses the
historical roots of America's deep faith in public education
as well as the critical role education has played in African
American protest movements.

The fact that both white and

black Americans have a deep faith in the power of education
provides a compelling case study of how both groups embrace
identical social ideals but for different historical reasons.
Finally, this chapter closes by addressing the counterargu
ments

to

remained

the

thesis

largely

that

confined

black
to

the

political
borders

discourse
of

the

has

liberal

tradition.
Black Political Protest within the Liberal Tradition
Berlin

(1975) points out that the implications of the

American Revolution were readily apparent to blacks, who were
then referred to as Negroes. By the time of the Revolution,
blacks had been living in America for over 150 years. This
fact enabled them to seize an historic opportunity to appro
priate

the

language

of

Lockian

individualism

in order to

obtain their own freedom. As Berlin explains:
By the end of the eighteenth century, the trans
formation of Africans to Afro-Americans was largely
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complete. Just as the colonial debate with Britain
pushed ideas of natural rights and universal liberty to
the fore, a century of cultural change enabled blacks
to listen in on that debate and turn it to their advan
tage. If transplanted Englishmen were prepared to assert
their independence, transplanted Africans were ready to
take their liberty (1975, 10, 11).
Thus,

the

spirit

of

independence which

inspired the

colonists in the 1770's to seriously contemplate dissolving
their union with Great Britain emboldened blacks to challenge
slavery. In 1773, four free Negroes petitioned the Massachu
setts

colonial

legislature to

abolish

slavery within the

colony (Aptheker, 1951). It is worth noting that their words
echoed the

identical

Lockian rhetoric

that

the

colonists

themselves employed to justify their grievances with King
George III

and the British Parliament.

They spoke of the

"divine spirit of freedom,” reflecting the idea that freedom,
not

inherent

class

or race

distinctions,

represented the

natural condition of men and the divine will

of God.

The

petitioners showed not only that they understood the nature
of

the

colonists'

struggle

with

the

British

government;

moreover, the petitioners argue that the same natural rights
which

forbade

Negroes

to

challenged

"taxation

live
the

as

without

free

legislature

men.
to

representation"
The

petition,

be politically

entitled

in

effect,

and morally

consistent.
This

pattern

repeats

itself

over

and

over

again

throughout the Revolutionary period. When the British Crown
placed Massachusetts under martial law in retaliation for the
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famous "Boston Tea Party," Negroes seized the opportunity to
petition

the military

declared that

government

they "have

for their

freedom.

They

in common with all other men a

naturel right to [their] freedoms without Being depriv'd of
them"

(Grant,

climate

1968,

motivated

(Berlin,

1975).

30) . For other blacks,

their
Once

attempts

to

the political

escape

hostilities

from

commenced,

bondage
manpower

shortages forced both sides to rely on black soilders by
promising them freedom in exchange for service. Though the
Revolution itself did not uproot the institution of slavery,
a significant number of blacks gained their freedom as a
result

of

the

war

(Quarles,

1961;

1986;

1975;

1984).

After

Franklin and Moss,

1987;

hostilities ceased,

blacks continued to capitalize on the

political

climate

to

Johnson and Roark,

Berlin,

petition

against

slavery,

initiate

freedom suits, protest racially discriminatory laws,
take their

freedom by running away

(Grant,

1968;

or to

Berlin,

1975).
Without question, Frederick Douglass stands out as the
best nineteenth century example of a black political leader
who consistently invoked the liberal tradition to promote the
goal

of

Douglass

racial

equality.

vehemently

principally

proposed

Throughout

opposed

his

colonization

transporting

blacks

public

career,

schemes
back

to

that
Africa

(though sometimes other places were suggested) , as a solution
to the race problem. All such proposals, he argued, premised
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themselves on the notion that blacks and whites could not
possibly live together in a racial democracy. For Douglass,
it mattered not whether such efforts were supported by blacks
or by whites. Rather, Douglass boldly declared that not only
could the Negro be peaceably assimilated into the American
body politic, but the very moral integrity of the republic
rested on the Negro's full incorporation into the mainstream
of American life:
I shall advocate for the Negro, his most full and
complete adoption into the great national family of
America. I shall demand for him the most perfect civil
and political equality, and that he shall enjoy all the
rights, privileges, and immunities enjoyed by any other
members of the body politic. I weigh my words and I
mean all I say, when I contend as I do contend, that
this is the only solid, and final solution of the pro
blem before us. It is demanded not less by the terrible
exigencies of the nation, than by the Negro himself for
the Negro and the nation are to rise or fall, be killed
or cured, saved or lost together. Save the Negro and
you save the nation, destroy the Negro and you destroy
the nation, and to save both you must have one great
law of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity for all Ameri
cans without respect to color (Douglass, 1966, 7).
One century later, Martin Luther King echoed these same
sentiments.

In King's famous

"I Have a Dream"

speech,

he

begins by invoking patriotic authority - the Declaration of
Independence,
Proclamation.

the Gettsyburg Address,
However,

"the

and the Emancipation

architects

of

our

republic"

offered a "promissory note" that pledged liberty.

But for

blacks, that note had proved to be "a bad check," one "marked
insufficient funds"

(King, 1986,

217) . His dream of racial

equality, King continues, did not fundamentally depart from
America's Holy Writ:
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. . . . It is a dream deeply rooted
dream that one day this nation will
out the true meaning of its creed truths to be self-evident, that all
equal (Ibid, 219).

in the American
rise up and live
we hold these
men are created

Thus, King marshalls the core principles of the repu
blic in service to the cause of black equality. Moreover, by
mixing Biblical prophecies with patriotic references, King's
speech affirmed America's natural law tradition in a dual
sense - by placing the nation's secular laws under the scru
tiny of divine law and appealing to America's historic sense
of mission and Divine Providence (Myrdal, 1944; Hartz, 1955;
Peterson, 1976; Sandoz, 1990; Miller, 1992) . Finally, King's
dream that his children would one day be
character

and

not

their

skin

color

judged by their

affirmed

the

Lockian

birthright to equality of opportunity rather than equality of
outcome.

He seemed to be saying that black Americans were

only asking for the right to fairly compete in the Lockian
race like every other American.
As a result of the civil rights struggles of the 1950's
and

1960's,

new

legislation

sought

to

eliminate

legal

barriers to blacks participating freely in the marketplace.
With the legal barriers gone,
indivi-dualism,
(1985)

black failure,

according to

is the fault of blacks themselves.

Parent

found that the market mentality produces a tendency

within a significant segment of the black community to blame
themselves

for their unequal

status

in American

society.

Roughly the same proportion of blacks and whites believed
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that black inequality could be attributed to less in-born
ability in blacks to learn: slightly more blacks (23.3%) than
whites (21.0%) agreed with the statement. Forty-six percent
of blacks attribute lack of will or motivation as the cause
of black problems, whereas 59 percent of white respondents
agreed with that statement. Slightly more than half of black
respondents (54.2%) believe that if blacks would try harder,
they could be just as well off as whites; roughly the same
number

of

blacks

(53.7%)

maintain

that

many

of

blacks'

problems are brought on by blacks themselves. Finally, 22.6%
of blacks think that blacks would rather accept welfare than
work for a living (Parent, 1985,- 7-8) .
These conclusions have been corroborated by Sigleman and
Welch (1991) who found that 24% of blacks think that African
Americans have less in-born ability than whites and 44% of
blacks think that blacks lack sufficient will and motivation
to pull themselves out of poverty. Barker and Jones

(1994)

cite a Joint Center of Political Studies-Gallup Poll which
reports

that

80% of blacks believe that well-off African

Americans do not do enough to help other blacks get ahead
(44). Taken together,

these findings seem to indicate that

key aspects of the liberal tradition - namely the tendency to
attach

responsibility

for

success

or

failure
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primarily to

the efforts of individuals - inform African

American political attitudes.3
To say that the American Creed informs African-American
political attitudes and strategies is not the same as saying
that blacks and whites see the same reality. Parent (1985)
shows that whites are more

likely to interpret the black

situation in terms of individualistic thinking than blacks.
Sixty-nine percent of whites believe blacks could be just as
well off as whites if they worked harder; even more whites
(78.1%)

believe that though racial discrimination has held

down blacks, many of the problems faced by blacks are brought
on by blacks themselves; finally, 34.1% of whites maintain
that blacks would rather receive welfare than work for a
living. Sigleman and Welch (1991) found that 69 percent of
blacks explained racial
discrimination;

inequality results primarily

from

the comparable figure among whites was 46

percent. Even more revealing, seventy-five percent of black
respondents maintained that whites do not want them to get
ahead, while only 43 percent of whites held this view. Thus,
3It is not the purpose of this dissertation to deny
either the existence of, or the autonomy of, a separate black
political culture distinct from dominant American norms. In
fact,
this chapter devotes an entire section to the
discussion of black cultural autonomy and to objections to
the thesis that the liberal tradition has deep roots in black
America. It will be argued that not only does an autonomous
black political culture exist, but the failure of the
majority culture to understand this basic fact has grave
social, political, and economic consequences. Nevertheless,
the acknowledgement of black cultural autonomy does not
overturn the profound impact of the American Creed on black
culture.
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though the black population subscribes to key aspects of the
liberal

tradition,

African

Americans

tend

to

interpret

political reality very differently from whites. The autonomy
of black political culture (including some of its nonliberal
traits), as well as the counterargument to the influence of
liberalism

on

black

America,

is

the

subject

of

a

later

section in this chapter.
Not only do blacks and whites interpret reality with
"different pairs of lenses," they often come to radically
different conclusions even when they apply individualistic
thinking.
troubled

While
by

many

the

white

inherent

Americans

conflicts

have

between

been
the

deeply

nation's

commitment to human equality and its treatment of blacks,
others have appealed to the values of liberty to justify the
racial status quo. Appeals to various "states' rights" and
"limited

government"

theories

have

been

used

slavery and to defend Jim Crow segregation

to

justify

(Hartz,

1955;

McGarrick, 1964; Wilkinson, 1979).
Often,

these

rationalizations

were

little

more

than

direct appeals (or thinly-veiled ones) to overt racism. After
the legislative victories of the civil rights movement in the
1960's, political conflicts concerning racial policy revolve
primarily around the question of the best means to achieve
racial
liberal

justice.
allies

Many black civil rights
argue

that

policies

groups

aimed

at

and their
promoting

equality of opportunity solely by outlawing discriminatory
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policies do not address the cumulative effects of centuries
of discrimination against blacks
1967; Wilson,

(Carmichael and Hamilton,

1978; 1987; Merriman and Parent,

1983; Bell,

1987; Brown, 1992; Orfield, 1996). This view of the American
Creed would require the government to not only outlaw racial
discrimination,

but

to

intervene

marketplace to help blacks

proactively

"catch up"

in

wit h whites

the

in the

Lockian race. Opponents of policies such as busing, affirm
ative

action,

minority

set-aside

programs,

and

racial

redistricting contend that race-conscious policies unfairly
violate the rights of white Americans and defeat the laudable
goal of the civil rights struggle to have blacks judged "not
by

the

color

character"

of

their

skin but by the

(Wilkinson,

Steele, 1986; Jones,

1979;

Sowell,

content

1981;

of their

Murray,

1987; Edsall and Edsall,

1984;

1991; Armor,

1995).
In spite of the fact that black civil rights groups and
their

allies

opponents,

routinely

political

question

the

conservatives,

motives

for

the

of

their

most

part,

stubbornly insist that they believe in the goal of racial
justice.

For

conservatives,

any

use

determination of government policy
all,

is

of

race

in

illegitimate;

the
after

Americans should be judged as individuals. Thus,

language

of

individualism,

when

applied

to

the

race-related

policies, not only leads to different policy preferences, but
it serves as a fault line for ideological divides in America
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concerning the role of government (Merriman and Parent, 1983;
Carmines and Stinson, 1989; Edsall and Edsall, 1991).
The fact that the American commitment to Lockian values
often leads to polarizing ideological positions on issues of
race is one of the central

focuses

of this dissertation.

Bellah and associates (1985) illustrate this point when they
report that Americans, steeped in a culture of individualism,
often lack the conceptual tools to deal with genuine social
and

cultural

differences.

Americans

operate

from

the

political assumption of a consensual community of autonomous,
but essentially, similar individuals; but as Bellah writes,
this definition often has little room for those who do not
meet that criteria:
For all the lip service given to respect for cultural
differences, Americans seem to lack the resources to
think about the relationship between groups that are
culturally, socially, or economically quite different.
Writing from the context of a very different culture,
Octavio Paz, the Mexican poet, has pointed out that
hierarchial societies often do better than egalitarian
ones at including culturally different groups in a
common moral order because they accept and give moral
meaning to different levels and degrees of wealth and
power. Some groups are poor and weak, but all are in
cluded in a common social body where the strong and
the rich have special obligations to look out for the
others. Of course, this view has often been used to
rationalize exploitation and oppression. But the radi
cal egalitarianism of an individualist society has its
own problems. For such a society is really constituted
only of autonomous middle-class individuals. Those who
for whatever reason do not meet the criteria for full
membership are left outside in a way unknown in a
hierarchial society. The very existence of groups who
do not meet the criteria for full social participation
is anomalous. There should be no such groups. Their
existence must be someone's fault, either their own
- perhaps their culture is defective and they lack a
"work ethic" or there is something wrong with their
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family system - or someone else's: economic or political
elites perhaps oppress them and prevent their full
participation. Whatever explanation is accepted, it is
difficult to give moral meaning to differences that are
considered fundamentally illegitimate (206-207).
Bellah7s findings do not bode well for black political
movements. African Americans have had a radically different
historical experience than other Americans; therefore,
inability

of

Americans

to

make

moral

sense

out

of

the
real

cultural, social, and economic differences has the effect of
delegitimizing black protest in the first place. Moreover, it
avails powerful ideological firepower to those opposed to
specific policies that blacks may favor. The Protestant work
ethic,

the Horatio Alger myth,

and other cultural symbols

collaborate to buttress the claim that what African Americans
want

is not

"equal rights," but

"special rights,"

a view

succinctly represented by Republican presidential candidate
Pat Buchanan's slogan: "Equal rights for all, special privi
lege for none." Blacks who favor affirmative action,
majority

black

legislative

districts,

or

support

more
the

existence and the enhancement of historically black colleges
are

accused

of

advocating

a double

standard

- that

is,

opponents charge them with preaching a rhetoric of equality
for

all

while

Americans.

fighting

Furthermore,

for

special

rights

for

African

since politics is the "art of the

possible," America's liberal consensus invariably influences
the kinds of policy solutions that can be proposed to solve
problems associated with black inequality and also stand a
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reasonable

chance

of

being enacted

(Merriman and Parent,

1983; McCloskey and Zaller, 1984).
One of the more commonly hailed

solutions to social

problems in America (particularly those which involve race)
is education
Arendt,

(Jefferson,

1958;

Dewey,

1904; Cubberly,

1966; Alexander

1919; Rush, 1947;

and Alexander,

1985;

Reitman, 1992) . Indeed, belief in the transforming power of
education to improve human well-being represents one of the
most powerful deductions from Locke. This legacy is directly
traceable to the cultural imprint of the Enlightenment in
America. For African Americans, access to greater educational
opportunity

(or,

in

many

cases,

education

at

all)

has

historically been at the heart of black protest movements.
The

centrality

of

education

in America

importance for African Americans will

and

its

specific

be discussed in the

next section.
"In School We Trust"
Justice

Felix

Frankfurther,

a

participant

in

the

adjudication of the Brown cases, described the public school
as "the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means
for

promoting

Education,

our

common

333 U.S. 203

destiny"

('McCullom

v.

Board

of

[1948]). Indeed, Brown v. Board of

Education testifies to the deep faith that Americans have in
the

power

of

education.

The great

majority

of Americans

conceptualize education in rather utilitarian terms as if it
were a commodity in the marketplace; education must be useful
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both to the individual and the larger society (Reitman, 1992,
4). Moreover, Americans consider the provision of education
to

be

a

legitimate

government

responsibility.

This

responsibility rests primarily at the state and municipal
levels of government, as opposed to the federal government.
The

popularization

of American

schools

and

colleges

since the end of World War II provide ample evidence for the
centrality of education in American life. In 1950, 34 percent
of the American population twenty-five years of age or older
had completed at least four years of high school while 6 per
cent of that population had completed at least four years of
college. By 1985, 74 percent of Americans twenty-five years
old

or

older

had

completed

at

least

four years

of

high

school, whereas the comparable figures for completion of at
least four years
1989,

of college stood at

1) . Education

is

considered

19 percent

part

of

the

(Cremin,
Lockian

birthright. Many ordinary Americans today expect to obtain a
college

education,

an

expectation which

for

much

of

our

nation's history was beyond the reach of most families.
The focus of this section is twofold: (1) to discuss the
historical basis for the preeminence of education in American
culture, and

(2) to demonstrate how African Americans have

viewed access to education as an indispensable tool in their
battles for full equality.
Government involvement in education has a long history
in America. For example, in 1642 the colonial legislature of

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

47

the Massachusetts

Bay

Colony

passed

a

law

requiring

all

parents to see to the education of their children; five years
later,

the

teacher

legislature

and permitted

required
taxes

for

all

towns

to

appoint

education.

In

1643,

a

the

Virginia assembly passed a resolution granting legislative
encouragement to wealthy benefactors who bequeathed money,
land, or other materials in support of the establishment of
schools (Cremin, 1970, 177-181; Butts, 1960, 34). Never
theless, despite these early efforts, colonial legislatures
generally ignored education. The colonies during the early
years

duplicated

the

class-oriented

English

educational

system in which the idea of a free, universal education for
all made little sense. Only those wealthy enough to afford it
received

an

education,

whereas

poorer

families

either

received no education at all or had to settle for learning
various trades and/or manual skills
Butts,

1960,

34;

Genovese,

1967;

(Cubberley,

Cremin,

1970;

1919,

21;

1980;

K.

Alexander and M.D. Alexander, 1985, 21).
What efforts did exist reflected values inherited from
the mother country.
provided

that

For example,

indigent

parents

the "pauper school
who

declared

laws"

themselves

paupers would have their children sent to specified private
or pay schools for a free education (Cubberley,

1919,

15).

The 1647 law in Massachusetts was promulgated in order to
teach all to read the Scriptures and thus avoid falling prey
to "that old deluder,

Satan"

(Cremin,

1970,

181). This law
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reflected the Protestant belief that any man should at least
be

literate enough to read the Bible for himself

(Butts,

1960, 36). Another vestige of the English system, the "rate
bill," required parents to pay an amount for each child to
supplement inadequate school revenues (K. Alexander and M. D.
Alexander, 1985, 21). The amount assessed was collected from
the

parents through

ordinary tax bills.

This

requirement

remained in place in New York State until 1868

(Cubberley,

1919, 149).
The colonists7 Revolutionary struggle with Great Britain
gave significant legitimacy to the philosophy of education as
essential for the welfare of the state. America's Declaration
of Independence boldly asserted the Enlightenment belief in
the superiority of science and reason as the basis for the
"social contract;" moreover, the philosophy of the Enlighten
ment tended to equate knowledge with human freedom. Education
came to be seen as a primary vehicle for trans- mitting the
values essential for a free,

democratic society and would

serve as the "first line of defense" against the threat of
tyrannical government

(Butts, 1960; Cremin,

1970; 1980; K.

Alexander and M. D. Alexander, 1985; Bloom, 1987). Prominent
Americans who held this particular view of education include
James Madison, Benjamin Rush, George Washington, and Thomas
Jefferson
Butts,

(Cubberley,

1960,

Alexander,

37-38;

1919, 57; Jefferson,
Rush,

1947;

K.

1904; 1942, 89;

Alexander

and

1985) .
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However, perhaps no single individual more embodied the
spirit of the public or common school movement than Thomas
Jefferson. He initiated a bill for universal education in the
Virginia

legislature

in

1779.

Though

the

measure

was

defeated, he provided the inspiration for a later generation
of reformers (Jefferson, 1904). Writing to his old professor
George Wythe from Paris in 1786, Jefferson said:
I think by far the most important bill in our whole
code is that for the diffusion of knowledge among the
people. No other sure foundation can be devised for the
preservation of freedom and happiness. . . . Preach, my
dear sir, a crusade against ignorance; establish and
improve the law for educating common people. Let our
countrymen know. . . that the tax which will be paid
for this purpose is not more than the thousandth part
of what will be paid to kings, priests, and nobles
who will rise up among us if we leave the people in
ignorance (1942, 89).
Despite having prominent advocates, the emergence of a
consensus on the role of government in education proceeded
slowly.

The

United

States

Constitution

spelled

out

no

specific role for education; with the exception of the land
grants for schools provided under the Northwest Ordinance of
1787,

the

federal

role

in

education

was

nonexistent

(K.

Alexander and M. D. Alexander, 1985, 55). In fact, a search
of the debates at the Constitutional Convention reveals that
only once was anything related to education discussed;

it

related to whether the new government would be empowered to
establish a national university. While the chair answered in
the

affirmative,

(Cubberley,

1919;

the

issue was

52).

not

Considering

explored
the

any

Founding
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preoccupation with limiting the arbitrary use of power by the
central government and the common belief that education was
a private matter, their failure to authorize a clear role for
the national government in education is not surprising. Thus,
the

battle

for

public,

tax-supported

education

would

be

located at the state level. The lack of a clearly specified
role for the federal government in educational matters gave
rise to a uniquely American concept - the idea of

"local

control" of public schools.
The journey from sporadic early school laws to uniform
state systems of free public education would be an arduous
one, with battles over tax support and sectarianism along the
way.

By 1825,

system of

it had been generally accepted that a state

education would necessitate general

and

direct

taxation of a major source of revenue such as real property
(Ibid, 131). Therefore, in order to achieve their objective,
public school advocates had to overcome a variety of obsta
cles: (1) the long-held belief that education constituted the
sovereign province of only those who could afford it, (2) the
fear that making education available to all would make it
"too common,"

thus

educating people

"out of their proper

position in society," (3) the conviction of many that it was
immoral

to

tax

one

man's

property

for

the

education

of

another man's child or to require those with no children at
all

to be taxed

in order to support public

schools,

(4)

opposition from religious groups who viewed nonsectarian,
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public

schools

as a threat to religious

liberty,

(5)

the

suspicion that the crusade for public schools was merely a
ruse

designed

to unite

Church

and

State,

and

(6)

public

indifference to the benefits of public education (Cubberley,
1919; 1920; K. Alexander and M. D. Alexander, 1985; Cremin,
1989) .
This period saw the rise of an extraordinary group of
leaders

such

as

Horace

Mann

of

Massachusetts

and

Henry

Barnard of Connecticut who championed the cause of public
schools,

which were also referred to as "common schools."

They argued against tuition in any shape or form, maintaining
that a "free school" should no longer mean one where the poor
received a free education whereas all others paid tuition.
The pauper

schools,

they contended,

unjustly

injured the

poor, many of whom chose not to enroll their children at all
because of

the

stigma attached to attending such schools

(Cubberley, 1919, 121; Butts, 1960, 39; K. Alexander and M.
D. Alexander, 1985, 23). Moreover, they argued that free and
general education was a "natural right of all children in a
Republic." They pointed to the influx of European immigration
(which accelerated after 1825) as evidence for the need of an
institutional mechanism to assimilate these new arrivals into
a democratic culture

(Cubberley,

meshed

political

well

with

a

1919,
climate

121). This argument
in

which

property

restrictions that prevented many poor whites from voting and
holding office were tumbling under the weight of "Jacksonian
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democracy"

(Rossiter,

19 62).

Finally,

they insisted that

such schools should be nonsectarian and secular; religious
education in the schools should convey a respect for freedom
of conscience rather than teach the doctrines of a particular
church. Furthermore, they believed it violated the principle
of separation of church and state to compel a man to pay
taxes

to

support

religiously-based

instruction

in public

schools regardless of whether he believed in what was being
taught

or

not

(Butts,

1960,

40;

K.

Alexander

and M.

D.

Alexander, 1985, 139) .
In addition to the alleged efficacy of the common school
in instilling democratic virtues, universal education as an
instrument for the social and economic advancement of the
poorer

classes

advocates

was

attached

encountered

their

central

to

to

Not

it.

most

the value

its

most

surprisingly,

stubborn

ardent

they

resistance

often

from

the

wealthiest members of society who were more interested in
preserving aristocratic privilege. Moreover, with the growth
of cities

and

advocates

of

empowering

the
free

more

industrialization
schools

Americans

that

saw education
to

take

accompanied
as the means

advantage

of

the

it,
of
new

economy (Cubberley, 1919, 101-115). Horace Mann represented
one of the most powerful advocates of education as a tool for
social

uplift

of

the

poor

and

the

leveling

of

class

distinctions. He argued that ignorance lay at the heart of
feudal rule

in Europe,

but the emergence of a capitalist
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economy had created a "more adject condition of servitude"
than the Middle Ages ever had. Education, he continued, could
counteract the tendency toward the concentration of wealth
and power into the hands of the very few. Mann maintained
that

the

depended

continued
on

a

prosperity

general

of

diffusion

a

of

capitalist
knowledge

economy

among

the

masses. "Education, then," Mann declared, "beyond all other
devices

of

human

origins,

is the

great equalizer

of

the

conditions of men" (1849, 59). In his view, education lacked
the power to transform men morally so that they would "abhor
the oppression of their fellow-men;" rather, it provided men
with the necessary means to resist the selfishness of other
men (Ibid, 60).
Curiously, the enemies of common schools also used the
rhetoric of individualistic values in the hope of defeating
the movement. They openly questioned the desirability of the
expansion of education to the masses, and thought democracy
was better protected by an enlightened, leisure class. Some
doubted government's ability to carry out such an endeavor at
all; others felt that taxation for public education amounted
to the confiscation of the property of one class to educate
another, thereby violating individual freedom. Still others
believed that religious liberty was at stake; the specter of
free,

nonsectarian

schools

symbolized,

in

their

eyes,

threat to their right to worship God as they pleased (Ibid,
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121-122). Thus, the rhetoric utilized on both sides of the
public school debate testifies to America's distinct fidelity
to Lockian values.
Cubberley captures vividly the intense and polarizing
character

of

the

political

battle

over

free,

public,

nonsectarian, tax-supported education:
Excepting the battle for the abolition of slavery,
perhaps no question has ever been before the American
people for settlement which caused so much feeling or
aroused such bitter antagonisms.
Old friends and
business associates parted company over the question,
lodges were forced to taboo the subject to avoid
disruption, ministers and their congregations often
quarreled over the question of free schools,
and
politicians avoided the issue. The friends of free
schools were at first commonly regarded as fanatics,
dangerous to the State, and the opponents of free
schools were considered by them as old-time
conservatives or as selfish members of society. . . .
Often those in favor of taxation were bitterly assailed,
and even at times were threatened with personal vio
lence. Henry Barnard, who rendered such useful service
in awakening Connecticut and Rhode Island, between 1837
and 1845, to the need for better schools, tells us that
a member of the Rhode Island legislature told him that
a bill providing a small state tax for the schools,
while he was then advocating, even if passed by the
legislature could not be enforced in Rhode Island at
the point of the bayonet. A Rhode Island farmer threa
tened to shoot him if he ever caught him on his property
advocating "such heresy as the partial confiscation of
one man's property to educate another man's child." A
member of the Indiana legislature, of 1837, declared
that when he died he wanted engraved on his tombstone,
"Here lies an enemy to free schools" (1919, 119, 133).
Gradually, the advocates for free,
all won the day.

common schools for

State legislatures accepted the idea and

began to recognize that they must require local school dis
tricts to tax themselves to provide for public schools rather
than simply encourage it. As a result, state constitutions
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and legislative statutes began to limit local discretion over
the schools; the idea that a degree of centralized planning
to achieve uniformity

in a state system of education was

preferable to completely decentralized local control (Butts,
I960, 39) .
By the time Massachusetts passed the first compulsory
attendance

law

in 1852,

responsibility

for

education was

firmly entrenched at the state level (K. Alexander and M. D.
Alexander, 1985, 25). A series of subsequent court decisions
further

strengthened

the

preeminence

of

the

state

in

educational policymaking.4 The period between 1870 and 1900
saw the

expansion

of

the

concept

of public

education

to

include the high school and the flowering of state-supported
universities (Stuart v. School No. 1 of Kalamazoo. 30 Mich.
69 (1874); Butts, 1960; Lucio, 1963).
However,

these

reforms

did

not

completely

eliminate

local control over the schools. Rather, what emerged was a
system whereby state agencies set minimal standards for the
school districts while day-to-day management of the schools
remained with locally elected school boards,
intendents,

principals

and

teachers.

This

local super
arrangement

represents an approach to the governance of education that is
uniquely American

(Butts,

1960,

39).

It mirrors,

in some

4These include Railroad Co. v. Husen 95 U.S. 465 (1877) ;
Leeper v. State, 103 Tenn. 500 (1899) ; Fogg v. Board of
Education. 76 N.H. 296, (1912); Scown v. Czarnecki. 264 111.
305 (1914); Moore v. Board of Education. 212 N.C. 499 (1937).
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ways,

the relationship of divided sovereignty between the

national government and the states. In a nation with such a
deep-seated

mistrust

of

centralized

authority,

it

is

difficult to imagine how any other political outcome could
have emerged.
In summary,

the American public

school marries

both

abstract fidelity to Lockian idealism and the institutional
embodiment of Horatio Alger pragmatism. Americans expect the
public

school

to

transmit

democratic

values

to

each

succeeding generation; it is one of the primary institutions
charged

with

the

task

of

assimilating

immigrants

into

American culture. Moreover, education represents the hope of
a better society.

It is thereby enlisted

in the cause of

social reform. Thus, social reform advocates, regardless of
their ideological leanings, appeal to education in some form
or fashion in order to bring about in reality their vision of
the American Creed. Their faith flows directly from the creed
of

the

stream

Enlightenment which
flowing

inevitably,
education,

throughout

sees

reason

history

that

as

a progressive

is

slowly,

eroding the barriers to human progress.
or

more

"enlightenment,"

becomes

the

but
Thus,

hailed

solution for an infinite number of social ills, ranging from
poverty and racism to environmental degradation to the crisis
of teenage pregnancy and AIDS
Cremin,

1989; Purpel,

Knowledge,

in

the

(Dewey,

1989; Reitman,

American

psyche,

1966;

Allen,

1992; Walters,
is

the

key

1989;
1992).

to

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

more

57

rational
turns

and humane social policy.

the

public

school

into

a

This orientation often
political

and

cultural

battleground of competing interest groups who war over issues
as diverse as curriculum design or content to disciplinary
issues to desegregation (Cremin, 1989; Reitman,

1992).

In addition to its cultural functions, education, as the
Warren Court recognized in Brown. is essential for economic
and social mobility of individuals in American society. With
the

rapid

expansion

industries,"

as

well

of

technology

as

stiffer

and

global

"knowledge-based
competition,

the

importance of education in preparing a highly-skilled labor
force multiplies
1987; Reich,
U.S.

(Johnston and Packer,

1987; Wilson,

1978;

1991). No wonder national reports such as the

Education Department's A Nation At Risk

(1983) which

allege that academic achievement among American students lags
significantly

behind

that

of

their

industrial world generate such panic

counterparts

in

(Chubb and Moe,

the

1990;

Fiske, 1991). Regardless of how "education reform" manifests
itself, the highly political nature of any proposal to change
the schools testifies

in part to the importance Americans

attach to their role in preparing the work force.
Blacks,
high

regard

like other Americans, have historically had a
for

the

value

of

education,

but

for

a very

different reason: for most of their history in America, the
opportunity to acquire learning was routinely denied them.
The

struggle

for

equal

educational

opportunities,
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central theme of black political agitation, provides further
evidence of black acceptance of the Lockian creed. Before the
Civil War, access to an education constituted a luxury beyond
the reach of most Southerners, regardless of race. Usually,
the well-to-do in the South provided private tutors for their
children or sent them to Europe for their college education
(Harris, 1924; Vincent,

1981). The planter class deemed the

provision of education to their slaves as a mortal threat to
their

hegemony;

thus,

it

is

not

surprising

that

they

generally opposed tax-supported universal education for the
masses (Butts, 1960; Genovese, 1967; Anderson, 1981, 1988).
Slaves states passed laws prohibiting instruction to blacks,
and those who violated the law were commonly subjected to
fines,

imprisonment,

or whippings if apprehended

(Vincent,

1981) .
Therefore, the existence of slavery,

from the outset,

politicized the importance of education for black Americans.
Black political leaders,

from various ideological stripes,

have consistently viewed education as foundational to impro
ving the lot of African Americans. Their perspective has been
powerfully
social,

conditioned

economic,

Americans.

Blacks,

and

by the knowledge
political

like

other

of their

status
Americans

unequal

vis-a-vis
shaped

white
by

the

thinking of the Enlightenment, tend to equate knowledge with
human freedom. The Enlightenment's attachment to science and
learning,

coupled with

the reality of

slavery and racial
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discrimination

combined

to

place

access

to

educational

opportunity at the forefront of black political movements in
America

(Brotz,

1966;

Bullock,

1967;

Dann,

1971;

Vincent,

1981; Quarles, 1986; Franklin and Moss, 1987; Anderson, 1988;
Sansing, 1990).
Douglass, for example, recognized the liberating poten
tial of learning at a young age.

In his autobiography, he

recalls his mistress who first instructed him in the rudi
ments of the alphabet. Excited with her pupil's progress, she
went on to tell her husband what she was doing. Upon hearing
the news, the master lectured his wife on the evils of
teaching slaves to read. Not only was it unlawful, he said,
but it was also unsafe.

Douglass happened to overhear the

conversation:
. . . . if you give a nigger an inch he will take an
ell. Learning will spoil the best nigger in the world.
If he learns to read the Bible it will forever unfit
him to be a slave. He should know nothing but the will
of his master, and learn to obey it. As to himself,
learning will do him no good, but a great deal of harm,
making him disconsolate and unhappy. If you teach him
how to read, he'll want to know how to write, and this
accomplished, he'll be running away with himself (Doug
lass, 1962, 79).
This incident, Douglass recalls, inspired in him a spirit of
rebellion. The very fact that his master desired that he be
kept in ignorance motivated him to acquire as much knowledge
as he

could.

Douglass

never forgot

the words,

"Knowledge

unfits a child to be a slave" (Ibid, 79).
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In an article Douglass he later wrote for The North Star
entitled, "What Are the Colored People Doing for Themselves?"
he further spells out his views on education:
. . . . Let us educate our children, even though it
should us subject to a coarser and scantier diet, and
disrobe us of our few fine garments. "For the want of
knowledge we are killed all the day." Get wisdom - get
understanding, is a peculiarly valuable exhortation to
us, and the compliance with it is our only hope in this
land [my emphasis]. - It is idle, a hollow mockery,
for us to pray to God to break the oppressor's power,
while we neglect the means of knowledge which will give
us the ability to break this power - God will help us
when we help ourselves (Douglass, 1966, 208).
Douglass' vision of education was widely shared among
blacks. Free Negroes, though they often found themselves in
an

economically

precarious

state,

often

formed

self-help

associations to finance schools for their children; at other
times,

they

(Porter,

received

1942;

assistance

Woodson,

1968).

from

sympathetic

Once the social

whites

stigma

of

attending "free schools" was removed by the public school
movement,

Negroes sought admission to these schools on an

equal basis; more will be said about this in the next chapter
(Woodson,

1968;

Grant,

1968).

Despite laws which outlawed

such activity, some white Southerners taught Negroes to read;
it proved impossible for the state to completely regulate the
practice out of existence (Woodson, 1968). When the Freed
man's Bureau came to the South following the Civil War, they
found preexisting black schools, many supported by blacks'
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own efforts.

Some of these schools predated the Civil War,

despite local opposition to their existence (Porter,

1942;

Woodson, 1968; Anderson, 1988).
The end of slavery further intensified the thirst within
black Americans for education. It is most clearly manifested
in their efforts to secure schooling for themselves and their
children.

Booker T. Washington,

himself part of this mass

movement, described the period this way: "It was a whole race
trying to go to school. Few were too young, and none too old,
to make the attempt to learn" (Anderson, 1988, 5).
Historians have generally underemphasized the indis
pensable

role

opportunity
accepted

that

blacks

a reality

aid

from

played

in

for themselves.

Northern

making
While

educational
they readily

philanthropists,

missionary

societies, white Republicans and sympathetic Southern whites,
the

values

of

self-help

and

self-determination

- values

nurtured indigenously within the black community - formed the
bedrock of the ex-slaves'

educational movement

(Anderson,

1988, 5). African Americans demonstrated a commitment to the
Protestant

work

ethic

and

Lockian

individualism

that

equalled, if not surpassed, that of whites. Black politicians
in the Reconstruction state legislatures provided the impetus
for instituting universal education in the former Confederate
states

(Bullock,

1967; Vincent,

1976; 1981; Jenkins,

1983;

Anderson, 1988; Sansing, 1990). As W.E.B. DuBois would later
remark, "Public education for all at public expense was, in
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the

South,

a

Negro

idea"

(Anderson,

1988,

6) .

When

controversy flared at the turn of the century over whether
liberal education or vocational training was best suited for
the Negro (personified by the differences between Booker T.
Washington and W.E.B. DuBois), the debate was not (at least
among

black

Americans) ,

whether

black

schooling or had the capacity to grasp

needed

Americans
"higher

culture";

rather, the debate, in part, turned on which model held the
most promise for social uplift of the race (Washington, 1901;
DuBois,

1903; Brotz,

1966; Aptheker,

1971; Anderson,

1978;

1988).
Finally, black appreciation for the value of education
has tended to extend beyond its potential to better equip
them to earn livings or to empower them to fight for social
and

political

education
racial

as

rights.

Rather,

a fundamental

prejudice.

The

tool

fact

African

Americans

in the battle

that

the

to

belief

view
reduce

in

the

intellectual and moral inferiority of blacks provided part of
the rationale

for slavery

is beyond debate

(Davis,

1966;

Botz, 1966; Dann, 1970; Blassingame, 1972; Tocqueville, 1988;
Higgins,

1990).

conclusions

to

Thomas
be

Jefferson,

speculative,

though

nevertheless

claiming

his

expressed

a

commonly held view of blacks:
. . . . I advance it, therefore, as a suspicion only,
that the blacks, whether originally a distinct race,
or made distinct by time and circumstances, are inferior
to whites in the endowments both of body and mind. It
is not against experience to suppose that different
species of the same genus, or varieties of the same
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species, may possess different qualifications. Will not
a lover of natural history then, one who views the
gradations in all the races of animals with the eye
of philosophy, excuse an effort to keep those in the
department as man as distinct as nature has formed
them? This unfortunate difference of color, and perhaps
of faculty, is a powerful obstacle to the emancipation
of these people (Jefferson, 1955, 143).
However, when Tocqueville visited America in the 1830's,
he found little evidence that public opinion toward blacks
had significantly improved. In fact, he observed that racial
prejudice appeared to be most prevalent in Northern states
where the institution of slavery had been abolished than in
the South (1988, 343) . Indeed, he noted that the widespread
belief in the moral and intellectual inferiority of blacks,
not the

legal

institution of slavery,

posed the greatest

obstacle to social progress for the Negro. For this reason,
Tocqueville doubted that the two races could live together in
a racial democracy. A social climate such as this, however,
only served to inflame the passions of African Americans for
education all the more. Through learning, it was hoped, they
would prove their detractors wrong. Samuel Cornish, editor of
the black newspaper The Rights of All, was an early advocate
of a system of education for blacks. In an 1827 editoral, he
wrote:
. . . . Let us sacrifice or rather consecrate, the means
of these unnecessary, and sometimes sinful indulgences,
to the lid of a sealed box, for the purpose of educa
tion. It is truly said that knowledge is power, and let
our coloured population once become as learned, as
refined, and as wealthy as other classes of community,
and prejudice will hide her face - the tyrants spell
will be broken. To talk about prejudice against color
is nonsense; but raise up sons learned and enterprising
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with offsets of 2 0 to 3 0 thousand dollars - but rear
daughters intelligent and polished heiresses to their
tens and hundreds of thousands, and the fair sons and
daughters of Columbia will forget the law of lights and
shades - it will be expunged from our system of philo
sophy. And as should be, merit will form the estimate
of character and respectability (Dann, 1971, 301).
In

this

passage,

Cornish

calls

upon

his

people

to

establish schools of their own, not simply to learn skills
and attain knowledge (though they have intrinsic value in and
of themselves), but also to silence the prejudices of white
Americans. His perspective views color prejudice - and not
simply legal, political, and economic barriers - as barriers
to black progress. Through education, Cornish hopes, African
Americans

can

develop

enlightened,

enterprising,

and

respectable communities which will disprove racial theories
of black inferiority.

In other words,

rather than produce

elaborate philosophical treatises refuting theories of inhe
rent differences between the races, blacks should turn their
attention toward practical action;

after all,

results are

more difficult to argue against. His words reveal his degree
of

dedication

to

the

Protestant

work

ethic

and

Lockian

individualism. Blacks should be pragmatic, not philosophical
- consistent with the manner in which Lockianism manifests
itself in America

(Hartz, 1955). Through hard work, sweat,

and perseverance,

African Americans

merit

first-class citizenship,

would show that

they

values consistent with the

Protestant work ethic (Weber, 1976). Cornish's remarks imply
an acceptance of the American concept of merit.
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He certainly was not alone in his beliefs.

Frederick

Douglass emphatically argued that what blacks needed from
whites was not sympathy,

but rather the freedom to either

rise or fall based on their own efforts. Unhindered access to
education, for this reason, was one of the essential precon
ditions to make this
Industrial

education

ideal a reality

(Brotz,

1966,

283).

in the mind of Booker T., Washington

afforded blacks with the opportunity to acquire skills and
training necessary to "prove" that they could be effective
partners

in the building

of a new

southern

economy,

and

therefore could not rightfully be denied political and social
rights (Washington, 1901; Brotz, 1966; Anderson, 1978; 1988;
While rejecting Washington's belief that blacks needed to
"prove themselves worthy" of political and social equality,
DuBois nevertheless did not depart from American individu
alism

(at

least

until

late

in his

life) .

In

advocating

liberal education for a "talented tenth," DuBois set out in
part to counter the objections of those who said that college
was inappropriate for the Negro; the ideological climate of
Social Darwinism at the turn of the century had reinforced
longstanding racial stereotypes (DuBois, 1903; Brotz, 1966;
Aptheker, 1971; Anderson, 1978; 1988). Thus, DuBois affirmed
the "inalienable rights" of African Americans while pushing
for liberal education as a means of discrediting the doubters
of black ability. Black academics have traditionally accepted
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the role of countering racist propoganda directed against
African Americans (Kujovich, 1987, 158).
Therefore, black and white Americans come to attribute
similar intrinsic value to education, but they arrive at the
same social ideeil through the tunnels of profoundly different
historical experiences. White Americans more closely identify
with education as part of their Lockian birthright, though
this sentiment is rarely articulated. Blacks value education
precisely
rights,

because

was

it,

like

specifically

treated as free men,

other

denied

political
them;

and

rather

economic

than

being

interpretations of the Declaration of

Independence and the Constitution treated them as if they
were disinherited children rather than free sons. The NAACP's
protracted

campaign

against

"separate

but

public schools, which began in the 1930's,

equal"

in

the

constitutes one

chapter in the history of black efforts at attaining equal
educational opportunity in America. From the perspective of
blacks, the cause of educational opportunity and political
freedom were

intimately

linked.

The

fact

that whites and

African Americans bring different historical experiences to
the political dilemma of desegregation contributes,

in no

small way, to the divisive character of such debates.
Aristotle reminds us in The Politics that it is simply
not possible to speak of education apart from some considera
tion of the good life and the question of the best regime.
Since it is inevitable that people will disagree over matters
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concerning education, the topic is thus inherently political
(1984, 229-230) . Certainly, Americans did not invent the idea
of education as essential to the health of the republic, nor
are they the first to quarrel about its specific role

in

society. However, the American assertion in the superiority
of reason over other bases for authority elevates the signicance of education more so than it has in other countries
(Arendt,

1958). Hence, education in America is more readily

politicized.
changes,

Political

religious

battles

values,

over

academic

proposed

curriculum

standards,

education

reforms and other issues illustrate the politically explosive
potential of education in America. Desegregation in education
must be seen as a powerful example of this phenomenon.
Thus far, I have argued that blacks have from the days
of the Revolution down through the civil rights era invoked
the themes of the liberal tradition to press their claims for
liberty. It has also been contended that the importance that
African Americans, though peering through a different pair of
historical lenses, nevertheless attach virtues to education
consistent with the legacy of the Enlightenment. Moreover,
the efforts that blacks have expended historically to acquire
the means
aspects

to education
of

individualism.
political

the

reflect an acceptance

Protestant

work

ethic

of

critical

and

Lockian

This interpretation of the history of black

protest,

of course,

is

not

universally

shared.

Before further developing the thesis that black political
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discourse,
demonstrates

and
the

American Creed,

specifically,
fidelity

of

desegregation
African

it is necessary to

litigation,

Americans

consider the

with

the

counter

argument to this assertion. That is the subject of the next
section.
African Americans: True Disciples of Locke?
With respect to the African American protest tradition,
Oakes (1995) writes:
. . . . The fact that black political leaders consis
tently claimed the liberal tradition as their own
therefore constitutes a major problem in the history
of American political culture. . . . black political
thought. . . has never been divorced from the liberal
tradition. From the late eighteenth century to the
late twentieth, blacks have successfully harnessed
the themes of liberalism to the struggles against
various forms of inequality (205-206) .
Dawson (1995) offers black nationalism and black Marxism
as

counterexamples

for

his

view

that

black

political

discourse cannot be confined within the boundaries of the
liberal tradition. He argues that scholars who study black
political thought err because,

on one hand,

they tend to

overemphasize the importance of a few prominent individuals.
Furthermore, he contends that black nationalist intellectuals
like

David

Walker,

Martin

Delaney,

Marcus

Garvey,

and

organizations such as the Nation of Islam are systematically
underrepresented

in

their

analyses

of

black

political

thought. He also points to examples of blacks such as W.E.B.
DuBois and Martin Luther King who, in the course of their
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philosophical journeys, either dissented in part, or rejected
entirely, fundamental tenets of liberalism (see DuBois, 1940;
1945; King,

1967).

Finally,

Dawson points out

the

consistent demand

in

black politics that their individual leaders take political
stands that are perceived by the community as not harmful to
the black community,
fact,

an auspiciously nonliberal trait;

some would call it antiliberal.

public

community

censoring

and

in

This tradition of a

sanctioning those

seen as

attacking the black community manifests, for example, in the
general disdain for black conservatives and black Republi
cans.

White politicians, by and-large, are not expected (at

least not explicitly) to articulate the "white perspective"
when they go to City Hall, the state legislature or Congress.
In contrast, black political leaders bear the special burden
of

being

seen

not

constituencies,
sents

a

clearly

as

representatives

of particular

but as spokesmen for the race. This repre

peculiar
departs

only

aspect
from

of

black

dominant

political

American

culture

political

that

norms.

Dawson's critique carries considerable weight. He makes
a powerful case for a "black counterpublic" as an ideological
site for the

criticism of American democratic theory and

practice that is consistent with the work of other scholars.
For example, Blassingame (1972) persuasively documented the
existence of a "slave community" which synthesized African
and American elements in a time when most scholars had
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seemingly concluded that the Middle Passage and the ordeal of
American

slavery

had

eradicated

all

aspects

of

African

culture (see, for example, Stamp, 1956; Moynihan, 1965). That
the slaves did not simply adopt the white master's culture
(though they were influenced by it) , but maintained a cul
tural integrity of their own has been shown by other scholars
(Genovese,

1976;

Levine,

1977; Sobel,

1979;

Stuckey,

1987;

Higgins, 1990). Pinderhughes (1987) objects to the use of the
binary lenses of "assimilationism vs. black nationalism" to
explain black political thought. This fallacy, she continues,
not only understates the range of black political discourse,
but also overstates the degree of unity among blacks. African
Americans,

she writes,

"may agree on racial

and economic

matters; they might disagree on racial or economic or agree
on the economic or racial goals;
both"

or they may disagree

on

(1987, 127).
Acknowledging

the

existence

of

a

separate

black

political culture does not overturn the thesis that black
political discourse has remained predominately within the
borders of the liberal tradition.

In fact,

the reality of

historical and cultural differences between blacks and whites
explains how America's abstract commitment to Lockian values
of equal rights and equal opportunity for all often leads to
conflicting policy preferences with respect to debates

on

desegregation, affirmative action, racial redistricting. The
focus of this section, however, is to demonstrate while black
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nationalism and black Marxism constitute significant streams
of the history of black political thought, their existence
does not

contradict my main thesis.

Moreover,

even those

critiques of American democracy which have attempted to go
beyond

the borders

of

the

liberal tradition

nevertheless

maintained strong liberal elements.
What, after all, is black nationalism? Is it not rooted
in the sense that the "common experience of discrimination,
humiliation, and economic self-interest" unites blacks in a
unique way in relation to white America and to each other?
Because of the common experience of slavery and segregation,
they were no longer Mandingo, Mandinka, Yoruba, Ibo, or Hausa
- they had become "one nation," or a "nation within a nation"
(Brotz,

1966;

DuBois,

1996).

Berlin,

1975; Aptheker,

Similarly,

1971; Walker,

1993;

the political crisis with Great

Britain in the 1760's and 1770's forged within the colonists
a sense

of nationalism - no

longer were

they

simply New

Yorkers, Virginians, or Georgians; they were Americans. The
colonial

sense

of

having

endured

a

common

oppression

is

spelled out vividly in the specific "usurpations" which King
George III is alleged to have committed in the Declaration of
Independence.

Therefore,

by basing black nationalism on a

sense of a common historical experience, are they not acting
like Americans?
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Secondly, black nationalism tacitly accepts the doctrine
of inalienable rights, a foundational stone of the American
republic. Despite the stridency of David Walker's condem
nation of American slavery and the Founders' complicity with
it in his Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World, he
leaves unscathed the doctrine

of

inalienable

approach radically differs from that of Marx,

rights.

His

who attacks

capitalism on every point. One would think that one of the
most radical treatises ever written condemning slavery and
white

racism would

"leave no

stone unturned;"

seemingly,

Walker would attack every pillar deemed responsible for the
oppression of his people.
The reason he does not attack the concept of inalienable
rights is obvious: he supports it. "Are we MEN!" Walker asks,
(1992, 3 6) a direct challenge to Jefferson's expressed doubts
about the faculties of blacks. An affirmative answer to this
question, Walker argues, undermines all the justifications
for slavery. In asserting black manhood, Walker claimed that
African Americans could not be rightfully denied the benefits
of the same inalienable rights that applied to every other
American.
So fervently does Walker accept this concept that any
means were justified to end slavery.

The violation of the

rights of African Americans represents such a grievous evil
that any means to eliminate

it were

justified,

including
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violeOnt

revolution.

Walker's call

sounds very much

like

Jefferson's call for revolution: because the king had vio
lated the inalienable rights of the colonists as Englishmen,
he had forfeited his right to rule. As a consequence,

the

colonists were justified in dissolving their political ties
with

the

British

crown.

Walker,

in

effect,

vindicates

Jefferson and, by extension, Locke.
This pattern repeats itself consistently throughout the
history of black nationalism. All nationalist movements from
Martin Delaney to Elijah Muhammad aimed at establishing a
separate black nation premise themselves on the inalienable
right of self-determination

(Brotz,

1966;

Aptheker,

1971;

Wintz, 1996). African American oppression is deemed to be so
violative of the concept of inalienable rights and/or higher
moral law that blacks may justifiably sever their ties with
the United States and establish their own nation. In reality,
black

nationalism

does

not

fundamentally

challenge

the

liberal concept of rights; indeed, it vindicates it.
A survey of the rhetoric of Malcolm X produces even more
evidence for the compatability of black nationalism with the
liberal tradition.

Perhaps more explicitly than any other

black nationalist thinker, Malcolm ventures to great lengths
to sever his ties with the American political consensus. In
a speech in 19 64, Malcolm uttered these words:
I am not a politician. I'm not even a student of
politics. I'm not a Democrat. I'm not a Republican. I
don't even consider myself an American. . . . I don't
come here tonight to speak to you as a Democrat or a
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Republican or an American or anything you want me to
be. I'm speaking as what I am: one of twenty-two m i l 
lion black people in this country who are victims of
your democratic system. They're victims of the Demo
cratic politicians, the victims of the Republican
politicians. They're actually the victims of what you
call democracy. So I stand here tonight speaking as
a victim of what you call democracy (X, 1968, 134).
On the surface,

it appears that Malcolm X rejects the

entire American democratic experiment. A cursory examination
of his speeches seems to indicate that that is his precise
intent (Haley, 1992; Breitman, 1967). He sees himself not as
an American, but rather as a victim of America: after all,
the mere fact that a man sits at a table does not make him a
diner. Malcolm dismissed King's strategy of civil disobe
dience in order to appeal to the nation's conscience as a
waste of time, countering that if America really had a soul
it would not have enslaved and mistreated African Americans.
The Nation of Islam, of which he was a minister, expoused the
belief that the black race were the "chosen people of God"
(Lincoln, 1984), a direct challenge to America's own sense of
Divine Providence

(Hartz,

1955;

Peterson,

1976;

Gebhardt,

1993).
However, not even Malcolm can escape his Americanism. By
pronouncing the judgement of Allah on sinful America, Malcolm
invoked America's higher law tradition.

In subjecting the

nation's practices to a Higher Judge, how was he different
from David Walker, William Lloyd Garrison, Nat Turner, John
Brown, and Martin Luther King? In proposing to bring human
rights charges before the United Nations against the United
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States

for

its

treatment of African Americans

1970) , Malcolm behaves like an American.
charging

the

United

States

with

human

(Breitman,

The very idea of
rights

violations

assumes these rights exist in the first place; moreover, if
these rights are violated, those victimized by such actions
have the right to self-defense and self-determination.

His

journey toward Pan-Africanism in the last year of his life (a
logical extension of his black nationalism) , rests on key
aspects of the liberal creed - namely, the idea that a common
historical

experience

(particularly

a

common

oppression)

forms the basis for national identity. For Malcolm, the Ame
rican ideal proved to be so powerful that not even he,

in

spite his best efforts, could successfully think beyond it.
America ironically provided Malcolm with the analytical tools
with which to interrogate herself.
With black nationalism eliminated as a fundamental chal
lenger to the liberal tradition, I now turn to Marxism. Du
Bois and many black intellectuals before and after him became
members of the Communist Party (Marable, 1982; Stuckey, 1987;
Pinderhughes, 1987; Dawson, 1995). Yet, socialism has never
been able to attract a large share of the black masses, in
spite

of

the

fact

that historical discrimination

against

African Americans have deprived them of a significant share
of the

benefits

of

capitalist

democracy.

Logically,

they

would seemingly have little stake in the preservation of the
status q u o .
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Several ideas have been advanced to explain this rather
curious

fact.

Organizational deficiencies,

such as severe

pressure to integrate into the economy (which also crippled
institutions

among white

ethnic

immigrants), were

parti

cularly more pronounced among blacks; they tended be in more
marginal

economic

straits

than

their

white

counterparts

(Garner, 1977). Marable (1982) attributes the demise of black
left radicalism partly to government sponsored efforts to
eradicate the left as well as crackdowns within the labor
union establishment during the McCarthy era through the black
power

revolt.

organizations

It

has

often

also

been

succumbed

charged

to

the

same

that

communist

racism

toward

blacks that African Americans had united with them to fight
against.

Quoting

Shawna Maglangbayan,

Marxist,

writes:

"Marxism-Leninism

Marable,

[is]

himself

a

a reactionary and

white supremacist ideology whose chief aim is to maintain
Aryan world hegemony once capitalism is overthrown"
85) . Pinderhughes

(1987)

points

to the

(1980,

Communist Party's

failure to resolve the ideological contradictions between
internationalism and black nationalism. The party's inability
to manipulate racial issues, she concludes, renders them an
unattractive option for the black population. Finally, black
intellectuals would have been faced the same dilemmas in the
post-World War II era as white members of the left; in par
ticular,

(1) they had to explain the postwar economic expan-

pansion, considering their confident predictions during the

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

77

Depression years that the "death of capitalism" was near and
(2) in light of the revealed brutality of Stalin's regime,
how could one still tout Marxist as the best hope for mankind
(Diggins, 1990) .
While all of the aforementioned explanations carry a
certain measure of validity,

they miss a more fundamental

problem for Marxism with respect to black Americans: the fact
that they are Americans. Indeed, it was never necessary for
African Americans to become revolutionaries because the idea
of America is already revolutionary.
The American revolutionaries found willing allies in the
New England

church,

thereby eliminating

the

necessity of

making the Revolution also a war to overthrow established
religion,

unlike

Peterson,
already

the

situation

in

France

(Hartz,

1955;

1976). Religion in America, as Hartz put it, was
revolutionary

(41) .

The

same

is

true

with

the

nation's core principles. Why make war with principles which
are so useful in justifying one's own cause? Moreover,

not

only

end

does

America

assert the

right

to

revolution

to

unjust oppression, she goes further to declare this right to
be "self-evident." America proclaims the fundamental equality
of all men - certainly a radical thought in 177 6 in light of
the history of the Western world. A nation that sees itself
as "hopefully experimentalistic" in its societal arrangements
(Myrdal, 1944,

7) keeps the door of reform - even of revo

lution - constantly ajar.

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

78

Thus, Walker did not need to build a new revolutionary
theory;

rather,

he

African

Americans]

only
are

needed
men,

to

insist,

"We

[meaning

too!"

Whereas

the

European

liberal felt the compulsion to produce elaborate treatises in
order

to

rationalize

the

right

to

challenge

secular

and

ecclesiastical authorities deemed to be "God-ordained" and
immutable,

African Americans

live

in a society where the

right to rebel against perceived injustices is viewed as a
birthright. Having inherited such a legacy, it is no wonder
that black protest leaders,

in the main,

draw inspiration

from the Declaration of Independence rather than The Commu
nist Manifesto.
Moreover,

since

the

Revolution

did

not

declare

the

"death of God," He could still be enlisted, when necessary,
to serve political ends. The fact that the Revolution did not
engage in an all-out war against the church had the effect of
maintaining

religion

as

a significant

player

in American

politics. As Tocqueville observed, the lack of a state church
in America actually served to strengthen the role of religion
in America

(1988, 298-299). The fact that religion has not

been "eliminated from the [political] game" (Anderson, 1964)
injects a significant element of moralism into American poli
tics. Moralism has been found at the core of reform movements
throughout the nation's history,
the temperance movements,

from the abolitionists to

to the present-day anti-abortio

nists. Political reform movements in America often resemble
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"holy crusades" or Islamic jihads

in character.

The black

protest leader, as a consequence, never needed to become Marx
- he already had Moses and the Prophets.
In summary, the American Creed binds African Americans,
as well as other traditionally disadvantaged and despised
groups,

into the American fold in a manner that is truly

extraordinary

considering

their

historical

circumstances.

Myrdal is right when he concludes:
The liberal Creed, even in its dynamic formulation by
Jefferson, is adhered to by every American. The una
nimity around, and the explicitness of, this Creed i s
the great wonder of America. The "Old Americans,"
all
those who have thoroughly come to identify
themselves with the nation - which are many more
than the Sons and the Daughters of the Revolution adhere to the Creed as the faith of their ancestors.
The others - the Negroes, the new immigrants, the Jews,
and other disadvantaged and unpopular groups - could not
possibly have invented a system of political ideals
which better corresponded to their interests. So, iy He
logic of the unique American history, it has developed
that the rich and secure, out of pride and conservatism,
and the poor and insecure, out of dire need, come to
profess the identical social ideals. . . . Behind it all
is the historical reality which makes it possible for
the President to appeal to all in the nation in this
way: "Let us not forget that we are all descendants from
revolutionaries and immigrants" (1944, 13).
By proclaiming the

self-evident

truth of

the

fundamental

equality of all men, the Creed knits African Americans and
other historically disadvantaged and despised groups into the
American fold in a manner that is truly extraordinary.
Consequently, The Creed

ideologically underwrites the

tradition of black protest in America. Blacks had to go no
further than to the words of the Declaration of Independence
and the Constitution to find a rationale for challenging the
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racial status quo in America. Thus, I expect that the history
of the efforts to achieve desegregation, both at the public
school

and

college

level,

would be

consistent with

this

established historical pattern. I anticipate that the NAACP
would appeal to the values of the Creed to buttress its legal
challenge to segregated education. However, Lockian indivi
dualism is a "doubled-edged sword" which supplies counter
arguments to interests opposed to specific remedial policies
favored

by

many

black

civil

rights

proponents

and

their

liberal white allies. Many white Americans object to "raceconsciousness" in the determination of public policy; they
interpret

the meaning

of

the

civil

rights

struggle

as

a

repudiation of race-consciousness and an affirmation of the
equal worth of every individual. When applied to the issue of
desegregation in higher education, the existence of publicly
funded,

historically black universities poses a troubling

dilemma for an ostensibly "colorblind" society. Therefore,
all the

litigating parties,

irrespective

of

the

specific

positions they hold, insist that they are being faithful to
the American Creed.
Chapter Two shifts the focus of this dissertation from
the macro-level of American political culture to the early
history of the school desegregation movement. This chapter
traces

this

phenomenon

to

the

Supreme

Court's

landmark

decision in Brown.
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CHAPTER 2. THE ROAD TO BROWN
A cursory examination of the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Fordice demonstrates that the justices
clearly viewed the case as another extension of the logic of
Brown v. Board of Education. Relying on the reasoning of
Brown as well as its successor cases (most notably, Green v.
School Board of New Kent County) , the Court declared that
Mississippi's

nondiscriminatory policies

did not meet the

state's burden "to eradicate policies and practices traceable
to its prior de jure dual
segregation"

(505 U.S. 717,

system that continue to foster
728 [1992]). Thus, the Supreme

Court continued its tradition of applying principles derived
from elementary and secondary desegregation cases to higher
education.5 Therefore,

in

order

to

adequately

assess

the

significance of the ruling in Fordice. it is important to
revisit Brown.
This chapter concentrates on the school desegregation
movement

leading up

to Brown. It will

be

shown that

the

NAACP's legal campaign to end racial segregation in education
provides a compelling case study in the fidelity of black
Americans to the liberal creed. Indeed, by appealing to the

50ther public school cases besides Brown and Green on
which the Court relied on include Swann v. CharlotteMecklenbera Board of Education. 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Gilmore v
City of Montgomery. 417 U.S. 556 (1974); Pasadena City Board
of Education v. Spangler. 427 U.S. 424 (1976); Board of
Education of Oklahoma Citv Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S.
237 (1991); and Freeman v. Pitts. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
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Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, they charge
Plessv's "separate but equal"

doctrine with violating the

amendment's original intent - to safeguard the rights of the
newly emancipated slaves from state laws that deprived them
of their fundamental rights.
I begin by reviewing the original purpose of the Four
teenth

Amendment

addressed

by

because

the parties

one
in

of

the

the
Brown

central
cases

questions

was whether

school segregation was permissible in light of the vision the
framers had of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is followed by
a discussion of how the civil rights of ex-slaves were, for
all intent and purposes, effectively nullified through court
decisions, Northern neglect, legislative fiat, and violence.
The

fact

that the

citizenship

seriously "qualified"

(Woodson,

rights
1921)

of

blacks

had

been

explains the rise of

organizations such as the NAACP. Given the plight of blacks,
I will present the range of alternatives that were available
to the NAACP.

It will be argued that the NAACP's choice to

pursue a litigation strategy to overturn the "separate but
equal" doctrine
tion's

belief

provides a strong case for the organiza
in

the

American

creed.

Indeed,

the

NAACP

rejected an alternative characterization of the race problem
in America - the idea that racism represented only one facet
of class

exploitation,

achieved

without

a

and black

radical

liberation

restructuring

could not be
of

the

basic

institutions of American capitalism. The NAACP's litigation
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strategy

affirmed

their

belief

in the

basic

goodness

of

American institutions while simultaneously fighting for the
right of blacks to share equally in the bounty of America.
Once the legal barriers to black participation in the main
stream of American life were eliminated, the NAACP believed
that blacks would be able to compete in the marketplace on a
equal footing with other Americans.

This vision played a

powerful role

of the desegregation

campaign,

in shaping the

course

and would have ramifications well into the post-

Brown era.
Reconstruction and Reversal
The South's defeat in the Civil War ended slavery and
permanently denied to the states the right to secede from the
Union. As the Thirty-Ninth Congress convened in Washington in
December of 1865, it confronted the task of determining the
means by which the defeated Southern states would be restored
to the Union. Under the existing Constitution, three-fifths
of

black

slaves,

discreetly described

in the document as

"other persons," were counted for the purposes of taxation
and

representation.

With

slavery

abolished

and

African

Americans declared free persons by the result of the war, it
became necessary to define precisely what freedom meant. Did
freedom entitle the newly freed slaves to all the rights,
privileges
including

and
the

immunities enjoyed
right

to vote?

Or

by

free white persons,

could

blacks

justly

be

excluded from political participation or, as some argued, be
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required to demonstrate some minimal level of competence in
order to qualify for voting privileges? Perhaps more impor
tantly, which level of government - the national government
or the states - had the power to define the specific rights
of

citizenship?

Was

there

a

difference

between

national

citizenship and being a citizen of a particular state? In
short,

the task of restoring the defeated Southern states

required Congress to address the status of the newly emanci
pated slaves under the Constitution (Flack, 1908; Kendrick,
1914; tenBroeck, 1951; Crosskey, 1953; James, 1956; Graham,
1968; Baer, 1983; Kaczorowski, 1987).
Faced

with

the

duty

of

defining

the

constitutional

status of the Negro, the memory of Scott v. Sanford (60 U.S.
393 [1857]) loomed large. The Court rejected the freedom suit
of Dred Scott, a black slave, on the grounds that because of
his African ancestry he was not,
citizen

of

the

United

States

nor could he ever be,

within

the

meaning

of

a

the

Constitution. Even emancipation, in the eyes of the Court's
majority, did not make blacks part of the political community
(60 U.S. at 405 [1857]). Crosskey writes:
. . . . the full purport of that case. . . .was that no
"man of African descent, whether a slave or not," could
enjoy, under the Constitution of the United States, any
right or protection [my emphasis] whatsoever. All such
men were left, by the principles of the Dred Scott case,
to the absolute, unrestrained power of the separate
states (1953, 1084).
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The ruling effectively left blacks at the mercy of the
states. The Court's opinion, though clearly racist in tone,
nevertheless reflected the settled constitutional doctrine of
the times - that the fundamental rights of citizenship were
secured by the states. The Founding Fathers believed that the
greatest threat to liberty rested with the national govern
ment; furthermore, pre-Civil War jurisprudence held that the
Bill

of

Rights

limited

only

the

actions

of

the

federal

government.6 Therefore, when the Southern states enacted what
came to be known as "The Black Codes," they did more than
simply making it clear that their attitudes toward the ex
slaves had not softened. In another sense, the newly formed
Southern

legislatures were exercising the authority

state

governments were assumed to have.

6The landmark case in this regard was Barron v.
Baltimore (32 U.S. 243 [1833]) where the Supreme Court held
that the Bill of Rights limited only the actions of the
federal government and not those of the states. At the time
of the adoption of The Bill of Rights, most states already
had included protections of individual liberties within their
state constitutions; presumably, the ordinary citizen had
little reason to believe that the state governments would
mount an assault on his inalienable rights. Thus, the
original document inhered within it a fundamental defect with
respect to the ability of African Americans to secure their
rights against the actions of state governments. This was
true precisely because it was the states that had legalized
slavery as well as the supporting code of laws madde
necessary by its existence. The notion of "state citizenship"
would provide the rationale in part for later Supreme Court
decisions justifying judicial nonenforcement of the civil
rights of blacks. Not until the twentieth century when courts
began to "incorporate the Fourteenth Amendment" did this
doctrine began to crumble.
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Franklin and Moss (1987) describe the ramifications of
the Black Codes on the newly freed slaves:
. . . Several of them undertook to limit the areas in
in which Negroes could purchase and rent property.
Vagrancy laws imposed heavy penalties that were designed
to force all Negroes to work whether they wanted to or
not. The control of blacks by white employers was about
as great as that which slaveholders exercised. Negroes
who quit their jobs could be arrested and imprisoned for
breach of contract. Negroes were not allowed to testify
in court except in cases involving members of their
race. Numerous fines were imposed for seditious spee
ches, insulting gestures or acts, absence from work,
violating curfew, and the possession of firearms. There
was, of course, no enfranchisement of blacks and no
indication that in the future they could look forward
to full citizenship and participation in a democracy
(206).
By severely restricting the political, civil, and eco
nomic liberties of the freedmen,
reduce

African

Americans

to

a

these laws threatened to
condition

not

appreciably

different from slavery. The Black Codes merely constituted
but

one

manifestation

of

a

Southern

political

climate

characterized by increasing defiance of national authority.7
Northerners interpreted these events as evidence that the
South was in rebellion again.

Thus,

the need for national

protection of the rights of citizens, whether they be white

7Other examples of Southern defiance include the
following: Southerners continued to invoke states' rights
doctrine; the rights of Northern whites and federal officials
in the region were routinely ignored. White Southerners
sympathetic to the Union were branded "scalawags" and
received similar treatment. Many former successionists were
returned to political office while newspapers and periodicals
had, by the spring of 18 66, succeeded in whipping up antiUnion sentiment to pre-Civil War levels (Kendrick, 1914;
Graham, 1968; Kaczorowski, 1987).
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Unionists,

military or federal personnel,

or freedmen was

widely acknowledged and urged upon members of Congress (Kac
zorowski, 1987, 26-30).
In response to

the Black Codes,

Congress passed the

Civil Rights Act of 1866. As originally proposed, the civil
rights bill declared:
All persons born in the United States, and not
subject to any foreign power, are hereby declared to be
citizens of the United States, without distinction of
color, and there shall be no discrimination in civil
rights and immunities among the inhabitants of any state
or territory of the United States on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude (Kluger, 1975,
627) .
Supporters of the legislation saw it as an extension of
the Thirteenth Amendment that
slaves.

secured the freedom of the

In their view, the white South's intransigence had

made it necessary for Congress to guarantee equality under
the law and to spell out the privileges and immunities that
the newly freed blacks were now entitled to. Under the new
law, ex-slaves would be entitled to the rights
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property, and to full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, and penalties, and none other, any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation,
or custom, to the contrary
withstanding (14 Stat. 27, quoted in Graham, 1968, 307308; Kluger, 1975, 628).
However, did the proposed legislation only apply to the
specifically enumerated rights listed in the bill? Or were
the specifically named rights merely examples

intended to

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

88

communicate that the intent of the bill was to nullify the
Black Codes? Had the Civil Rights Bill passed in its original
form with

the

broad

anti-discrimination

language

intact,

Congress would have been empowered to strike down any future
state laws that fostered segregation (Kluger, 1975, 628).
Democrats and conservative Republicans objected to the
potentially broad scope of the bill,

arguing that it would

forbid the states from using race as a basis for any kind of
statutory discrimination or classification.

Interestingly,

state laws requiring segregation in public schools were cited
as examples of the kinds of state practices which the federal
government would have the right to
passed
166) .

(Cowan in Avins,

1967,

outlaw

if the measure

127; Rogers in Avins,

Opponents

insisted

that

unconstitutional

exercise

of

the

bill

federal

1967,

represented

power

against

an
the

states. The bill passed after the anti-discrimination clause
was removed, only to be vetoed by President Andrew Johnson.
In

his

veto

message,

the

president

accused

Congress

of

unconstitutionally usurping the sovereignty of the states.
Congress subsequently voted to override the president's veto
and the Civil Rights Bill became law.
Nevertheless, doubts about the constitutionality of the
new law remained. Thus, many in Congress saw the need for a
constitutional

amendment to

lay the matter

to rest.

John

Bingham, a Republican representative from Oregon, introduced
the original draft of the Fourteenth Amendment. It began:
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The Congress shall have power to make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the
citizens of each State all privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States [Article IV, Section
2]; and to all persons in the several States equal
protection in the rights of life, liberty, and
property [Fifth Amendment] (Kluger, 1975, 630).
By bracketing references to other parts of the Constitution,
Bingham attempted to reassure his colleagues that what he was
proposing was not revolutionary; rather, the new amendment
was based on powers which were in the Constitution already
(Ibid, 630). The new amendment, Bingham and other supporters
of the measure argued,

would simply arm Congress with the

express power to enforce the guarantee of equality.

It did

not transfer all sovereignty over civil rights to the federal
government, as conservative opponents charged.
However, the language of the first draft generated oppo
sition

both

from

conservatives

and

Radical

Republicans.

Conservatives argued that the proposal would give Congress
the right to define and secure the rights of citizens - and
conceivably,

the right to take away rights from citizens.

Such a proposal,

they maintained,

constituted a broadside

against the American concept of free government - the idea
that

governments

exist

to

secure natural

rights,

not

to

define the rights of citizens (Flack, 1908; Avins, 1967). On
the

other hand,

Radicals

objected

to the wording

of

the

original proposal because it made Congress responsible for
securing the civil rights protections of citizens. Congres
sional majorities had a tendency to shift, they pointed out;
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thus,

the

original

proposal

did

not

place

civil

rights

protections beyond the power of future Congresses to either
repeal or to simply not enforce (Bickel, 1955; Graham, 1968;
Kluger, 1975; Kaczorowski, 1987).
Therefore, the final draft of the amendment eliminated
the offensive language. Section One of the Fourteenth Amend
ment declared:
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person
the equal protection of the laws.
Supporters of the Amendment insisted that, by passing
this legislation, the national government was not "granting
rights" to the freedmen; instead, it was securing them. After
all, governments existed to secure preexisting, inalienable
rights according to the laws of nature; this new amendment
merely

declared

entitled

to

that

the

former

those same rights.

slaves,

now

Furthermore,

freed,
those

were

on the

Republican side who regarded the Fourteenth Amendment as the
constitutional

embodiment

of

the

Civil

Rights

Act

often

coupled their arguments with appeals to abstract theories of
justice and the natural rights of man
Thus,

many

of

the

framers

of

the

(Bickel,
Fourteenth

1955,

61) .

Amendment

regarded their task as consistent with the spirit of John
Locke and the Founding Fathers (ten Broeck 1951; Avins, 1967;
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Graham,

1968,

295-335;

Friedman,

1969,

184;

Baer,

1983;

Kaczorowski, 1987). Graham observed:
At the outset, the Lockean philosophy of ante
cedent and inalienable rights (which colonial leaders
had employed so effectively in the Revolution) simply
had been given a new twist. Americans, it was argued,
had to live up to the Declaration. "All men" had to
mean all men; "Governments. . . instituted to secure
rights" of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi
ness"; and governments "deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed" had to bestow
protection, and to bestow it equally, irrespective of
race and color, or the "self-evident truths" became
self-evident mockery.
. . Slavery was
ethically
repugnant, not simply because it chattelized man, but
because it repudiated the very purpose of government and
arbitrarily denied to some humans its protections solely
on the basis of color (1968, 278).
The most heated debates during the proceedings concerned
the question of whether or not suffrage constituted a natural
right which could not be abridged by government (and hence,
could not

be denied to

blacks)

or

a political

privilege

subject to qualifications set by government (Kendrick, 1914;
Frank and Munro, 1950; James, 1956; Avins, 1967; Kaczorowski,
1987).

Eventually,

the

extended to black men

Fifteenth
the

Amendment

right to vote.

specifically

The actions

of

racist organizations like the Ku Klux Klan motivated Congress
to pass enabling legislation under the enforcement provisions
of the Fifteenth Amendment to blunt efforts on the part of
these groups to prevent blacks from exercising their consti
tutional rights.8
8The Civil Rights Enforcement Act of 187 0 made it a
federal crime for private individuals to conspire to injure
or oppress persons exercising their constitutional rights.
Because the Ku Klux Klan was a private organization, the Ku
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In 1875, Congress passed what would turn out to be the
last national civil rights measure enacted until 1957. After
a long, protracted legislative fight led by Senator Charles
Sumner of Massachusetts, Congress passed a new law aimed at
guaranteeing to all citizens irrespective of race "the full
enjoyment of the accommodations. . . of inns, public convey
ances on land and water, theatres and other places of public
amusements" (Kluger, 1975, 50) . In addition, the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 forbade states to disqualify citizens for jury
service on the basis of race (Ibid, 50).
Therefore,

the Thirteenth,

Fourteenth,

and

Fifteenth

Amendments declared that African Americans were the political
equals of whites. Many abolitionists saw these developments
as the completion of the American Revolution (Graham, 1968;
Kluger,

1975; Baer,

1983; Kaczorowski,

1987). At the time,

many of the proponents of the civil rights measures of the
Reconstruction period believed that the passage of these laws
and constitutional

amendments had permenantly

settled any

questions regarding the black man's constitutional status.
Thus,

many Northerners who had sympathized with the black

man's cause now believed that the freedman had been handed
all of the rights that it was within government's power to
bestow.

Klux Klan Act of 1871 made it a federal offense for two or
more persons to conspire to deprive persons of their equal
protection and voting rights.
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As subsequent events would prove, this sentiment turned
out to be tragically flawed.

The Civil War had undeniably

affirmed the permenance of the Union, the illegitimacy of the
right to secession, and the freedom of the slaves. But the
congressional debates did not resolve the question of whether
state citizenship or national citizenship was primary. Many
Americans who had consented to the expansion of the role of
the federal government during the war now feared the loss of
state sovereignty to a growing national behemoth. Moreover,
the fact that many of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
considered

it the constitutional

embodiment

of the Civil

Rights Act of 1866, rather than simplifying matters, actually
clouded the picture. This was true because the framers had
stripped

the

Civil

Rights

Bill

of

the

no-discrimination

clause in order to secure passage. Because of this compro
mise,

it could be argued that while the Civil Rights Act of

1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment granted blacks equal rights
under the law, that did not necessarily guarantee them access
to the same public accommodations and services as whites.9
Partly for this reason, Sumner lost his fight to have unseg

9The deletion of the no-discrimination clause of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 created considerable problems for
the NAACP legal team during the Brown cases. The NAACP was
looking for clear, unambigous evidence that the framers of
the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment intended to
outlaw all class discrimi- nation based on race. The striking
of the no-discrimination clause was seized upon by the
Southern attorneys general to argue that it could not have
been the intention of
Congress to ban all statutory
classifications that were race-based.
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regated schools included in the public accommodations section
of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Therefore, because of these
unresolved issues, the Supreme Court played a powerful role
in interpreting the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court's decision in The Slaughterhouse Cases
(16 Wall. 36 [1873]) reaffirmed the fact that the protection
of the rights of freed Negroes represented Congress' original
purpose in crafting the Fourteenth Amendment.10 However, the
Court's

interpretation

of

the

Fourteenth

Amendment

would

ultimately have the effect of stripping the black race of the
very constitutional rights that the Amendment's designers had
explicitly

tried

to

protect.

The

Court

zeroed

in on

the

phrase "citizens of the United States" in the amendment. The
majority

concluded

prohibited

state

that

action

citizenship; however, the
security

and

the

Fourteenth

abridging the

Amendment

rights

only

of national

"fundamental civil rights for the

establishment

of which

organized

society

is

instituted," the Court declared, "remain. . . under the care
of state governments" (Ibid, 76) . In other words, the protec
tions enshrined in the Bill of Rights

(such as freedom of

10The
Louisiana legislature in 1869 granted one
corporation a twenty-five year monopoly over the entire
butchering business in three of the state's parishes. Rival
slaughterhouses sued, arguing that the Louisiana law deprived
them of their natural right to practice the profession of
their choice, creating a condition of slavery in violation of
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. By a 5-4 margin,
the Supreme Court upheld the monopoly, declaring that the
"pervading purpose" of the Civil Rights Amendments had been
to protect the rights of blacks, not the rights of butchers
to practice their profession (16 Wall. 36, 71).
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speech, a free press, the right to petition, right to a fair
trial, right to sit on juries, etc.) properly, according to
the Court's majority, resided under the jurisdiction of the
several

states.

This

jurisprudence which

view

coincided

saw the national

with

pre-Civil

government,

War

not the

states, as the greatest menace to the protection of indivi
dual liberties.11 Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment, as far
as the Court was concerned, had not fundamentally altered the
relationship between the federal government and the states.
The ruling created considerable

space for subsequent

state governments to define the rights of citizenship in ways
which effectively denied equal protection to black Americans.
Moreover, the Supreme Court afforded blacks no defense from
acts by private individuals which violated their constitu
tional rights. With the return of "home rule" in the South,
blacks experienced a gradual, yet systemmatic assault on the

“Perhaps in part to insulate themselves from the charge
that they were doing away with the privileges and immunities
clause, the Court felt compelled to cite some examples of
rights protected by national citizenship: the right to vote
in federal elections, the right to go to the seat of
government and gain access to federal buildings, the right to
petition the federal government for redress of grievances,
and the right of access to seaports, the high seas, and
navigable streams and the like. Kluger (1975) finds such an
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment incredulous: "Was
it possible that Congress and the nation had fought a great
war and undergone agonizing recuperation with force-fed
medicine to establish such rights as these - rights that were
implicit in the supremacy clause of the Constitution" (1975,
58)? Wilkinson adds: "But to the black South Carolina
sharecropper of 1873, bowed by debt and bound to the sod,
protection when abroad or 'on the high seas' was not exactly
the most precious gift" (1979, 14-15).
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gains of the Reconstruction period.
interest

in

the

phillanthropic
withdrawal

plight

of

the

organizations,

Furthermore,

former

slaves,

steadily

Northern
save

diminished.

for
The

of federal troops from the South following the

election of 1876 reflected a widespread resignation in the
North with the

"Southern problem."

The Negro,

in Horatio

Alger terms, was left to fend for himself (Kluger, 1975, 55;
Wilkinson,

1979,

20-23;

Marable,

1982;

Franklin and Moss,

1987; Quarles, 1987).
Considering the political tenor of the times, it is not
surprising that a "states-rights"

theory of

jurisprudence

pervaded Supreme Court decisions which interpreted the rights
of African Americans under the Civil War Amendments. In a
number

of decisions,

the Court rendered narrow interpre

tations of these amendments that left the power to determine
what constitutional rights blacks would enjoy in the hands of
the

states.12 Beginning in 1887,

Southern

states began to

12In United States v. Reese (92 U.S. 214 [1875]), the
Supreme Court declared that the Fifteenth Amendment had not
conferred upon Negroes (or anyone else) the right to vote;
suffrage was a right granted by the states. The Court held
that the right to vote was "not a necessary attribute of
national citizenship."
in a companion case, the Court in
United States v. Cruikshank (92 U.S. 542 [1875]), a case
involving the indictment of white rioters who broke up a
black political rally,
determined that the Fourteenth
Amendment only provided protection against discriminatory
actions
on the
part
of
the
states;
it offered
no
constitutional protection against actions committed by
individuals that violated the civil rights of blacks. Using
the same logic, the Court in The Civil Rights Cases (109 U.S.
3 [1883]) declared the Civil Rights Act of 1875 which banned
racial discrimination in public accommodations as unconstitional. Restaurants, inns, theaters, and businesses were
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enact a series of laws requiring the separation of the races
in virtually every sphere of human activity - from schools,
to the courts,

parks,

sidewalks,

hotels,

residential dis

tricts, and even cemetaries (Woodward, 1951, 212). New laws
like the poll tax, the grandfather clause, residency require
ments,

literacy

gerrymandering,

tests,

property

intimidation,

ownership

requirements,

outright violence,

and other

devises were employed to disenfranchise black voters (Kluger,
1975, 67-68) .
Thus, the stage was set for Plessv v. Ferouson (163 U.S.
537

[1896]).

Homer Plessy challenged a Louisiana law that

required separate accommodations on railway cars for white
and black passengers.
upheld

the

Louisiana

By an 8-1 margin,
statute,

the Supreme Court

concluding

that

separate

facilities for the races were permissable under the Four
teenth Amendment as long as the facilities were equal.

It

could not have been the object of the amendment, the majority
insisted, "to abolish all distinctions based upon color, or
to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality,
or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory
to either" (Ibid, 544). In making their argument, they cited

private entities who could discriminate, and victims of such
actions could not appeal to the Fourteenth Amendment for
relief. Yet, not all of the decisions of this period were
unfavorable to black plaintiffs. See Railroad Company v.
Brown 84 U.S. 445 (1873), Strauder v. West Virginia 100 U.S.
303 (1879), Ex-oarte Virginia 100 U.S. 339 (1879), Ex-parte
Yarbrough 110 U.S. 651 (1883), and United States v. Waddell
112 U.S. 76 (1884).
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state laws establishing separate public schools for whites
and blacks under their police powers as examples of legiti
mate uses of the concept of race to make legal distinctions
among the citizenry.13 The Court denied the plaintiff's claim
that

enforced

separation

implied

the

inferiority

of

the

colored race, countering that if blacks saw the statute in
that fashion "it is not by reason of anything found in the
act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that
construction upon it" (Ibid, 551).
Justice

John Marshall

Harlan,

a

former

slaveholder,

penned one of the most quoted dissenting opinions

in the

history of the Court. He charged that the Court's majority
was simply being dishonest when it denied that the statute
did not imply the inferiority of the Negro race. Of course,
white Americans believed that they were superior to blacks,
Harlan countered; such notions reflected the popular thinking
of

the

day

(DuBois,

1946;

Kluger,

1975;

Lofgren,

1987;

Orfield, 1996). The Constitution, however, denied legitimacy
to such rationalizations. "Our Constitution is color-blind,
and neither knows nor tolerates classes among its citizens"
(163

U.S.

537,

Harlan's view,

559

[J.

Harlan,

dissenting]).

Plessy. in

effectively destined African Americans for

13Specifically, the Court referred to Roberts v. City of
Boston. 5 Cush. 198 (1849) in which the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts determined that the general school
committee of Boston did have power to provide separate
schools for the instuc-tion of Negro children and to prohibit
them from attending schools set aside for whites.
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second-class citizenship because it gave states the power to
use race as a basis for placing blacks "in a condition of
legal inferiority" with respect to other Americans

(Ibid,

563) .
Three

years

later,

the

case

of

Cummina

v.

Richmond

County Board of Education (175 U.S. 528 [1899]) presented the
Court with an opportunity to clarify the Plessv doctrine. In
Cumming, the Supreme Court demonstrated that it seemed more
interested in washing its hands of the problems of African
Americans than
doctrine

was

in

insuring that

actually

honored.

its
In

"separate but
response

to

equal"

increased

demand on the existing school facilities set aside for black
school children, a Georgia school board solved the problem by
turning the only black high school into a grade school. Black
taxpayers petitioned the courts to enjoin the operation of
any white high school in the county in accordance with Plessv
until

one

was

provided

for

black

children.

True

to

its

states-rights philosophy, the Court upheld the school board's
action, declaring that authority over education rested with
the states, not the federal government. A strict adherence to
Plessv would

have

at

least

required the

school

board

to

provide an equal, though separate, high school for blacks.
Instead, not only did the Court refuse to insist that this be
done,

the school board was not required to provide a high

school for black students at all. Interestingly, the Supreme
Court marshalled the example of school segregation to justify
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the

"separate

but

equal"

doctrine

and an

education

case

served as the first test case for the Plessv regime. As it
turned out,

Cummings was a sign of what was to

come

for

African Americans:
. . . In time equal became a ghost word, a balm for
for the nation's conscience, a token of the law's
hollow symmetry and logic, but quite irrelevant in
so far as the Negro was concerned. Signs of inequality
sprouted everywhere. In the park was the separate water
fountain that happened not to work; at the back of the
restaurant was the black carry-out line; in the theatre
was the Jim Crow balcony, unmaintained, because "they'd
trash it up anyhow." Nor was there a separate-but-equal
election to which blacks might be consigned when exclu
ded from the white one (Wilkinson, 1979, 19).
There was no dissenting opinion in Cummings. In fact,
Justice Harlan spoke for a unanimous Court.

Kluger

(1975)

described this turn of events in the following manner:
By the close of the nineteenth century, then, the
Supreme Court had nullified nearly every vestige of the
federal protection that had been cast like a comforting
cloak over the Negro upon his release from bondage. Even
his sole demonstrated friend among the Justices was an
unreliable champion. Once more, the black man seemed to
have no rights that the white man was bound to honor
(83) .
Thus, by the turn of the century, the words of the Civil
War Amendments had,

for all

intents and purposes,

become

"dead letters" for black Americans. Plessv granted the states
a

"blank

Southern

check"
society.

concerned,
Thus,

to

apply

As

far

the Negro was

segregation to
as

every

Northern public

aspect

opinion

of
was

"out of sight and out of mind."

it is within this context of indifferent,

and often

violently hostile public sentiment toward African Americans
that the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
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People (NAACP) emerged. The NAACP and its particular interest
in equal educational opportunity for blacks, is the subject
of the next section of this chapter.
The NAACP and the Crusade Against Segregated Education
The NAACP was founded in 1909 by a biracial group of
Americans alarmed by the deterioration of the political and
civil rights of blacks. Among their principal concerns were
the increase in acts of violence - most notably,
and

race

riots

Americans.14 Also,
increasing

-

committed

by

whites

lynchings

against

African

the organization owed its beginnings to

disenchantment

among

influential

blacks

and

sympathetic whites with strategies for black advancement that
deemphasized,

or

ignored,

the

immediate

quest

for

full

political and civil equality for African Americans (DuBois,
1903; Aptheker, 1951; Kellogg, 1967; Ross, 1972; Franklin and
Moss, 1987; Tushnet, 1987). To achieve their aims, the NAACP
opted for a strategy of agitation and protest that involved
lobbying for desired legislation deemed beneficial to blacks,
publicity campaigns, propoganda designed to counter negative
public perceptions of blacks, and litigation to secure and
protect the rights of African Americans.

14The story of the founding of the NAACP has been told so
often, that it can only receive summary treatment here. Two
general histories that I recommend are Charles Kellogg's
NAACP (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967) and B. Joyce
Ross's J. E. Sprinaarn and the Rise of the NAACP, 1911-1939
(New York: Atheneum, 1972).
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From the outset, the NAACP chose to remain within the
ideological orbit of eighteenth century liberal democratic
traditions. This can be demonstrated in a variety of ways.
The organization's tactics - lobbying,

litigation,

holding

public meetings, and the like - assumed the legitimacy of the
principles

of

Constitution.

the

Declaration

of

Independence

and

the

The NAACP purposely appealed to these great

documents to make the

case

for black equality.

Moreover,

their tactics represented a classic case of interest group
pluralism,
theory.

a cornerstone principle of democratic political

The fidelity of prominent blacks within the NAACP

such as W.E.B. DuBois, James Weldon Johnson, William Pickens,
and Robert Bagnall to American democracy was further attested
to by their highly critical posture toward Marcus Garvey's
"Back to Africa" movement during the 1920's. African Ameri
cans,

they

argued,

were

better

served

channeling

efforts toward obtaining equality in America,
pursuing

the

dream

of

establishing

a

their

rather than

separate

nation

in

Africa (Martin, 1976, 273-333).
Despite the fact that some of the founding leaders of
the NAACP were economic leftists and/or socialists who advo
cated

the

restructuring

of

the

American

economy,

their

program emphasized the attainment of full civil and political
equality for blacks within the existing socioeconomic system.
White socialists like Mary White Ovington and Charles Edward
Russell

felt

that

blacks

must

free

themselves

from
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vestiges of chattel slavery before they could engage in any
struggle for revolutionary change (Ross, 1972, 18-19). In the
beginning, the founders of the NAACP contemplated linking the
group to the burgeoning labor movement; however, the idea was
abandoned for fear that few labor organizations would take up
the Negro's cause.
Furthermore, the founding of the National Urban League
in 1910, an organization with the stated goal of promoting
the economic uplift of blacks, discouraged the development of
an economic emphasis within the NAACP (Ibid, 19; 144). To be
sure, in any movement where many organizations have a common
goal, it is important for individual groups to stake out an
area of focus as to avoid confusion of purpose, unnecessary
competition for membership,

and duplication of effort. The

decision to blaze a path that tended to deemphasize economic
solutions

to

the

plight

important

implications

of African

for the

Americans

future

would

have

development of

the

organization.
Further evidence for the NAACP's determination to pursue
black equality through existing American political institu
tions

is

found

in

its

growing

faith

in the

efficacy

of

litigation. This faith emanated, in large measure, from
a

string

of

highly-publicized

association.15 These

favorable

legal

rulings

victories
had the

for

the

effect

not

15These included the following: Buchanan v. War lev (245
U.S. 60 [1917]) declared that municipal ordinances requiring
residential segregation were unconstitutional. Six years
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only

of

enhancing

the

reputation

of

the

association

to

outsiders and attracting new supporters (Tushnet, 1987, 1),
but internally, it gave the NAACP confidence in its ability
to mount additional assaults against racially discriminatory
practices in the courts. The organization's sense that the
pursuit of legal equality represented its specific area of
expertise

in the

overall

struggle

for

black

advancement

profoundly influenced the NAACP's response to criticism of
its tactics during the 1930's, which will be explored later
in this chapter. Coupled with the fact that it had rejected
solutions
capitalist

calling
order,

for
many

a fundamental
in the

restructuring of the

NAACP's

regard efforts by black insurgents

hierarchy

in the

came

to

1930's for the

association to adopt a greater economic emphasis not only as
threatening, but as heretical.
Moreover,

the NAACP, through its publicity,

research,

and propoganda efforts, revealed their commitment to another
core American virtue: the inherent efficacy of education or
"enlightenment." These efforts were premised on the assump
tion that the American race problem was

largely - though

clearly not entirely - attributable to ignorance. Some of the
NAACP's

early

leaders

believed that by making

the public

later, the Supreme Court in Moore v. Dempsey (2 61 U.S. 86
[1923]) overturned the conviction of an Arkansas black on the
grounds that the proceedings had occurred in a mob-like
atmosphere. In Nixon v. Herndon (273 U.S. 536 [1927]) Texas'
all-white Democratic primary was declared unconstitutional
because it excluded blacks from participating.
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aware of abuses committed against African Americans while
simultaneously pointing out the accomplishments

of blacks

that they might be able to improve whites' perceptions of
Negroes. For example, The Crisis, the organization's monthly
magazine,

devoted

celebrating

a

black

considerable
culture

and

explicitly debunking purportedly
black

inferiority.

amount

of

attention

accomplishments
"scientific"

Advertisements

from

while

theories

black

to

of

educational

institutions of all kinds appeared prominently in the pages
of

The Crisis, no doubt

believed

that

the

black

a reflection of how much
man

needed

education.

DuBois

Thus,

the

NAACP, by assembling the true facts concerning the Negro's
condition and presenting them to the public, hoped to appeal
to the nation's conscience and thereby effect change (Ross,
1972, 45-46).
Not only did the organization value education in the
abstract, but the NAACP expressed interest in improving the
educational

opportunities

available

to

blacks

from

its

earliest days. Despite the fact that Northern philanthropy
had helped to raise the general level of education throughout
the

South,

blacks

increasingly were

forced to

settle

for

inferior schools. Southern states allocated considerably less
money for facilities and teacher salaries for black schools
than their white counterparts. Black students were taught by
teachers

with

less

training

than

white

teachers;

they

attended shorter school terms, and had fewer course offerings
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than

similarly

situated

whites.

Similar

patterns

of

discrimination existed in higher education (DuBois and Dill,
1911; Harlan,

1958; Bullock,

1967; Kellogg,

1967; Kujovik,

1987; Anderson, 1988). Consequently, the NAACP in its early
years was an advocate of federal aid to education,
that the

infusion of

federal dollars

hoping

would bolster

black

education.16 However, Southern states had established such a
pattern

of

systemmatic underfunding

and neglect

of

black

schools that by the 1920's DuBois reversed his position on
the subject of federal aid to education; he predicted that
more aid would simply enable whites to become more effective
racists (Tushnet, 1987, 6) . With the help of a grant from the
American Fund for Public Service [also known as the Garland
Fund],17 The

Crisis

published

a

series

of

articles

from

16On this score, they were greatly disappointed. For
example, the Smith-Lever Act of 1914 provided funds for
agricultural extension programs. However, the law gave states
the discretion in deciding which schools received the money;
not surprisingly, black schools often received little, if
any, funds for agricultural extension programs. This was the
flaw of other federal education programs; for example, often
black land-grant colleges were routinely denied their fair
share of federal funds that they were entitled to under the
Second Morrill Act of 189 0 because the states had the right
to determine the division of the federal funds to the
appropriate universities (Alexander and Alexander, 1985, 5556; Kujovik, 1987; Christy and Williamson, 1992) .
17The Garland Fund derives its name from Charles Garland,
a twenty-one year old Harvard undergraduate who inherited a
fortune upon the death of his father, a Boston millionaire.
Believing it wrong to claim a fortune he had done nothing to
create, Garland gave some $800,000 to establish a fund to
support liberal and radical causes. Roger Baldwin, director
of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), became the
fund's chief administrator. Among the organizations assisted
during the nineteen year existence of the Garland Fund were
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September 19 26 to July 1928 that documented the disparities
between black and white education in the South.18
Equal educational opportunity for blacks, thus, figured
prominently among the goals of the association from its very
beginning. This concern, combined with the NAACP's increased
confidence
change and

both
in

in litigation as an

instrument to effect

its own capacity to successfully challenge

racial discrimination set the stage for the organization's
leaders to pursue a long-term strategy to confront Jim Crow
segregation

in

the

public

schools.

They

also

sensed

an

opportunity to gain a more substantial grant from the Garland
Fund to support their efforts.
By this time, an interlocking relationship had emerged
between the Garland Fund and the NAACP. James Weldon Johnson,
general secretary of the NAACP,

also sat on the board of

directors that administered the fund, as did Morris Ernst, a
member of the NAACP's Legal Committee. In 1929, Johnson and
Ernst along with Lewis Gannett, a literary critic active with
the United Mine Workers of America, the Rand School of Social
Science, the League for Industrial Democracy, the magazine
The New Masses, the American Birth Control League, the SaccoVanzetti Defense League, Vanguard Press, the Brotherhood of
Sleeping Car Porters, and the NAACP (Kluger, 1975, 132;
Tushnet, 1987, 2-20).
18The data revealed that South Carolina spent ten times
more on the education of every white child as it did for
every black child. No other Southern state approached the
inbalance between black and white education that existed in
South Carolina. Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and Alabama
spent five times as much on whites as it did on blacks; in
North Carolina, Maryland, Virginia, Texas, and Oklahoma, the
ratio was two to one (Kluger, 1975, 134).

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

108

the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) formed the fund's
Committee on Negro Work. Beginning in August,
May,

1930, the committee,

1929 through

in collaboration with the NAACP,

drafted a proposal to give the NAACP a sizable grant from the
Garland Fund (Kluger, 1975, 132; Tushnet,

1987, 6-7).

Noting that blacks were the largest group of unorganized
workers in America, the proposal called for the Garland Fund
to finance a massive legal campaign aimed not only at giving
Southern blacks

their

constitutional

rights

but

a

"self-

consciousness and self-respect which would inevitably tend to
effect a revolution

in the economic life of the country"

(Kluger, 1975, 132). Included in the request was a memoranda
of proposed legal strategy,

particularly

in the education

arena. Taxpayers' suits were urged to assure equal as well as
separate schools

in the

seven states that most

discriminated against blacks - Alabama,
Georgia,

Louisiana,

Mississippi,

and

blatantly

Arkansas,

South

Florida,

Carolina.

NAACP anticipated that the suits would make the

The

costs of

maintaining dual school systems so prohibitive that it would
force

Southern

states

to

integrate

their

public

schools

(Ibid, 132).
This strategy was

significantly modified when Nathan

Margold, a legal consultant hired by the NAACP, weighed in on
their deliberations. Because there were thousands of school
districts in the South, the NAACP's original proposal would
have required them to engage in an infinite number of suits
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that would have to be waged to equalize black schools. Such
an approach, he argued, not only would be a waste of their
material resources, but it offered no assurance that a legal
victory in one district would have any governing effect in
another.

Instead,

Margold noted

that Plessv had

endorsed

racial segregation so long as facilities were equal. But what
if facilities not only were unequal, but they were habitually
operated in such a manner as to maintain racial inequality?
Margold suggested that the NAACP should start by attacking
the "equal" portion of the Plessv doctrine. Based on what the
NAACP's investigations of Southern education had uncovered,
he argued that it could be readily shown that neither the
spirit nor the letter of the "separate but equal" doctrine
actually existed for black people in the South

(Ibid, 133-

135). The NAACP's early victories in University of Maryland
v. Murray (169 Md. 478 [1936]) and

Missouri ex. rel. Gaines

v. Canada (305 U.S. 337 [1938]) reflected Margold's influence
on their tactics.19
19The Murray and Gaines cases were very similar. Neither
Maryland nor Missouri provided graduate or professional
education of any kind to black students within the state.
Both states, however, operated scholarship programs for
qualified blacks to pursue postbaccalaureate studies out-ofstate. The Maryland Supreme Court declared that the out-ofstate tuition program to be unconstitutional. Two years
later, the U.S. Supreme Court concurred, finding the program
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and did not meet its
burden under Plessv to provide separate and equal education.
Moreover, the Court wrote that "the provision for payment of
tuition in another state did not remove the discrimination"
because whites were not subject to the same treatment by the
law. The Gaines ruling did not inspire repentence on the part
of the South; on the contrary, other Southern states soon
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In

summary,

eliminating

the

NAACP's

segregated

long-standing

education

and

its

interest
faith

in

in
the

legalistic approach came together in the school desegregation
movement.

Education,

however,

was only one component of a

broad-based legal strategy to achieve political and civil,
equality for blacks. The association did not stop pursuing
legal equality for blacks on other fronts once the decision
to

attack

NAACP

segregated

adapted

the

education

philosophy

was
of

made.20 Therefore,

classical

liberalism

the
in

service to the goal of attaining equal opportunity under the
law for black Americans.
The NAACP's proposed strategy, however, was not greeted
with unanimous support. Moreover, the stock market crash of
1929 and subsequent Great Depression presented the NAACP with
the greatest challenge to its core convictions to date. The
economic crisis touched off an intense debate, both inside
and outside the NAACP,

over the relevancy of the associa

adopted their own unconstitutional versions of the Missouri
out-of-state tuition program for blacks (Friedman, 1969, 523;
Kluger, 1975, 187-194; Dorsey, 1981; Miller, 1982).
20The following cases are examples of legal victories for
the NAACP on issues other than education: Hale v. Kentucky.
(303 U.S. 613 [1938]) [right to a fair criminal trial where
blacks have been habitually barred from juries]; Lane v.
Wil s o n , (307 U.S. 268 [1939]) [racially discriminatory laws
denying blacks the right to vote]; Smith v. Alwriaht. 321
U.S. 649 (1944) [white primary]; Morgan v. Virginia. 328 U.S.
373 [laws requiring segregation of interstate passengers];
Henderson v. United States. 339 U.S. 816 (1950) [segregation
in carrier regulation]; and Shelley v. Kraemer. 334 U.S. 1
(1948) [racially restrictive covenants].
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tion's focus on legal equality for blacks. This exchange is
the focus of the next, section.
The Triumph of Legalism
Not everyone within the Garland Fund's hierarchy was
enthusiastic about the NAACP's strategy.

Indeed,

the one with the most hands-on experience with

Baldwin the

legal

approach - was perhaps the most skeptical. He believed that
the

legalistic

approach

was

doomed

to

fail

because

"the

forces that keep the Negro under subjection will find some
way of accomplishing their purposes, law or no law" (Kluger,
1975, 132). Drawing from his personal background of defending
the rights of antiwar activists and conscientious objectors
during World War I, Baldwin held that the law was to be used
only as an instrument to a broader goal

(and then defen

sively) , not as an end in and of itself. Baldwin considered
the black man's plight a subset of the struggles of working
class people in America; the solution to the problem required
the restructuring of the American economy, rather than simply
guaranteeing legal rights. He felt the NAACP should devote
its time toward effecting the unionization of black and white
workers

"against

their

common

[capitalist]

exploiters"

(Kluger, 1975, 133).
Baldwin's views were not uncommon among those on the
left during the 1920's and 1930's. More importantly,

other

members of the Garland Fund's Board of Directors shared his
sentiments. The committee's initial proposal passed (though
the vote was close) and $100,000 was approved for the NAACP's
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strategy.21 Nevertheless,

this tension remained,

and would

serve as a chronic source of conflict between the fund and
the NAACP. Many of the fund's directors were more interested
in the unionization of workers, and did not readily see how
the NAACP's focus on litigation served that end.
By contrast, the NAACP's draft proposal emphasized that
voting rights,

equal rights in schools,

on juries,

and in

public accommodations must precede unionization and

"real

economic independence" for Negroes (Tushnet, 1987, 7). Their
approach was in line with the NAACP's traditional stance that
put civil and political equality for blacks over strategies
for economic uplift of African Americans.

When pressed to

defend the relevancy of the proposed campaign, NAACP leaders
insisted on the "obvious link" between what it saw as the
attainment of civil and political equality for blacks and the
fund's concern for the labor movement. Nevertheless, some of
the fund's directors remained unconvinced. In fact, on more
than one occasion, some of the members of the board attempted
to divert funds from the NAACP to the American Negro Labor
Congress and the International Labor Defense (ILD), organi
zations that were more

left-wing than the NAACP.

Garland

21The NAACP received only slightly more than $20,000 of
the original $100,000 that was promised. A number of factors
contributed to this: in the first place, the stock market
disaster seriously depleted the capital the fund had at its
disposal.
Secondly,
the
Garland
Fund's
ideological
commitments led them to support marginal political groups who
had difficulty repaying their loans. Finally, there existed
underlying tension between the fund and the NAACP over how
the funds should be used (Tushnet, 1987 1-20).
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himself reportedly lamented the fund's decision to fund the
NAACP's litigation drive because he felt the organization was
not radical enough (Ibid, 14) .
The NAACP's tactics elicited criticism from prominent
leftist intellectuals outside the Garland Fund, such as
Ralph Bunche, a political scientist at Howard University. He
scorned

the

legal

approach,

arguing

that

its

proponents

failed to appreciate that the law was merely an instrument of
the capitalist class to exploit the working classes (Bunche,
1935, 315). The NAACP, according to Bunche, had "conducted a
militant fight under this illusory banner" (Ibid, 315). They
had

placed

too

much

faith

in

the

Constitution

(and

in

particular, the Civil War Amendments), divorcing it from the
real political and economic realities of life in America for
African Americans.

"This view," he continued,

quite significant fact that the Constitution.

"ignores the
. . cannot be

anything more than what the controlling elements of American
society want it to be" (Ibid) .
Furthermore,

as

the

Depression

deepened,

pressure

mounted, both within and without the NAACP, for the associa
tion to rethink its traditional program of fighting for legal
equality for blacks in favor of a greater emphasis on classbased approaches to addressing the problems faced by African
Americans.22 The organization's

critics

failed

to

see the

22Blacks, an economically subordinate class even in boom
times, were especially devastated by the Depression. By 1934,
nearly 40 percent of working-age blacks were categorized as
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wisdom or the relevancy of an ambitious legal strategy in the
midst of an unprecedented economic crisis (Ross, 1972, 144185; Tushnet,

1987, 8). They reminded the NAACP that their

rather impressive legal victories had yet to translate into
a

fundamental

ordinary

transformation

black Americans.

in

the

Residential

everyday

lives

of

segregation reigned

both in law and custom despite Buchanan; the state of Texas
circumvented the Supreme Court's decision on white primaries
by declaring the Democratic Party a private organization with
the right to discriminate.

Discrimination,

they concluded,

had continued despite favorable court decisions,

either by

nonenforcement, outright defiance, or ingenious circumvention
of the law. Why should this campaign be any different?
W. T. B. Williams,
were

a

"doubtful

in making the case that the courts

remedy,"

recalled

the

Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia

example
(5 Pet.

of

The

1 [1831])

where Chief Justice John Marshall's Supreme Court denied that
Georgia had the right to forcibly remove the Cherokee Indians
from the lands they occupied. Drawing an analogy to those who
would likely oppose favorable court decisions on behalf of
blacks, Williams writes, "They [opponents of black rights]

incapable of self-support. By 1935, some 65 percent of
employable African Americans in Atlanta were in need of
public assis-tance; the comparable figure in Norfolk was
higher (Kluger, 1975, 140) .
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can easily say with President [Andrew] Jackson. . . 'Marshall
has made this decision, now let him enforce it'" (1935, 439440) .
Finally,

even

if one

assumed

that

Southerners would

honor judicial judgements that - for example, required them
to equalize funding between black and white schools - where
would the money come from? A proposal to extract increased
appropriations for black schools in the poverty-striken South
of the 1930's looked like a classic case of the proverbial
attempt to "squeeze blood out of a turnip"
136) . Thus,

the NAACP's

strategy was

(Kluger,

1975,

criticized not only

because of doubts about its relevancy to the times and its
attention

to

economic

issues,

but

also

the

efficacy

of

litigation itself was called into question.
To be sure, though the NAACP had consciously decided in
its

early

years

to

relinquish

the

role

of

securing

the

economic advancement of American blacks to the National Urban
League,

it had

altogether.

not been able

Rather,

to avoid

economic

concerns

its concern for the legal equality of

blacks necessarily engaged them in skirmishes to insure equal
economic opportunities for African Americans. As more blacks
migrated to the cities from the rural South and encountered
racial discrimination in areas such as housing and hiring,
the NAACP made forays into the economic sphere. For example,
it had sought admission of black workers into the American
Federation

of

Labor

(AFL), though

with

no

success;
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association

had

assisted

in

the

unionization

of

black

railroad workers, and fought against racial discrimination in
wages and hiring under the New Deal programs

(Ross,

1972,

160). Thus, it simply was not true, as its critics charged,
that the NAACP did not have an economic program.

However,

considering the way that the NAACP's critics defined the
issues,

it

simply

was

not possible

to

accommodate

those

pushing for a heavier economic emphasis in the association's
basic

program without a

fundamental restructuring

of the

mission, internal organization, and practices of the NAACP.
This, however, turned out to be precisely what the NAACP
was not willing to do. During the 1930's, its board of direc
tors continued to be dominated by those who believed that the
association's historic role - the attainment of full civil
and political equality for blacks - must take precedence over
any program of economic uplift. Once equality under the law
had been secured, blacks would be able to move into the main
stream of American society.

They continued to oppose the

suggestion that a fundamental restructuring of the economy
was

a prerequisite

for black

liberation.

Save for racial

segregation, the NAACP's ideology affirmed the moral goodness
of American capitalist and democratic institutions. This view
was shared by both black and white board members.

In fact,

prominent blacks within the upper echelon of the NAACP, such
as Walter White, Roy Wilkins, and Louis T. Wright proved to
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be just as committed to the NAACP's traditional mission as
their older, white colleagues (Ibid, 172).
Its

leaders and supporters defended their

approach

more

broadly,

and

their

choice

legalistic

to

focus

on

segregated education specifically. For example, though they
had

not

succeeded

in

securing

a

long-standing

goal

- a

federal anti-lynching law - the association attributed the
statistical

decline

in

lynchings

over

the

previous

two

decades to their efforts (Ibid, 157-158). Moreover, those who
criticized

the

NAACP's

legal

program

had

the

burden

of

demonstrating how this could be done - up to that time, the
NAACP's efforts, as well as those of other groups, had proved
largely unsuccessful

in achieving this goal.

Many

of the

NAACP/s leaders foresaw no change in this situation in the
immediate future; therefore, they reasoned that a full-scale
legal attack on segregated education promised more immediate
results. Furthermore, many of the critics on the left failed
to provide practical tactics or could not agree on the right
approach to restructure the economy. As a result, many of the
NAACP's leaders dismissed them as impractical. For example,
Bunche

(1935)

severely criticized the NAACP's methodology

while offering no solutions of his own. His logic implied
that black liberation could not occur within the context of
American capitalism, but he neglected to include any guidance
for how

blacks

might

construct

a political

system more favorable to their interests.

and

economic

In addition,
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attacking inequalities such as huge disparities in the pay of
white and black teachers,

the NAACP

felt it could secure

tangible economic benefits for black communities (like higher
salaries) now in lieu of their larger goals. For them, this
approach seemed more practical and natural, given the NAACP's
roots, than venturing into the untried,

untested waters of

economic theories.
Charles Thompson, commenting on the litigation campaign
against

segregated

reasonable

schools,

alternative to

called

remedy

the

courts

immediate

"the

abuses

of

only
the

Negro separate school" (1935, 419-434). In response to fears
of state defiance and circumvention of the law, he wrote,
"The history of litigation in this country reveals only rare
instances

where

the

decisions

of

our

higher

courts

are

flouted to the extent of a direct refusal to act in accord
with them"

(Ibid, 425). He also hinted that litigation may

actually improve the condition of public schools for blacks
by

drawing

routinely

attention to
by

white

the gross

school

inequities perpetuated

officials.

Alain

Locke

(1935)

doubted that if integrated education was firmly established
as official policy that "few [white] parents would exercise
their

right

to

send

their

children

to

separate

private

schools and forego the advantages of public education on this
account" (411). He hoped that mutual association of the races
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in public schools would provide the means for eradicating the
most harmful stereotypes that whites harbored about blacks
(Ibid, 411).
Intertwined with the debate raging between the legalists
and the economic determinists was a controversy precipitated
by an editorial

submitted by DuBois

in the January,

1934

issue of The Crisis entitled, "Segregation." He declared that
. opposition to segregation is an opposition to dis
crimination.

. . But the two things do not necessarily go

together, and there should never be an opposition to segre
gation

pure

and

simple

unless

segregation

does

involve

discrimination" (20). By this time, DuBois had began to lose
hope in the realization of black incorporation into American
capitalist democracy;

his sympathies were

shifting toward

labor and the Communists and he thought blacks needed to move
leftward also

(DuBois,

1968, 289-307). His editorial ques

tioned the validity of the stance that racial segregation in
any form should be met with unmitigated opposition. Though
recognizing that many of the association's leaders considered
racial segregation inherently evil, DuBois exploited the fact
that the NAACP had never formally rendered an overall policy
statement to that effect. He urged the NAACP to analytically
distinguish between segregation and discrimination.
In light of white antipathy toward the black man, DuBois
reasoned that African Americans must work in the meantime to
make their own institutions the best they could be. A policy
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of

unqualified

opposition to

segregation,

he

maintained,

implied that black institutions - whether they be schools,
churches,

fraternal associations,

businesses,

etc.

- were

inherently inferior because they were black. DuBois attempted
to remind the association of examples from its history where,
in his view, the NAACP had made practical concessions to the
reality of segregation.23 Consequently, he concluded that an
acknowledgement

of

a distinction

between

segregation

and

discrimination would not be inconsistent with the historical
activities of the association.
DuBois' position placed him at odds with the prevailing
philosophy of the association's leaders. They objected to his
interpretation of the NAACP's mission and historical stance.
J.

E.

Springarn,

the

last

white

chairman

of

the

board

quipped: "But we [the NAACP] were always against segregation,
we always regarded it as evil,
evil"

(1934,

if sometimes as a necessary

79). The fact that the organization had made

23 I will mention a few examples. He argued that though
the Association had opposed the extension of segregation in
public education, it had never undertaken to attack the
separate schools where black children were already being
educated. Secondly, once the United States entered World War
I, the NAACP supported a Negro officers' training camp and
otherwise encouraged black enlistment in the armed forces
despite the fact that blacks would be relegated to segregated
units. Thirdly, though the NAACP had originally opposed the
establishment of a Negro hospital at Tuskegee, once it was
established, it fought to provide for that hospital the
widest opportunity. Finally,
he pointed out that the
association had never explicitly denied the necessity of
black organizations for self-help and defense, though it had
recognized them as a necessary evil that reminded them of the
very color line of which they were struggling to overcome
(DuBois, 1934, 52-53).
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practical concessions to segregation on occasion, Springarn
replied, should not be construed as a generalization about
the overall mission of the NAACP. David H. Pierce feared that
any concession to segregation was tantamount to compromise
with prejudice and, if continued, with slavery. DuBois' views
could be used, he concluded, to provide aid and comfort to a
"policy of extreme reaction" (80). Walter White expressed a
similar sentiment:
To accept the status of separateness, which almost
invariably in the case of sub-merged, exploited, and
marginal groups means inferior accomodations and a
distinctly inferior position in the national and
communal life, means spiritual atrophy for the group
segregated. . . Arbitrary segregation of this sort
means almost without exception that less money will be
expended for adequate sewerage, water, police and fire
protection and for the building of a healthy community
(80-81).
Because unequal treatment always followed segregation, White
argued, the NAACP had always stubbornly resisted segregation
in

municipal

ordinances,

racially

restrictive

covenants,

hospital services and "wherever it "shows its head"

(81) .

Thus, targeting segregation in schools did not depart from
the association's traditions.
DuBois'

position did not prevail.

The Board passed a

resolution in April, 1934 which read:
The National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People is opposed both to the principle and
the practice and the practice of enforced segregation
of human beings on the basis of race and color.
Enforced segregation by its very existence carries
with it the implication of a superior and inferior
group and invariably results in the imposition of a
lower status on the group deemed inferior. Thus both
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principle and practice necessitate unyielding oppo
sition to any and every form of enforced segregation.
(149).
DuBois remained unsatisfied. What about black churches?
How about black colleges?
newspapers

Did the NAACP believe in Negro

and Negro businesses?

spirituals (149)?

Did

it believe in Negro

DuBois resented the implication that all

black institutions, made necessary by the reality of white
exclusion,

were

nothing more than

inferior

imitations

of

white institutions. In summary, he complained that the NAACP
resolution was merely an abstract declaration of principle
which

did

not wrestle

with

the hard

issues.

The rupture

between DuBois and the association could not be bridged; in
May,

1934 he resigned every post he held within the NAACP.

Nevertheless,
build

their

he

continued his

own

institutions.

crusade,
Directly

urging blacks
challenging

to
the

premise of the NAACP's campaign against segregated education,
DuBois asked:
Does the Negro need separate schools? God knows
he does. But what he needs more than separate schools
is a firm and unshakable belief that twelve million
Negroes have the inborn capacity to accomplish just
as much as any nation of twelve million anywhere in the
world ever accomplished, and this is not because
they are Negroes but because they are human (1935,
333) .
DuBois' ideological opponents continued to press their
case. Thompson

(193 5) countered,

"I think most of us would

agree that to segregate is to stigmatize, however much we may
try to rationalize it" (433) . Segregation was always precipi
tated by the actions of whites;

thus,

he reasoned that if
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blacks acquiesce or rationalize the practice "they do some
thing to their personalities which is infinitely worse than
any of the discomforts some of them may experience in a mixed
school"

(433).

irreparable

Long

(1935)

personality

wondered if segregation caused

damage

to

black

children.

Both

authors anticipated the psychological theories of Kenneth
Clark which would be utilized by NAACP attorneys in the Brown
cases.
Therefore, in the midst of the crisis of the 1930's, the
NAACP

hardened

its belief

in

its historical

convictions.

Drawing on classical liberal sources, the NAACP envisioned a
society whereby race could not be used for any reason to deny
black Americans the full benefits of American citizenship.
This view refused to entertain a distinction between volun
tary segregation and compulsory segregation;

instead,

the

NAACP regarded racial separation as it was then practiced as
inherently

evil

and

always

harmful

to

the

black

race.

Secondly, the association reaffirmed its commitment to the
tactics of litigation and other forms of agitation within the
confines

of

existing

American

institutions

as

the

most

reasonable method of attacking racial injustice. It rejected
theories which suggested that the American economy needed to
be radically restructured before black Americans could enjoy
their full rights as citizens.

Rather,

the NAACP believed

that once equal opportunity was guaranteed under the law,
blacks would have equal footing with all other Americans in
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the Lockean race. Thus, legalism had triumphed. The prevai
ling vision

of

the NAACP's

leadership

which consolidated

itself as a result of the controversies of the 193 0 's not
only profoundly shaped the association for decades to come,
but it significantly influenced the course that the school
desegregation campaign would take. The legacy of the contro
versies of the 1930's constitute the subject of the final,
upcoming section of this chapter.
The Legacy of the Thirties
To paraphrase Louis Hartz, once the question of "first
principles" for the NAACP was settled, all subsequent issues
became "matters of technique"

(1955,

10) . The ideological

framework in which the litigation strategy against segregated
education evolved was firmly established in the 1930's. The
controversies both within the ranks of the NAACP and from
outsiders served to harden the organization's commitment to
its

traditional

program:

(1)

the

pursuit

of

civil

and

political equality of blacks took precedence over promoting
the economic concerns of African Americans,

and (2) racial

segregation in any form constituted an inherent evil which
must

be

categorically

opposed.

Therefore,

the

strategy

ultimately decided upon reflected the conscious choice of the
NAACP

in the face of counterarguments that other ways of

expending its resources might prove more fruitful (Tushnet,
1987, 8).
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The NAACP's ideological framework shaped the subsequent
course that the campaign took in a number of important ways.
For

example,

since

the

NAACP

equated

segregation

with

discrimination, the organization in the end chose to attack
the constitutionality of Plessv itself; no other alternative
was possible without the NAACP breaking with, or altering its
principles. As segregative practices designed to make black
education more "equal" while preserving separation of the
races were being struck down one by one, the issue proved to
be unavoidable.24 Despite the fact that many Southern states
were scrambling to improve previously neglected black schools
in response to the barrage of legal attacks,25 settling for
M In Gaines ex. rel. Missouri v. Canada (305 U.S. 337
[1938]), the NAACP challenged the unequal application of
Plessy without attacking the constitutionality of the
separate but equal doctrine itself. By contrast, the graduate
and professional education cases of the late 1940's and early
1950's attacked the constitutionality of Plessv itself. Yet,
the NAACP, while arguing that blacks be admitted into white
institutions still had a fallback position: insisting that
blacks be provided equal facilities of their own. See Sipuel
v. Board of Regents. 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painterr
339 U.S. 629 (1950); and McLaurin v. Oklahoma Board of
Regents. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
25The 1940's was characterized by furious activity on the
part of Southern state legislatures to upgrade black schools
in the hope of discouraging integration. For example, when a
black student applied for admission to LSU Law School in
1946, the LSU Board of Supervisors and the State Board of
Education moved quickly to establish a law school at
historically black Southern University (Vincent, 1981, 166).
The creation of Southern Law School, however, did not stop
blacks from attempting to enter LSU's law school on an equal
basis (Wilson v. Louisiana State University Board of Super
visors . (92 F. Supp. 986 [1950]). Similar law suits were
filed in other parts of the country. See Johnson v. Board of
Trustees 83 F. Supp. 707 (E.D. Ky. [1949]) State ex. rel.
Toliver v. Board of Education. (230 S.W. 2d 724 Mo. [1950]),
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the equalization of schools under Plessv ran counter to the
NAACP's vision that segregation itself was the evil that had
to be eradicated.. The Supreme Court vindicated the NAACP's
position in Sweatt v. Painter (339 U.S. 629 [1950]) when it
determined

that

Texas'

frantic

efforts

to

enhance

black

education under the "separate but equal" doctrine did not
negate their constitutional duty to admit Herman Sweatt to
the

University

of

Texas

Law

School

Creating a separate black law school,
failed

to

satisfy

the

state's

on

an

equal

basis.

in the Court's view,

constitutional

mandate

to

provide equal protection for black citizens because
The University of Texas Law School possesses to a far
greater degree those qualities which are incapable of
objective measurement but which make for greatness in a
law school. Such qualities, to name but a few, include
reputation of the faculty, experience of the admini
stration, position and influence of the alumni, standing
in the community, traditions and prestige (Ibid, 634).

Parker v. University of Delaware. (75 a. 2d 225 Del. [1950]),
McKissick v. Carmichael. (187 F. 2d 949 [4th Cir. 1951]),
cert, denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951), Gebhart v. Belton. (91 A.
2d 137 Del. [1952]) and Tureaud v. Board of Supervisors (116
F. Supp. 248 [E.D. La. 1953]). This pattern of upgrading
black
education
as
opposed
to
integration
prevailed
throughout the South. States, for example, adopted their own
versions of out-of-state tuition plans (in defiance of the
ruling in Gaines) rather than provide graduate education for
blacks within their borders.
Clarendon
County,
South
Carolina, one of the Brown defendants, accepted a bid in 1951
for a new $261,000 high school for blacks and had plans for
two new grade schools for colored children on the drawing
boards. Governor James Byrnes, who had successfully pushed a
school equalization bond issue through the legislature,
warned that if the federal courts ordered integration, he
would order the public schools closed and converted to a
private system (Kluger, 1975, 523, 531-532).
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Conversely,

creating a new black school,

even if the

state of Texas provided it with state-of-the art facilities
and equipment, did not meet the standards of equal protection
because of these

"intangible benefits"

that the Court in

Sweatt decision recognized. In other words, it was impossible
for Sweatt to receive an equal legal education at an all
black law school within the meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause. While the Court's reasoning did not overturn Plessv
outright,
challenge
itself.

it seemed to indicate that the time had come to
directly

the

constitutionality

of

segregation

The Court's rationale that providing separate law

schools for blacks denied them certain intangible benefits
that would be theirs in an integrated setting lay at the
heart of the NAACP's case in Brown. The NAACP applied the
principle announced in Sweatt to elementary and secondary
education.
Plessv had explicitly denied that statutory segregation
imposed a badge of inferiority upon the segregated group, in
blatant

contradiction

to the

facts

of

how

"separate

but

equal" was practiced. The reality of how Plessv was applied
seemed to strengthen the determination of black lawyers to
overturn the legality of segregation itself. Had the NAACP
lawyers not believed so strongly that state-imposed segre
gation created a sense of inferiority among African Americans
(as well as a sense of superiority among whites), it is not
likely they would have relied as heavily as they did on
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Kenneth Clark's famous doll tests which alleged that school
segregation psychologically damaged black children.
These "facts of life" made DuBois' suggestion that all
segregation may not in fact be harmful

(but may in fact be

necessary for survival) seem, to many leading black thinkers,
impractical at best and racial treason at worst. During the
heat of the controversy that DuBois' position had generated,
Francis J. Grimke, a prominent black minister, sighed:
Why Dr. DuBois has reopened the question of segre
gation in THE CRISIS I am at a loss to know. Can it
be possible that in the remotest part of his brain
he is beginning to think, after all, that it is a
condition that ought to be accepted, a condition that
we ought to stop fussing about? If so, then his
leadership among us is at an end; we can follow no
such leader (1934, 173) .
Grimke's remarks implied that the issue raised by DuBois
did not need to be debated: the issue was settled. How could
any self-respecting, thinking black American consider such a
thought?
Thus, the NAACP's view that racial segregation was an
inherent evil most clearly manifested itself in its legal
arguments before the Supreme Court during the Brown cases.26
They insisted that segregation in education was wrong because

26In Brown. the Supreme Court reviewed five school dese
gregation cases originating in Kansas, South Carolina,
Virginia, Delaware, and the District of Columbia. These cases
were Brown v. Board of Education 98 F. Supp. 797 (D.Kan.
[1951]), Briggs v. Elliot. 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D. S.C.
[1951]), Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward
County. 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va.
[1952]), Belton v.
Gebhart, 91 A . 2d 137 (S. Ct. Del. [1952]), and Bolling v.
Sharpe (344 U.S. 873 [1952]).
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the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly intended to
forbid the states from passing laws which applied to one race
that did not apply likewise to another.

The existence

of

school segregation in many states during the 1860's was not
relevant;

congressional

and

judicial

authority

under

the

Fourteenth Amendment was broad enough to outlaw the practice.
Indeed,

the

NAACP

exploited

the

fact

that

some

of

the

congressional opponents of the civil rights measures cited
school segregation as one of the areas the federal government
should not be able to interfere with. These references, the
NAACP's attorneys reasoned, proved that Congress understood
the amendment as nullifying the existing Black Codes in the
states and forbidding the enacting of race-based statutory
distinctions in the future. Moreover, the NAACP maintained
that whether or not separate facilities were equal or not was
beside the point;

the very act of segregation

in and

of

itself denied blacks equal educational opportunities in vio
lation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Friedman, 1969, 12) . It
was here where the social science evidence became crucial to
the NAACP's

case.27 The NAACP's attorneys

quoted a chorus

^Not coincidentally, the district court in Brown v.
Board of Education (98 F. Supp. 797 [D.Kan. , 1951]) found the
separate facilities provided for the races to be comparable.
Nevertheless, the district court upheld the Kansas statute,
declaring that as long as Plessv was the law of the land, the
state was permitted to maintain segregated schools. The
ruling, however, served the NAACP's purposes for two reasons.
First, the district court acknow-ledged that the facilities
were equal; thus, the Supreme Court would have to determine
the constitutionality of segregation itself. Unlike previous
cases, it could not require the defendants to address clear
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line of eminent social scientists who held that the very act
of segregating black children from whites

of similar age

caused personality damage in black children, irrespective of
whether
Chein,

or

not

1948;

the

facilities

Kurland

and

were

Casper,

equal

1975).

(Deutscher
Thus,

the

and

NAACP

concluded that Plessy stood in opposition to both the letter
and the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment (Friedman, 1969,
180-206).
However, their interpretation of the framers' motives
required them to skirt the significance of persistent racial
discrimination

in

education

in

the

states

despite

the

amendment's passage. Public education during the 1860's was

inequalities within the school system rather than reexamining
the separate but equal doctrine itself. Second, the district
court, in Item VIII of its findings of fact, explicitly
acknowledged the plaintiffs' claim that segregation damaged
the personalities of black children:
Segregation of white and colored children in public
schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored
children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction
of law; for the policy of separating the races is
usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the
negro group.
A sense of inferiority affects the
motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the
sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to restrain
the educational and mental development of negro children
and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would
receive in a racial integrated school system (Friedman,
1969, 542; Kluger, 1975, 424).
This finding was quoted verbatim by the Supreme Court in
Brown and formed the heart of the Court's decision. "Whatever
may have been the state of psychological knowledge at the
time of Plessv v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported
by modern authority. Any language in Plessv v. Ferguson
contrary to this finding is rejected" (347 U.S. 494 [1954]).
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still in an embryonic stage; and in the South,

it had been

stubbornly resisted (Genovese, 1967; Kluger, 1975; Anderson,
1988).
black

Though there existed a long standing tradition of
agitation

against

compulsory

racial

segregation

in

public education dating to the antebellum period (Peterson,
1935;

Grant,

1968;

Kluger,

1975;

Dorsey,

1981;

Vincent,

1981) , the provision of any education for blacks - in the
minds

of

those

sympathetic to

the ex-slaves

and

to many

blacks themselves - was viewed as a sign of progress (Kluger,
1975, 633) . Confronted with the problem of massive illiteracy
among the ex-slaves,

many blacks and liberal whites cared

less about whether blacks received education on an integrated
basis as much as whether they receive schooling at all. As a
result, when Senator Sumner lost his fight to have the right
to desegregated schools included in the public accommodations
section of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, many observers did
not think it was an important issue (Ibid, 50). In light of
these facts,

it was not surprising that Southern attorneys

maintained that the existence of school segregation in the
1860's (particularly in Northern and Western states), meant
that Congress had never intended for school segregation to
fall

within

the

purview

of

the

Fourteenth

Amendment.28

28They cited the following examples as proof that
Congress never intended to deny states the right to schools
segregated by race: (1) the segregation of schools within the
District of Columbia, (2) the establishment of all-black
schools by the Freedman's Bureau, (3) federal enactments
granting land allotments for the establishment of all-black
schools, (4) the striking of a provision to the Civil Rights

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

132

Southern

attorneys

recounted

a

vast

array

of

historical

evidence of school segregation during the period in question
while conveniently ignoring the fact that the Supreme Court
had on numerous occasions applied the Fourteenth Amendment to
areas that the framers had clearly not contemplated.29 There
fore, the crux of the South's argument rested on the premise
that the Court must be bound not only by the prejudices of
the present, but by the prejudices of the past.
The Supreme Court's decision was exactly what the NAACP
had

hoped

for.

When

faced with

the

question

of whether

Congress intended to prohibit segregated schooling when it
originally

adopted

the

Fourteenth

Amendment,

the

Court

reached a startling conclusion: the intent of the framers of
the

Fourteenth

Amendment

"cannot

be

determined

with

any

degree of certainty" (347 U.S. 483, 489). The Court's finding
was, at best, curious in light of an abundance of historical
evidence that Congress did not intend to eliminate segregated

Act of 1875 which would have included schools in the category
of public accomodations which could not be provided on a
segregated basis. Curiously, the Southern argument more
faithfully adheres to the historical context of the 18 60's
than the NAACP's version of events in one critical respect:
it is more blatantly honest about the racial prejudices which
existed in the country at large and in the halls of Congress.
This is no doubt a function of their determination to prevent
racial mixing in the schools. The historical context of postCivil War America can be summoned by the South as an ally
because it produces a fountainhead of examples of overtly
racist policies and practices that continued in spite of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
29See, for example, Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S.
(1905) and Coppage v. Kansasr 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
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schooling when it passed the Fourteenth Amendment;

indeed,

Congress had passed up several opportunities to do just that.
Rather, Chief Justice Warren wrote that public education, by
modern standards, played a far less significant role in postCivil

War

America,

and

in

the

South

it was

practically

nonexistent. These facts, in the Court's view, explained the
"paucity" of information that the history of the amendment
produced with respect to the intent of the framers. There
fore, the Warren Court insisted that the permissability of
segregation in public education must be determined based on
the role of public education in 1954, not 1868, or 1896. Cahn
(1955)

observed,

"Never was Thomas Jefferson more clearly

vindicated in his insistence that the Constitution belongs to
the living generation of Americans" (152). By insisting that
the historical record was too murky to provide any guidance
in the present controversy, the Court's logic played directly
into the NAACP's color-blind theory of the Fourteenth Amend
ment.
Having judged the history of the Fourteenth Amendment as
inconclusive,

the Court turned to sociology.

The justices

cited several authors, most notably Kenneth Clark's study of
sixteen black schoolchildren in a segregated South Carolina
school. When asked to pick which of the dolls was the "nice"
doll, ten children chose the white dolls, as opposed to the
black dolls. He extrapolated that the tests demonstrated that
segregated schooling created within black children a sense of
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inferiority. Clark testified that this result was consistent
with evidence from a larger study that he and his wife had
conducted as well as other related literature in the field.
The Court apparently agreed with Clark's conclusions,
declaring that to separate black children from others of the
same age and qualifications

solely because of their race

could potentially "affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone" (347 U.S. 483, 494). Writing for
a unanimous court, Chief Justice Earl Warren declared,

"We

conclude that in the field of public education, the doctrine
of separate

but

equal has no place.

facilities are inherently unequal"

Separate educational

(Ibid, 495). Recognizing

the potentially sweeping nature of its decision, the Court
directed all the parties to submit briefs in the following
term on the question of remedy (Ibid, 495-496).
Curiously, the Court neglected to classify the right of
blacks
rather,

to

integrated

Plessv was

schools

a

constitutional

right;

invalidated because segregation harmed

African American children.
explaining why,

as

In addition, the Court, without

determined that the fact that segregation

violated the Equal Protection Clause "makes unnecessary any
discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"
Five will

explore

(Ibid). Chapter

in more detail the significance of the

Court's failure to clarify these two points.
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In Bolling v. Sharpe (347 U.S. 497 [1954]), a companion
case

to

Brown.30

the

Supreme

Court

invalidated

school

segregation within the District of Columbia:
Classifications based solely upon race must be
scrutinized with particular care, since they are con
trary to our traditions and hence constitutionally
suspect. . . . Segregation in public education is not
reasonably related to any proper governmental objec
tive, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the
District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an
arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation
of the Due Process Clause (347 U.S. 497, 499-500).
Nevertheless, DuBois7 doubts about the NAACP's approach
would haunt the organization in the post-Brown era. The NAACP
appropriated the ideals of the Declaration of Independence in
support of a vision of American society where race was not
considered as a rational basis for the formulation of public
policy. However, they failed to resolve the tensions between
the atomistic individualism of the Lockian tradition and the
African American community's internal sense that it had a
unique historical experience that separated it from the rest
of American

society.

This

element

of

black consciousness

implied that certain aspects of classical liberalism did not
apply

to

African

Americans.

Consequently,

the

NAACP's

integrationist philosophy left it wholly unprepared for the
difficult questions which lay ahead.

Desegregation,

in the

30Bolling is often separated from the other Brown cases
because it involved segregation in the District of Columbia.
The Fourteenth Amendment was directed at the states;
therefore, segregation within the District of Columbia was
challenged under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
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immediate aftermath of the Brown decision, was defined merely
as

insuring that blacks had legal access to public white

institutions (Preer, 1982) . This interpretation reflected the
belief that the tenets of atomistic individualism constituted
universal principles which were specifically applicable to
every aspect of the black man's struggle for eguality.

As

long as the issue revolved around the rights of individual
blacks to attend all-white public schools or universities,
then the matter seemed fairly clear-cut.
Once the problem shifted to defining what public school
and state higher education systems needed to do to satisfy
the constitutional requirements of Brown. the issues became
exceedingly more complicated. Among the thorny institutional
aspects

of

public

higher

education

desegregation

were

questions about the future status of state supported black
universities.

Did these institutions have a future role to

play in an integrated system of higher education,

or were

they to be the unfortunate, though necessary, casualties of
the need to remedy a century of intentional discrimination in
higher education? The ethos of the black power movement of
the

1960's intensified the suspicion of many blacks that

integration was the belief that the only way blacks could be
effectively educated was in the same classrooms with whites
(Wilkinson, 1979, 46-48; Preer, 1982; Kujovik, 1987). DuBois
had warned the NAACP of this very possibility. As a result,
significant elements within the black community came to view
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the NAACP's agenda of integration to be out of step with
their vision of what was

in the best

interests

Americans.

attempt

apply

In

fact,

the

to

of

the

black

NAACP's

integrationist model to higher education raised fundamental
questions about the entire basis for the Court's decision in
Brown. The problems associated with the application of Brown
to higher education are the subject of Chapter Three.
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CHAPTER 3. APPLYING BROWN TO HIGHER EDUCATION
Brown and its Unanswered Questions
One way to
Court's

decision

evaluate the significance of the
in

Brown

v.

Board

of

Supreme

Education

is

by

contrasting it with the tide of American history since 1619,
when the first Africans arrived in Jamestown. Viewed from the
perspective of 3 35 years of slavery and Jim Crow segregation,
the tide of American history can be justly interpreted as a
tale of black exclusion from the bounty of America.

It is

precisely this burden of history which gives Brown its place
in the annals of constitutional law. In a sense, Brown held
out the hope of redemption - and this redemption had come
from a most unlikely source.

May 17,

1954

- the

day the

Supreme Court handed down its decision in Brown - seemed like
"A Day of Atonement" for an institution which could be viewed
as one of the chief bastions of white power in America (Wil
kinson, 1979, 4) .
Though there was much in the Court's traditions to give
the black man hope that the Court might grant him a favorable
hearing

(After all, did not Madison believe that the true

test of a democracy is how well it protects the rights of
those in the minority?), there was nothing inevitable about
a partnership between the Court and the black man. "Indeed,"
Wilkinson concludes,

"its very lack of inevitability - the

striking incongruity of it - lent Brown and events thereafter
their magical and almost unprecedented power"

(Ibid,

138
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Brown became a watershed in the struggle for African American
inclusion into the body politic precisely because Plessv had
been the norm (Miller, 1982; Orfield, 1996).
Not only did Brown cut against the current of American
history with respect to black Americans, it held out the hope
of freeing the nation from the ugly details of its past. Ten
years after Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma reminded the
country of the peculiar place of race and racism in American
consciousness,
chart

a

Brown offered the nation an opportunity to

different

course.

Moreover,

the

Court

in

Brown

appeared to place great faith in the power of education and
the institution of the public school to lead the way toward
this new dawn.

To Justice Felix Frankfurther, the public

school represented "the symbol of our democracy and the most
pervasive means for promoting our common destiny"
v.

Board of Education. 333 U.S.

at 231,

J.

(McCullum

Frankfurther,

concurring). After a century of compulsory public education
in America, the public school as an agent of assimilation that is, converting Irish, German, Polish,

Italian, Greek,

and Swedish immigrants into Americans - had been generally
accepted (Bickel, 1978; Wilkinson, 1979). Integration could
work, it was argued, and "the kids themselves would make it
work"

(Wilkinson,

1979,

41).

Thurgood

Marshall

told

the

Court:
These same kids in Virginia and South Carolina and I have seen them [black and white children] do it they play in the streets together, they play on their
farms together, they go down the road together, they
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separate to go to school together, they come out of
school and play ball together. They have to be sepa
rated in school (Friedman, 1969, 239).
Thus, Brown spoke of education's promise and its potential,
nothing of its problems. Education would point the way toward
a new age envisioned by the reformers;
Horace Mann

after all, did not

say "education is the great equalizer of the

conditions of men?" Thus, Brown v. Board of Education stands
out as a monumental victory in the struggle to incorporate
black Americans into the mainstream of American life.
Despite the idealism which Brown inspired, implementing
the Supreme
difficult.

Court's decision would prove to be extremely
In the first place, -the South was not ready to

abandon racial segregation in its schools without a fight.
Thus, the NAACP's victory in Brown represented the beginning,
not the end, of a new phase in the struggle to secure equal
educational opportunities for blacks. More importantly, Brown
failed to answer many critical questions.

For example,

if

segregated schools were unconstitutional, then what kind of
schools were? Was the evil segregation itself, or the state's
imposition of it (Wilkinson, 1979, 29)? Did Brown mean that
black colleges and universities were unconstitutional rem
nants of Jim Crow systems of higher education that must now
be eliminated

(Miller,

1982)? This chapter concentrates on

the difficulties that courts and federal agencies would have
in

attempting

to

apply

the

mandate

of

Brown

in

education.
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This chapter begins by arguing that the heart of the
dilemma which Brown posed stemmed from the very framework
which had been so successful in overturning the legality of
"separate but equal" education: the belief that desegregation
was a personal right to which each black citizen was enti
tled.

To deny blacks admission into schools and universities

simply because of their race violated the principle of the
fundamental equality of all men espoused in the Declaration
of Independence. Once the issue was defined in that way, the
political and legal battles over desegregation turned on the
question

of whose

rights

should

prevail.

In

the

initial

phase, the predominate question was whether or not the right
of blacks to attend integrated schools would outweigh the
right of popular (mostly white) majorities to control their
school systems.
Secondly, this chapter focuses on how the demise of the
separate but equal doctrine forced public black colleges to
justify their right to exist.

It will be demonstrated that

desegregation and the Black Power movement gave rise to a
racial

consciousness

which

came

to

view

the

NAACP's

traditional integrationist ideology as a threat to one of the
black community's most cherished institutions - the black
public

college.

This

fear

intensified

as

the

locus

of

desegregation efforts shifted from insuring the admission of
individual black applicants to white schools to the need to
dismantle "root and branch" (Green, 391 U.S. 430 [1968]) the
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vestiges of de jure segregation. Judges, lawyers, educators,
legislators, and activists debated whether the application of
Brown necessarily required the elimination of state-supported
black colleges.
Thirdly,

I

discuss

a

number

of

significant

higher

education desegregation precedents which attempt to apply
principles

derived

from

elementary

and

secondary

school

desegregation cases. This chapter shows that these precedents
leave many pertinent questions concerning the fate of black
colleges unanswered. These cases situate the Mississippi case
in

a

constitutional

framework

and

present

the

range

of

alternatives that was available to the Supreme Court when it
considered United States v. Fordice.
Desegregation as a Personal Right
From the very beginning, the NAACP had defined desegre
gation as the right of blacks as individuals to have legal
access to white institutions on the same basis as any other
citizen. The 1955 rearguments in the remedial phase of Brown
afforded the NAACP another opportunity to reiterate its core
philosophy.

Plessv. in their

view,

was

wrong

because

it

allowed states to use race as the rationale for denying black
Americans

certain

constitutional

rights

that

were

freely

exercised by other Americans. To use race in such a way was
irrational, constitutionally suspect, and violated the spirit
of liberty inherent in the Declaration of Independence. The
NAACP's

doctrine

of

individual

rights

undergirded
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argument in 19 55 when it attempted to persuade the Supreme
Court to mandate specific deadlines whereby Southern school
districts would be required to demonstrate compliance with
Brown. The right of blacks to attend integrated schools was
"present and personal" and deserved to be protected without
delay.
By contrast, the South urged the Court to proceed with
caution,

countering with a rights theory of its own.

"The

overwhelming majority of people regard that decision [Brown]
as a serious blow which they did not expect" North Carolina's
attorney general declared (Friedman, 1969, 448). The current
system of segregated education in the South enjoyed wide
spread public approval from Southern taxpayers. In addition,
the

Constitution did not grant explicit authority to the

federal

government

with

respect

to

education;

therefore,

education was a state matter. If federal judges presumed to
dictate to local school boards how the schools should be run,
they would be unjustly acting without the consent of the
governed, thus undermining the basic contractual relationship
between citizens and their rulers.31 Forced integration, Sou
31Interestingly, other commentators noted that Brown
presented a conflict between segregation's forced separation
of the race and integration's forced imposition of associ
ation. Ernest van den Haag (1957) complained that the Court
attempted to solve the problem of forced segregation by
restricting the right of disasso-ciation. Herbert Weschler
(1959) suggested that the principle announced in Brown - that
"separate educational facilities are inherently unequal" lacked a principled foundation. The real dilemma which the
segregation cases posed was whether the state had the power
to restrict the right of association and, for that matter,
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thern attorneys argued, was tantamount to a deathknell for
public education in the South. Integration, if implemented,
had to proceed slowly in order to win public acceptance; they
warned

that

Southerners

would

respond

negatively

to

any

attempt from without to forcibly impose integrated schools.32
The NAACP dismissed suggestions by Southern attorneys
that their school districts should be granted flexible, openended

timetables with which to convert

segregated

school

systems to integrated ones. Thurgood Marshall retorted,

"I

don't believe any argument has ever been made to this Court
to postpone the enforcement of a constitutional right. The
argument is never made until Negroes are involved” (Friedman,
1969,

525).

The NAACP

considered

proposals

for

"gradual

integration" the equivalent of asking African Americans to
wait

until

the

South

voluntarily

conceded

to

them

their

the right of disassociation. Neither of these men were
apologists for the South; on the contrary, they agreed with
the result in Brown but questioned the reasoning behind the
decision.
32In this vein, Maryland's attorney general cited the
fact that the state had discontinued its system of providing
out-of-state tuition scholarship for black graduate students
rather than providing graduate and professional educational
opportunities for blacks within the state as proof that the
South, if left to its own internal processes, would right
itself. Thurgood Marshall replied that the state had only
abolished this out-of-state program in 1954, sixteen years
after the Supreme Court declared in Missouri v. Gaines and
eighteen years after its own Court of Appeals in Uni
versity of Maryland v. Murray (169 Md. 478 [1936]) had
declared such practices to be unconstitutional. "So that it
took them six-teen years to catch up with the law of their
own Court of Appeals and the law of this Court and use that
as the basis for saying that because of their good faith we
should work the problem out" (Fried-man, 19 69, 523).
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inalienable,

antecedent

rights

under

the

Declaration

of

Independence and the Constitution. Though the NAACP did not
use this precise language, it essentially argued that if the
Court tolerated delay in the implementation of desegregation,
it would be guilty of capitulating to what Tocqueville called
the

"tyranny of the majority"

(1988) . In short,

the 1955

rearguments of Brown afforded the NAACP another occasion to
reaffirm its faith in the American Creed.
The ruling in Brown II represented, in large measure, a
victory for the South. Though the justices did not give the
lower courts a "blank check,"

the ruling provided federal

judges with great latitude in desegregation cases. The Court
gave the following directives to lower courts:
1. Remember that school authorities, not the
courts, have the primary duty for determining how and
when schools are integrated.
2. Require the school board, however, to make a
prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with
the May 17, 1954 ruling.
3. Once such a start is made, the board may be
given additional time to complete integration.
4. The burden rests on the school board to esta
blish the need for additional time. Do not grant a post
ponement unless you are convinced the board is acting in
good faith to bring about integration at the earliest
practicable date. Among the factors which may be consi
dered in deciding whether a school district may delay
integration are necessary administrative rearrangements,
adjustments of the transportation systems, revision of
school district lines to accommodate the altered situ
ation, revision of local laws and regulations.
5. Do not allow school boards to postpone inte
gration merely because the board members or their
community favor segregation.
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6. Plans calling for desegregation by steps are
permissable provided authorities, acting in good faith,
are proceeding with all deliberate speed.
7. Retain jurisdiction during the period of tran
sition (Brown v. Board of Education. 349 U.S. 294, 300301) .
Though Brown II placed local school districts under the
scrutiny of

federal

"school authorities,

judges,

the Court made

it clear that

not the courts, have the primary duty

for determining how and when schools are integrated"

(349

U.S. 294, 300). The justices directed local officials to make
"a

prompt

and

reasonable

start"

toward

creating

unitary

systems and called for the development of plans to accomplish
that end; federal judges were charged with making sure these
efforts proceeded in "good faith." But the Court failed to
elaborate

on what

it meant by phrases

such as

"with all

deliberate speed," "a prompt and reasonable start," and "good
faith." The Supreme Court issued no specific decrees, promul
gated no minimum steps required to satisfy its mandate, and
gave

no

timetables

directives.

for the

Lingering

accomplishment

questions

about

of

what

any

of

Brown

its
II's

implementation decree actually meant provided the opening
that

many

Southerners

had

hoped

for

in

order

to

delay

integration indefinitely.33 The Brown decisions mobilized
33Largely as a result of the intense opposition to
integration in the South and, with rare exceptions, a
lackluster enforcement effort from the federal government,
only 2.3 percent of southern blacks were enrolled in
desegregated schools by 1964 - ten years after Brown (Note,
19 67). A whole cluster of mechanisms were devised to obstruct
Brown including "freedom of choice" plans, school closures,
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Southern

congressmen,

governors,

state

legislatures,

educational officials, and citizens groups in a determined
effort

to

ensure

that

the

South's

right

to

maintain

segregated schools prevailed over the black man's right to
education on an integrated basis.
One year later, the Supreme Court's decision in Florida
ex. rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control (350 U.S. 413), a higher
education case,

further consolidated the view that desegre

gation was the personal right of an African American student
to attend white institutions on the same terms as every other
citizen.

Brown

II

's

implementation

decree

gave

federal

district judges wide discretion to grant delays to

local

school districts for administrative considerations related to
the conversion of segregated school

systems to integrated

ones. The University of Florida Law School insisted that it
should

not

be

required

to

admit

Virgil

Hawkins

until

a

systemmatic analysis of the likely impact of desegregation on
both the Florida public school system and its colleges and
universities could be conducted (Preer, 1982,

141-142).

In

public aid to private schools, and optional attendance zones
(which allowed white parents to send their children to allwhite schools even if all-black schools were more proximate
to their homes). Cases which involved tactics designed to
evade desegregation include Cooper v. Aaron. 358 U.S. 1
(1958), Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board. 197 F. Supp.
649 (E.D. La., 1961), Griffin v. County School Board of
Prince Edward Countv. 377 U.S. 218 (1964), Green v. School
Board of New Kent Countv. 391 U.S. 430 (1968), and Ranev v.
Board of Education of Gould District. 391 U.S. 443 (1968).
See also (Carter, 1959; Peltason, 1971; Wilkinson,
1979; Morris, 1984; Orfield, 1996).
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other words, the institutional impacts of desegregation had
to be assessed before blacks as individuals could be inte
grated into white universities.

Brown

I I /s implementation

decree, the state of Florida contended, must apply to higher
education.
For the NAACP, Florida's argument was all too familiar:
the rights of whites had to be taken

into account before

desegregation could proceed. What the state really wanted,
the NAACP replied, was the right to delay the admission of
blacks to its universities for as long as possible. The NAACP
argued that this case was consistent with pre-Brown prece
dents in graduate and professional education where the Court
required

immediate

admission

of

black

applicants

to

the

schools in question. Brown I I 's "with all deliberate speed"
decree,

to

the extent that

it allowed

for administrative

complexities to delay the implementation of desegregation,
did not apply to higher education.
The Supreme Court accepted the NAACP's premise. In a per
curiam decision, the justices denied certiorari to the Haw
kins case and then recalled and vacated its order of May 24,
1954. In ordering the case remanded, the Court declared that
the Brown

implementation decree had no bearing on a case

involving a black applicant to a state law school:
As this case involved the admission of a Negro to a
graduate and professional school, there is no reason
for delay. He is entitled to prompt and immediate
admission under the rules and regulations applicable
to other qualified candidates. Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629; Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University
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of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631; c.f. McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents for Higher Education, 339 U.S. 637 (350
U.S. 413 [1956]).
The Court's disposition of the Hawkins case indicated
that it thought that the issues presented constituted no new
legal questions that had not been resolved by Sweatt. Sipuel.
and McLaurin. In rejecting Florida's arguments that the Brown
implementation order did not apply in Hawkins, the Court,
like the NAACP, refused to consider the institutional aspects
of

higher

education

desegregation.

Subsequent

per

curiam

decisions by the Supreme Court reiterated the same point: the
"deliberate speed" principle was inapplicable to higher edu
cation.34 By endorsing the NAACP's
case

contributed

to

the

prevailing

framework,
notion

the

that

Hawkins
progress

toward desegregation could be measured fairly easily; all one
needed to do was to conduct a "head count" of the number of
blacks who had reached the "promise land of white classrooms"
(Wilkinson, 1979, 46). It would not be until United States v.
Fordice in 1992 that the Supreme Court would render a full
opinion focusing on the institutional aspects of desegrega
tion in higher education.

^Examples include Frasier v. Board of Trustees. 134 F.
Supp. 589 (M.D. N.C. 1955), aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 975
(1956) , Lucy v. Ada ms . 134 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ala. 1955) ,
aff'd 228 F. 2d. 619 (5th Cir. 1955), cert, denied, 351 U.S.
931 (1955), Booker v. Tennessee Board of Education. 240 F.
2d. 689 (6th Cir. 1957), cert, denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957),
and Meredith v. F ai r. 199 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Miss. 1962), 305
F. 2d. 343 (5th Cir. 1962), cert, denied, 371 U.S. 828
(1962) .
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The effect of the Supreme Court's decisions in Sipuel.
Sweatt. McLaurin. Brown. and Hawkins hardened the view that
desegregation

was

an

individual

right

in

two

important

aspects that this dissertation will concentrate on. In the
first place, by defining desegregation in terms of a personal
right, the courts left untouched the power of the state to
alter admissions policies in "racially neutral" ways that had
the effect of nullifying the hard-won legal rights of black
Americans. The NAACP's legal thrust against segregated edu
cation had only contemplated qualified black applicants who
had

been

denied

admission

to

white

institutions

merely

because of their race. However, what if blacks either failed
to meet the qualifications or if universities and state
legislatures enacted policies and procedures which, for all
intents and purposes, ensured that few blacks would meet the
requirements for admission? Now that the "separate but equal"
doctrine in education had been overturned,

the burden had

shifted to individual black applicants to prove that they
could comply with whatever standards they would be required
to meet (Preer, 1982, 144).
Starting in 1956 around the time of the Southern Mani
festo,35 Southern

states

began

changing

their

admissions

350n March 12, 1956, one hundred Southern congressmen and
all but three of the region's senators issued the "Southern
Manifesto," a document in which they pledged to overturn the
Supreme Court's integration decisions. The resolution was
apparently triggered by discussions within the Eisenhower
administration concerning civil rights legislation pursuant
to Brown. The manifesto was undoubtedly designed
to
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policies in higher education. These practices were consistent
with the general hardening of opposition to the Brown ruling
throughout the South during this period.

Some were openly

racist in their purpose to prevent integration at any cost;
however,

others were couched in racially neutral

language

that in practice accomplished the same end. For example, the
University of Florida Law School began to require a score of
340 from all its applicants on its admissions examination.
When

Virgil

Hawkins

took

the

test,

he

scored

only

200,

effectively ending his efforts to enroll in the state's allwhite law school

(Ibid,

145) . In this case,

the change in

Florida's admissions criteria could be justified on educa
tional grounds. The unfortunate conclusion to Hawkins' quest
for admission to the University of Florida graphically illu
strated the fact that the securing of legal rights by blacks
and the ability to exercise them were two entirely different
things.
Other

states

enacted

new

admissions

policies

which

effectively put integrated higher education out of reach for
most African Americans. Louisiana required each applicant to
state-supported universities to submit certificates to the
schools to which they sought admission attesting to his or

discourage the administration from pursuing any legislation
which might aid the cause of integration and black rights. It
represented but one example of an entire climate of Southern
resistance to the Brown decisions (Carter, 1959; Wilkin- son,
1979; Dorsey, 1981; Miller, 1982; Preer, 1982; Burk, 1984;
Morris, 1984) .
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her eligibility and good moral character. The certificate had
to be

signed by the appropriate parish

superintendent of

education and high school principal. However, the state also
passed laws which permitted the dismissal of any principal,
teacher,

or state employee who advocated integration.

surprisingly,

Not

few people chose to sign the required certi

ficates

for

fear of losing their jobs

Miller,

1982,

592;

Preer,

1982,

(Dorsey,

145).

1981,

Georgia

92;

required

applicants to submit certificates from alumni of the school
they wished to attend; few alumni from white univer-sities
wanted to endorse the application of a black student (Preer,
1982, 145). In 1959, the Georgia General Assembly limited the
age for undergraduate admission for its colleges to twentyone and for graduate and professional education to twentyfive.

Evidently,

applicants,
secure

law reflected

the

fact

that

black

forced to endure a legal marathon in order to

admission,

counterparts

this

tended

to

be

older

than

their

white

(Ibid, 145). In 1963, Mississippi, recognizing

that blacks generally scored signifiantly below the mean test
scores of whites on the American College Test
requiring minimum test scores

on the ACT

(ACT), began

as a tactic to

prevent blacks from enrolling in all-white universities. This
new policy followed the controversy surrounding James Mere
dith's petition to enter the University of Mississippi. This
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policy played a pivotal role in the adjudication of United
States v. Fordice. More attention will be devoted to this
subject in the next chapter.
Secondly, by minimizing the importance of institutional
issues,

the Hawkins case neglected to take

seriously the

impact that desegregation would have on public historically
black universities. The NAACP's legal offensive in cases such
as Sweatt, McLaurin. Brown. and Hawkins predicated themselves
on the assumption that black applicants could not hope to
receive

education

of

a

substantially

equal

quality

in

a

segregated setting. Because segregated education represented
in the minds of many observers an egregious violation of the
individual rights of black Americans, the potential ramifica
tions of integration on black colleges was hardly considered.
Indeed, the Court, by declaring that "separate is inherently
unequal," (347 U.S. 494) appeared to endorse the notion that
separate education - meaning, black education - necessarily
meant inferior education. This implication set in motion a
debate about the future of black colleges which, among other
things,

led

many

black Americans

to

integrationist ideology. The "opening

rethink

the

NAACP's

rounds" of this debate

are discussed in the next section.
Desegregation and the Future of Black Colleges
Kujovich

(1987)

captured

very

pointedly

the paradox

which the politics of desegregation forced upon historically
black colleges:
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At midcentury the black public college was both
a vestige of unconstitutional discrimination and a
vestige of self-help and affirmative action by the black
population. It was the product of segregation, but it
also represented the achievements of a black academic
community forced to develop in isolation while under
taking the most difficult educational task in the
history of the nation. With the demise of the separate
but equal doctrine, the worst qualities of the colleges
made them candidates for extinction while their best
qualities made them essential institutions serving the
needs of the black community - needs that white public
colleges were not likely to serve (159).
Because the black public college was both an artifact of
segregation
community,

and
many

a vehicle
African

of

self-help within

American

leaders

came

the
to

black
vastly

different conclusions as to what integration should mean for
the future of these institutions. Some black Americans viewed
these schools as obstacles that needed to be removed if the
goal of full

integration into American society were to be

achieved. Lewis (1949) wrote:
In the final analysis, the system of higher edu
cation for Negroes will remain relatively warped and
inadequate no matter what happens short of elimination
so long as the kingpin in the system - the publiclysupported college for Negroes only - continues (3 61).
The rapid upgrading of black colleges in the 1940's by
Southern states trying to discourage integration helped to
reinforce this view. Walter White, in a strategy conference
at Howard University prior to the Brown cases, complained:
Each time the NAACP wins a court case against a
Southern state, new buildings spring up on the campuses
of the colored land-grant colleges. We must make the
public conscious of the fact this is a waste of tax
payers money. It would be unjust to Northern states
to require additional Federal expenditures to "equa
lize" the funds for colored land-grant colleges
because it is the Northern states that already bear
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the greatest burden of taxation (1952, 342).
Earlier in the same discourse, White clearly expressed
his conviction that black colleges were not only inferior to
white institutions; in addition, agitation on the part of
blacks for additional funds for these schools (unless their
programs were radically revised) was a waste of time:
In the field of higher education, the colored
people of the United States must be willing to give
up the little kingdoms that have been carved out in
Southern states for so-called land-grant colleges.
These schools do not begin to match the quality of
white institutions that come under the same heading.
It is wasteful and a brake on progress to agitate
for additional funds to run these schools unless
their programs are radically revised. There is a
place for the college that is currently charged with
performing the land-grant function but this place
must not be on a segregated basis. The colored landgrant colleges, as the figures I am about to quote
will reveal, have never received their just share
of Federal and state support (Ibid, 341).
White's

remarks

were

consistent

with

a

significant

change in the NAACP strategy that had occurred since the
Sipuel decision. In the wake of the Gaines case, the creation
of new, separate academic programs on black campuses had been
treated as gains in educational substance, though temporary
setbacks

for

the

cause

of

outlawing

segregation.

Black

educational leaders, fully aware of the academic shortcomings
of their institutions, often welcomed these new investments,
even while recognizing that Southern states were more inte
rested in preventing integration than they were concerned
about the educational welfare of black students (Preer, 1982,
86-87) . However, by the late 1940's the NAACP had decided to
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launch an all-out offensive on segregation in education. New
programs at black colleges were henceforth seen as wasteful,
duplicative efforts which impeded the goal of opening access
to white universities. The new enhancements of black colleges
were viewed as desperate attempts on the part of an unrepen
tant South to make separate schools more equal in the hope of
avoiding integration altogether. Thus, the NAACP's new legal
strategy left no room for black colleges once the goal of
obtaining legal access to white state universities had been
achieved (Ibid, 87).
In this respect, White's views were reminiscent of the
association's response to DuBois' doubts about the NAACP's
legal strategy against segregation during the 1930's. White
continued to believe,
segregation

was

as he did in the 1930's, that racial

inherently

evil.

The

expansion

of

black

colleges should not be encouraged because they would never be
treated as the equal of white colleges. As far as the NAACP's
earlier support of enhancements at black colleges was con
cerned, White's position sounded very much like J. E.
Springarn's

rebuttal

to

DuBois:

practical

concessions

to

segregation from time to time do not necessarily overturn our
fundamental conviction that racial segregation must always be
opposed.
James Nabrit, Jr. , a law professor at Howard University
and a legal tactician for the NAACP, had expressed similar
ideas in a conference of black college presidents two years
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earlier.
tening,

However,
his

Nabrit's tone not only was

perspective

acknowledged

that

less threa

the

coming

of

integration would plunge the black public college through a
difficult period of soul searching:
The Negro Land Grant Colleges must resist political
efforts to saddle courses and curricula upon them
which they are not organizationally [or] financially
eguipped to operate on a high level of efficiency.
They should resist efforts to use them to nullify
recent Supreme Court decisions. . . [T]he Negro Land
Grant College must adjust its program to an integrated
system of education in the South, where segregation
will no longer exist, where competition will be ter
rific, where inferior plants, poorly trained teachers,
weak administrators, curricula inadequate for a demo
cratic society, and unsound educational policies will
no longer be tolerated (1950, 79, 80-82).
Like White, Nabrit opposed enhancements at black schools
which he viewed as last-ditch attempts to preserve Jim Crow
segregation and encouraged black college presidents to resist
such efforts.36 However, Nabrit's remarks also reflected the
sense that if black colleges were to have a role to play in
a post-Plessv future, their leaders needed to be prepared for
changing social conditions.

A number of black educational

leaders were pondering exactly what that future might mean
for

black

colleges

(Thompson,

1952;

Atwood,

1952;

1958;

Jenkins, 1952; Clark, 1958; Nabrit, 1958) . Charles Thompson
put the matter rather succintly:

"the burden is upon the

36In light of the political disenfranchisement of most
African Americans in the South and the fact that black
college presidents had to answer to their state legislatures,
it is not clear how the leaders of these institutions could
have prevented their states from imposing new academic
programs on their campuses designed to keep black students at
black colleges.
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Negro publicly-supported college to justify its continued
existence and future role"

(1958, 129).

Other black educators responded to Thompson's challenge.
S.M. Nabrit, president of Texas Southern University, the uni
versity created by Sweatt v. Painter, argued that the legacy
of Jim Crow segregation in education meant that
the average Negro cannot compete on equal terms with
the average white student in our society. This fact
may be embarrassing to Negroes and to white people
alike, but it is undeniable. It is this retardation
which requires the continuation of Negro institutions
of higher learning, and it certainly suggests one of
their prime functions: remedial education and pro
fessional education for persons with the potential
but lacking many of the educative experiences and
skills essential for first class competition (1958,
415) .
F. D. Moon, president of Langston University, Oklahoma's
black land grant school,

agreed with Nabrit's assessment:

"For a great many years to come, if Negro youth are to
receive higher education, there will be a pressing need
for the retention of the one-time Negro college" (19 62, 325) .
Nabrit and Moon echoed the sentiments of many black educators
who believed that the legacy of discrimination in segregated
educational systems had ill-equipped most African Americans
to compete

on

equal terms with their white counterparts.

Therefore, they contended that legal access to white univer
sities would not be an adequate remedy for black students who
continued to be the victims of discrimination. In fact, they
feared that a "desegregation only" remedy might actually
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decrease educational opportunities for most African American
students (Kujovich, 1987, 160-161).
Moreover,

the black college's struggle to justify its

continuation found support in the educational profiles of
many of its students. While the National Scholarship Service
and Fund for Negro Students studied the success of the more
capable black undergraduates enrolled in integrated universi
ties (Ibid, 161), black colleges reported serious educational
deficiencies
bodies.

in a substantial proportion of their student

For example, both Jackson State College in Missis

sippi and A & M and Normal College in Arkansas (now known as
Arkansas-Pine Bluff)

had instituted remedial programs for

college freshmen for students who lacked basic reading skills
(Troup, 1949; Stephan, 1962) . Maryland's Morgan State College
operated a special remedial curriculum which included nearly
half of the entering freshmen class during the 1950's because
the students' performance on placement tests indicated that
they were unprepared for college level work (Grant, 1958). At
North Carolina's five black public colleges during the early
19 60's, the average score on either the verbal or math por
tions of the Scholastic Aptitude Test

(SAT) was below 3 00

(Harris,

though

1962,

291-292).

Therefore,

some

black

students were prepared to excell in white universities, many
others still had a vested interest in the perpetuation of
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black colleges. In the meantime, Southern states continued to
improve black colleges in an effort to avoid the mandate of
Brown.37
In addition, the prospect of the closure and/or merger of
black colleges with white institutions jeopardized the status
of another constituency that had a vested interest in the
continuation of black colleges: black faculty and administra
tors (Kujovich, 1987, 162-163). Black colleges had served as
one of the two major employers for black academics under the
separate but equal regime; integration presented the distinct
possibility that black educators, themselves the victims of
discrimination, might be displaced for failing to meet up to
white

standards.

In

a region

recognize black competence,

which

routinely

refused

to

even the most confident black

academics could not be assured of employment.
Furthermore, events surrounding the integration of the
University of Louisville in Kentucky fed to these fears. In
1951,

Louisville agreed to admit black students to all of

their programs. As part of this action, Louisville Municipal
College,

a

branch

of

the

university

reserved

for

black

37In 1951, Georgia provided $2 million for new buildings,
increased operating expenses for its black colleges, and
equalized faculty salaries at white and black campuses.
Louisiana, under court order to desegregate the New Orleans
campus of Louisiana State University (now University of New
Orleans [UNO]), began construction of Southern University in
New Orleans (SUNO). In 1960, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission
specifically said that upgrading Negro colleges was not a
proper remedy and assumed that equality of educational
opportunity was only available at white colleges (Preer,
1982, 147).
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students only, was discontinued. The faculty of the Municipal
College included eighteen persons, including four with earned
doctorates
college
Board

and at least seven persons who had served the

for eight or more years.

of

Trustees

subsequently

However,

fired

the

the University
entire

college

faculty. Subsequent negotiations led the university to hire
one member of the college faculty (Atwood,
1987,

162-163).

The

events

at Louisville

1951; Kujovich,
underscored

the

fears of many African Americans that the implementation of
Brown might force many qualified black academics out of the
teaching profession.
Thus, the demise of the separate but equal doctrine pre
sented black public higher education with a profound dilemma.
Black educators were divided: some welcomed the opportunity
for black colleges to compete with white institutions and to
be judged by the same standards as their white brethren.38
Others, while welcoming the demolition of legal barriers that
prevent blacks from enrolling at white universities,

still

wanted to preserve the right of blacks to voluntarily choose

38A concrete example of this is seen in the decision of
the Conference of Presidents of Negro Land-Grant Colleges in
1955 to terminate its existence and accept the invitation to
join the Association of Land-Grant Colleges and State
Universities. In another example, the Southern Association of
Colleges and Schools (SACS) discontinued its two-tiered
method of accreditation whereby white universities either
received an A rating or were not accre-dited and black
universities were ranked either A, B, or C. From now on, the
same policies would apply to both. Competing on an equal
basis for the first time, about half of the sixty-five black
colleges evaluated passed muster (Preer, 1982, 148-149).
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to attend predominately black colleges. Moreover, many felt
that the reality of racial segregation

in elementary

and

secondary schools made black colleges, at least in the short
run, an absolutely essential link between blacks and access
to higher education.

Yet,

same people predicted

at the same time, many of these

that

integration would

cause black

colleges to lose their best students, athletes, and faculty
to white institutions. These losses presented the prospect of
heaping new burdens on black

institutions

in addition to

their historic traditions of being underfunded and isolated
from

the

academic

mainstream

(Preer,

1982,

149).

These

traditional handicaps also suggested that black universities
would face formidable obstacles in accomplishing the goal of
desegregating
clearly

their

believed

student

that

some

bodies.39 While
black

some

institutions

blacks
would

inevitably cease to exist, the slow pace of integration of
39The
experience
of West Virginia
State and the
enrollment of Bluefield State College in West Virginia and at
Lincoln University in Missouri represented exceptions which
illustrated the rule. Shortly after the Brown decision, these
colleges attract substan-tial numbers of whites to their
campuses. As part of its effort to shed its all-black
identity, West Virginia State dropped out of its all-Negro
athletic conference and joined the West Virginia Inter
collegiate Conference. But the experience at West Virginia
were atypical of most black colleges in practically every
respect. The college was located in Charleston and had low
tuition. Most black colleges were located in the rural
hinterlands or in the same city with other white colleges.
Furthermore,
West
Virginia's
relatively
small
black
population affected the pace of change in that state. The
racial climate in other Southern states where the black
population was substantially larger tended to be more
politically charged and resistant to change (Preer, 1982,
148) .
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white

Southern

universities

meant

that

the

wholesale

disappearance of black colleges would not occur any time soon
(Jenkins,

1952; Stephan, 1958; Moon, 1958; 1962; Henderson,

1958) .
Therefore,
educators,

despite the concerns voiced by many black

desegregation continued to be defined by many

observers as simply the legal right of blacks as individuals
to attend white
1960's.

Though

institutions during the
theoretically

1950's and early

integration

was

a

"two-way

street," many black and white proponents of Brown appeared
not to take the idea of whites entering black colleges very
seriously. Thus, progress toward desegregation was measured
largely in terms of how many black students had been admitted
into

white

Wilkinson,

universities

(Redding,

1958;

Valien,

1958;

1979; Preer, 1982).

However, the politics of desegregation radically changed
in the mid-1960's.

The passage of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, the 24th Amendment, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965
(to the extent that these enactments represented the goal of
securing the basic civil rights of African Americans that
allowed

blacks

and

whites

with

competing

ideologies

to

organize around) shattered the civil rights policy consensus
(Piven and Cloward, 1971). Without the goal of civil equality
to unite them, genuine divisions emerged over the direction
the movement should take. The collapse of the civil rights
policy consensus during the mid-1960's and the ascendency of
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the

Black

Power

supporters
about the

of

movement

created

black colleges

an

opening

to voice their

implications of Brown more openly.

the

trepidations
Armed with a

growing sense of race pride and consciousness,
only became more defensive of black colleges

for

blacks not
(as well

as

black culture and black institutions generally), but many
openly challenged one of the central assumptions on which the
Brown decision was based - the presumed inferiority of black
educational

institutions.

That is the subject of the next

section.
Black Power, Black Colleges and Brown
Civil rights advocates were accustomed to resistance to
integration from whites; however, the Black Power movement
represented

resistance

to

integration

from blacks.40 Many

within the civil rights establishment were caught off-guard
by the new insurgency. Calls for "Black Power" replaced the
singing of "We Shall Overcome;" peaceful, non-violent demon
strations gave way to urban riots;

civil rights stalwarts

like Martin Luther King, Roy Wilkins, and Bayard Rustin were
accused of

"not being radical enough" by figures

Stokely Carmichael, Huey Newton, and H. Rap Brown.

such

as

In par

ticular, the Black Power insurgency called into question the
traditional civil rights establishment's conceptualization of
the race problem:
40White
racists
bent
on
preserving
segregation
capitalized on the Black Power movement, maintaining that it
was proof that integration was unpopular with both races.
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What we are discovering, in short, is that the
United States— all of it, North as well as South, West
as well as East— is a racist society in a sense and to
a degree that we have refused so far to admit, much
less face. . . . The tragedy of race relations in the
United States is that there is no American Dilemma.
White Americans are not torn and tortured between their
devotion to the American creed and their actual beha
vior. They are upset by the current state of race
relations, to be sure. But what troubles them is not
that justice is being denied but that their peace is
being shattered and their business interrupted (Silberman, quoted in Carmichael and Hamilton, 1967, 5).
Black Power advocates rejected Gumnar Myrdal's view that
Americans were inwardly torn between their ideals of equal
justice for all and their actual treatment of African Ameri
cans. Myrdal's conceptualization of the race problem had been
enthusiastically embraced by the NAACP and other civil rights
organizations and had been specifically acknowledged by the
Supreme Court in footnote 11 of the Brown opinion. The Black
Power critique asserted that the NAACP's vision - and the
vision of other integrationists as well - was naive. Rather,
they maintained that America was fundamentally, and perhaps
incurably, a racist society. The non-violent, "turn the other
cheek" tactics of King, ultimately, were misguided; the only
force that America respected was power.

Some drew parallels

between the plight of African Americans to that of colonized
and newly independent peoples of Asia and Africa; blacks in
America,

it was argued, were not simply the victims of Jim

Crow segregation but internal
Hamilton,

1967;

Young,

colonialism

1970).

Often,

(Carmichael and
their

critiques

suggested that the solution to the black man's plight could
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not be found within the confines of American democratic and
capitalist institutional arrangements.
Carmichael and Hamilton in Black Power: The Politics of
Liberation in America explicitly expressed utter contempt
for the goal of integration which had been pursued by civil
rights organizations such as the NAACP and the SCLC (Southern
Christian Leadership Conference):
. . . According to its advocates, social justice will
be accomplished by "integrating the Negro into the main
stream institutions of the society from which he has
been traditionally excluded." This concept is based on
the assumption that there is nothing of value in the
black community and that little of value could be
created by black people. . . We recall the conclusion
of Killian and Grigg: "At the present time, integration
as a solution to the race problem demands that the
Negro foreswear his identity as a Negro." The fact is
that integration, as traditionally articulated, would
abolish the black community (1967, 53,55).
Carmichael and Hamilton implied that Brown, because of
its endorsement of integration, was a racist decision.41 Like
many Black

Power

advocates,

they

feared that

integration

offered blacks entrance into white society but at the price
of cultural extinction.

Moreover,

Carmichael and Hamilton

41This same charge was repeated by Lewis M. Steel, an
associate counsel for the NAACP, in a 19 68 article in The New
York Times Magazine. It was entitled "Nine Men in Black Who
Think White." Steel criticized the Court for failing to
articulate the principle that equality before the law was an
absolute right which all citizens were entitled to, and
official
efforts
to hinder the exercise
of
inherent
constitutional rights would no longer be tolerated. Instead,
the Court compromised, meaning that the rights of blacks to
equal protection would have to be balanced against the rights
of the very whites who had denied them equality. Steel was
summarily fired after the article appeared; several members
of the NAACP's legal staff quit to protest the firing.
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doubted the relevancy of Brown in light of the fact that
whites were abandoning the central cities in favor of the
suburbs, leaving behind heavy concentrations of poor blacks
in urban

areas.

''Clearly

'integration'— even

if

it would

solve the educational problem— has not proved feasible.

. .

. The real need at present is not integration but quality
education"

(Ibid, 157). Their analysis amounted to a rather

stinging rebuke of those black students who had literally
risked their lives in order to integrate the public schools
and the colleges (Wilkinson, 1979, 47) . Blacks did not need
integration as much as they needed the power to control their
own

schools,

neighborhoods,

politics,

and

economies,

the

proponents of Black Power countered. In short, the advocates
of Black Power made DuBois a prophet.
Thus,

pre-existing black misgivings about the ramifi

cations of Brown. the growing political clout of blacks as a
newly enfranchised class,

and the rhetoric of Black Power

combined to produce a climate of greater black assertiveness
(Young, 1970; Wilkinson, 1979; Preer, 1982). The leaders and
supporters

of

black

colleges

became

more

proactive

in

defending their institutional interests. While the Coleman
report and the Commission on Civil Rights extoled the virtues
of greater desegregation by linking it with

increases

in

academic achievement, black educators busied themselves with
carving out niches for black colleges within the context of
desegregated education. LeRoy B. Allen, president of Cheyney
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State College in Pennsylvania,

charged that events in West

Virginia "proved once again that the constant tendency is to
make Negro leadership expendable" (1966, 452). He envisioned
desegregation as a process whereby "proportionately
numbers

of

maintained"

Negro

educators

and

administrators

large

must

be

(Ibid, 452). He rejected the theory that blacks

must be willing to surrender the educational benefits that
black

colleges

blessings"

afforded

that

in

order

desegregation

to

gain

purportedly

the

"greater

offered

them.

Rather than seeing traditionally black colleges as expendable
now that Brown was the law of the land, Allen insisted that
black universities were needed more than ever to meet the
increasing demand for higher education.
This section makes no attempt to elucidate the multiple
factors which contributed to the rise of the Black Power
movement.

However,

in view

of African American political

history, a black backlash against Brown was not surprising.
In Chapter One, it was argued that black nationalist thought
in America has a long history. Thus, when Malcolm X (for whom
many of the advocates of black power drew inspiration) urged
blacks to pursue freedom "by any means necessary," he had
said very little that David Walker had not already said in
1829.

Rather,

tradition

Malcolm X built on a preexisting political

in the African American community.

The same was

true of black separtists in the 1960's who proposed creating
a black nation out of several states

(Brotz,

1966; Haley,
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1992; Wilkinson,

1979). In addition, those who argued that

the black man's plight could not be solved until capitalism
was

either

overthrown

little that was new;
lively

debate

or

radically restructured had

Chapter

between

the

Two discussed

legalists

(the

said

in detail the
NAACP

and

its

allies) and those favoring economic redistribution during the
1930's. While the Black Power movement per se did not command
a mass following, it nevertheless articulated a broad ideo
logical framework which was shared by many African Americans.
Its militant emphasis on black pride and self-determination
appealed to broad segments of the black community. Thus, many
blacks sympathized with many of the broad goals articulated
by the proponents of Black Power while rejecting some of the
more specific positions and tactics of the movement (Young,
1970, 329).
Thus,

as black educators became more resentful of the

notion of the "inherently unequal" nature of black education,
Jencks

and

Reisman

published

an

article

in

the

Harvard

Educational Review on the shortcomings of black colleges that
proved to be the functional equivalent of the 1965 Moniyhan
Report on black family life.42 The authors described black
42Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1965), among other things,
stressed that rising rates of out-of-wedlock births, female
headed homes, and welfare dependency were among the most
central problems facing lower-class blacks. His suggestion
that these problems stem from previous patterns of inequality
that originated in slavery and that certain aspects of this
legacy were pathological triggered an angry response from
many corners of black academia and the civil rights community
(Hare, 1969; Alkalimat, 1969; Staples, 1970; Hill, 1972;
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colleges as "academic disaster areas" (1967, 55), with little
chances for successful integration (Ibid, 57). They listed a
host of factors which would frustrate efforts to desegregate
these institutions. These included the poor, rural locations
of many of these schools,

the competition of white public

colleges in urban areas, the disparity of funding between
white and black campuses,
trained black

students.

and the academic needs of poorly
They

concluded,

"Integrationists,

both black and white, may disapprove of Negro institutions on
principle, but it will be hard to demand that such institu
tions be closed as long as Negroes are voluntarily choosing
them"

(57).
Jencks

and Reisman were roundly

denounced

for their

conclusions. Their observations were dismissed as inaccurate,
impressionistic, and not based on the day-to-day realities of
black colleges.

Stephen Wright,

head of

the United Negro

College Fund, took the authors to task for numerous factual
errors

in

their

article

(1967,

451-455).

Albert

Dent

of

Dillard University complained that Jencks and Reisman not
only unfairly stereotyped these institutions, but that they
ignored evidence related to the positive educational impacts
of black colleges (Ibid, 461-464). Hugh M. Gloster of Hamp

Ladner, 1973). William Julius Wilson wrote, "The vitriolic
attacks on the 'Moynihan Report'. . . helped to create an
atmosphere that discouraged many scholars from exploring
certain aspects of the lower-class black experience" (1984,
77) .
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ton Institute took exception to the glossy terms with which
the authors spoke of white universities:
. . . It might interest Jencks and Riesman to know that
some Negro students - after observing nonteaching
professors, diverted graduate students, and stimulantobsessed undergraduate students - feel that the large
universities are also "academic disaster areas" (461).
The sense that smaller class sizes and more direct
contact with professors made black colleges more conducive to
black academic success manifested itself in the overwhelming
opposition of African Americans to a 1967 proposal to phase
out the law school at Texas Southern University. Between 1950
and 1965, TSU had produced 95 percent of the black members of
the Texas bar (Jones, 1969). Interestingly, Herman Sweatt had
dropped out of the University of Texas Law School before the
end of his first year, while Henry Doyle,

TSU's first law

student

Sweatt's

and

a

witness

who

testified

at

trial,

graduated and became a member of the Texas bar (Preer, 1982,
120) . Thus,

the

reasons

cited

for

the

school's

academic

inferiority during the 1940's - its small classes and its
black student body - had by the late 19 60's provided the
justification for TSU's continued existence (Ibid).
In summary, the Brown decision, far from being a "pana
cea," left many critical questions about the future of black
higher education unanswered. Many proponents of integration
continued to embrace an interpretation of Brown that included
little concern for its impact on black colleges. Partly for
this reason, a black backlash against Brown was not particu
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larly surprising. It is not argued here that all blacks who
sought to preserve

black

institutions

were

proponents

of

Black power per se. Rather, the strength of the movement lay
not in its numbers,

but

in its

ideological appeal.

Black

Power had deep roots in the history of black nationalism,
which was discussed in Chapter One. Second, black nationalism
borrowed many
rights,

of

its

core concepts

the equality of all men,

-

belief

in

inherent

the right to self-deter

mination, black self-help, and the social contract - from the
Lockean tradition. Thus, certain aspects of the broad vision
articulated by the advocates of Black Power resonated among
a significant segment of the black community, even while the
majority of blacks rejected the tactics of its most vocal
practictioners.
The emerging vision of the defenders of black colleges
amounted to a synthesis of certain aspects of the liberal
tradition and the sense that black Americans had a unique
historical experience which white society was obliged to take
into account.

Brown was

intended to deal with compulsory

racial segregation, it was argued; it had no bearing on the
voluntary choices of blacks to attend colleges in which their
race was in the majority. Black educators believed that the
legacy of Jim Crow segregation left many prospective black
college students unprepared to compete with white students on
an equal basis; thus, if black institutions ceased to exist,
many blacks would be denied the opportunity to pursue higher
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education altogether. While black students on white campuses
often

felt

alienated

from the

academic

community,

black

colleges served as "creditable models, psycho-socially conge
nial settings, special-group-oriented enclaves, and as insu
rance

against

a possible

declining

interest

in educating

Blacks" (Tollett, 1972, 207). Tuition costs at black schools
tended to be considerably less than at their white counter
parts, thereby making them an economic bargain for the poor,
regardless of race.
Supporters of black colleges not only wanted to preserve
the right of blacks as individuals to make

the voluntary

choice to attend black schools, but they asserted that the
black community had the right to maintain these institutions.
These

institutions were necessary

in

light

of the unique

history of African Americans, it was maintained, and served
a remedial role in integrating blacks into the mainstream of
American society. Furthermore, because the Brown opinion did
not expressly state whether it meant to eliminate compulsory
segregation or segregation regardless of its purpose, black
educators were able to extol the virtues of the black college
without

being

required

to

repudiate

the

entire

Brown

decision.
At the same time, black college leaders articulated a
vision of black colleges as institutions committed to provi
ding

quality

education

recognized that

for

all

regardless

of

race.

They

in the wake of B r ow n. historically black
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schools needed non-racial justifications for their existence.
Black educators often pointed out that African Americans had
not established schools for the express purpose of racial
segregation; thus,

in a sense desegregation coincided with

the historical traditions of black colleges.43 However, they
believed that partly because of their legacy of underfunding,
they were ill-equipped to compete on even footing with white
schools

for

schools as

white
inferior

students.

Most

whites

perceived

institutions and did not

see them as

serious options for the pursuit of higher education.
black college presidents
organize

themselves

in

during the

order

black

Thus,

late 1960's began to

i-n order

to

increase

their

political influence as well as their financial resources.44
43This point is illustrated by the position taken by the
National Association
for Equal
Opportunity
in Higher
Education (NAFEO) during the Adams v. Richardson case, which
will be discussed later in the chapter. In the NAFEO brief,
the black colleges questioned whether public black colleges,
established with specific state intent to separate whites
from blacks, could be implicated as a collaborator in illegal
segregation. Blacks, the NAFEO protested, were the victims of
discrimination, not its perpetuators.
^The
National
Association
for
Equal
Educational
Opportunity in Higher Education (NAFEO) was formed in 1969 by
the presidents of both public and private black colleges.
Initially, the organization was formed to challenge the Nixon
administration's lack of support for black higher education.
The formation of NAFEO showed how black college leaders had
come full circle since the Brown ruling in 1954. One year
after Brown. the presidents of the black land-grant colleges
had voluntarily disbanded their organization and merged into
the Association
of
State Universities
and
Land-Grant
Colleges.
By 1969, black college presidents saw the need of organizing
all-black organizations in order to protect their interests.
The NAFEO's
agenda
devoted very
little
attention to
integration; instead, it focused on increasing the visibility
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Not only did black colleges more agressively pursue greater
financial

aid

from

philanthrophic

sources

(a traditional

benefactor of black education), but these institutions sought
to gain a larger share of federal aid as well (Ware, 1966).
Taking

note

education
should

of

the

during the

have

Furthermore,

a

more

massive

expansion

1960's,

blacks

equitable

black educators

of

federal

aid

to

determined that they

share

of

these

funds.45

insisted that black colleges

needed to be financially compensated to remedy the effects of
historical discrimination by the states in order to "catch
up"

with

white

universities.

These

enhancements,

they

maintained, were deemed essential for desegregation to occur
on traditionally black campuses.
Meanwhile, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
the expansion of federal spending in higher education had
given the federal government greater power to prod states
toward desegregation, either by filing lawsuits or withhol
ding federal funds. However, in light of the unsettled state
of

the

law

in this

area,

it

still

remained

unclear

how

federal authorities would interpret the mandate of Brown in
higher education.

This background set the context for the

of black colleges and attracting private financial support
for black universities. The NAFEO stressed that black
colleges were essential institutions that played a critical
role in insuring access to higher education for black and
poor students.
45In 197 0, black colleges received only 2 percent of all
federal funds to higher education (U.S. Congress, cited in
Preer, 1982, 194).
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landmark Supreme Court decision in Green v. School Board of
New Kent County (391 U.S. 430 [1968]). Green initiated a new
phase in public higher education desegregation: the require
ment

that

states

not

only

grant

legal

access

to

white

institutions to blacks, but that they dismantle dual systems
of higher education for the races. The next section discusses
the impact of Green on higher education.
"The Affirmative Duty to Desegregate"
The

Green

decision

in 1968

crystallized

the

Supreme

Court's frustration with the snails-pace of public school
desegregation as well as its determination to enforce Brown.
In Green, the Court struck down a freedom of choice plan
which required first and eight grade students to annually
choose which school they wished to attend. In three years of
operation, not a single white child had chosen the county's
all-black school. Though 115 black children had selected the
all-white school, 85% of the blacks still attended the all
black school. The Court determined that the county's "freedom
of

choice"

plan

had

been

devised

to

delay

integration

indefinitely. School boards had the "affirmative duty," the
Court wrote, to promulgate plans that "promise realistically
to convert promptly to a system without a 'white' school and
a 'Negro' school, but just schools" (391 U.S. 430, 442). This
duty, the Court elaborated, was the school board's and could
not be shifted either to parents or students.
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Green firmly established that school boards were not
simply required to cease unconstitutional actions;

rather,

they had a proactive responsibility to enact policies and
procedures that would transform segregated school

systems

into integrated ones (Crump, 1993, 769). Moreover, the Court
indicated that it would tolerate no more delay on the part of
local school districts. Furthermore, the Supreme Court made
it clear that it was not only interested in affirming the
right of black students to attend all-white schools; rather,
states were required to destroy all the vestiges

of dual

systems of education "root and branch" (391 U.S. 430) . Green
reflected the Court's growing
ways

state

and

local

impatience with the various

governments

had manipulated

Brown's

implementation decree in order to prevent or to limit,
much

as

possible,

the

number

of

blacks

able

to

as

attend

integrated schools. In the wake of Green. future courts asked
whether continued racial identifiability of schools resulted
from state action or represented the voluntary choices of
parents and students.
The Supreme Court's intent to eradicate dual systems of
education "root and branch" increased the sense of urgency in
the

debate

over

the

constitutionality

of

public

black

colleges (Note, 197 0; Tollett, 197 2). Up to this point, the
Court had only concerned itself with the rights of African
Americans to attend all-white public schools and state uni
versities.

Green forced future courts to grapple with the
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issue of defining the remedial measures necessary in order
for a state to fulfill its "affirmative duty" to desegregate.
Among

the

principal

address was

questions

whether

that

the rights

courts

would

have

to

of blacks to desegregated

education could be reconciled with the desire of a signifi
cant segment of the black community to maintain voluntary
majority black public universities

(Bickel,

1971,

239-240;

Shimeall, 1980, 537-538).
It would not be until United States v. Fordice that the
Supreme Court would render a full opinion on the nature of
the state's "affirmative duty" to desegregate. Because of the
Court's

silence

on

this

matter,

the

task

fell

to

lower

federal courts which, not surprisingly, came to conflicting
conclusions.

Alabama State Teachers Association v. Alabama

Public School
M.D.

Ala.

and College Authority46 (289 F.

[1968]),

decided

a

few

months

Supp.
after

13 68,
Green,

represented the first attempt to tackle the problem. In this
case, a black teachers' organization at Alabama State College
in Montgomery challenged the constitutionality of an act of
the

Alabama

legislature

creating

a

branch

of

Auburn

University in Montgomery. They argued that the expansion of
Auburn served to perpetuate a dual system of education in
Alabama in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and would
undercut the

efforts

of Alabama

State College to recruit

white students. In rejecting the black plaintiffs' arguments,
46Hereinafter, this case will be referred to as A S T A .
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the district court drew a distinction between public school
desegregation cases and those

involving higher education.

Public schools, the court stated, were "free and compulsory,"
giving

school

boards

greater

leverage

in

impacting

the

choices available to students. Colleges, on the other hand,
were anything but "free and compulsory," and they differed
widely in size, missions,
tors.

States,

the

course offerings, and other fac

court concluded,

did not have

as many

remedial options at its disposal to impact the choices of
students as to which university they would attend.

Given

these differences, the court reasoned that
as long as the State and a particular institution
are dealing with admissions, faculty and staff in good
faith, the basic requirement of the affirmative duty
to dismantle the dual schools system on the college
level, to the extent that the system may be based on
racial considerations, is satisfied (Ibid, 789-790) .
Because the district court perceived there to be stark
differences between the contexts of public school cases and
colleges, it believed its remedial options were more limited.
The district court's opinion stood in marked contrast to the
NAACP's

interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in

Sweatt, mentioned in the last chapter. Sweatt declared that
creating a separate law school for blacks denied them certain
"intangible benefits" which they would receive in an inte
grated setting. The NAACP reasoned that the benefits which
integration would bring were similarly denied to students at
the elementary and secondary levels of education. This view
minimized the differences

between the public

schools
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postsecondary education and seemed to assume that whatever
remedial options applied in one context equally applied in
the other. ASTA. however, recognized a fundamental difference
between the two contexts. By defining the "affirmative duty"
of Green

strictly

in terms

of racially nondiscriminatory

admissions and hiring policies,

ASTA represented a rather

restrictive interpretation of the remedial power of federal
courts in higher education desegregation cases.
Other courts have defined the state's
under

Green more broadly.

In Norris

v.

responsibility

State

Higher Education (327 F. Supp. 1368 E.D. Va.

Council

of

[1971]), black

plaintiffs sought the enjoining of plans to upgrade Richard
Bland College, an all-white college in Richmond, from a twoyear school to a four-year institution. The plaintiffs argued
that

this

proposal

served

to

perpetuate

segregation

by

placing Richard Bland in direct competition with historically
black Virginia State College (also located in Richmond) for
white students. They charged that the Virginia legislature
had knowingly and willfully passed this legislation in an
effort

to

undercut

Virginia

State's

efforts

to

attract

whi te s.
The district court in Norris said the Green standard
applied with "equal force" in higher education. While noting
the differences between higher education and public school
cases that the court recognized in ASTA. the court concluded
that while the options available to the state may differ, its
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responsibility was

just as

exacting.

Moreover,

the

court

rejected the defendants' contention that ASTA standard should
be the controlling

law in this case.

declared that when the particular

Instead,

facts

the judges

of the case were

considered, ASTA simply did not expound principles which were
generally applicable to higher education desegregation cases.
Relying on the phraseology of

Green, the court

in Norris

declared that the state had the obligation to "convert its
white colleges and black colleges to just colleges"

(Ibid,

1373).
Consequently,

ASTA and Norris announced two opposing

views of the applicability of Green to higher education. ASTA
defined the state's "affirmative duty to desegregate" very
narrowly - its definition was restricted to the duty of the
state to promulgate policies, practices, and procedures that
did

not discriminate

on the basis

of race.

ASTA did not

necessarily require the dismantlement of black schools to
achieve desegregation; rather, it declared that state educa
tional policies should not be predicated on race.
respect,

ASTA's

logic

served

colleges would appeal
close their schools.
black

colleges

as

a precedent

to resist attempts

In that

which

black

to merge and/or

But ASTA was a two-edged sword:

seeking

enhancement

of

their

campuses

for
to

compensate for historical patterns of discrimination as well
as to facilitate their attempts to adapt their missions to
social change, the ASTA remedy did not require the states to
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do

so;

in fact,

it could be

argued that

enhancing black

schools constituted discrimination in favor of such insti
tutions that violated the color-blind spirit of ASTA. On the
other hand, supporters of black colleges were deeply troubled
by Norris7 interpretation of the Green standard. The language
of

Norris,

specifically

the

statement

that

the

state's

responsibility was to "convert its white colleges and black
colleges to just colleges," raised the specter that desegre
gation

in higher

education might mean

the

elimination of

black public colleges.
The Supreme Court refused to grant either case a full
hearing; instead, the Court summarily affirmed the decisions
of the lower courts (393 U.S. 4 [1969]; 404 U.S. 907 [1971]).
Apparently, the Court believed that the issues presented in
ASTA and Norris were not fundamentally different from those
the

justices

had

context.

Lower

Supreme

Court,

already

addressed

federal judges,
were

forced

in

the

public

school

lacking precedent from the
to

tackle

the

question

of

interpreting the mandate of Green in higher education alone.
Thus,

they continued to rely on precedents

set in public

school desegregation cases for guidance.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburo Board of Education
U.S.

1

[1971])

illustrated

that

the

problem

of

(402

applying

public school desegregation precedents to higher education
was far from clear-cut. In Swann, the Supreme Court attempted
to further clarify the "affirmative duty" announced in Green.
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Federal courts, the justices announced, had broad "equitable
powers" to remedy constitutional violations, and they vali
dated the use of a variety of methods
types

of

racial

quotas,

(including certain

majority-to-minority

transfer

programs, the rearrangement of attendence zones, and busing)
to effectuate desegregation. In subsequent cases, the Supreme
Court made it clear that the mandate of Brown also applied to
Northern and Western school systems as well; despite the fact
that many of these systems had no statutory history of racial
discrimination in public education, the Court determined that
the existence of de facto segregation made them subject to
Brown.47
Nevertheless,
higher

education

the ambiguity of Brown's application to
persisted,

despite

the

Court's

more

agressive and interventionist posture. For example, the Court
in Swann made it clear that a school's identity should not be
reflected
quality

of

in

the

its

racial

composition

facilities

activities of the school

and

of

the

equipment,

(402 U.S.

1,

18

faculty,

or

the

the

sports

[1971]).

Such a

situation, the Court warned, would consitute a prima facie
case of violation of constitutional rights

(Ibid,

18) . On

this score, Swann harmonized the spirit of Green which set
forth the goal of creating school systems that did not have

47Examples include Keyes v. School District No. 1 . 413
U.S. 189 (1973), Columbus Board of Education v. Penick. 443
U.S. 449 (1979), and Davton Board of Education v. Brinkman.
443 U.S. 326 (1979)
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"white schools" and "black schools" but "just schools." In
essence, Swann declared that continued racial identifiability
of public schools - and by extension, colleges - created the
presumption of a constitutional violation.

Therefore,

the

very fact that a college was "black" made it vulnerable to
constitutional challenge. Secondly, the Court affirmed that
federal

judges

had

broad

equity powers

in

desegregation

cases. Concerns about the continued racial identif iability of
universities and Swann's affirmation of the "broad equitable
powers" of federal judges provided the rationale for Geier v.
Blanton

(427

F.

Supp.

644

[M.D.

Tenn.

1977])

and United

States v. Louisiana (718 F. Supp. 499 [E.D. La. 1989]) where
district courts ordered the merger of black and white insti
tutions after concluding that previous efforts had failed to
produce significant progress toward integration.48
However, Swann disavowed a "substantive constitutional
right" to a particular racial balance, making it unclear what
48In Geier. the district court ordered the merger of
histo-rically black Tennessee State University (TSU) with the
University of Tennessee-Nashville (UT-N), a cross-town white
school, with TSU emerging as the surviving institution.
Though conceding that merger was a "radical remedy," it felt
that this option did not exceed the remedial power of the
court. The Geier court relied on Swan's reasoning to justify
merging the two institutions. The merger was upheld on appeal
(579 F.2d. 1056 [6th Cir. 1979]), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 886
(1979) . In the Louisiana case, the district court ordered, as
part of a radical overhaul of the higher education system,
the merger of Louisiana State University Law Center (97%
white, 3% black) with Southern University Law Center (58%
black, 42% white), with LSU as the surviving institution.
However, the court was forced to reverse itself following a
ruling by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on the Missis
sippi higher education case (914 F.2d. 676 [5th Cir. 1990]).
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an integrated school, or an integrated school system, should
look like. Was 10 percent black enrollment enough? Or should
it be twenty? Thirty? Swann's lack of clarity on this issue
made it unclear how this precedent applied in the context of
higher education, where federal judges, state legislatures,
and educational officials had to figure out what to do with
black colleges. Should Brown and its progeny be targeted only
at state-enforced racial segregation? Or was racial separtism
so invidious in and of itself that government was obligated
to dismantle it, regardless of its cause?
Therefore, the status of the black public university,
two decades after Brown. was far from clear.

On one hand,

these universities existed partly because, despite increasing
black enrollments on white campuses, many African Americans
still found white academic communities to be both unfriendly
and uncomfortable.

Hostility to integration,

though often

manifesting itself in less obvious forms than in the 1950 's
and early 1960's, was still very real. On the other hand, the
NAACP's integrationist ideology threatened the very existence
of black institutions because it equated superior education
with education in a mixed setting. Black college leaders by
the 1970's were increasingly defining the goal of desegre
gation in terms of enhancing black institutions whereby they
could expand their missions in ways that would enable them to
serve

all

students,

regardless

of

race.

These

competing

versions of the meaning of Brown for higher education finally
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led to
National

a direct

confrontation

Association

for

between the NAACP

Equal

Opportunity

and the

in

Higher

Education (NAFEO) in the case of Adams v. Richardson (356 F.
Supp.

92 [D.C.D.,

1973]). The Adams case is the subject of

the concluding section of this chapter.
Adams and the Concept of Equal Educational Opportunity
The Adams case commenced in 1970 when the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund (LDF) filed suit against the U.S. Department of
Health, Education,

and Welfare.49 The LDF accused the agency

of failing to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 forbidding racial discrimination in programs receiving

49The NAACP Legal Defense Fund was established to
coordinate the NAACP's legal campaign against segregation in
1939. In its early years, it worked closely with the NAACP's
leadership. Often, board members held joint memberships on
the NAACP's Board of Direc-tors and the LDF's Board of
Directors. This arrangement, in the wake of the Brown
decision, became untenable, as the operations of the NAACP
were subjected to intense scrutiny by the organization's
enemies. Southern district attorneys and attorney generals
accused LDF lawyers with "fermenting litigtion" (manufac
turing legal business by advising or causing actions likely
to produce lawsuits and then participating as the attorneys
on record in the cases; in the legal profession, this is
grounds for disbarrment.). In addition, Southern congressmen
complained about the fact that board members sat on both the
NAACP's Board and the LDF. They wanted the Bureau of Internal
Revenue to investigate whether the NAACP and LDF were
violating tax laws by accepting contributions as non-profit
organi-zations and using them for political purposes. In the
face of these pressures, many of the NAACP's leaders feared
that their ability to bring test cases would be hampered
without a formal severing of corporate ties between the NAACP
and the Legal Defense Fund. Thus, in 1957, the NAACP and the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund formally became two distinct
corporate entities (Morris, 1984; Ware, 1994).
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federal financial assistance. The HEW had found ten states50
operating dual systems of education in violation of the law;
however,

the agency had annnounced that

it would not use

threats of cutoffs in federal aid to prod state and local
officials to desegregate. Since the threat of fund termina
tions had been credited with encouraging states to speed up
efforts to desegregate since 1964, the move was seen as a
slowdown in enforcement efforts by the federal government to
effect desegregation (Orfield, 1969; Preer, 1982, 198). The
suit combined all levels of education and charged HEW with a
"general and calculated neglect" to enforce the law (Preer,
1982, 198) . HEW rebutted that it had upheld the provisions of
the

law by seeking voluntary compliance

(Ibid,

201).

The

district court did not agree with HEW, and ordered the agency
in Adams v. Richardson to commence enforcement actions within
120 days (356 F. Supp. D.C.D.

[1973]).

The Adams case signaled a fundamental shift in the Legal
Defense Fund's approach to desegregation in higher education.
Previous
Americans

lawsuits

concentrated

on

the

rights

to attend specific universities.

The

of

African

suits

had

50The Adams states were Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma,
North Carolina, Florida, Arkansas, Pennsylvania, Georgia,
Maryland, and Virginia. The Adams case testified to the
unevenness of federal enforcement efforts during the period.
Not all the states with historically black colleges received
notices nor were required to submit desegregation plans;
Texas, South Carolina, and Alabama were not notified by HEW
that they were in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 until 1980 (356 F. Supp. 92, 100; Preer, 1982,
196) .
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pursued integration on a school-by-school basis. The Adams
lawsuit recognized the increasingly systemic organization of
higher education and the need for systemic solutions to the
problems of racial discrimination.

Ironically,

it was the

NAACP that refused to consider systemic solutions fourteen
years earlier in the Hawkins case; rather,

it viewed Flo

rida's insistence that an impact study of the effects that
desegregation might have on the state's educational system
merely as a stalling tactic.

Invoking the letter of Green,

the NAACP argued that states needed to dismantle segregated
school

systems

"root and branch"

and remedies which

only

focused on specific universities failed to meet the state's
"affirmative duty" to desegregate. Now it was the NAACP that
was advocating institutional remedies (Preer, 1982, 141-142;
198-200) .
The fact that the LDF's lawsuit encompassed all levels
of education
applied

to

(thus assuming that a single
all)

caused

great

legal

consternation

standard

among

black

college presidents, who feared the Adams ruling might lead to
the

dismantling

of

black

public

colleges.51

The

NAFEO

submitted an amicus curiae brief with the Court of Appeals

51Black college presidents and educators were not alone;
while Adams v. Richardson navigated through the courts, the
future of black colleges was widely debated in other social
arenas. For example, the first National Black Convention,
meeting in Gary, Indiana in March, 1972, took a stand against
the merger of black and white state colleges. Rev. Jesse
Jackson, leader of Operation PUSH, sponsored Black Expo, with
the theme "Save the Black College" (Preer, 1982, 205).
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for the District of Columbia
brief

constituted

position.

At

the

a

in April,

fundamental

core

of

the

1973.

broadside
NAFEO's

on

The NAFEO's
the NAACP's

argument

was

the

contention that, contrary to the NAACP's reasoning, the Green
standard did not apply in higher education. The NAFEO sought
to refute three of the Legal Defense Fund's basic premises:
(1)

whether

public

school

precedents

standards for higher education;

provide

suitable

(2) whether black colleges

could be implicated in systemwide discrimination; (3) whether
eliminating the racial identity of state colleges promised to
enhance educational opportunities for black students (Ibid,
202) . Black

colleges,

the

NAFEO

insisted,

perpetuators of discrimination; rather,

were

not

the

they were its vic

tims. It objected to the suggestion that black colleges were
guilty of maintaining unnecessary program duplication and
therefore should be merged into unitary systems of higher
education.

In other words,

the NAFEO

brief

asserted that

blacks should not be forced to abandon the tangible benefits
of maintaining black colleges in favor of the hypothetical
and uncertain advantages of an integrated system:
The Black Institutions of Higher Education have served
and continue to serve as the bridge between a crippling
and debilitating elementary and secondary educational
system to which Brown itself was directed because of the
experience with the equal education cases from Murray to
Sweatt in the field of higher education. This experience
demonstrated that equality of educational attainment
could not be achieved until the feeder system of the
secondary and elementary levels had been improved for
black students. Eighteen years after Brown, with a
general consensus that this feeder system has not been
improved— and maybe has lost ground,. . . the assimi
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lation of the Black Institutions of Higher Learning
would be to remove the wooden beam in order to replace
it with a steel or cement support before the new beam
is in place, leaving the structure unsupported at all
(NAFEO Motion to Intervene as Amicus Curiae, in Haynes
III, 1978, C—23 - C—24).
The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the district
court, reaffirming the finding that HEW's enforcement efforts
had been insufficient

(480 F.2d.

1159

[1973]).

It accepted

the LDF's conception of the problem as systemic, requiring
coordinated statewide efforts in order to remedy. However,
the Court of Appeals suggested that states consider the role
that historically black colleges have played in providing
educational opportunities for black students:
A predicate for minority access to quality post
graduate programs is viable, co-ordinated state-wide
higher education policy that takes into account the
special problems of minority students and of Black
colleges. These Black institutions currently fulfill
a crucial need and will continue to play an important
role in Black higher education (Ibid, 1164).
The district court in Adams v. Califano52 was even more
emphatic about the role of black colleges:
The process of desegregation must not place a
greater burden on Black institutions or Black students'
opportunity to receive a quality higher education. The
desegregation process should take into account the
52Following the Court of Appeals' decision in Adams v.
Richardson, eight states submitted desegregation plans to
HEW, and the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) accepted them. The
NAACP Legal Defense Fund sued for further relief, charging
that the plans accepted by HEW were deficient and failed to
meet Title VI requirements. HEW contended that it was
inexperienced in higher education matters; the district
court, nevertheless, ordered HEW in Adams v. Califano (43 0 F.
Supp.
118
[1977])
to develop criteria specifying the
components of acceptable desegregation plans for state
systems of higher education.
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unequal status of the Black colleges and the real danger
that desegregation will diminish higher educational
opportunities for Blacks. Without suggesting the
answer to this complex problem, it is the responsi
bility of HEW to devise criteria for higher education
desegregation plans which will take into account the
unique importance of Black colleges and at the same
time comply with the Congressional mandate (430 F. Supp.
118, 120).
The Adams cases represented the first time that federal
judges incorporated in their decisions special consideration
for the impact that desegregation might have on black public
colleges. Though not resolving the constitutional dilemma of
black colleges by any means, the Adams decisions constituted
a significant victory for black educators concerned that the
price of desegregation would be the extermination of black
colleges. Many of the black college presidents' concerns were
reflected in HEW's higher education desegregation criteria,
promulgated in 1978 pursuant to Adams v. Califano. The HEW
Criteria

required

the

desegregation plans:

following

components

to

statewide

(1) the state would define the mission

of each institution within the higher education system;

(2)

a description of planned improvements for black institutions,
including

the

improvements;

dollar
(3)

the

amounts

and

elimination

timetables
of

for

unnecessary

these

program

duplication in a way that is consistent with strengthening
the mission

of

black

institutions;

(4)

priority conside

ration for the placement of new, high demand progams should
be given to black institutions; and (5) the withholding of
state approval from any changes within the higher education
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system which may thwart or undermine the goal of desegre
gation (U.S. Department of Health, Education,

and Welfare,

1978).
Thus, the tension between ASTA, Norris. and Adams have
formed the legal cornerstone of subsequent higher education
desegregation battles in the absence of guidance
Supreme

Court.

ASTA

interpreted

the

Green

from the

standard

very

narrowly, restricting the "affirmative duty to desegregate"
to

the

promulgation

hiring practices.

of

nondiscriminatory

Norris

interpreted

admissions

and

Green's mandate

for

higher education more broadly, insisting that though, remedial
options may differ, the standard applied with equal force.
Norris raised the question of whether the state's charge to
transform

its

existence

of

colleges
black

to

public

"just

colleges"

universities.

precluded

Adams

the

cautioned

states to consider the role of black public colleges when
developing

statewide desegregation plans.

Adams

suggested

that Green's "just schools" standard, which did not consider
if

majority

black

public

schools

serve

any

beneficial

societal roles, may be inappropriate in the context of higher
education.
The

Adams

cases

also

illustrated

the

growing

rift

between the LDF's endorsement of integration at all costs and
the reservations of other interest groups within the black
community about the wisdom of this approach. The debate raged
even

within

the

NAACP

itself.

At

the

association's

1973
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annual meeting, the national leadership introduced a resolu
tion calling for mergers to achieve desegregation. After much
discussion,

the

title of the resolution was

"Merger of State Supported Colleges" to

changed

from

"Desegregation of

State Colleges" (Preer, 1982, 205). The compromise reflected
the

lack

of

consensus

within

the

NAACP's

rank-and-file

membership on the definition of desegregation.53 Though the
revised wording represented a clear compromise in light of
dissension within the ranks, Executive Secretary Roy Wilkins
nevertheless

insisted,

"There

is

nothing

at

variance

in

association policy in calling for desegregation of state

^Nevertheless, despite their awareness of the opposition
of many blacks to further desegregation efforts as well as
dissension within their own ranks, the NAACP backed a 1974
Louisiana plan that proposed the merger of Louisiana State
University and Southern University and historically white
Louisiana Tech with historically black Grambling College. Roy
Wilkins declared that the issue of integration in higher
education was no different than in the case of the public
schools (Preer, 1982, 205). After the Supreme Court refused
to stay the merger of Tennessee State University and the
University of Tennessee-Nashville, the Legal Defense Fund
announced its intention to seek the merger of black and white
state colleges in other Southern cities (Ibid, 221). In 1979,
on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Brown decision,
Kenneth Clark took an uncompromising stance on integration.
He wrote:
There has been no evidence to refute what the Court
said in Brown: "separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal." Whatever might have been the value
of black colleges in the seventeenth century and up to
World War II, their continuation - particularly statesupported, publicly funded colleges - is a flagrant
violation of the letter, the spirit, and the goals of
the Brown decision. It marks a return to Plessv v. Fer
guson. Black colleges and white colleges are educational
anachronisms (Clark, 1979, 8).
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supported systems. Under desegregation, any kind of operation
that would desegregate those faciliies would be acceptable"
(Ibid, 205).
However,

many African Americans accused the NAACP of

trying to exterminate black colleges. Because of the histo
rical

link between the NAACP and the NAACP Legal Defense

Fund,

many African Americans continued to view these

two

organizations as if they were synonymous, despite the fact
that they had been formally separated for years. Thus,

the

very organization which had been synonymous with the fight
for equal

rights

for African Americans

stood accused,

at

least in some quarters of the black community, with racial
treason. By endorsing remedies that threatened the existence
of black colleges, their critics within the black community
accused them of being out of step with what was in the best
interests of African Americans.
Actually, the NAACP was internally divided. Those within
the NAACP who believed that Brown was intended to eliminate
all racial segregation (regardless of its cause or its pur
ported benefits) did not take kindly to be portrayed in this
manner. They held to the view that separate education would
always be inferior education because white state legisla
tures would never treat black schools equally (Clark, 1979;
Wilkinson, 1979; Bell, 1979). While many pure integrationists
recognized many of the problems associated with integration
that their critics had identified,

they nevertheless con-
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eluded

that

integration's

liabilities
integration

(Armor,
might

benefits

far

1995) . Conversely,

become

an

excuse

for

outweighted
many

feared

states

to

its
that

simply

eliminate black colleges without improving black access to
higher education.

Some NAACP officials recognized that the

organization was losing ground in the black community because
of the Adams case. They pointed out that the LDF, not the
NAACP, had initiated the Adams case, and accused the LDF of
damaging the NAACP's reputation with the black community.54
Nonetheless, the criticism reflected the disillusionment
felt by many blacks with legal efforts to enforce the Brown
decision and the sense that integration itself had actually
proved

to

be

disastrous

for

the

black

population

(Bell,

1975) . It also served as an example of the tendency noted by
Dawson (1995) of a public community censoring those seen as
^The Adams case became part of a long simmering feud
that had been developing between the NAACP and the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund for years. Though both organizations are
viewed synonymously in the eyes of the public, they had
actually been pursuing two different agendas for quite some
time. However, because of that public per-ception, the NAACP
was unable to compete financially with the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund. Many donors assumed that giving to one of the
organizations was as good as giving to the other. In
addition, the the NAACP accused the LDF of initiating suits
(including Adams) in the NAACP's name without consulting with
the organization's leader-ship. For years, NAACP officials
demanded that the LDF drop the NAACP initials in front of its
name to avoid confusion in the public mind. Relations between
the two organizations turned icy in the late 1970's and early
1980's . Finally, the NAACP sued the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
to try to force the LDF to relinquish its ini-tials; the suit
was ultimately unsuccessful (Ware, 1994; NAACP v. NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund. 559 F. Supp. 1337 (D.C.D.C.
[1983]); rev'd 753 F. 2d. 131 (1985), cert, denied, 472 U.S.
1021 (1985) .
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attacking perceived black interests. Ironically, Brown. aimed
at eradicating separate but equal in education,

failed to

destroy the allure of Plessy; the very decision that had
victimized blacks could now be summoned to support a new
version

of

"separate

but

equal"

(Bell,

1975;

Wilkinson,

1979) .
The ambivalence in black America over integration,

as

well as the unsettled state of the law with respect to the
requirements for desegregation in higher education, set the
backdrop for the Mississippi case. The litigation, initiated
in

1975

by

the

Black

Mississippians'

Council

on

Higher

Education, stemmed from the frustration of black plaintiffs
with the Legal Defense Fund's handling of the Adams case and
their concern that the desegregation process would result in
the elimination of black colleges.

Chapter Four focuses on

the history of United States v. Fordice.
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CHAPTER 4. UNITED STATES V. FORDICE
Public Education and Racial Politics
Knowledge unfits a child to be a slave (Douglass,
1962, 79).
Gunnar Myrdal

observed that

education has played

an

especially significant role in American thought and culture.
He wrote:
Education has always been the great hope for both indi
vidual and society. In the American Creed it has been
the main ground upon which "equality of opportunity for
the individual" and "free outlet for ability" could be
based. Education has also been considered as the best
way - and the way most compatible with American indivi
dualistic ideals - to improve society (1944, 882).
In Chapter One, I argued that the American faith in the
power of education represents one of the most powerful deduc
tions

from the Lockean settlement.

American

education

is

premised on the idea that the United States is a meritocratic
society where persons are free to rise and fall based on
their

own

efforts.

Thus,

according

to

Allen

and

Jewell

(1994), when one achieves educationally, it is presumed that
he or she is adding to his or her "human, social and cultural
capital"

in a way that enhances his or her economic value

(178) . At the same time, the public school represents one of
the chief

institutions charged with

instilling democratic

values to each succeeding generation; it is also assumed to
play an instrumental role in "assimilating" new arrivals into
mainstream American culture. Social reform movements typic
ally appeal to education to effect change in American society
197
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(Myrdal 1944; Cremin,

1989; Reitman,

1992). Viewed in this

light, the Brown decision should be seen as an example of the
American tendency to use education as the instrument to bring
about social change - in this case, in the area of race rela
tions (Arendt, 1958; Wilkinson, 1979).
It was also argued that the existence of slavery in the
Southern United States politicized the importance of educa
tion for African Americans in a way that distinguishes them
from the nation's majority population.

"Education," Wendy

Brown writes, "remains the essential element for liberation
from social and economic subordination in the black commun
ity" (1992, 121). Dr. Beverly Cole, the National Director of
Education for the NAACP, concurs:
We [meaning African Americans] have always regarded
education as our blueprint for survival. Since before
the Civil War when every slave state had laws against
blacks learning to read and write, those actions sig
naled to the African American community the absolute
importance of education, and we have been struggling
to obtain access to a quality education ever since
(1991, 23) .
Therefore, the struggle to obtain equal access to educational
opportunities has occupied a central place in African Ameri
can liberation movements in the United States. Education, for
African Americans,

should

bring

them

closer

to

freedom.

Conversely, because Southern planters viewed the education of
slaves as a threat to the institution of slavery, the coming
of tax-supported universal education in the South would have
to wait until the end of the Civil War. If education "is the
great equalizer of the conditions of men"

(Mann, 1849, 59),
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Southern whites seemed determined to nullify its potential to
make the ex-slaves the social equals of whites. Consequently,
Southern aristocracy demonstrated their faith in education by
their unwillingness to educate their slaves.
The South's defeat in the Civil War hardly softened the
hostility of many Southerners toward public education, and
perhaps no state better exemplified Southern antipathy toward
public education than Mississippi. In fact,
less on black education than Mississippi
73) ; thus,

no state spent
(McMillen,

1990,

it provides a classic case study of how racial

considerations have profoundly shaped the politics of educa
tion in America. Black Mississippians, like blacks elsewhere,
have seen access to education as a crucial component in the
struggle to equalize their life chances. Consequently, when
a group of black plaintiffs initiated the lawsuit that ulti
mately became United States v. Fordice. it represented the
most recent chapter in the struggle of black Mississippians
for equal educational opportunity.
This chapter begins by tracing the development of the
"separate but equal" system of higher education in the state
of Mississippi.

This

is

followed by

a discussion

of the

period between the state's campaign of massive resistance to
the Brown decision to the filing of the Avers suit by the
Black Mississippians Council of Higher Education. Third, this
chapter locates the Mississippi case within the context of
the increasing polarization of racial politics in America.
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Fourth, I examine the arguments raised by the parties in the
suit and

demonstrate how the opposing sides

linked their

cases to critical aspects of the American Creed.

Finally,

this chapter concludes with a discussion of the Court's deci
sion in Fordice.
Mississippi Higher Education: Separate and Unequal
While Northern and Western states were moving toward
tax-supported education, the Southern planter class remained
either indifferent or openly hostile. Mississippi aristocrats
were no different than the rest of their Southern brethren in
their contempt for the common school movement.

In general,

opposition to the idea came from evangelical clergymen who
regarded the

"encroachment of

scientific discoveries upon

sacred mysteries with profound

intolerance"

and

southern

gentry who simply felt that education was a luxury,

not a

right, and one which should be indulged by those who could
afford to pay for it (Sansing, 1990, 34).
Two factors broke the political gridlock that prevented
the

establishment

of a public

university

in Mississippi:

first, the Panic of 1837 eroded the financial base of pri
vate-supported

seminary

education,

thereby

weakening

the

position of the evangelicals. Secondly, the growing sectional
dispute

over

slavery

increased

the

pressure

on

Southern

states to "educate her sons at home." Thus, the state legis
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lature chartered the University of Mississippi in Oxford in
1844 and designated it by statute to serve whites only (Ibid,
34-35).
The South's defeat in the Civil War forced white Missi
ssippians to face the possibility that the former slaves whom they deemed as their "social inferiors" - might now be
able to enjoy the same rights that white men considered as
their Lockian birthright.

Perhaps nothing horrified white

Mississippians more than the idea of blacks exercising the
right to vote - especially in light of the fact that African
Americans constituted 54 percent of the state's population in
1870

(McMillen,

1990,

37). Provisional Governor William L.

Sharky declared in 18 65 that even if it were limited to the
most

educated

and propertied

blacks,

enfranchisement

was

impossible in Mississippi; General William T. Sherman doubted
that black suffrage could be imposed by force

(Ibid,

36) .

That same year, many whites were terrified when a group of
Vicksburg blacks petitioned Congress for the right to vote
(Ibid,

36-37) . An

influential Democratic editor predicted

that the enfranchisement of blacks would produce only one of
two results: white exodus from the state or a race war (Ibid,
37) .
However, despite their opposition, white Mississippians
were unable to prevent blacks from entering the body politic,
at least in the short run.

The Reconstruction Act of 1867

made black Mississippians eligible voters for the first time,
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and they helped to draft a new constitution. On the basis of
this

new constitution,

Mississippi was

readmitted

to the

Union in 1870 (Ibid, 37). In 1870, black legislators coalesed
with northern Republicans and southern "scalawags" to create,
for the first time, a public education system,

albeit on a

racially segregated basis (McMillen, 1990, 75; Sansing, 1990,
56-62). The legislature agreed to provide stipends of $100
each to college

students who

system and to reorganize the
University of Mississippi had

choose to teach

in the new

state university.
been set

aside

Since the

for whites,

these efforts raised the question of state-supported higher
education for blacks.
In 1870, there were two private colleges in Mississippi
providing higher education for blacks: Shaw University and
Tougaloo Normal and Manual Training School
61; Jenkins, 1983, 275-276; McMillen,

(Sansing,

199 0,

1990, 101). Shaw,

established by the Misssissippi Conference of the Methodist
Episcopal Church at Holly Springs in 18 66, included a commer
cial

institute

and

a

medical

school

in

addition

to

the

traditional liberal arts curriculum (Sansing, 1990, 61). In
1890, it changed its name to Rust University and subsequently
to Rust College. Tougaloo55 was established in Jackson, Mis
sissippi by the American Missionary Society and the Freed

55Its name was changed to Tougaloo University in 1871. In
1916, it was renamed Tougaloo College and in 1953, the
school's name was changed to Tougaloo Southern Christian
College (McMillen, 1990, 101).
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man's

Bureau

in

1869.

Both

schools

received

small

state

subsidies; thus, they were "quasi-public" institutions until
the state's Constitution of 1890 banned the use of public
funds for private institutions (Sansing, 1990, 62; Jenkins,
1983, 275-276).
The

ex-slaves'

passion for

learning made many white

Mississippians uneasy. Judge Robert S. Hudson of Yazoo City,
in an open letter to Chancellor John Newton Waddell of the
University of Mississippi asked,

"Will the faculty as now

composed, receive or reject an appllicant for admission as a
student

on

account

of

color?"

Waddell

and

the

faculty

responded that they would be "governed by consideration of
race and color" and would "instantly resign should the trus
tees require them to receive negro students" (Sansing, 1990,
62). Their exchange was widely circulated in the Mississippi
press and stimulated numerous comments. The Jackson Clarion
wrote of the faculty: "We warmly endorse their stand" (Ibid,
62). However, Governor James Alcorn branded Hudson's letter
as the "stuff of political hucksters" and chided the "obse
quious faculty" for allowing "such a man as Judge Hudson" to
intimidate them. He added that they were at liberty to resign
at any time (Garner, quoted in Sansing, 1990, 62).
The controversy over educational equality gave a sense
of urgency to establishing a state-supported university for
blacks only. In May, 1871, Alcorn University was founded on
the old campus of Oakland College, which ironically, had been
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an antebellum liberal arts school for the sons of planters
(Sansing,

1990,

63;

Jenkins,

1983,

278;

Thompson,

1989;

McMillen, 1990, 103; Blake, 1991, 540). Alcorn was designated
as the state's black land grant college - the first black
institution so designated in the South.56 While black leaders
initially preferred the
Mississippi
school,

over

the

integration of the University of

establishment

of

a

separate

black

they were won over by the state's generous support

for Alcorn during its early years (McMillen, 1990, 103). The
legislature

promised to

Alcorn annually

appropriate

a

sum

of

$50,000

to

over the next ten years and the governor

appointed an all-black board of trustees.

In addition, the

state was to provide the same number of scholarships

for

Alcorn that it provided for the University of Mississippi.
56The Morrill Act of 1862 providing for the establishment
of land grant colleges marked a watershed in the history of
American education. Before the Civil War, higher education in
America had been restricted to private, sectarian institu
tions serving only the wealthy and professional classes and
offering a classical curri- culum to train the chilren of the
privileged for leadership posi-tions in society. The land
grant colleges represented a rejection of both purely clas
sical education in favor of a scientific and practical
curriculum and a democratization of American higher educa
tion. By the turn of the century, these colleges had assumed
a major role in making higher education more broadly acces
sible to the working classes and in training the leaders of
agriculture, industry, and science. Alcorn was only one of
three black insti-tutions designated as a land grant college
until the Second Morrill Act of 1890 extended the mandate to
black schools. Though the new law required states to "equit
ably" apportion federal funds to land grant schools, in
reality, black land grant colleges were woefully underfunded
in relation to their white counterparts throughout the Plessy
era (Kujovik, 1987; Sansing, 1990, 62; K. Alexander and M. D.
Alexander,
1985, 55-58;
Presidents of 1890 Land-Grant
Colleges and Universities, 1980; McMillen, 1990, 103-106).
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Furthermore, the institution was to receive 60 percent of the
state's land-grant appropriation funds pursuant to the First
Morrill Act based on the fact that blacks were the majority
of the state's population (Jenkins, 1983, 278; Sansing, 1990,
64; McMillen,
that

black

Revels,

1990,

103). As a testament to the importance

Mississippians

the black United

resigned his

seat

attached
States

in Congress to

to

education,

Senator

Hiram

from that state,

become the university's

first president (Blake, 1991, 540-541).
Alcorn's political good fortunes,
last

very

long.

educational

The

parity

waning
for

of

blacks

however,

Republican
and

the

would not

commitment

to

reassertion

of

Democratic control of the legislature in 1874 would put black
and white public higher education on two distinct paths. In
1875, Alcorn University's state appropriation was drastically
reduced

to

$15,000

annually,

an

omen

of

things

to

come

(Jenkins, 1983, 278; McMillen, 1990, 103). In 1876, its all
black

board

of trustees

was

replaced

by one

composed

of

whites only (McMillen, 199 0, 103). The Democratic legislature
reduced Alcorn's share of the state's land-grant funds from
three-fifths to one half; in that same year, the state also
abolished the $100 stipends for scholarship students. Between
1876

and

1890,

Mississippi

appropriated

only

$82,140

to

Alcorn, an average of only $5,476 annually (Mayes, quoted in
Jenkins,

1983, 280).
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By systemmatically undermining Alcorn's financial base
and appointing an all-white board, the state of Mississippi
made its purpose abundantly clear: it intended to provide an
institution for blacks of inferior quality designed to frus
trate the efforts of black Mississippians to compete for the
same educational and economic opportunities that whites took
as their Lockian birthrights.

In 1878,

Alcorn

charter

University's

reestablished

the

and

institution as Alcorn

Mechanical College.
from Alcorn's

original

the state revoked
a

new

charter

Agricultural

and

The striking of the term "university"

name was deliberate;

the

state

intended to

relegate Alcorn to the status of a "vocational, agricultural,
and

trade-oriented

quality"

that

Mississippi

could

(Blake,

curriculum
not

of

compete

1991,

questionable
with

the

collegiate

University

of

540) . The same statute changing

Alcorn's charter provided for the creation of Mississippi
Agricultural and Mechanical College
University)

(now Mississippi State

in Starkville. This new institution assumed the

land-grant functions for the state previously provided by the
University of Mississippi. Though the state technically had
two

land-grant

unfolded,
only.

institutions,

Alcorn

Finally,

became
the

a

state

it only funded one:

land-grant

institution

legislature

allowed

as time
in name
Alcorn's

physical plant to deteriorate by official neglect (Sansing,
1990, 64).
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Southern Democrats would not have been able to enact
these reversals in black educational gains in the absence of
a political climate characterized by growing disinterest in
the plight of the ex-slave. As it was argued in Chapter Two,
by the 1870's Northern public opinion had tired itself of the
problems of the Negro, and many were content to let the South
resolve the problems related to the future status of African
Americans in its own way (Bullock, 1967; Woodward, 1974; Kluger,

1975; Marable,

Following the return

1982;

Quarles,

1987; McMillen,

of

"home rule"

1990).

in Mississippi,

some

whites wanted to abolish public education altogether, viewing
it as a "Yankee innovation" that had been imposed on them
against their will

(McMillen,

1990,

75) . However,

"cooler

heads" prevailed; many conservative lawmakers determined that
such drastic action would be imprudent in that it ran the
risk of triggering massive

black resistance

and

inviting

northern intervention into their affairs (Anderson, 1988, 27;
McMillen,

1990,

75) . Moreover,

the ex-slaves'

school cam

paigns had ignited interest among the classes of poor whites
for

universal

education

(Anderson,

1988,

27).

Practical

political concerns prevented the most extreme factions from
wiping out public education altogether. However,

the state

did, significantly reduce support for public education and to the extent that the state supported public schools, it was
primarily directed

toward benefiting whites

at the

black

man's expense. At the turn of the century, African Americans
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represented 60 percent of the state's school aged population,
but black schools only received 19 percent of the state's
funds

(McMillen, 1990, 73). In 1899, A. A. Kincannon, State

Superintendent

of

Education,

described

state

educational

policy with respect to the black race rather succintly when
he said:
It will be readily admitted by every white man in
Mississippi that our public school system is designed
primarily for the welfare of the white children of the
state, and incidentally for the negro chidren (quoted in
McMillen, 1990, 72).
Many white Mississippians believed (as whites elsewhere)
that blacks were intellectually inferior to whites, and were
skeptical that providing education would improve the plight
of ex-slaves.
taxed

to

Some whites resented the very idea of being

support black

education,

countering

that blacks

should pay for their own schools. However, lurking behind the
appeals

to

white

supremacy

were

practical

concerns

that

educating blacks would destabilize the racial status quo of
the

state.

Mississippi

Governor

James

Vardeman

expressed

white fears very well in 1899 when he said:
In educating the negro we implant in him all manner
and ambitions which we then refuse to allow him to gra
tify. It would be impossible for a negro in Mississippi
to be elected as much as a justice of the peace. . . .
Yet people talk about elevating the race by education!
It is not only folly, but it comes pretty nearly being
criminal folly. The negro isn't permitted to advance and
their education only spoils a good field hand and makes
a shyster lawyer or a fourth-rate teacher. It is money
thrown away (quoted in McMillen, 1990, 72).
By limiting the quality of black education, the state's
white minority hoped to cripple the pollitical aspirations of

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

209

African Americans,

inhibit the ability of blacks to compete

with whites economically, and to insure a low-skilled, menial
labor force (Ibid, 73). When discussions about black educa
tion

took

place

among

white

Mississippians,

one

of

the

principal concerns was the "right kind of education for the
Negro" - one that did not disturb the racial hierarchy of the
state.

For this reason,

divide

taxes

state lawmakers

along racial

lines

die

let a proposal to

for

the purposes of

public education. Under this proposal, taxes levied on white
taxypayers for public education would be spent only on white
schools; similarly, black schools would be financed only with
taxes

from black

citizens.

Supporters

of

the proposition

maintained that it was consistent with the Plessv decision as
well as white hostility toward being taxed for black schools.
However,

the proposal was defeated because

of

fears that

expenditures to black schools might have actually increased
(Ibid,

76-78).

In the final analysis, black Mississippians

ended up being taxed to support white public schools, despite
the fact that they were legally barred from attending those
very

institutions

Mississipians

were

(Ibid,

78-79).

unable

to

In

summary,

completely

while

white

eliminate

the

educational gains made by blacks as a result of Reconstruc
tion,

they nevertheless

devoted themselves

to

efforts

to

direct the character of black education so that it would not
disturb the settled nature of white hegemony in the state.
They were determined to keep the former slaves, as well as
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their

descendents,

in

a

subordinate

role

in the

state's

postbellum political and economic order.
Nevertheless, Alcorn's black leadership persisted in the
goal

of

creating

the

best

liberal

arts

college

and

high

school they could in spite of the state's intentions. McMil
len (1990) noted:
Its first president, Hiram Revels (1871-1882),
whatever his administrative shortcomings, was educated
in the classical tradition and he staffed the institutution with black men much like himself, most of them
graduates of Fisk University. Its first generation of
students wrestled with Latin and Greek as well as with
English literature, trigonometry, and chemistry. Its
redesignation as an A&M college meant little; the pro
fessors and the curriculum remained the same and when
Revels retired he was followed by a succession of other
liberally trained black educators who did not share
white notions about black academic limitations (103).
Often this required the institution's administrators to
deliberately lie to state officials to avoid offending white
sensibilities.

They emphasized that Alcorn was

"primarily

industrial" and that its students were engaged in a "very
practical

curriculum"

appropriate

for

a

black

school.

However, despite the heroic efforts of Alcorn officials to
provide instruction that whites deemed blacks unworthy of,
the institution more closely approximated a high school than
a university until the 1940's. This pattern held true for
most public black colleges in the South (Blake,

1991,

543-

544). The fact that Alcorn's high school program continued
until after the Brown decision not

only demonstrated the

state's determination to circumscribe the institution's
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development;

it provided a stark commentary on the unequal

nature of elementary and secondary education for blacks in
Mississippi as well.57
The Supreme Court's ruling in Plessv and its application
of the "separate but equal" principle to education in Cum
mings only gave sanction to what the state of Mississippi was
already doing. Between 1884 and 194 6, the state legislature
authorized the establishment of five additional universities.
In each case,

the state's intent to keep the races apart

guided their decisionmaking. Three of these new schools were
reserved for whites only and the other two existed solely to
serve blacks.58

57In 1950, only 25 percent of eligible blacks of high
school age were enrolled in high school in Mississippi
compared to 62 percent of the state's eligible white students
(McMillen, 1990, 89).
58The white universities were Mississippi University for
Women (1884), University of Southern Mississippi (1910), and
Delta State University (1924). Jackson State University,
established originally as a private school for the purpose of
preparing black ministers and teachers, came under state
control in 1940. It took ten years of petitioning by black
Mississippians to convince the legislature to aquire the
school, which was in serious financial trouble as a result of
the Great Depression. On assuming control, the state changed
the name of the school to Mississippi Negro Training School
and cut its curriculum from four years to two. After four
years of political pressure from Jackson State College
alumni, the school's four-year curriculum was restored;
however, its degree-granting authority was limited to teacher
education (McMillen, 1990, 107-108). In 1946, the state
established
Mississippi
Valley
State
University
as
Mississippi Vocational College with the mission of "educating
teachers primarily for rural and elementary schools and
providing
vocational
training
for
Black
students"
(Petitioners' Brief, 1991, 4).
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By 1910, Mississippi's pattern of deliberately underfunding Alcorn in comparison to other state-supported white
universities was well entrenched. Table 1 on page 213 illu
strates the point. State funding policies reflected a
deliberate effort to relegate Alcorn to an inferior status
within the higher education system. Moreover, these patterns
had no educational justification other than the perceived
need

to keep

whites

and blacks apart

in

institutions

of

separate and decidedly unequal educational quality.
As the state progressively increased its financial
commitment to higher education, the gap in funding between
Alcorn

and

the

other

institutions

widened

rather

than

narrowed. Table 2 on page 213 chronicles state appropriations
for higher education during the 1928-1929 fiscal year.
What is significant about these figures is not simply
the fact that the financial disparities between Alcorn and
the white universities increased as the state's commitment to
higher education increased. It is also interesting that when
Mississippi

established new all-white universities,

these

institutions began at a higher funding level than Alcorn even
though it was the second oldest college in the state.

For

example, Delta State Teachers College, founded only in 1924,
received slightly more revenues for its general fund than
Alcorn for the 1928-29 year

($159,500 for Delta State and

$155,185 for Alcorn); however, Delta State's capital outlay
budget was a whopping 3 9 percent higher than Alcorn's.
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TABLE 1. LEGISLATIVE APPROPRIATIONS
FOR MISSISSIPPI'S SENIOR COLLEGES (1910-1911)

Institution
Univ. of Mississippi
Alcorn A&M College
Mississippi A&M
Industrial Institute
and College*

General
Expenses

Capital
Outlay

Total

$157,004
43,905
340,737
162,054

$ 86,500
9,500
112,343
105,650

$243,504
53,405
453,081
267,704

*now Mississippi University for Women
SOURCE: Aubrev Keith Lucas. The Mississippi Leaislature and
Mississippi Public Hiaher Education. 1890-1960, (Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University) , 1966, p. 149.
TABLE 2 . LEGISLATIVE APPROPRIATIONS
FOR MISSISSIPPI'S SENIOR COLLEGES ( 1 9 2 8 - 1 9 2 9 )
General
Expenses

Institution

Univ. of Mississippi $
388,057
Alcorn A&M College
155,185
Mississippi A&M
1,009,218
Miss. State College
488,245
for Women
State Teachers College*
287,000
Delta State Teachers
159,500
College

Capital
Outlay

Total

$1,620,000
225.000
683,543
565.000

$2,008,057
380,185
1,692,761
1,053,245

501.000
365.000

788.000
524.000

*now University of Southern Mississippi
SOURCE: Aubrey Keith Lucas, The Mississippi Legislature and
Mississippi Public Higher Education. 18890-1960. (Ph.D. dis
sertation, Florida State University), 1966, p. 152.
The

state

also

systeinmatically discriminated

against

Alcorn in its disbursement of federal and state funding for
land grant purposes. For example, a 1945 report submitted to
the Mississippi Board of Trustees of State Institutions of
Higher Learning described a well-developed School of Agri
culture

and

College

of

Engineering

at

Mississippi
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College;
rinary

it also included recommendations for a new vete
school,

graduate

education

in

home

economics,

a

forestry deapartment, and an engineering station. That same
report, however, revealed that the state had not spent a cent
for land grant activities at Alcorn, though it was legally
obligated to do so (Mississippi Board of Trustees of State
Institutions of Higher Learning,

1945). Because the experi

ment stations played a critical role in developing scientific
research methods

in higher education,

the state's funding

policies retarded the development of the physical sciences at
Alcorn.59 These practices were consistent with the overall
intent of Jim Crow education. Black colleges existed mainly
to produce teachers to serve in the segregated schools and
graduates in the lowest vocational occupations. Graduate and
professional education were deemed inappropriate for blacks.
The

evidence

suggested

that

Mississippi's

system

of

higher education was more successful in its aim of frustra
ting black college education than any other state

in the

South. In 1932, Mississippi, though it had the largest black

590ften, the experiment stations at white universities
were staffed by university faculty; thus, the stations became
the first form of graduate instruction at the white land
grant institutions. Thus, the denial of Morrill land grant
funding to black land grant colleges comparable to their
white counterparts severely limited the curriculums of these
institutions and made them land grant schools in name only.
Not until the separate but equal doctrine began to be
subjected to legal challenged in the 1940's did Southern
states reluctantly began to expand the academic offerings at
these institutions
(Kujovik,
1987,
42-64;
Christy and
Williamson, 1992).
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population

of

any

state,

had

only

2.7

four-year

college

graduates per 10,000 blacks (Blake, 1991, 544). By compari
son,

Georgia,

the

million blacks,

only other

southern

state with over

a

had almost four times the number of black

four-year college graduates (10.7 per 10,000) in 1932 (Ibid,
544). In 194 0, when 77% of the black high school age popu
lation in the South were not enrolled in school, the figure
for Mississippi was 89% - the highest black out-of-school
population of any southern state (Anderson, quoted in Blake,
1991, 545). Thus, despite the efforts of black public col
leges

to

operated

increase
in

an

black

college

environment

where

graduation
the

odds

rates,
were

they

heavily

stacked against them.
In 19 54, on the eve of Brown, Mississippi's system of
higher education stood decidedly separate and unequal.

In

that year, H. M. Ivy, President of the Board of Trustees of
State Institutions of Higher Learning, submitted a report to
the full board documenting the inequalities between white and
black education in the system. The report noted that while
white students had the benefit of a variety of undergraduate
programs and extensive offerings at the graduate and profes
sional levels, the missions of black colleges had been cir
cumscribed primarily to undergraduate training in teacher
education, agricultural and mechanical arts and the teaching
of various trades (Avers v. Allain. 674 F. Supp. 1523, 15281529) . Additionally, it commented that, in Alcorn's case, the
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institution's

actual

offerings

did

not

match

its

stated

mission: the report found that there was little evidence that
Alcorn was in fact a land grant institution (McMillen, 1990,
104) . The

report

also

made reference

to

the

inequitable

funding patterns which favored white institutions over their
black counterparts. For example, of the better than $10 mil
lion that the state spent on higher

education during the

period of 1952-54, only 15.7% of those dollars were spent on
black institutions (Avers v. Allain. 674 F. Supp 1523, 1529).
Like whites elsewhere in the South, white Mississippians
defied the Brown

decision,

determined

to maintain racial

segregation in higher education. Nevertheless, black Mississipians, encouraged by the Court's ruling, would assert their
rights to educational equality and challenge the status quo.
Their challenge to the state's practices, which ultimately
led blacks to take Mississippi to court, are the subject of
the next section.
From Brown to Avers
The Brown decision was roundly denounced throughout the
South as an affront to the entire Southern way of life (Car
ter, 1959; Orfield, 1969; Bartley, 1969; Peltason, 1971;
Martin, 1970; Wilkinson, 1979; Tabarlet, 1987). Criticism of
the Court ranged from charges that the justices relied on
"sociological reasoning" rather than time-honored traditions
of constitutional law to charges that the Court, as well as
anyone associated with or supportive of the Brown decision,
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was involved in a worldwide communist conspiracy to overthrow
the government of the United States (Bartley, 1969; Wilkin
son, 1979) .
The Supreme Court's decision in Brown did not come as a
complete surprise to the state's political leadership. While
the segregation cases were being argued before the Supreme
Court,

the

state

legislature

began

making

provisions

to

either influence the Court's decision or to circumvent any
ruling

that

(Carter,

jeopardized

the

continuation

of

segregation

1959, 21-22). During a special session, the state

legislature passed an equalization program for the public
schools which called for equal salaries for black and white
teachers,

equal transportation,

school opportunities

for

equal buildings,

all children

- black

and equal
and white.

However, the program was not to go into effect until after
the Supreme Court's ruling, and only if the state's position
that segregation was constitutional was affirmed. Not sur
prisingly, when the Supreme Court announced its decision in
Brown. Mississippi's belated equalization program was never
enacted (Ibid, 22). During the regular session in early 1954
(prior to the Court's announcement), the legislature agreed
to appropriate only enough funds for the public school system
for a year, instead of two years as was its custom.60. State
60This ^ is significant because in those days,
the
Mississippi legislatures convened its regular session only
once every two years. Thus, it is clear that the state was
bracing itself in anticipation of the Supreme Court's ruling
and was preparing for whatever contingencies were deemed
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Lawmakers wanted the flexibility to make whatever adjustments
might be made "necessary" by the Brown decision. They anti
cipated that they might be called into special session before
the next regular session in 1956.
Nevertheless, despite a climate of offical opposition,
Medgar Evers, Field Director of the Mississippi State Con
ference of the NAACP applied for admission to the University
of Mississippi School of Law in January, 1954

(Adams, 1992,

269) . His application was rejected on the grounds that he had
failed to comply with the requirement that he submit two let
ters of recommendation from prominent citizens of his county.
While Evers did submit letters from two citizens in Newton
County, where his family's homestead was and where he had
lived most of his

life,

the State Board replied that his

letters should have come from Bolivar County where he had
lived the two years prior to his application

(Ibid,

269) .

After consulting with NAACP officials, Evers decided not to
pursue the matter further.61
Once the Court's decision was announced,

the state of

Misssissippi, like her Southern neighbors, quickly mobilized
in an effort to circumvent Brown. Mississippi Governor Hugh
White called it "the most unfortunate thing that has ever

necessary.
61Instead, Evers went to work for the NAACP in Jackson
investigatng racial incidents in Mississippi and the state
wide activities of the White Citizens Councils (Adams, 1992,
269-270).
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happened” and insisted that it was "impossible to mix the
races together in the public schools of Mississippi" (Tabarlet,

1987,

33).

The

Jackson

Clarion-Ledqer

published

an

editorial which said that "May 17, 1954, may be recorded as
a black day of tragedy for the South" (Carter, 1959, 25). The
Jackson Daily News' lead editorial was entitled "Blood on the
Marble Steps"

(Ibid, 25). In late May, Circuit Judge Tom P.

Brady criticized the Court in a speech to the Sons of the
American Revolution in Greenwood, Mississippi for abandoning
over a half century of legal precedent in the Brown decision.
Brady argued that the justices did not take into account the
black man's basic inferiority to the white man

(Ibid,

26).

Organized leadership would be required if the South intended
to

successfully resist

impose the Brown

efforts by

decision

on the

"outside
South.

agitators"
The

to

speech was

widely circulated, and Brady's words are considered as the
inspiration

for

the

formation

of

the

Citizens'

Council

Movement throughout the South (Carter, 1959, 26-35; Bartley,
1969, 85) . The first Citizens' Council62 was formed in July,
62The White Citizens' Councils (the term "White" was
dropped from the name in the late 1950's) sprang up in
reaction to the Brown decision. Prior to Brown. the Ku Klux
Klan was the best known white supremacist organization;
however, its influence was limited even in Mississippi. Many
"respectable racists" disliked the "white trash" reputation
of the Klan and feared that the Klan's reliance on terrorism
and murder (as well as other extralegal tactics) would invite
massive federal intervention in the South. The Citizens'
Councils, sometimes referred to as "the country club Klan"
drew their membership from business leaders, professionals,
clergymen, and educators committed to the doctrine of white
supremacy. They worked through existing political and legal
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1954,

in

Indianola,

Mississippi,

near

the

heart

of

the

state's Delta region (Bartley, 1969, 85; Tabarlet, 1987, 34).
The movement spread rapidly to Alabama,
South Carolina,
(Bartley,

Louisiana,

Florida, Arkansas, Tennessee,

1969,

84).

Mississippi

boasted

Texas,

and Virginia
the

largest

membership in the Citizens' Councils of any Southern state;
by the end of 1954, the Mississippi Association of Citizens'
Councils claimed chapters in more than thirty counties (Ibid,
8 6 ).

Meanwhile, the legislature created the Legal Education
Advisory Committee in order to allow both black and whites to
voice

support

for voluntary

segregation

(Ibid,

76) . The

governor selected a few conservative blacks who supported the
plan in order to demonstrate that black Mississippians did
not want integration;

rather,

"outside agitators" with no

appreciation for Southern mores were attempting to impose it
against the will of both black and white citizens of the
South.

Held

speeches
remain

by

the

on

July

whites
same.

30,

1954,

insisting
However,

the conference began
that

much

the
to

racial

the

status

chagrin

of

with
quo
the

organizers of the conference, the blacks who attended did not
stick to their original bargain.

With near unanamity,

the

black spokesmen urged the state to comply with the Supreme
Court decision

(Ibid, 76). Their much-publicized bi-racial

institutions in order to obstruct desegregation and hamper
the activities of civil rights organizations (especially the
NAACP).

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

221
conference a fiasco, the legislature subsequently passed a
constitutional amendment that permitted the abolition of the
entire public school system (or parts of it) , and provided
for

the payment

of

tuition

attend private schools.

grants

to

school

children to

(Ibid, 76) . These amendments passed

with a solid majority of the popular vote in December, 1954,
thanks largely to the efforts of the White Citizens' Councils
(Ibid,

76, 85-86).

The message was clear:

the state would

rather abolish the public school system than to integrate.
Meanwhile,

the State Board of Institutions of Higher

Learning announced a new regulation requiring applicants to
the University of Mississippi to obtain character references
from five alumni of the school,

and decreed that any such

references would have to have been acquainted with the appli
cant for at least two years (Adams, 1992, 269). Since the new
rule required black applicants to find white alumni who would
write letters of recommendations for them,

it served as an

effective barrier to blacks entering white universities for
nearly a decade. Mississippi's "character requirement" was
copied by other Southern states that were searching for ways
to discourage black applications to all-white universities
(Dorsey, 1981; Preer, 1982; Samuels, 1991).
From the halls of the United States Senate, Mississippi
Senator

James

Eastland

emerged

as

perhaps

the

greatest

champion of blatant white supremacy. He regularly denounced
desegregation as a communist-inspired plot to undermine the
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foundation

of

Anglo-Saxon

according to Eastland,
things,

civilization.

White

supremacy,

was part of the immutable order of

and segregation was consistent with "the Constitu

tion,

the laws of nature,

and the

laws of God"

(Bartley,

1969,

118). He specifically accused some of the key social

scientists who were cited in footnote eleven of the Court's
opinion of subversion. These included Theodore Brameld,
Franklin Frazier,
Eastland,

was

and Gunnar Myrdal. Brameld,

"a member of no

less than

E.

according to

10 organizations

declared to be communistic,

communist front,

dominated"

33). The House of Representa

(Wilkinson,

1979,

or communist

tives' Un-American Activities Committee had "18 citations of
Frazier's connections with Communist causes

in the United

States," Eastland complained (Ibid, 33). Eastland dismissed
Myrdal as an "alien" and a "socialist" who had dismissed the
federal Constitution as unsuited for modern conditions (Barttley,

1969,

120; Wilkinson,

1979,

33). He also criticized

Myrdal for relying on sources that he considered to be sub
versive,

such as

Wilkinson,

Frazier and DuBois

(Bartley,

1969,

120;

1979, 33).

But opposition to the Brown decision was not simply a
manifestation of the racial animosities of white men or a
reflection of Southern-style McCarthyism. This became clear
in 1956 when many Southern states
broadened their
interposition

(including Mississippi)

attack on the Brown decision by enacting

resolutions.

Basically,

the

interposition
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resolutions conceived of the Union as an interstate compact
whereby

the

states

had

only

surrendered

to

the

national

government those powers directly specified in the compact in this case, the Constitution. All other powers, according
to the South, belonged to the states. This included the power
to regulate public schools. Brown v. Board of Education, in
their view, did not overturn the state's sovereignty over its
public schools according to the Tenth Amendment. While the
Fourteenth Amendment did place certain limitations on the
powers of the states,

it did not fundamentally change the

nature of the Union nor forbid the states from operating
segregated schools.

By supposing that the

states had the

right to declare null and void any law that, in their view,
violated the original compact, the South set the Tenth Amend
ment against the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Four
teenth Amendment in Brown. Consequently,

if the Fourteenth

Amendment did not change the nature of the Union, any action
on the part of the federal judiciary to implement the Brown
decision would be illegal barring the enactment of a consti
tutional amendment (Bartley, 1969, 126-134).
Thus, the South resurrected a constitutional debate over
the

relationship

between

the

federal

government

and

the

states that could be traced back at least to the Virginia
Resolution in 1798; similar arguments were relied on by John
Calhoun during the nullification crisis in 1832. To be sure,
there existed legitimate fears in the states about the growth
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of federal power in many nonracial areas: many of the inter
position resolutions mentioned fields other than race where
state lawmakers railed against alleged "federal usurpations
of the sovereignty of the states" (Ibid, 133). Still, despite
the claim of a spokesman for the Virginia Defenders that
Brown was "the occasion, rather than the cause, for reasser
ting the sovereignty of individual states within the Union"
(Ibid,

133) , the timing of this reassertion,

least, made such claims suspicious. Rather,

in the very

it looked like

the South was fighting the Civil War all over again.
The South's determination to resist desegregation forced
a

confrontation

between

the

national

government

and

the

states. Throughout the 1950's, the federal government seemed
reluctant to take decisive action to enforce the

Court's

decision in Brown. It took a threat to law and order to push
President Eisenhower into nationalizing the Arkansas National
Guard during the Little Rock school crisis in 1958 to force
the integration of Central High School. Thus, the slowness of
the federal government's enforcement efforts made it possible
for

Mississippi

to

continue

to

defy

the

Brown

decision

outright throughout the decade of the 1950's. In 1958 and
1959,

the

University

of Mississippi

Graduate

School

and

Mississippi Southern College,63 in concert with other state
officials not only denied admission to two black applicants

63It is now the University of Southern Mississippi.
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to

their

schools;

state officials

blatantly violated the

rights of these applicants in the process.64
When James Meredith, an Air Force veteran, petitioned to
enter the University of Mississippi in 1961, the university,
the state college board, the governor, the lieutenant gover
nor,

and

other state officials joined forces

prevent his admission.

This time,

in order to

however,

the university

lost its battle to deny Meredith admission,

but only after

the state exhausted all of its legal options

(Meredith v.

Fair. 305 F. 2d 341 [5th Cir. 1962]; cert, denied, 371 U.S.
828

[1962];

despite

a

admitted,

enf'd,

313

F.

2d

532

[1962]).

Nevertheless,

federal court order requiring that Meredith be
he had

to be

escorted by

federal

marshals

and

attorneys from the U.S. Justice Department in order to insure

M In 1958, Clennon King, a professor at Alcorn College,
sought to enroll in the University of Mississippi Graduate
School. Unable to get any alumni to write letters for him, he
nevertheless tried to register in person. Governor J.P.
Coleman, Attorney General Joe Patterson, and Commissioner of
Public Safety Tom Scarborough met him at the Registar's
office to personally deny his petition. He was arrested and
subsequently committed to the state's mental hospital for a
short time. An NAACP spokesman remarked, "no other state has
ruled that a man was crazy because he wanted an educa-tion"
(Bartley,
1969,
212).
He was declared
sane,
and he
subsequently left the state. The following year, Clyde
Kennard's application to Mississippi Southern College was
rejected. Upon leaving the campus after meeting with college
officials, Kennard was immediately arrested for speeding and
charged with illegal possession of alcohol (though he did not
drink). Though the state Supreme Court overturned his
conviction two years later, Kennard was convicted of theft
and sentenced to seven years in prison in a case where much
of the evidence was manufactured. Kennard developed cancer
while in the state penitentiary and died in 1963 (Bartley,
1969, 212; Adams, 1992, 270-271).
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his admission (Tabarlet, 1987, 35-36). Meredith's admission
precipitated a riot which ultimately required 16,000 U.S.
troops

to

put

down.

Two

men

were

killed,

hundreds

were

injured, and nearly 200 were arrested (Ibid, 36, 51-52).
Having lost the battle to prevent all blacks, regardless
of their qualifications,
the

state

from entering white universities,

of Mississippi moved to circumscribe access to

traditionally white schools by African American applicants.
In 1963, the University of Mississippi, Southern Mississippi,
and Mississippi State University all enacted admissions poli
cies requiring a minimum score of 15 on the American College
Test

(ACT) for entering freshmen. At the time, the average

ACT score for white Mississippians was 18 while the average
score for blacks was 7 (Avers v. Allain. 893 F. 2d 732, 735).
The gap between black and white performance on the ACT was a
powerful
education

testimony

to the

legacy of separate

for black Mississippians

at the

and unequal

elementary

and

secondary level. The new policies fit a general pattern among
Southern

states

strategy

of

that was mentioned

altering

admissions

in Chapter Three:

requirements

in

the

facially

neutral ways in order to limit the number of blacks who would
be able to meet the new standards as much as possible. The
new admission standards at Mississippi's white universities
manifested another

form of the

state's

resistance to the

Brown decision.
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Mississippi State University admitted its first black
student in 1965; Mississippi University for Women and Delta
State University followed suit in 1966.

In 1967,

the Uni

versity of Southern Mississippi became the last all-white
university to drop its color barrier to blacks (Davis, 1993,
412-413).

Alcorn State became the first black college

in

Mississippi to enroll white students in 1966; Whites first
enrolled at Jackson State in 1969 and at Mississippi Valley
State in 1970 (Ibid, 413) .
Nevertheless,
technically
schools

Mississippi's

"integrated,"

still

improvements

while

persisted.
in

the

the racial
Though

black

the

universities

designations
state

colleges,65 a

of

were
its

had made

some

substantial

gulf

remained between the financial support and academic offerings
for predominately white schools and black ones. Table 3 on
page 228 summarizes the distribution of degree programs among
Mississippi's institutions of higher learning as of 1974.

6SBetween 1966 and 1974, the state had appropriated
$16,084,656 for new construction at Alcorn State University.
The comparable figures for Jackson State and Mississippi
Valley were
$17,691,557
and
$10,668,514
respectively.
However, the state was still making substantial investments
on the white campuses as well. Mississippi allocated
$11,417,960 for new construction at Delta State Univer-sity,
$13,989,528 at Mississippi State, $9,705,574, $17,206,793 at
the University of Mississippi, and $12,412,978 at Southern
Missis-sippi. Thus, while the new investments brought much
needed improve-ments to black campuses,
they did not
substantially reverse the "cumulative defecit" that had
amassed from a century of underfun-ding black higher
education.
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TABLE 3. SUMMARY OF DEGREE PROGRAMS AT
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING
IN MISSISSIPPI
Institution

B*

M»

D*

S*

Alcorn State University
28
Delta State University
34
Jackson State University
32
Miss. University for Women
37
Mississippi Valley State
26
Mississippi State University 94
University of Mississippi
62
Univ. of Miss. Med. Center
4
Southern Mississippi
106

13
22
14
—
68
45
9
73

—
—
—
—
38
28
9
37

4
1
1

B*
M*
D*
S*
P*

=
=
=
=
=

—
18
7
—
27

P*
—
—
—
—
—
1
3
—»«•

bachelor degree programs
master's degree programs
doctoral degree programs
specialist degree programs
professional degree programs

SOURCE: U.S. Exhibit 1, "State of Mississippi Modifications
to the Plan of Compliance to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964," pp. 52-53, in United States v. M abus. Docket No.
90-1205, U.S. Supreme Court Records. Fall Term 1991.
In addition, the predominately black institutions con
tinued to receive a substantially smaller share of overall
state appropriations than the predominately white universi
ties. Table 4 on page 229 documents the distribution of state
dollars to its universities between 1970 and 1974.
Mathematically, these figures were computed based on the
total

number

of

student

credit

hours

at

the

respective

institutions. Formula funding was based on student enrollment
at both the baccalaureate and postbaccalaureate levels. Since
the predominately white universities offered a greater range
of programs at both levels than the predominately black uni-
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TABLE 4. STATE APPROPRIATIONS FOR
MISSISSIPPI UNIVERSITIES, 1970-1974*
Institution

Total AoDrooriation

Alcorn State University
Delta State University
Jackson State University
Mississippi State University
Mississippi Univ. for Women
Mississippi Valley State Univ.
University of Mississippi
Univ. of Southern Mississippi

$ 9,442,783
12,341,051
19,804,944
41,414,924
11,021,959
8,889,710
35,545,525
36,700,432

*These figures are based on student credit hour production.
Funds for new construction at these universities are not
included in these totals.
SOURCE: U.S. Exhibit 1, "State of Mississippi Modifications
to the Plan of Compliance to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964," p. 97, in United States v. Mabus. Docket No. 901205, U.S. Supreme Court Records. Fall Term 1991.
versities,

significant disparities between black and white

colleges continued to persist. The inequalities were even
more stark with respect to the land grant activities of the
state. For fiscal year 1970, Mississippi received $4,465,035
in federal funds under the Morrill Act to divide between its
two land grant universities. When the funds were divided, all
but

$127,000

of

those

dollars

went

to Mississippi

State

(Avers Complaint, January 28, 1975, 17).
Furthermore, the University of Mississippi, Mississippi
State University, and the University of Southern Mississippi
established several off-campus centers throughout the state,
which further insured that few white students would attend
predominately black schools. As black college presidents in
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Mississippi increasingly defined the missions of their
institutions as places that provided low-cost education to
all Mississipians,

they viewed the

existence

of the off-

campus centers as a deliberate effort on the part of the
state to discourage white enrollment at black colleges. The
black

college

presidents

maintained

that

these

branch

campuses "unnecessary duplicated"66 the course offerings of
their institutions and served to drain away funds, students,
programs, resources, and facilities that might otherwise be
invested

in Jackson

State,

Alcorn

State,

and Mississippi

Valley.67
“ "Unnecessary duplication" refers to instances where two
or more institutions offer the same nonessential or noncore
program. Using this definition, the district court in Avers
considered all duplication at the bachelor's level of
nonbasic liberal arts and sciences course work and all
duplication at the master's level and above to be unnecessary
(United States v. Fordice. 505 U.S. 717, 738) . Implicit in
the term is the lack of an educational rationale for such
duplication and the fact that some, if not all, duplica-tion
could be practically eliminated (Ibid, 739).
67In 1972, the state legislature passed a law which
limited somewhat the universities' ability to establish
branch campuses.
Senate Bill No.
1527 prohibited the
establishment of a degree granting branch or residence center
within 40 miles of another Mississippi university. The new
law was designed to end the "haphazard manner" in which these
branch campuses were being created;
many times,
the
universities were establishing off-campus centers in the same
cities (Peoples, 1995, 258-259). However, the urban areas of
Jackson and Natchez were specifically exempted from this
provision. This exemption expressly protected the existence
of The Universities
Center
(operated
jointly by the
University of Mississippi, Mississippi State, and Southern
Mississippi) located in Jackson, and the University of
Southern Mississippi Natchez Center. Nor did the new law
require the closing of the Mississippi State University
Branch Center in Vicksburg, which was less than 4 0 miles from
Lorman, Mississippi, where Alcorn State is located. The
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Patterns of faculty employment continued to reflect the
legacy of segregation in Mississippi higher education. It was
not until the 1970-71 academic year that the state broke with
its historic policy of not hiring black faculty at white
universities.

During that

year,

the University

of Missi

ssippi, Mississippi University for Women, and Southern Miss
issippi hired blacks for the first time. Delta State hired
its first black in 1973-74, and Mississippi State joined the
crowd in 1974-75

(Davis,

1993,

413). Meanwhile,

the black

universities hired whites at Alcorn State in 1966-67, Jackson
State in 1967-68, and Mississippi Valley in 1968-69

(Ibid,

413) .
In 1969, HEW's Office of Civil Rights found the state's
higher education system to be in violation of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Preer, 1982; Adams, 1993; Connell,
1993; Davis,

1993; Kujovich,

1996). HEW requested that the

state submit a desegregation plan to disestablish the dual
system. However, four years passed before Mississippi deve
loped any sort of plan to meet HEW's request. They were able
to get away with negligence largely because HEW lacked clear
definitions of desegregation in the higher education context,
a point which will be further explored later in this chapter.

Universities Center offered the white population of Jackson
an alternative to Jackson State; similarly, both the Natchez
and Vicksburg branch campuses, located in close proximity to
Alcorn State, competed for the same pool of white students
that Alcorn was trying to attract to its campus (Avers
Complaint, January 28, 1975, 15-17).
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Chapter Three discussed how dissatisfaction with HEW's record
on securing compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 prompted the NAACP Legal Defense Fund to bring the
Adams suit. After the Adams court ruled against the federal
government, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) turned its focus
to Adams states such as Mississippi.
Meanwhile,

the Adams case motivated a group of black

Mississippi activists who were dissatisfied with the state's
progress toward desegregation to begin sharing information
with each other concerning the state's response to HEW. They
formed

an

organization

called

the

Black

Mississippians'

Council on Higher Education (Davis, 1984, 243; Adams,

1993,

277) . While the NAACP Legal Defense Fund was frustrated with
the federal government's record of enforcing the provisions
of

Title

VI,

the

Council

was

more

concerned

about

the

unequal status of black colleges within Mississippi's system
of

higher

educa-tion.

desegregation would

They

result

feared

that

the

process

of

in the further marginalization

and/or the elimination of black colleges.
In a letter dated May 21, 1973, OCR renewed its request
that the state submit a desegregation plan (Peoples,
303).

1995,

Hastily and without relying on any black input,

the

state submitted its first Plan of Compliance on June 7, 1973.
Among other things, the plan operated as if Brown's mandate
in higher education meant freedom of choice and little else,
ignoring the potential ramifications of the Supreme Court's
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decision in Green for higher education.
marily rejected by HEW on November 10,

The plan was sum
1973

(Adeems,

1993,

276-277; Peoples, 1995, 303). After a period of negotiations
and resubmissions, HEW approved the state's plan of May 28,
1974 pertaining to its four-year institutions (Adams, 1993,
277). Among other things, the black colleges complained that
the state's Plan of Compliance left the branch campuses at
Jackson,

Natchez,

and Vicksburg intact.

Instead,

the Plan

called upon Jackson State to participate in the Universities
Center in Jackson and for Alcorn to provide 25 percent of the
teaching load at the bachelor's and master's level at the
Natchez Center (U.S. Exhibit 1, "State of Mississippi Modifi
cations to the Plan of Compliance to Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of

1964,"

82-83).

While the Plan required the

removal of programs at the Universities that were duplicative
of Jackson

State's

course

offerings,68 it permitted,

with

Board approval, the development of any "unique or profes
sional

programs

University"

which

are

not

offered

at

Jackson

State

(Ibid, 82) . The Board of Trustees proposed that

68John Peoples,
former president of Jackson State
University, complained that the provision forbidding the offcampus centers to duplicate course offerings at Jackson State
and Alcorn was routinely evaded for years. The off-campus
centers would change the title of course offerings while
leaving
the
course
content
essentially
the
same
as
corresponding courses at Jackson State or Alcorn; thus, a
course at Jackson State entitled, "Modern European History"
might be offered at the Universities Center as "The History
of Europe After 1900" (U.S. Exhibit 14, Letter from John A.
Peoples to Dr. E. E. Thrash [July 25, 1975], United States v.
Mabus, 1991, 144-145; Peoples, 1995, 309).
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it would seek a special appropriation from the legislature of
slightly less than $3 million to implement the total plan
(78) .
Still to

be resolved was

the status

of

the

state's

junior colleges.69 Since compliance with Title VI required an
approved plan for the entire system of higher education, and
since the junior colleges could not agree on a comprehensive
plan,

HEW referred Mississippi's case to the U.S.

Department

in

August,

1974

Justice

for enforcement action

(Ibid,

277) .
For several months after HEW's referral of Mississippi's
case to the Department of Justice,

no visible

action was

taken. The Justice Department did consider entering a pre
existing case in Mississippi in order to attack the state's
higher education system. In 1970, the Lawyers Committee for
Civil

Rights

Under

Law,

a Washington

based

civil

rights

advocacy group, brought suit to force the U.S. Agricultural
Extension Service to desegregate fWade v. Mississippi Coope
rative Extension

Service. 372 F.

Supp.

126

[N.D.

Miss.],

modified, 378 F. Supp. 1251 [N.D. Miss. 1974], vacated, 528

69This posed a problem because the state's college board
had no constitutional authority over the junior colleges.
Each public junior college in Mississippi had an independent
governing board, while all fell under the authority of the
Junior College Commission. This commission, however, had very
little real authority over the fiercely independent, county
based governing boards. Consequently, it is not surprising
that the junior colleges could not come to a suitable
settlement to the question of deseg-regation (Peoples, 1995,
303) .
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F.2d.

508

[5th Cir.

1976]).

The

Extension

Service was

a

branch of both Mississippi State University and Alcorn State
College,

which were

included

as

defendants.

It was

also

partially funded by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which
was also named as a defendant (Adams,

1993, 278). Although

the decision in Wade had been handed down in 1974, the case
remained active in order that its implementation might be
monitored. In January, 1975, the Justice Department announced
its intention to enter the case as a plaintiff, creating the
interesting situation of the federal government being on both
sides of the case (Ibid, 278). The Justice Department sought
to reopen the suit and expand its jurisdiction to include the
entire higher education system,

"thereby hoping to kill two

unconstitutional birds with one judicial stone"

(Ibid).

The Black Mississippians7 Council was displeased with
HEW7s

decision

portion

of

Mississippi7s higher education plan because it did not,

in

their judgement,
the

state7s

to

accept

the

senior

college

fundamentally alter the unequal status of

black

institutions.

Unwilling

to

allow

the

Justice Department to obtain judicial approval for the H E W 7s
accepted
Council

solution

for Mississippi7s

on January 28,

1975

senior

filed Avers v.

colleges,

the

Waller70 as

a

70In Mississippi, the governor is the titular head of the
higher education system, even though the Board of Trustees
for
State
Institutions
of
Higher
Learning
has
the
constitutional authority to actually manage the system.
Therefore, the suit has changed names with succeeding
gubernatorial administrations. William Waller was governor in
1975 when the suit was filed; subsequently, William Allain,
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class action suit and invoked a three-judge district court
(Avers Complaint, January 28, 1975; Preer, 1982, 212; Adams,
1993,

278).

In their petition,

they accused the state of

unconstitutionally violating the rights of African American
citizens in the state by failing to maintaining a separate
and inferior system of higher education for blacks. However,
unlike the NAACP lawsuits which were geared primarily toward
eliminating barriers to black admission at white universi
ties, the Avers complaint charged Mississippi officials with
systemmatically underdeveloping predominately black insti
tutions. They aimed primarily to improve black universities,
arguing that, these institutions still served a vital role in
assuring access to higher education for African Americans.
Leading the list of plaintiffs was Jake Ayers, Sr.,71 father
of two of the minor plaintiffs
1982,

212).

The

Justice

in the Adams suit

Department

subsequently

motion to intervene as a plaintiff in the case

(Preer,
filed

a

(Motion to

Intervene as Plaintiff, April 7, 1975).
The Avers suit not only signaled the beginning of a new
phase in the history of Mississippi higher education; it com

Roy Mabus, and Kirk Fordice (the current governor) have been
named defendants in the Mississippi case.
71Jake Ayers, Sr. had been a longtime civil rights
activist and a member of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic
Party
(MFDP), an all-black political party famous for
challenging the legitimacy of the all-white Mississippi
delegation to the 1964 Democratic National Convention in
Atlantic City, NJ. Ayers died in 1986, but the suit which
bears his name continues.
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menced a significant turning point in the debates about dese
gregation in higher education more broadly. The next section
attempts to place the litigation in Mississippi in a wider
context of what was happening nationally with respect to
desegregation and civil rights enforcement.
The Political, Judicial, and Regulatory Context of Avers
The Avers suit crystallized how the political landscape
of desegregation in higher education had radically changed
since the early pre-Brown lawsuits in the graduate and pro
fessional school cases. Since Green. the Supreme Court had
made it clear that it had lost patience with the deliberate
tactics that state universities had utilized to escape the
full weight of the Brown mandate in higher education; mere
"freedom of choice" plans were not sufficient.

States now

were expected to demonstrate clear numerical progress toward
desegregation.
systems

be

Moreover,

eradicated

the Court's

"root

and

insistence that dual

branch"

occurred

in

the

context of the increasingly systemic organization of higher
education

in the

states.

As

a consequence,

the

focus

in

desegregation enforcement shifted from not only insuring that
individual blacks had access to white universities, but also
to

the

creation

of

unitary

systems

of

higher

education,

thereby exposing the vulnerability of public black colleges.
In

Chapter

witnessed
rights.

the

Three,

collapse

it was

shown

of

policy

the

that

the mid-1960's

consensus

on

civil

The effort to apply the Green decision to higher
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education drove a wedge through an already deeply divided
civil rights community which agreed on the issue of expanding
black access to white universities, but disagreed about what
should happen to public black colleges.

With the goal of

legal equality obtained, longstanding tensions between black
integrationism

and black separtism reemerged.

The debate

over the future of the black college in the post-Brown era
represented but one facet of black America's schizophrenia
between its desire to be fully integrated into the mainstream
of American society and its desire to preserve its unique
history and culture.
Thus, Avers represented the first time that blacks had
challenged racially discriminatory practices in higher edu
cation where the principal
access

to

all-white

strengthening

black

goal was

not simply

institutions,

but

universities.

This

contrast to the Reconstruction period,

access
stood

increased

defined
in

as

marked

where black acqui-

esence to segregated schools reflected their recognition of
the

reality

of

the

hostility

of

Southern

whites

to

the

concept of public education and to integrated education in
particular.

It also differed remarkably with the pre-Brown

litigation of the NAACP against segregation in which benefits
had accrued to black colleges as a byproduct of the efforts
of Southern states to evade the full effect of integration.
Unlike the past where the existence of all-black institutions
was seen by some as illegitimate, dangerous, or contrary to
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American ideals, the Avers plaintiffs uncompromisingly defen
ded the existence of public black colleges based on their
vision of the Constitution.
In May, 1975, the Black Mississippians' Council adopted
a position paper which attempted to forge a synthesis between
the concepts of legal equality and equal educational oppor
tunity (Preer, 1982, 212). They urged the courts to move away
from preoccupation with educational form (which they defined
as the racial identity of students, faculty, administrators,
and institutions)

to educational substance

(the necessary

requirements for quality education). The Council chastised
both the Justice Department and the Legal Defense Fund for
their obsession with eliminating the racial identifiability
of institutions, arguing that both parties neither understood
the ramifications that a desegregation-only remedy would have
for the educational opportunities of black Mississippians.
Black colleges, they asserted, were needed to preserve the
full range of educational opportunities for black youth. The
Ayers plaintiffs did not disavow the need to increase black
access to historically white
rather,

institutions

in Mississippi;

they maintained that the goal of increasing black

access to previously all-white universities should supple
ment,

not replace,

the academic opportunities afforded to

black

Mississippians

by

black

colleges

(Ibid,

212) . In

insisting that Mississippi's black colleges be preserved and
enhanced in any desegregation remedy, the Council defined the
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goal

of desegregation as making sure that black

students

would have equal educational opportunities regardless of what
institution they chose to attend.
The concerns listed by the Avers plaintiffs tended to
mirror the institutional aspirations of black colleges in
Mississippi. Though Mississippi's black universities were not
listed specifically as plaintiffs in Avers. the institutional
heads of the black schools have had considerable input with
regard to the framing of the arguments by attorneys for the
plaintiffs (Peoples, 1995, 317-318) . In addition, the plain
tiffs
Alumni

solicited

and

Association

received
of

Public

financial
Colleges,

support
a

from

black

The

college

advocacy group that had been formed with the cooperation of
the presidents of Mississippi's black colleges.72 Because of
72The Alumni Association of Public Colleges is a
collaboration of the alumni associations of Jackson State,
Alcorn, and Missis-sippi Valley to advocate the cause of
black colleges within the state of Mississippi. It was
established in 1969 in Jackson in response of the refusal of
all-white inter-alumni associations to accept black alumni
associations. The formation of the association required the
putting aside of past grievances that had served to divide
the individual institutions in question. For example, Alcorn
alumni had opposed the state's decision to take over Jackson
State College in 1940, deeming it unnecessary. As time
passed, enmity between the two schools intensified as Jackson
State developed into an institution with more than twice the
enrollment and academic scope as Alcorn. When the state
established Mississippi Valley, both Jackson State and Alcorn
alumni opposed the move, but they did not have anything
resembling
the
political
clout
to
prevent
white
Mississippians from creating another "separate but equal"
black institution within the state. The alumni of the two
older black schools saw the creation of a third black public
college as an unwelcome competitior to them for the already
measley allocation of state funds for black schools. Thus,
the formation of the Alumni Association of Public Colleges
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the close relationship between the plaintiffs' aims and the
aspirations of black universities, they had to fend off the
charge by attorneys for the state of Mississippi that what
they were in fact asserting were "institutional rights" not
individual rights

(Brief

for Respondents,

in Kurland

and

Casper, 1993, 379 [especially, footnote 30]). Title VI of the
Civil Rights of Act of 1964 and the Fourteenth Amendment, the
state argued, were designed to protect individuals from acts
that infringe on their liberties (either by the state or by
private individuals); it did not establish rights for insti
tutions to recieve equal protection.73 The Avers plaintiffs
accused the state of distorting their argument,

insisting

that the "examination of institutions is necessary in deter
mining whether individuals

(here, the plaintiff class)

afforded their constitutional and statutory rights"
Brief of Private Petitioners,
448-449).

in Kurland and Casper,

are

(Reply
1993,

They countered that individuals can only receive

higher education from institutions. Hence, if state policies
represented a definite break from the past: the black college
alumni associations began to shift their focus from fueding
against each other toward fighting their common foe: state
educational policies that discriminated against all black
colleges in Mississippi.
73The evidence shows that Mississippi's argument directly
impacted at least one justice on the Supreme Court, albeit it
the one justice, Antonin Scalia, who dissented in the state's
favor in Fordice. Scalia interpreted the question of whether
black colleges were entitled to enhancement as part of a
desegregation remedy a question of institutional,
not
individual, rights. Quoting Gaines and Sweatt. he argued that
"it is students and not schools who are guaranteed equal
protection of the laws."

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

242

unconstitutionally discriminate against certain institutions,
such actions would abridge the rights

of the

individuals

receiving an education in such settings.
In describing what motivated her late husband to bring
the suit, Mrs. Lillie Ayers said:
The underfunding and disparate funding of Black insti
tutions amount to segregation. We as a Black race would
love to go to our Black colleges, but on the other hand,
we want the best education that this country has to
offer. . . . We will pursue this issue until justice is
done. . . . My husband was an avid reader. . . . He knew
that Alcorn existed a long time before Mississippi State
and the University of Southern Mississippi. It angered
him when the State Legislature made Alcorn a branch of
MSU, for all practical purposes. . . . I am going on as
long as it takes to get this matter settled because I
feel that this is what he wanted me to do (Brown, 1992,
1 2 2 ).

The Avers plaintiffs, thus, saw their task as requiring
them to take on not only the state educational establishment
in Mississippi which had discriminated against the state's
black colleges, but those civil rights liberals

(black and

white) who saw black colleges as obstacles that needed to be
removed

in order

opportunities.

for

blacks

Isaiah Madison,

to

obtain

equal

educational

convenor of the Council and

one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs wrote that while he
did not oppose an increased black presence on white campuses,
he did reject "any mode of educational integration or cul
tural assimilation which Blacks have not freely chosen to
undertake themselves"

(Preer,

1982,

212-213).

that the drive to merge black colleges

into

He believed
larger white

universities to meet the "just schools" standard announced in
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Green represented the handiwork of an elitist corps of white
social engineers

(with the assistance of a few blacks) who

had imposed their definition of desegregation on the black
population (Ibid, 213). While not condemning Brown directly,
Madison accused many

liberals of racism by

implying that

black colleges were necessarily inferior because they were
black. By implication, black leaders who favored the phasing
out of black schools had internalized the racist assumptions
of their white benefactors. Madison's views sounded the theme
of a longstanding complaint voiced by African Americans that
the Black Power movement had revived: black resentment of the
perceived paternalism of the "benevolent whites" who were
"helping" them. Avers represented a rebuke to liberal white
elites and their black counterparts who felt, as many African
Americans

saw

it,

that they knew best what

black people

wanted or needed.74
74Some integration advocates not only denied that black
schools had any educational value, but even if they did, it
did not matter. One NAACP official said that his organization
opposed segregated schools "no matter what is taught or how
well it is taught" because the "existence of segregation
teaches that racial separation is right and proper in
American society." While the official acknow- ledged that
thirty percent of all blacks college students were enrolled
in mainly black colleges, he denied that these schools
offered a unique educational experience. A black school board
member in one of the nation's largest school districts
remarked, "Of what value is it to teach black children to
read and write in an all-black school?" Many black college
officials reacted bitterly to such criticisms. For example,
Dr. Samuel DuBois Cook, president of Dillard University
scathingly referred to the liberal estab- lishment within the
federal bureaucracy and many civil rights organizations as
those who "masqueraded as friends" but are in fact the
greatest threats to "the future and well-being of black
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For many integrationists who saw Brown as the incarna
tion of America's long struggle to match its reality with its
ideals with respect to race, efforts by African Americans to
save black colleges smacked of heresy (Wilkinson, 1979) . How
ever, contrary to the opinions of their critics, the Avers
plaintiffs

(and by extension, the supporters of black col

leges generally)

did not

depart

from the American

Creed.

First, as mentioned in the last chapter, Brown never speci
fied whether it meant to eradicate compulsory segregation or
every type

of segregation,

whether

freely chosen or not.

Thus, the Avers plaintiffs were able to embrace the ideals of
Brown without having to directly repudiate some of its more
troublesome
"separate

assertions

facilities

are

-

particularly

the

notion

inherently unequal."

that

Because

of

Brown's ambiguity, supporters of black colleges were spared
the unenviable task of explaining how a decision of

such

profound symbolic and historical significance to both black
and white Americans could possibly be wrong - or, at the very
least,

naive

and

misguided.

Brown

seemed

to

epitomize

American ideals at their best; indeed, the shrill tactics of
Brown's critics only served to strengthen the conviction that
the South was "on the wrong side of history." As Wilkinson
has argued, "Those promoting an idea can do no better than to
hire intemperate opponents. And the vindication of Brown owes

higher education, particularly black colleges"
957-959).

(Bell, 1979,
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much to them" (1979, 34). Supporters of black colleges, then,
merely had to fashion an interpretation of Brown that suited
their cause; thus, they claimed Brown's moral legacy as their
own.
Secondly,

the

plaintiffs

contended

that

segregation

harmed blacks not simply because it denied them equality or
damaged them psychologically,

but because

it denied them

freedom. The end of legal segregation, the argument ran, left
blacks

free to choose from the

full range of

educational

institutions for academic, vocational, cultural, social and
economic reasons

(Preer,

1982,

213).

No

longer would the

choices of an individual black person be predetermined simply
because he or she happened to be an African American.

The

problem with defining integration as requiring the extinction
of black colleges was that it served to restrict the range of
legitimate choices that each individual black person could
make concerning which type of institution to attend.
Third, it has already been demonstrated that the elimi
nation of the racial identification of schools threatened the
power of black educators and black adminstrators. It also
posed a threat to black students who might not qualify for
admission to white universities. Not only were black colleges
important centers of black educational power, but they also
represented key centers of black political power as well. Not
surprisingly, the groups who resisted efforts to merge black
colleges out of existence were motivated, at least in part,
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by self-interest.

Since participation in politics by self-

interested groups or parties

is considered a foundational

cornerstone of politics in a democracy, the Avers plaintiffs
certainly did not depart from American democratic norms. This
conclusion becomes even stronger in view of the fact that the
original complaint was filed precisely because the plaintiffs
feared

that

a

solution

to

the

Mississippi

desegregation

problem was being imposed on them that was not in their best
interests.
Fourth, the Avers case provided strong evidence of black
fidelity to

another

African Americans,

key American virtue:

pragmatism.

For

pragmatism had historically manifested

itself in the proliferation of a vast array of black selfhelp programs, mutual aid societies, and social fraternities.
Blacks had developed these institutions to provide needed
services to their communities (such as education) in the face
of a hostile, white-dominated world that had refused to grant
them equal access to the public sphere. In the present case,
Avers symbolized black pragmatism in the recognition that (1)
racism would not be overcome as quickly as many had hoped and
(2) the end of legal segregation left many blacks unprepared
to compete with whites on the same terms.
realities,
still
blacks

the Avers plaintiffs argued that black colleges

constituted
and

In view of these

a

a

college

critical

link

education.

between

At the

disadvantaged

same

time,

black

colleges presented themselves as institutions representing
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the hope for a college education for all regardless of race
and

color

(another pragmatic

compromise); in a political

climate where majority-black

institutions were considered

suspect at best,

black colleges could ill afford to make

naked appeals to black self-interest.75
In addition, the plaintiffs were motivated to act by two
larger national trends: (1) the state of desegregation law in
higher education was largely unclear, and (2) HEW, which was
charged with the power to enforce Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act,

had yet to develop coherent enforcement stan

dards. Green had established the principle that states had
the "affirmative duty" to dismantle former de jure systems of
segregated

schools.

However,

it

was

unclear

what

implications of that ruling were for higher education;

the
nor

75At the same time, black colleges, while promoting an
image of themselves as universities for all the people,
struggled with the question of how to be schools which
appealed to all while main-taining a black cultural ethos.
Efforts by black colleges to attract a larger white clientele
have often fueled criticism and resentment from black
students and faculty, who feel that whites were now receiving
preferential treatment at their expense (Preer, 1982).
Nevertheless, despite the public stances of many black
colleges that they are universities for all races, their
critics have accused them of being only interested in
preserving themselves as all-black enclaves. The criticisms
of black colleges "ran the gamut": it was alleged that (1)
black colleges have a vested interest in maintaining medio
crity; (2) black colleges have difficulty retaining good
faculty, and that bright students do not develop intellec
tually there; (3) some have denounced the administrative
leadership of black campuses as a clique of autocratic,
incompetent, mismanagers who are more interested in protec
ting their turf than in raising the academic standards of the
institutions they purport to lead; and (4) black college
students must be educated in an integrated setting if they
are to compete in American society (Roebuck and Murty, 1993).
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was it clear what it should mean for elementary and secon
dary education. Chapter Three noted that the Supreme Court in
ASTA and Norris sidestepped two opportunities to clarify the
meaning and scope of the state's "affirmative duty" to dese
gregate in higher education. Federal courts, lacking guidance
from the Supreme Court, were left struggling to define the
appropriate constitutional remedies themselves; as a result,
conflicting interpretations of the Green standard had emerged
in the federal courts. Lacking judicial precedents in higher
education, federal judges attempted to draw on the experience
of elementary and secondary education,

often with problem-

matic results.
The unsettled state of higher education desegregation
law complicated HEW's predicament.

Federal regulators have

wide discretion to promulgate rules based on their interpre
tation of laws and judicial decisions. The problem for HEW in
this case, however, was that it simply was not clear what the
law was. Adding to their troubles was a lack of experience in
higher education desegregation;

HEW officials were accus

tomed to the more familiar problems associated with affecting
desegregation at the elementary and secondary levels (Ayers,
1984,

134). Even in 1980, after a decade of experience, an

OCR official said that the agency did not know what would be
the effect of eliminating "unnecessary program duplication"
on the states' systems of higher education (Bryson, quoted in
Ayers,

1984,

134).

In fact, during the Adams case, HEW had
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cited its inexperience in higher education as a justification
for its failure to develop comprehensive desegregation cri
teria;

Judge

Pratt,

however,

was

not

sympathetic

to

the

government's plea and ordered the agency to commence enforce
ment proceedings.
Not only was the law unclear and the federal government
lacked experience in higher education, but the question of
what should happen to black colleges
process

perplexed

HEW's

bureaucrats.

in the desegregation
Solomon

Arbeiter,

coordinator for higher education in OCR from 1967 to 1969
recalled how confusion and ambivalence toward black colleges
paralyzed the agency's efforts to develop coherent policies.
Though he envisioned desegregation as a process that would
bring about the elimination of the racial identifiability of
educational institutions, he found within the agency a great
deal of sympathy toward the plight of black colleges:
Even within the federal government there arose a great
deal of honest concern about the future of black col
leges. Should they be preserved as enclaves for the
education of blacks or should they be blended into a
total system for blacks and whites? At times I had the
feeling that the same people who wanted to establish
quantitative goals for minority enrollment and other
aspects of desegregation also were most sympathetic
toward arguments for minority self-determination.
These officials saw no moral or legal ambivalence in
taking those positions. They wanted strong enforcement
of desegregation and yet they maintained it was both
morally and legally proper to have separate minority
programs, activities and institutions (Arbeiter, quoted
in Preer, 1982, 196).
In retrospect, Arbeiter marveled at how a policy matter
of such high importance could essentially be allowed to go
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unaddressed for several years (Ibid, 196) . But desegregation
policy in higher education at the federal level did exactly
that - mainly because federal regulators had no clear idea of
what integration or desegregation should mean. And the exis
tence of publicly
their dilemma.

funded

black colleges

only complicated

Nor did the Adams decisions simplify HEW's

problem. Adams said that the desegregation process must take
into account the important role that black colleges play in
assuring access to higher education for blacks and the real
possibility that desegregation might negatively impact black
access to postsecondary educational opportunities.

But the

court gave HEW no guidelines of how to fulfill that charge.
Also, HEW officials interpreted the adversary positions taken
by the LDF and the NAFEO in the Adams litigation as evidence
that

African

Americans

-

the

intended

beneficiaries

of

integration - were not of one mind as to what the correct
policy should be. As a result, the task of crafting desegre
gation remedies under Title VI involved HEW administrators in
the "tug-of-war” between competing civil rights groups who
had sharply contrasting visions of the appropriate goals and
strategies that were appropriate in the desegregation process
(Ayers, 1984, 130-131).
Furthermore, what passed for federal enforcement efforts
during this period was a model of inconsistency. The track
record of HEW and the Department of Justice demonstrated not
only a clear definition of desegregation,

but revealed how
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vulnerable

the regulatory

political pressures.

zeal of these

For example,

agencies were to

five of the ten original

Adams states submitted desegregation plans, all of which were
rejected on the grounds that they were not specific enough in
detailing how the states proposed to transform their dual
systems of higher education into unitary ones (Adams, 1993).
Yet, at the same time that HEW was rejecting the plans from
the states, it had established no desegregation criteria of
its own. Pursuant to the Adams decisions in 1973, eight of
the ten Adams states submitted desegregation plans which OCR
subsequently accepted; however, the agency still had failed
to develop any comprehensive guidelines. Even more revealing
of the federal government's erratic compliance efforts was
the case of Mandel v. HEW (411 F. Supp. 542
where

the

state

of

Maryland

[D.C.D.

successfully

1976])

obtained

an

injunction against further OCR involvement in the state's
higher education system because the court found the agency
guilty of "arbitrary and capricious" enforcement of the law.
Furthermore, the failure of HEW to formulate a coherent
policy unvieled the vulnerability of the agency's enforcement
efforts to political pressures.

In some instances,

modified,

agencies

significantly

entirely,

enforcement efforts in order to avoid offending

powerful

politicians.76

At

other

or

failed

times,

to

federal
initiate

federal

policy

76For example, the government's decision not to challenge
segregated higher education in Alabama was attributed to
Governor George Wallace's political clout (Preer, 1982, 197) .
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vaccillated due to changes in who occupied the White House.
New presidents designated political appointees in critical
policymaking
implemented

positions,
new

policies

and

these

over

the

new

appointees

objections

of

often
career

bureaucrats and agency lawyers who were more familiar with
the cases in question.77 Thus, HEW's critics no longer simply
charged the agency with failing to promulgate clear guide
lines. They also accused the federal government of lacking
the political will to enforce the standards that it had.78
The Reagan administration's 1981 decision to reverse OCR's
threat to cut off federal funds to North Carolina was
attributed to Senator Jesse Helms' political standing with
the Reagan White (Dentler, Balzell, and Sullivan, 1984, 110;
Ayers, 1984, 133).
^For example, OCR's decision in 1970 that it would no
longer rely on threats to cutoff federal aid to states
reflected the Nixon administration's fulfillment of a
campaign promise to change the way the federal government
approached desegregation (Preer, 1982, 198; Orfield, 1996).
Similarly, when Ronald Reagan became president in 1981, the
Reagan Justice Department accepted a consent decree settle
ment in North Carolina that the Carter Justice Department had
previously rejected (Miller, 1982; Dentler, Balzell, and
Sullivan, 1984). The settlement ended a bitter struggle
between North Carolina and the federal government in which
HEW had initiated proceedings to cut off federal funds to the
state. The consent decree reflected the administration's
rejection of the use of threats to cut off federal aid to
prod states to dismantle desegregation.
78 The agency approved consent decree settlements in
North Carolina and Louisiana in 1981 (Miller, 1982; Prestage
and Prestage, 1987; Samuels, 1991). Commentators accused the
Reagan administration of accepting plans which did not meet
the standards of the Revised Criteria adopted in 1978
(Miller, 1982; Dentler, Baltzell, and Sullivan, 1984; Ayers,
1984). They pointed out that the consent decrees fell short
of the Criteria's guidelines with respect to enhancing black
institutions by giving them priority consideration for high
demand programs. The effect of such enhancements would bring
icreased funding, prestige, and serve to equalize the
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The unsettled state of higher desegregation law and the
uncertain regulatory environment heightened the anxieties of
supporters of black colleges. Thus, the Avers plaintiffs were
asserting a measure of self-determination when they filed the
case. While federal intervention was welcomed in the case,
policy vacillations at HEW and the Department of Justice made
the federal government an uncertain and unreliable ally. From
the very beginning, the Avers plaintiffs and the Department
of Justice had different agendas. The Black Mississippians'
Council was

determined

that

the

process

of desegregation

focus on expanding black access to white universities while
strengthening black colleges at the same time. However, the

curriculums of black institutions, thereby providing program
matic inducements to white students to consider black
colleges at the same time. Thus, the two pressing concerns of
black institutions - equalization and desegegation - could be
satisfied in one stroke.
The Reagan administration refused to insist on these
types of enhancements, and chose not to order the politically
unpopular proposal of removing academic programs from white
campuses to black ones. The administration's approach was
consistent with its overarching conservative philosophy of
government which, when applied to higher education desegre
gation, sought to minimize judicial intervention in state
educational matters. While both consent decrees mandated that
the states spend extra monies on black colleges, critics
charged that the majority of the new dollars were concen
trated in programs which were unlikely to have any positive
desegregative effect on black campuses. The effect of the
Louisiana and North Carolina decrees, they concluded, would
actually increase unnecessary program duplication rather than
reduce it. Therefore, critics accused the Reagan Justice
Department of approving plans that actually violated federal
desegregation standards. The administration defended its
approach, insisting that it simply had an opposing view of
the legitimate role of the federal government than groups
such as the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (Miller, 1982; Dentler,
Baltzell, and Sullivan, 1984; Ayers, 1984).
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Justice Department was primarily concerned with enforcing the
"just schools" standard in higher education, but it was not
clear what

the

federal

government meant

by desegregation

(Brown, 1993, 121-123).
Mississippi responded to the Avers complaint, as well as
the federal government's

intervention into the case, with

determined opposition. The state proceeded to implement its
own

Plan

of

Compliance

despite

the

federal

government's

objections. The college board partially financed the state's
defense by assessing each of the universities in proportion
to its state appropriation, creating the ironic situation of
Mississippi's

black

colleges

contributing

financially

to

advance the cause of positions that they were opposed to
(Peoples, 1995, 315).
However, state officials realized that a frontal attack
on the Brown decision at this

late date would be futile.

Instead, Mississippi pursued a different strategy: the state
insisted that compliance with Brown required the implementa
tion of race-neutral, "colorblind" policies in higher educa
tion. The effect of the Brown decision,

the argument went,

was to vindicate Justice Harlan's lonely dissent in Plessv
when he argued that "our Constitution is colorblind." Hence
forth, the state's obligation was to promulgate educational
policies without regard to race. Remedies that suggested, for
example,

that traditionally black universities must now be

enhanced to compensate for historical underfunding were in
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fact "race-conscious" policies that were impermissable under
the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.
In this sense, the Mississippi case was one battlefront
in a larger national debate over the meaning of the civil
rights

revolution

of the

1960's.

In

Chapter One,

it was

argued that political conflicts concerning issues of racial
policies between liberals and conservatives since the mid1960' s have revolved primarily around the question of the
best means to achieve racial justice.

Mississippi's argu

ments fell squarely within the conservative orbit: the state
argued that race consciousness in the determination of public
policy constituted a prima facie violation of the American
principle that each citizen be judged based on his or her own
merit. Conservatives increasingly began to object to policies
such as busing,

affirmative action, and minority set-aside

programs because, in their view, these policies practiced the
very evil the civil rights movement tried to eradicate. Libe
rals were accused of abandoning an emphasis on affirming the
worth of every individual
American traditions)

(which represented the "best" in

to promoting policies which required

"equality of results" or "proportional representation." These
ideas, according to conservative critics, were "un-American"
(Glazer, 1975, D'Souza, 1995). In the same way, the state of
Mississippi asserted that the black plaintiffs in Avers. by
insisting

that

the

Equal

Protection

Clause

required
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enhancement of historically black colleges, had advanced two
arguments which fundamentally violated the American Creed. In
the first place, they asserted that African Americans were
seeking proportional representation in college admissions,
college graduation, faculty and administrative hiring, and in
state appropriations to historically black colleges. Second,
the remedies favored by the petitioners, in the state's view,
were tantamount to assertions of "group rights." Mississippi
denied that the African American community had a constitu
tional right to educational institutions with equal resources
as white institutions, arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment
offered protection to individuals, not groups.
Furthermore,

evidence

began

to

mount

that

the

more

conservative vision of civil rights was gaining momentum.
After a series of court decisions that expanded the courts'
ability to foster desegregation, the Supreme Court in Milliken v. Bradley

(418 U.S. 717 [1974]) struck down a Detroit

metropolitan desegregation plan that involved the urban and
suburban districts.79 Since whites had been moving in ever
growing numbers to the suburbs since the end of World War II
(J.

Patterson,

1997),

Milliken

significantly

reduced

the

79The plaintiffs in Milliken argued that Detroit's public
schools were already 65 percent black, and a Detroit-only
remedy would not substantially alter the racial composition
of the city's schools. However, in a 5-4 holding, the Supreme
Court ruled that the district court had made no determination
of liability in the suburban districts; therefore,
an
interdistrict remedy exceeded the remedial power of the
court.

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

257

desegregative effect of court-ordered busing plans in many
Northern

and

(Wilkinson,

Western

1979;

metropolitan

Orfield,

1996;

school

Smith,

1996).

districts
Milliken

reflected the public mood: surveys indicated that close to 90
percent of whites preferred neighborhoood schools over busing
and

(much to the chagrin of many civil rights activists)

busing

was

opposed

by

a

sizable

segment

of

the

black

community.80
In another decision that would make it harder to effect
desegregation in the suburbs, the Supreme Court in Pasadena
Board of Education v. Spangler

(427 U.S. 424

[1976]) ruled

that school districts were not required by the Constitution
to make annual adjustments of the racial composition of their
student bodies if the changes were the result of shifting
demographic patterns within their communities. The justices
emphatically rejected the district court's insistence that
there be no

school "with a majority of any minority stu

80A s late as 1989, white opposition to busing still
hovered near 80 percent (Rossell, 1994, 642). Even more
interestingly,
a sizable number of African Americans
preferred neighborhood schools over busing; Rossell (1994)
reported that between 1972 and 1991, black support for busing
never surpassed 60 percent, and dipped below 50 percent in
nine of the twenty years surveyed (Ibid, 642). For example,
in Boston bitter antagonisms emerged between the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, which supported court-mandated busing, and
African American community activists who favored neighborhood
schooling (Bell, 1980) . Louisville was characterized by a
gradual buildup of black opposition to busing: a poll
conducted by the University of Louisville Urban Studies
Center indicated that 63 percent of blacks approved busing in
the first year of mandatory busing (1977-1978). By the next
school year, the figure had dropped to 49 percent (Wilkinson,
1979, 245).
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dents," setting aside the view that the absence of numerical
parity among the races was prima facie evidence of violations
of equal protection within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The demographic changes, the Court concluded, were
due "to a normal pattern of people moving into, out of, and
around the school system" (Ibid, 425) and were not related to
policies enacted by school officials. Therefore, the district
was not required to make policy adjustments in the absence of
a finding that the racial

imbalances resulted from state

action.
Furthermore,

the

belief that race was

an

inherently

illegitmate basis with which to ground public policy was
receiving increasing support from the Supreme Court.81 While
this argument had been traditionally advanced by the NAACP
and other civil rights groups to challenge racial segrega
tion, it left two questions unresolved. First, did compliance
with the Equal Protection Clause require a showing that state
policies were enacted without a discriminatory purpose or did
plaintiffs merely need to demonstrate that the policies in
question had "racially disparate effects" regardless of their
intent? The Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis (42 6 U.S.
229 [1976]) ruled that plaintiffs had to prove that it was
81Key cases include the following: Hirabavashi v. United
States 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States. 323
U.S. 214 (1944); Bolling v. Sharpe. 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954);
Garner v. Louisiana. 368 U.S. 157 (1960); Bell v. Maryland.
378 U.S. 226 (1964); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964); Loving v. Virginia. 388 U.S. 1 (1967); and Davis v.
School Commissioners of Mobile County. 402 U.S. 33 (1971).
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the intent of defendants to subordinate them because of their
race in order to prevail in racial discrimination suits.82
Proving

discriminatory

intent

presented

African

American

plaintiffs with a substantially greater burden of proof than
alleging discriminatory impact. Mississippi's defense in the
higher education desegregation case relied on the doctrine of
discriminatory intent. The state contended that its current
policies governing college admissions, faculty and adminis
trative

hiring,

institutional

missions,

and

funding were

based on nonracial considerations and indicated no evidence
of discrimination.
Finally, in one of the most important civil rights cases
in the post-Brown era, the Court in a 5-4 holding ruled in
Regents of University of California v. Bakke

(438 U.S.

265

[1978]) that an admission policy which reserved a set number
of slots for minority applicants at the University of California-Davis Medical School unconstitutionally discriminated
against Allan Bakke, a white applicant. Bakke charged that he
had been denied

admission while minority

applicants with

inferior academic qualifications had been admitted.

Justice

82In Washington. black applicants to the District of
Columbia Police Department challenged the constitutionality
of a verbal ability test required of all applicants. African
American applicants failed the test at a rate four times that
of whites. The plaintiffs alleged that such a racially
disparate result was unconstitutional. The Court argued that
only official conduct having a discriminatory purpose
violated the Equal Protection Clause. Justice White wrote
that simply the fact that blacks scored significantly lower
on the test did not make it unconstitutional.
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Powell,
simply

writing for the majority,
predicated

on

suggested that policies

compensating

African

Americans

for

historical patterns of discrimination impermissibly made them
"special wards" of the state, who were entitled to more equal
protection than
Americans,

others

(Ibid,

294-295).

For many African

Powell's words sounded chillingly similar to a

memorable paragraph that succintly represented the essence of
the Court's opinion in The Civil Rights Cases:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the
aid of beneficient legislation has shaken off the
inseparable concomitants of that state, there must
be some stage in the progress of his elevation when
he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be
the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights
as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the
ordinary modes by which other men's rights are protected
(109 U.S. 3, 24 [1883]).
Powell wrote, "The guarantee of equal protection cannot
mean one thing when applied to one individual and something
else when applied to a person of another color"
265,

289-290).

The majority opinion

(438 U.S.

in Bakke implied that

much of the cumulative effects of centuries of racial dis
crimination was too remote to remedy. Plaintiffs had to prove
how racial discrimination unconstitutionally abridged their
liberties in the "here and now." Similarly, Mississippi main
tained that a ruling requiring the

state to make massive

investments at the historically black colleges to compensate
for past

discriminatory policies would unconstitutionally

punish the state for past, as opposed to present discrimina
tion.

Such remedies were not only beyond the scope of the
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Equal Protection Clause,

they argued,

but they violated a

basic principle of fairness: in essence, the sons were being
asked to suffer for the sins of the fathers.
Mississippi pointed largely tc two significant develop
ments as evidence that its higher education system was in
compliance with the spirit of the Brown decision:

(1) the

revision of admissions requirements for the state's univer
sities, and (2) the establishment of "mission designations"
for the respective institutions.
The new admissions requirements relied almost exclu
sively on ACT scores as the basis for automatic admission to
the

state's, universities.

response

to

The

concerns voiced by

new

policies

faculty

developed

in

and staff persons

about high numbers of entering freshmen in state univerities
who were unprepared for college-level work. Starting in the
fall of

1977,

no student would be admitted to the senior

colleges with an ACT score of less than 9; however, schools
were

permitted

to

establish

and

maintain

higher

minimum

requirements.83 High school grades were not to be considered
83Not surprisingly, the historically white institutions
had higher ACT requirements than their black counterparts.
Initially, all of the white institutions had a minimum ACT
score of 15 for automatic admission. Later, the state
authorized these institutions to admit a select number of
"high risk" students who fell short of this "magic number;"
the number of students admitted on this basis should not
exceed 5% or 50 students (whichever number was greater). Some
black critics particularly scorned this loophole, viewing it
as a deliberate effort to subsidize the athletic programs of
Ole Miss, Mississippi State, and Southern Mississippi, in
1987, Mississippi University for Women received authorization
to raise its ACT minimum to 18. Applicants to MUW could be

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

262

as a factor in determining eligibility because of concerns
about "grade inflation."
When

the

new

requirements

failed

to

significantly

address the problems associated with the academic prepared
ness

of

freshmen,

the

state

implemented remedial

studies

programs in 1979. Three years later, in the midst of a down
turn

in

program.

the

state's

economy,

Mississippi

eliminated

the

Determining that the remedial programs were both

ineffective and too costly in the face of anticipated budget
cuts,

the Board of Trustees

in July,

1982 adopted a high

school preparatory curriculum aimed at positively effecting
the academic preparedness of incoming students.84
The state's refusal to include high school grades when
making admissions decisions particularly incensed many black
Mississippians. Recognizing that blacks did not perform as
well on the ACT as whites, many African Americans believed
that the new standards were directed at them

(Petitioners'

Brief, United States v. Fordice) . They accused the state of

admitted if they scored between 15 and 17 on the ACT and had
a cumulative grade point average of 3.0 on a 4.0 scale. Those
who scored between 15, and 17 on the ACT, yet failed to earn
a 3.0 could be admitted on an exceptional basis. In contrast,
the black institutions all have a minimum ACT score of 13;
however, they admit students who score between 9 and 12 on an
exceptional basis. Students who score below 9 must attend a
junior college before they can be eligible to transfer to a
senior college (Avers v. Allain. 676 F. Supp. 1523, 15321534).
MThe new curriculum was to consist of required courses
in the sciences, math, and English. It was scheduled for
implemenation in the fall of 198 6.
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setting up new, more sophisticated barriers to obstruct black
access to higher education within the state. The state argued
that the new policies were justified on educational grounds.
Mississippi had a legitimate interest in enacting policies
that sought to enhance the pool of qualified college appli
cants. The state no longer forbade blacks from enrolling in
white institutions by law;

if African Americans failed to

meet the admissions requirements of the state's universities,
official

policy was

not to blame.

Mississippi's

argument

echoed a familiar refrain: in the post-Brown era, blacks have
no one to blame

for

"failing to make

it" but themselves

(Parent, 1985).
Secondly, in 1981, after an extensive review of the cur
ricular offerings at each university, the Board of Trustees
issued "mission designations" for each public institution.
These missions were clustered in three categories: comprehen
sive,

urban,

and

regional

universities.

"Comprehensive"

institutions were defined as those universities offering the
widest variety of degree offerings and receiving the greatest
levels of funding.
Mississippi,

The Board recognized the University of

Mississippi

State

University,

and

Southern

Mississippi as comprehensive universities. These institutions
were authorized to continue offering doctoral programs and to
assert leadership in various disciplines. Jackson State, the
sole urban university, was assigned a more limited research
and degree mission tailored toward its urban setting. Despite
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the university's requests, the Board denied Jackson State a
leadership role in any particular field. The remaining uni
versities - Mississippi University for Women,
Alcorn State,

Delta State,

and Mississippi Valley - were classified as

"regional" universities. These institutions were permitted to
maintain their limited graduate offerings (provided some of
them gain

or

retain accreditation), but were principally

designed as baccalaureate-degree granting universities.

No

doctoral programs were to be offered by these institutions
(U.S. Exhibit 683, "Mission Statements," 1991, 275-277; Avers
v. Allain. 676 F. Supp. 1523, 1538-1542).
The black colleges and the Avers plaintiffs protested
bitterly against the new missions designations. They argued
that while the institutional missions appeared "race-neutral"
on their face, the state's policies did not address a century
of official

neglect of black higher

education.

This past

history, plaintiffs insisted, created a "cumulative deficit"
which the state was now obliged to remedy. The new designa
tions, they argued, served to "freeze in place" the unequal
advantages that white institutions had enjoyed throughout the
era of de jure segregation (Petitioners' Brief, United States
v.

Fordice

denied that
remedy the

in Kurland and Casper,
the

1993).

State officials

Equal Protection Clause required them to

"cumulative deficit" that the Avers plaintiffs

alleged

existed.

conduct

had

While

indeed

acknowledging

discriminated

that

against

previous
the

state

rights
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African

Americans,

Mississippi

officials

now

argued

that

present policies had made a decisive break with the state's
segregated past. Decisions regarding the missions of public
universities were legitimate issues of state policy that were
independent of any racial considerations. The state insisted
that the decisions regarding missions designations were made
for educational reasons and in view of Mississippi's limited
resources

(Respondents'

Kurland and Casper,

Brief, United States v. Fordice in

1993).

Twelve years of negotiations failed to break the impasse
between the parties.

In 1987, the case proceeded to trial.

The litigation embarked on a course that would ultimately
lead it to the Supreme Court. The journey of the Avers case
through the federal courts is the subject of the next section
of this chapter.
The Case Goes to Trial
Both the private petitioners and the Justice Department
insisted that Mississippi had not done enough to eliminate
the de jure segregated system. Specifically, they contended
that the use of the ACT as the basis for automatic admission
to the state's universities unconstitutionally discriminated
against African Americans.

The plaintiffs complained that

"more inclusive" alternatives to primary reliance on the ACT
were available, but the state had rejected them.85 They also
85In 1985, 72 percent of white students in Mississippi
scored 15 or better on the ACT, whereas only 30 percent of
black students achieved that mark, a difference of nearly two
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noted that even ACT officials had encouraged college adminis
trators to not rely exclusively on the the results of one
examination when making admissions decisions;

rather,

ACT

officials advised universities to take into account a whole
battery of factors

(such as high school grades and faculty

recommendations). The

plaintiffs

also

railed

against

the

institutional missions designations, arguing that they flowed
out

of

the

historical

racial

identities

of

the

state's

universities and served to perpetuate the unequal status of
the predominately black institutions.
While

both

the

private

petitioners

and

the

Justice

Department contended that the state unnecessarily duplicated
a high proportion of the academic programs at black and white
universities, the United States emphasized this aspect of the
case more than the Avers plaintiffs

(United States' Brief,

United States v. Fordice in Kurland and Casper, 1993). This
reflected the

fact that the

"bottom line"

of the federal

government's case was that Mississippi's higher education
system violated Green's mandate that dual systems of educa
tion

be

eliminated

"root

and

branch."86 By

contrast,

the

and a half times. However, the disparity between the high
school grades of black and white Mississippians was not
nearly as large: 43.8 percent of white high school students
and 3 0.5 percent of black students earned at least a 3.0
grade point average, and 62.2 percent of whites and 49.2
percent of blacks earned at least a 2.5 (505 U.S. 717, 737).
86For example, the Justice Department cited Geier v.
University of Tennessee (597 F.2d. 1056 [6th Cir. 1979])
where the court stated,
"the Green requirement of an
affirmative duty applies to public higher education as well
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Avers plaintiffs, while invoking Green, emphasized what they
believed to be the state's remedial duty under HEW's Revised
Criteria pursuant to Title VI. These guidelines, they main
tained, supported their claim that the enhancement of black
universities was necessary in order to "remove the badge of
inferiority" from these institutions, and insure that every
student's choice of which university be unhindered by state
policies that racially discriminated against predominately
black schools (Petitioners' Brief, United States v. Fordice.
in Kurland and Casper,

1993). At any rate,

were in harmony on one fundamental point:

the plaintiffs
compliance with

Brown. Green, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
required more than simply the enactment of nondiscriminatory
policies.

The ASTA standard,

they contended,

was not the

controlling law in this case.
The state, while acknowledging that white universities
had initially used the ACT to deny blacks access to their

as to education at the elementary and secondary school
levels. . . it is only the means of elimina-ting segregation
which differ" (Ibid, 1065). The United States stressed that
Geier gave federal courts wide discretion to order even
"radical" remedies to eliminate segregation in state systems
of higher education. The Avers plaintiffs also utilize the
Geier case in their arguments because it grants the courts
greater latitude to craft remedies and it, like Green,
imposes on the state the burden to implement remedies which
"realistically promise to work. . . now" (391 U.S. 430, 441).
However, this precedent is listed only as a footnote in their
briefs because the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Geier
upheld the merger of a black and white public institution.
The Avers plaintiffs were determined to resist the merger of
black and white institutions as a desegregation
remedy at
all costs.
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institutions, denied that the primary motive for the current
use of the ACT was to impose barriers to black admission to
predominately white institutions. Rather, the Board saw the
need to address the academic preparedness of college fresh
men.

The state defended the missions designations as sound

educational policies based on the reality
resources.

These policies,

Mississippi

of

its

concluded,

limited
met the

"good faith" standards of ASTA, and therefore the state was
obligated to go no further.

They rejected the plaintiffs/

contention that the continued racial identifiability of the
state's universities proved that the state had not meet its
"affirmative duty" to desegregate under Green.87
In addition, the state relied on Bazemore v. Friday (478
U.S. 385 (1986). Bazemore involved the persistence of racial
identifiability within the 4-H and homemaker clubs of the
North Carolina Extension Service. Pursuant to Title VI of the
Civil

Rights

Act

of

1964,

the

state's

Extension

Service

discontinued its policy of assigning students to particular
clubs based on race. However, despite the fact that students
were free to choose any particular club, a great number of
all-white and all-black clubs remained.

The Supreme Court

87A s of the 1985-8 6 academic year, over 99 percent of
white undergraduate students attended a historically white
institution; at the graduate level the figure was 9 6.6
percent. Black students were concentrated primarily at the
historically black institutions, though to a lesser extent;
in 1985-86, 70.3% of black undergrad-uates attended a
historically black institution; at the graduate level, the
figure was 63.7% (Petitioners' Brief for Writ of Cer-torari,
United States v. Fordice. in Kurland and Jasper, 1993, 36).
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ruled that the mere existence of clubs of one race did not
prove a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's
majority concluded that the Service had implemented nondiscriminatory admissions policy and that the racial composition
of the clubs reflected the voluntary choices of the partici
pants. Thus, the promulgation of racially neutral admissions
policies,

the Court declared, satisfied the Extension Ser

vice's remedial duty under the Equal Protection Clause.
Mississippi analogized the Bazemore decision to higher
education. In the first place, participation in the 4-H and
homemaker clubs, like choosing to attend college, constituted
a "voluntary" act. ASTA. which the state insisted was the
proper remedial standard for desegregation in public higher
education,

had stressed the voluntary nature of attending

college. Thus, where participation in programs operated by
the state was noncompulsory
nature of

elementary

and

(as opposed to the compulsory

secondary education), the

Equal

Protection Clause only required the state to implement nondiscriminatory admissions and hiring practices. The continued
racial

identifiability of Mississippi's

universities,

the

state continued, reflected the voluntary choices of students
and parents and were not traceable to the state's segregated
past (Respondents' Brief in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari,
United States v. Fordice. in Kurland and Casper, 1993).
The district court in Avers accepted all of the state's
contentions (Ayers v. Allain. 674 F. Supp.

1523 [N.D. Miss.
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1987]). The plaintiffs appealed to a three-judge panel of the
Fifth Circuit Court Appeals. The three-judge panel reversed
the district court's holding in February,

1990,

declaring

that the vestiges of Mississippi's de jure segregated system
of higher education remained substantially intact (893 F.2d.
732 [5th Cir. 1990]). However, the state appealed to the full
Fifth Circuit

and on

September

28,

1990,

affirmed the district court's decision

the

full

(914 F.2d.

court

676

[5th

Cir. 1990]). The plaintiffs filed for a writ of certiorari to
the

Supreme

Court;

on April

15,

1991,

the

Supreme

Court

agreed to hear the appeals in the Avers case (Walton, 1997,
162) .
The Supreme Court issued its ruling in United States v.
Fordice

on June 26,

1992.

The next section discusses the

Court's decision and its rationale.
The Supreme Court Rules
In

an

8-1

decision,

the

Supreme

Court

reversed

the

ruling of the full Fifth Circuit, declaring that the state of
Mississippi had not done enough to meet

its

"affirmative

duty" to desegregate as described in Green. Justice Byron
White, writing for the majority, stated that though the state
had enacted policies that were race-neutral on their face,
these policies substantially restricted a student's choice as
to which institution he or she would enter. The state, White
went on, bore the responsibility of either justifying these
policies or eliminating them.
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In particular,

the

Supreme

Court made the

following

determinations in its decree:
(1) First of all, the Supreme Court rejected out of hand
the state's contention that it had fulfilled its remedial
duty to desegregate by implementing race-neutral admissions
and hiring policies.

While the majority accepted the view

that the context of higher education afforded a measure of
"freedom of choice" to students that made it fundamentally
different from elementary and secondary education, the Court
refused to

accept ASTA's mandate that

states

adopt

"good

faith" race-neutral pollicies as the appropriate legal stan
dard in higher education desegregation cases. White wrote:
Our decisions establish that a State does not
discharge its constitutional obligations until it eradi
cates policies and practices traceable to its prior de
jure dual system that continue to foster segregation.
Thus, we have consistently asked whether existing racial
identifiability is attributable to the State. . . and
examined a wide range of factors [emphasis added] to
determine whether the State has perpetuated its formerly
de jure segregation in any facet of its institutional
system (505 U.S. 717, 728).
Thus, the Supreme Court held that the district court and the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, by relying on ASTA and Bazemore, had construed the state's "affirmative duty" too nar
rowly.
(2) The majority concluded that the state's use of the
ACT

was

"constitutionally

suspect"

despite

denial that the policy had a discriminatory

Mississippi's
intent.

They

noted that the ACT policy originated in 1963 during a period
of active resistance to integration by the state and argued
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that the change of the state's purpose for the requirement in
"mid-stream" did not eliminate its discriminatory effects.
The Court also rejected the state's premise that high school
grades should not be considered as a predictor of college
academic performance, noting that even ACT officials discou
rage universities from relying solely on test scores when
making admissions decisions (505 U.S. 717, 734-737).
(3)

The Court accepted the United States'

contention

that the state of Mississippi unnecessarily duplicated a wide
range of academic programs and that this practice served to
perpetuate the "separate but equal" system of public insti
tutions
that

(505 U.S.

34.6

percent

717, 738-739).
of

the

The district court found

undergraduate

programs

at

the

historically black institutions were "unnecessarily dupli
cated" by historically white universities; at the graduate
level, 90 percent of the program offerings at black univer
sities were unnecessarily duplicated by white universities.
However, the district court declined to rule that these facts
had anything to do with perpetuating the racial identities of
these institutions. The Supreme Court ruled that the district
court's reasoning ignored the fact that the very nature of
the dual system required duplicative programs for two types
of schools,

and the "present unnecessary duplication is a

continuation of this practice"

(Ibid, 738). Brown I I . White

argued, placed the burden on the state to prove that these
programs can be educationally justified; thus, the district
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court impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the plain
tiffs to demonstrate the constitutional defect of unnecessary
duplication (Ibid, 739) .
(4) The Court's majority determined Mississippi's 1981
mission designations, when linked with differential admis
sions

standards

existence

of

at

black

unnecessary

and

white

program

universities
duplication,

and

the

probably

"interfere with student choice and tend to perpetuate the
segregated system"

(Ibid, 741). The justices stressed that

they did not mean to imply that the assignment of different
admissions to institutions within a state higher education
system would .raise constitutional questions if one or more of
those institutions either became or remained predominately
black. Rather, the issue was whether the state had engaged in
discriminatory conduct and/or had sufficiently dismantled the
remnants of

its de jure dual system.

Because the Court's

majority was troubled by Mississippi's admissions policies
and the widespread duplication of programs at the state's
universities, they found it difficult to assume at face value
that the mission designations were benign.
(5) The Court refused to address the question of whether
the state would be required to upgrade Jackson State, Alcorn
State,

and Mississippi Valley as part of the desegregation

remedy (Ibid, 743). Instead, the justices wondered if it was
wise for a poor state such as Mississippi to maintain eight
public universities. Citing United States v. Louisiana
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F. Supp. 499 [E.D. La. 1989]), White asserted that closure of
one or more institutions would decrease the discriminatory
effects of the current system in Mississippi

(Ibid,

742).

However, the Court declined to rule on whether the closure or
merger of

institutions was

required,

suggesting that

the

elimination of program duplication and the revision of admis
sions criteria might eliminate the need for such a radical
remedy (Ibid).
Because the Supreme Court believed that the district
court and the Court of Appeals had utilized the wrong legal
standards,

it remanded the case bach to the district court

with a series of instructions. First of all, the state had
the burden of reconsidering all of its admissions policies
with the goal of eliminating all discriminatory effects while
at the same time maintaining "sound educational" practices.
Secondly, the district court were to inquire as to the prac
ticality of eliminating the discriminatory effects of the
mission designations.

Thirdly, the court was to consider a

wide range of alternatives to reduce duplication and waste
within the system, including, if deemed necessary, the merger
of institutions. Finally, the issue of whether the enhance
ment

of

historically

black

institutions

is

a

necessary

requirement for desegregation to occur was remanded to the
lower courts (Ibid, 743).
Justice Clarence Thomas,

the lone African American on

the Court, wrote a concurring opinion which argued that the
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continued

existence

of

historically

black

colleges

was

consistent with "sound educational" policies. Black colleges,
he argued, had served many important educational, cultural,
and psychological roles in preparing African Americans for
the transition into the larger white society.
ironic, to say the least," Thomas observed,

"It would be

"if the insti

tutions that sustained blacks during segregation were them
selves destroyed in an effort to combat its vestiges" (United
States v. Fordice. 505 U.S. 717, 749 [J. Thomas, concurring,
1992]).
Justice

Antonin

Scalia

dissented,

arguing

that

the

Court's standard in Fordice placed an "unsustainable burden"
on the states. He complained that the ruling resembled the
Green standard which the Court had previously required for
public schools. The Green mandate, Scalia contended, did not
apply in the context of higher education. "The constitutional
evil of the 'separate but equal' regime that we confronted in
Brown

I was

that

blacks

were

told

to

go

to

one

set

of

schools, whites to another," he protested. Bazemore's stan
dard for dismantling a dual system,

Scalia argued,

should

have provided the controlling law in Fordice. Scalia also
complained that the Fordice ruling was too vague and provided
little in the way of guidance to the lower courts.
Furthermore, he hinted that Fordice. rather than serving
the interests of African Americans, "is as likely to subvert
as to promote the interests of those citizens on whose behalf
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the present suit was brought" (United States v. Fordice. 505
U.S. 717, 749 [J. Scalia, dissenting]). While rejecting the
private petitioners' claim that the Constitution required the
state to equalize funding at the black institutions, Scalia
maintained that the Constitution did not prevent a state from
equalizing

funding

between

traditionally black

and white

universities if it chose to. However, he charged that the
Court's ruling in Fordice had effectively precluded states
from adopting that very option.

Fordice had

Green mandate to higher education;

extended the

by implication,

Scalia

reasoned that the Court had endorsed the compulsory-integration philosophy which formed the underpinnings of Green.
The Fordice standard jeopardized all policies that have the
effect

of preserving the existence

institutions,

of historically black

as well as any proposals that might enhance

them. Such a result should not be surprising, he continued.
It had

always

schools.

been the goal

"While

that may

be

of Green to eliminate
good

social

policy,"

black
Scalia

wrote, "the present petitioners, I suspect, would not agree"
(505 U.S.

717,

750 [J. Scalia, dissenting,

1992]). He con

cluded that an individual citizen is done a severe disser
vice when the state, in the name of maximizing integration,
minimizes diversity and "vitiates" his choices (Ibid, 750).
Scalia's final point was well taken by many African Ame
ricans who were carefully following the Fordice case.

The

Supreme Court had adamantly rejected Mississippi's argument

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

277

that

nondiscriminatory

policies

sufficiently

satisfied

a

state's duty to remedy past segregative practices in higher
education.

Rather,

contention

that

the

justices

facially

neutral

accepted

the plaintiffs'

policies

may

be

wholly

inadequate to overcome the effects of years of separtism and
may actually aid in perpetuating the vestiges of segregation.
On this score, the supporters of black colleges were pleased
with this portion of the Court's reasoning.

But the Court

refused to consider an equalization remedy favored by the
black plaintiffs.

Thus,

Ware commented that "although the

United States prevailed in Fordice. in reality Jake Ayers and
the other private plaintiffs lost" (1994, 671). The Fordice
ruling

left the future of historically black colleges

in

considerable doubt. The Court questioned the economic feasi
bility of the state of Mississippi's decision to maintain
eight universities, raising fears that Fordice provided the
legal justification for states to close black colleges in the
name

of

fiscal

responsibility.88 The

Avers

litigation had

been initiated with the expressed purpose of improving the
black institutions as black institutions.

Fordice did not

88In Mississippi's case, those fears turned out to be
justified. At a status and scheduling conference on October
22, 1992, the Board of Trustees issued a one-hundred page
report which proposed, among other remedies, the closure of
Mississippi Valley and the merger of Alcorn State University
with Mississippi State University. The state's proposal
generated a firestorm of protest from African Americans.
However, because the proposal also recommended the merger of
Mississippi University for Women with the University of
Southern Mississippi,
an unusual black-white political
alliance was forged (Mercer, 1992; Fienberg, 1994).
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answer the question of whether African Americans had a con
stitutional right to equally funded public colleges where
they were in the majority.
Fordice failed to provide the lower courts with a frame
work for what the Court would consider as an appropriate
remedy to satisfy the requirements of Brown and Green. In
essence,

Fordice

defined

what

desegregation

in

higher

education was not, not what it was. While relying on prece
dents established in public school desegregation cases, the
Court neglected to clearly articulate the extent to which
those principles apply in the context of higher education.
This lack of specificity gives lower courts little direction,
and promises to encourage more litigation in the future to
sort out this

legal dilemma.

For the supporters of black

colleges, the Fordice ruling provided no assurance that the
desegregation process would not culminate in the elimination
of

these

institutions

1993; Brown-Scott,

(Brown,

1992;

Weeden,

1992;

Smith,

1994; Washburn, 1994).

To further complicate matters,

Fordice occurred in a

context where many urban social districts in America were as
segregated as ever

(Wilson,

1987; Rossell,

1990; Chubb and

Moe, 1990; Kozol, 1991; Reich, 1991; Massey and Denton, 1993;
Armor, 1995) . At the same time, Supreme Court decisions were
making it easier for local school districts to be released
from longstanding desegregation orders, despite evidence that
substantial levels of racial segregation continued to persist
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in many school districts.89 The Court's majority seemed to
believe that the effects of the period of legal segregation
were

"too distant" to explain the persistence of racially

identifiable schools. The further the nation moves from 1954,
the Court appeared to say, the less likely that racial segre
gation can be attributable to the vestiges of de jure racial
discrimination.

In the current climate,

courts

seem more

willing to assume that high concentrations of racially segre
gated schools reflect the voluntary choices of parents and
students.
At the

same time,

the Fordice

decision

extended the

Green principle from the elementary and secondary level to
higher education. It has already been observed that federal
judges tend to look to precedents from elementary and secon
dary cases when deciding postsecondary desegregation cases.
89Those decisions included Missouri v. Jenkins. 110 S.
Ct. 1651 (1990), Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell. 498
U.S. 237 (1991), and Freeman v. Pitts. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
In Dowell and Pitts. the Supreme Court held that court
supervision of the school districts in question was no longer
appropriate because the dis-tricts had effected desegregation
compliance. The Court made these decisions despite evidence
of substantial levels of racial segre-gation in both cases.
The Court concluded that the continued racial identifiability
of the schools reflected normal demographic shifts in the
population and were unrelated to state policies. In Jenkins.
the Court struck down a district court order imposing a tax
on the Kansas City School District as part of a desegregation
order. The majority argued that the federal court had
exceeded its remedial authority by imposing a tax on the
citizenry without their consent. For some liberals, these
decisions signaled a decided shift of the Court toward the
right and away from the mandate of B rown: Gary Orfield's new
book, for example, is entitled Dismantling Desegre
gation: The Quiet Reversal of Brown v. Board of Education
(1996).
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On one hand, Fordice. as an extension of Green, defined the
remedial duties of states beyond the narrow interpretation of
the ASTA standard; on the other hand, the most recent prece
dents at the elementary and secondary level have limited the
remedial powers of the courts to effect racial balance in the
public

schools.

Given

these

contradictory

trends,

it

is

unclear how federal courts will apply the Fordice standard to
future higher education desegregation cases. In short, For
dice raised more questions than it answered.
Thus, thirty eight years after Brown. the state of the
law in higher education desegregation remained unclear. The
fact that such a result could still exist in the 1990's could
not have been anticipated by those who fought to secure the
Brown decision. The fact that the Fordice decision left the
status of publicly-supported black universities unclear was
seized upon by critical race theorists90 as an opportunity to
indict the

Court

(Calmore,

1992;

Johnson,

1993).

Johnson

(1993) argued that "Fordice is wrong because Brown v. Board
of Education is wrong; both cases fail to distinguish between
the goal of integration in an ideal society and the process

90Critical race theorists maintain that racism is a
fundamen-tal feature of American political culture and the
dominant values of the American Creed - particularly as they
inform American legal jurisprudence - devalue or delegitimize
critical aspects of African American culture. They reject
interpretations of Brown that require the elimination of
majority-black institutions as inherently racist. Critical
race theorists support the continued existence of historic
ally black colleges as part of their overarching worldview of
multiculturalism.
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of integration” (Ibid, 1). Fordice. Johnson charged, did not
fundamentally

challenge

any of the assumptions

of

Brown.

including the notion that there were few, if any, redeeming
qualities

about

African American

culture

that were worth

preserving. "The ideal integrated society," Johnson conclu
ded,

"can only be achieved through a transitional stage in

which racial differences are truly respected, a stage which
requires the public maintenance of and support for predomi
nately black colleges" (Ibid).
Others viewed the state of affairs as part of a social
retreat on civil rights similar to the post-Reconstruction
era

(P.

T.

Orfield,

Smith,

1996).

1991;

These

Kilmartin,

commentators

1992;

Norwood,

interpreted

the

1992;
Brown

decision as commiting the nation to the pursuit of racial
justice; thus, they saw the conservative ascendency under the
Reagan and Bush administrations as a repudiation of those
ideals

(Cruse,

1986) . Just as disturbing to some of these

commentators was the fact that many African Americans them
selves were taking the initiative to argue for majority black
schools, Afrocentric curricula, and all-black male academies
(Hacker,

1990; Steele,

1993; Orfield,

1996) . Orfield main

tained that history was sadly repeating itself again: in the
1990's, both prominent blacks and whites were arguing that
segregation should be given a chance to work.
Is

either

interpretation

correct?

Has

the

Brown

decision, in essence, been "quietly reversed" as Gary Orfield
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suggests? One hundred years after the reversal of black gains
during

the

Reconstruction

period,

is

history

repeating

itself? Or was the Brown decision fundamentally flawed to
begin with - particularly as it related to the future of
majority-black institutions? Were the assumptions of Brown
inherently

racist

(as

some

suppose), thus

producing

the

climate for an inevitable "black backlash?" Considering the
opinion in Brown and the assumptions that informed it, should
we not be surprised that, thirty eight years later, the state
of the law in higher education desegregation

(despite the

Fordice decision) is still clouded? These questions form the
basis for Chapter Five.
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CHAPTER FIVE. FROM BROWN TO FORDICE:
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Brown as a Cultural Icon
In Chapter One,

it was argued that the Brown decision

wedded the ethos of the American Creed with America's his
toric

treatment

citizens.

Brown

of

African

denied

racial

Americans

as

segregation

second-class
constitutional

sanction by appealing to the values of the American Creed. In
effect, the civil rights movement did not raise "new" issues
within the American context; rather, these were "old" issues
(e.g., the meaning of "equality," "equal protection of the
laws," etc.) that were being applied to modern conditions.
Put another way, Brown. and the civil rights movement which
followed,

could be considered "the unfinished work of the

American Revolution."
Brown triumphed,

The

antidiscrimination principle

of

in large part, because it could be rather

easily harmonized with the national narrative

- that the

individual is the basis for society and a just government was
one which maximizes individual freedom (McCloskey and Zaller,
1984). Indeed, Brown's status as a "cultural icon"

(Peller,

1997, 192) is largely because it is seen as a validation of
the

nation's

first

principles

(Kluger,

1975;

Wilkinson,

1979). In time, Brown laid the groundwork for the expansion
of

the

religion,

antidiscrimination
national

origin,

principle
sexual

to

include

orientation,

gender,
age,

disability (Gewirtz, 1997).
283
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However,

as this dissertation has shown,

the Supreme

Court's pronouncement in Brown I that "separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal" hardly settled the matter.
What did it mean for higher education, and did it mean that
state-supported black colleges were also unconstitutional?
Or was Brown's target the state's imposition of segregation,
and schools or colleges that are predominately of one race do
not necessarily violate the Equal Protection Clause? Does
Brown merely require that states enact racially nondiscriminatory policies

or does

it impose

on them the

burden to

compensate individuals and institutions (such as black uni
versities) that were systemmatically mistreated under the Jim
Crow system? Also,

how far may federal judges go to prod

states to dismantle former de jure systems of higher educa
tion? In short, while Brown has become an "American cultural
icon," it is a highly contested one: Americans have had some
very

deep

differences

with

respect

to

the

first

time

public

policy

implications of Brown.
Fordice
Court ruled
system

of

represents

in a case
higher

Mississippi's

the

that

the

Supreme

involving desegregation of a state

education.

"race-neutral"

The

Court

policies

do

ruled
not

that

while

satisfy

the

state's remedial duty to eliminate the vestiges of racial
discrimination in higher education. But the justices did not
specify what remedies would satisfy the state's mandate meaning that one is left with as many questions as answers.
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In Chapter Five, it will be argued that the fundamental
problem with Fordice is not simply that
ambiguous; rather,

it is unclear or

it does not reexamine any of the suppo

sitions of Brown v. Board of Education. The fact that Brown
is an American cultural icon explains not only the fact that
none of the parties involved questioned its moral authority;
it also explains the hesitancy of the Court to revisit it. It
will be argued that Brown

is

intimately

intertwined with

America's historic sense of mission and the fact that racial
segregation violated the nation's highest principles. Second,
it will be shown that Brown occurred in the context of the
Cold War when the United States was consciously portraying
itself as a moral example to the world.

This period made

America uniquely sensitive to moral appeals about the per
sistence of legal segregation in the Southern United States.
Third, it will be shown that Brown personifies the American
Creed in the sense that its early critics were dismissed as
"legalists" and "irrelevant." To Brown's defenders, it was as
"self-evident" as the Declaration of Independence itself.
However, though the American Creed has provided a common
rallying point for eliminating legal segregation, it has been
less successful at building policy consensus since the civil
rights legislative victories of the 1960's. Desegregation in
higher education represents one of those policy domains where
the liberal tradition leads to widely divergent policy prefe
rences. It will be argued that the American Creed complicates
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the ability of federal courts to craft remedies in higher
education desegregation because it is fundamentally a theory
of a limited role for the state. Brown does not challenge the
basic relationship between the American state and society;
thus, remedies that might involve significant federal inter
vention

(such as

universities)

are

busing

or massive

difficult

to

enhancement

justify

and

of

black

maintain.

In

addition, the ease with which Brown was assimilated into the
national

narrative

has

turned

out

to

be

a

"double-edged

sword," because it has been attacked, revised, and reinter
preted both from the black left and the conservative right.
Finally, it will be argued that Fordice demonstrates that the
Brown decision continues to tyrannize the debate of how best
to expand educational opportunities for African Americans and
other disadvantaged groups in American society.
America as a Symbol of Democratic Revolution
In Chapter One, it was argued that America seemed to be
the practical fulfillment of the "state of nature" as concep
tualized

by

Hobbes

and

Locke.

European

colonists

found

America to be a land unencumbered by the class and clerical
oppressions that afflicted their native

lands.

could a nation which never experienced a true

How

then,

feudalism,

which theoretically represented an idyllic "state of nature"
and had the historical luxury of being "born free" become a
universal symbol of social emancipation during the eighteenth
century? The power of Jefferson's words presupposed a vision
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of America as a creative and redemptive force in the world a view which had taken deep roots in European thought long
before the first shots were fired at Lexington and Concord.
From the time of Columbus'

voyages,

European writers and

thinkers romantically portrayed America as a "Garden of Eden"
or as the "Adam of the West"
that

St.

(Davis, 1966) ; indeed, the fact

Thomas More chose the Western Hemisphere as the

setting for his novel Utopia was no accident. As Davis wrote:
While a growing literature celebrated America as a
symbol of nature, free from the avarice, luxury, and
materialism of Europe, promoters and colonizers saw
the virgin land as a place for solving problems and
satisfying desires. This was true of the conquistadores
who tried to recreate the age of chivalric romance; it
was true of the Jesuits who followed Manuel da Nobrega
to Brazil, determined to purify morals and spread the
faith; it was true of the English Puritans who sought
to build a New Jerusalem as a model of piety for the
rest of the world; it was true of the drifters and
ne'er-do-wells, the bankrupts and sleazy gentlemen, who
fluttered to the New World like moths drawn to a light.
In America things would be better, for America was the
Promise Land (19 66, 6).
America offered Europe - and by extension, humankind the hope of redemption,

the opportunity to build anew, the

chance to build a new civilization that had profited from her
forefathers' mistakes. Indeed, the "state of nature" metaphor
was the latest of a series

of metaphors used to describe

America as "a place of new beginnings." It was this vision of
the New World which gave America its almost magical lure. By
the time of the Declaration of Independence, this portrait
was taken for granted.

European liberals had come to view

America as the hope for mankind, and the new political and
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social institutions in the fledgling republic appeared to be
"clearly modeled on nature's simple plan" and seemed to have
"fulfilled

the

ancient

dream

of

a

more

perfect

society"

(Ibid, 7).
Hence, it was precisely this portrait which made slavery
such a moral dilemma in America. In a land purportedly "free"
of the oppressions found in Europe, American slavery took on
the

appearance

of an

"original

sin."

It could

hardly be

overlooked that the words of the Declaration of Independence
were written by a slaveholder. One needed to explain how, in
an age of "enlightenment," the institution of slavery had
revived - especially considering the fact that it had disap
peared in much of Europe (Davis, 1966) . Indeed, many colonial
leaders conceded that unless the slaves were freed, the moral
legitimacy of their revolution would be seriously compromised
(Davis, 1966; Jordan, 1968; Berlin, 1975) . America's problem
was

complicated by the very intellectual boldness

of the

Declaration of Independence - specifically,

its claims that

its

emphasized

ethics

were

"self-evident."

Jefferson

the

universality of the American experience. American notions of
"inalienable rights" were portrayed as reflecting both "the
laws of nature and the laws of God." This implied harmony
between the American philosophy of government and the actual
way human

beings were best

designed

to

behave;

in

other

words, the Declaration of Independence spoke of the concept
of inalienable rights as if they were empirical, scientific

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

289

facts that reflected the wisdom of God Himself. The Revolu
tion, then, would span the gap between the Creator's ideal of
universal

liberty and human usurpations of that divinely-

ordained state through reason - an eighteenth century version
of the "science of politics." If this were true, how could
slavery be part of the perfect design of republican govern
ment? Consequently, America's status as a moral example of
democratic revolution has, from its beginning, inhered within
it the ideological ammunition for black protest. This section
elaborates

on

how

the

specifics

of

America's

historical

development have facilitated black political agitation in the
United States.

This understanding is essential to put the

Brown decision in its proper context.
First of all, unlike the European liberal, the American
was fortunate in that he did not have to directly implicate
organized

religion

status quo.

as

an

apologist

In the first place,

for

the

aristocratic

the Protestant work ethic

placed a premium on values such as self-control, frugality,
achievement, hard work, and industry - values that harmonized
well with the
McCullough,

capitalist creed

1991).

(Weber,

1976;

By giving the marketplace

Bell,

1976;

a spiritual

mission, the American capitalist did not face the European
problem of needing to attach morality to capitalist accumu
lation (Hartz, 1955). Furthermore, the rather belated attempt
of the British Parliament to establish Anglicanism and Roman
Catholicism as the official religions of the colonies,
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that it occurred on the eve of war, was almost providential
in its timing. Genuinely outraged by these actions, ministers
denounced the British king and interpreted the subsequent
outbreak of hostilities in apocalytic terms (Sandoz, 1990).
Thus, the Founding Fathers never needed to develop a "politi
cal religion" to counter a religious orthodoxy which defined
resistance to the structures of corporate society as sin.
Partly for this reason,

the Americans refused to join the

French philosophes in their crusade to discredit organized
religion entirely and to create a humanistic utopia (Hartz,
1955; Voegelin, 1975) . Not only could the British monarch not
rely on the ecclesiastical
defense,

establishment to rally to his

but organized religion turned out to be a fairly

useful ally for the rebellious Americans.
The fact that the American Revolution did not banish
religion to the abyss meant that it could still be appealed
to in the hope of making demands on the political system. It
is well known that religion has played a central role
defining
culture

African American
(Kluger,

identity

1975; Levine,

and

shaping

1977; Sobel,

in

community

1979; Lincoln,

1984; Allen, Dawson, and Brown, 1989; 1990; Smith and Selt
zer, 1990; Moses, 1993; Walton, 1997). Henry (1990) has shown
that African American political culture is unique and dis
tinct from the overarching American political culture because
it is rooted in a black church tradition that blends sacred
and

secular vision,

provides

and endows African

American
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people with a 'moral vision' that is not found in mainstream
American politics.

"This moral/religious tradition," Hanes

Walton wrote, "affixes justice on a permanent rather than a
relative basis"

(1997,

87). Blacks and whites,

thus, have

utilized the weapons of religion to draw attention to moral
injustices meted out to African Americans because of their
race.
Because the Founding Fathers did not need to directly
confront organize religion in order to justify their revolu
tion, they were never required to repudiate another concept
which would help to ideologically underwrite African American
protest movements: the belief in "natural law" that they had
inherited from their European ancestors.

In pre-Christian

Europe, whenever the elected "lawman" explained the law to
the people, "he was not assumed to make the law or invent it
but to expound something which existed prior to and indepen
dent of himself" (Myrdal, 1944, 15) . This tendency to believe
in the idea of a "higher law" undergirding the entire legal
system was reinforced by the influence of Christianity in the
West. The English Parliament, which functioned largely as a
high court than a legislature in the modern sense until the
late 1600's,
"declaring"

saw itself not as "creating law," but rather
or

"explaining"

the

law that

already

existed

(Myrdal, 1944, 15; Huntington, 1968, 112). Hence, the belief
in a "higher law" to which all human laws are thus subject
has

created

in

America

a

peculiar

respect

for

judicial
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institutions,

law and order,

and a cult of constitutional

worship (Myrdal, 1944, 12; Hartz, 1955, 9). As Corwin argues:
. . . . The legality of the Constitution, its supremacy,
and its claim to be worshipped [author's emphasis],
alike find common standing ground on the belief in a
law superior to the will of human governors (1929, 5).
Not only were the Americans

not

forced to repudiate

natural law, they "breathed new life" into the concept at the
same historical moment when European liberals were trying to
annihilate it (Voegelin, 1975).
Moreover, the "higher law" background of the Constitu
tion

gave

anti-slavery

forces

an

ideological

platform

to

challenge the "peculiar institution" (Stamp, 1957). America's
natural law tradition allowed abolitionists to castigate the
institution of slavery as a sinful human innovation opposed
to the

laws

of God.

Hence,

William Lloyd Garrison

could

denounce the Constitution as a "compact with Hell" and remain
within the American tradition.

In addition, Americans tend

not only to conclude that certain laws are "unjust," but also
to feel morally obligated to disobey them. John Brown justi
fied his

ill-fated

insurrection

on these

grounds.

Martin

Luther King defended the strategy of civil disobedience to
oppose racial segregation by the same reasoning (King, 1963).
Paradoxically, the belief that human law must be a reflection
of "higher law" - a tradition which has helped to create a
profound respect for law and order in America - also allows
some Americans to disregard the law in service to what they
perceive to be a higher principle (Myrdal, 1944, 16).
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America's lack of a feudal past allowed it to synthesize
Puritan piety,

Enlightenment rationalism,

and natural law

theory - ideals which would have been socially combustible in
much of Europe -

into a comprehensive national

identity.

While the absence of the identical social conditions that
existed in

Europe did not eliminate all of the potential

conflicts between these competing worldviews
today),

(nor does it

America's revolutionary moment did not require an

all-out war

of

attrition between these

ideologies.

These

ideals, both separately and collectively, forged a sense of
America as a "chosen people" with an almost messianic mission
in the world. Jefferson expressed this sentiment during his
second inaugural address:
I shall need, too, the favor of that Being in whose
hands we are, who led our forefathers, as Israel of
old, from their native land, and planted them in a
country flowing with all the necessaries and comforts
of life; who has covered our infancy with his provi
dence, and our riper years with his wisdom and power;
and to whose goodness I ask you to join with me in
supplications, that he will so enlighten the minds
of your servants, guide their councils, and prosper
their measures, that whatsoever they do, shall result
in your good, and shall secure to you the peace, friend
ship, and approbation of all nations (Jordan, 1968,
573) .
In this passage, Jefferson explicitly compared the set
tling of America with Israel's exodus from Egypt. Thus, from
a variety of routes - New England Puritanism, Enlightenment
rationalism,

the material abundance of the American conti

nent, millenial visions of utopia, or a combination of all of
these - it was possible to conclude that America indeed was
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the Promise Land and Americans were the chosen people. Black
and white Americans have exploited America's messianic selfconcept to advance the cause of equality for African Ameri
cans

throughout

the

nation's

history.

Indeed,

they

have

argued that America ran the risk of losing its "most favored
nation" status with Providence if she failed to square the
actual treatment of blacks with the nation's ideals (Davis,
1966; Jordan, 1969; Moses, 1993; Walker, 1992).
But for African Americans, the nation's sense of "mani
fest destiny" went deeper: blacks - and some whites - have
tended to assume that their experience of oppression in the
United States has endowed them with a "special righteousness"
before God (Higgins, 1990; Moses, 1993). In other words, not
only is America a chosen nation, but African Americans are a
chosen people within that nation

(Moses,

1993,

228). Black

Christian tradition has self-consciously appropriated this
imagery; hence, black Christians drew analogies between their
enslavement and that of Israel, and the sufferings of Christ
(as well as that of other Biblical heroes), were not unlike
their own (Sobel, 1979; Moses, 1993). Consequently, Harriet
Tubman was memoralized as the

"Moses of her People,"

leaders like Frederick Douglass, Marcus Garvey,

and

and Martin

Luther King were (and still are) treated like "black messiahs" (Moses, 1993). King's last speech before his assassina
tion,

in which he claimed to have "gone up to the mountain-

top" evoked images of Moses leading the people of Israel to
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the Promise Land.

This tendency is not confined to black

Christianity; in fact, the Nation of Islam has borrowed the
same imagery. Malcolm X and Louis Farrakhan have relied on
the metaphor

of

America

as Egypt and

black Americans

as

Israel to buttress their moral/secular visions (Haley, 1992;
Lincoln, 1984) . The pervasiveness of this view is evidenced
by the prevalence of Biblical metaphors found in a number of
popular books on the civil rights movement and the black
experience; these include Bearing the Cross (Garrow, 1986),
Parting the Waters

(Branch, 1988), Pillar of Fire

(Branch,

1998), Roll. Jordan. Roll (Genovese, 1976), and And the Walls
Came Tumbling Down

(Abernathy, 1989) , to name a few. Thus,

not only were African Americans struggling to secure their
rights, they believed that they were right (Strickland, 1979,
5) . Many black political and religious

leaders maintained

(though not always explicitly) that they spoke with a unique
moral voice which America needed to listen to if she was to
fulfilled her destiny.
Hence,

the American Creed represented a synthesis of

Enlightenment rationalism, Puritan piety, and the tradition
of natural law - and these three strands of thought combined
to produce America's concept of itself as a "light to the
world. Not only have African Americans accepted key tenets of
American messianism, but they have seen themselves as having
a special role to play within the "chosen nation." The fact
that America's national consciousness evolved as a "flight
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from the European struggle" has meant two things:

not only

was there not an indigenous aristocracy that counterrevolu
tionaries could possibly restore, but it could not be argued
that the march of capitalism had uprooted traditional shared
understandings between lord and peasant, a point of departure
for which socialism depends (Hartz, 1955; Moore, 1966). As a
result,

America's Creed assumes that

its historical

expe

rience provides an objective model for the rest of the world.
As Hartz writes:
This then is the mood of America's absolutism: the
sober faith that its norms are self-evident. It is one
of the most powerful absolutisms in the world, more
powerful even than the messianic spirit of the continen
tal liberals which. . . . the Americans were able to
reject. That spirit arose out of contact with an oppo
sing way of life, and its very intensity betrayed an
inescapable element of doubt. But the American absolu
tism, flowing from an honest experience with universa
lity, lacked even
the passion that doubt
might give.It
was so sure of itself that it hardly needed to become
articulate. . . . it has refused to pay its critics the
compliment of an argument (1955, 58-59).
Thus, the Lockian settlement provides the background for
the Brown decision. The end of World War II thrust the United
States on center stage in world affairs as leader of "The
Free World." Embroiled in an ideological war with communism,
the United States was consciously promoting
democratic
national

capitalism as

development

the most

that

the

its version

enlightened pattern

emerging

nations

of

of
of

Asia,

Africa, and Latin America could adopt. In this context, the
nation's lingering problem of racial segregation stood out as
a profound embarrassment. Segregation had began to undermine
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American prestige in the world. Justice Department attorneys
utilized this very argument

in their

amicus curiae brief

before the Supreme Court in the Brown cases:
It is in the context of the present world struggle
between freedom and tyranny that the problem of racial
discrimination must be viewed. The United States is try
ing to prove to the people of the world, of every natio
nality, race, and color, that a free democracy is the
most civilized and most secure form of government yet
devised by man. We must set an example for others by
showing firm determination to remove existing flaws in
our democracy.
The existence of discrimination against minority
groups in the United States has an adverse effect upon
our relations with other countries. Racial discrimina
tion furnishes grist for the Communist propoganda mills,
and it raises doubts about even among friendly nations
as to the intensity of our devotion to the democratic
faith. . . . The segregation of school children on a
racial basis is one of the practices in the United
States that has been singled out for hostile foreign
comment in the United Nations and elsewhere [italics
added] . Other peoples cannot understand how such a prac
tice can exist in a country which professes to be a
staunch supporter of freedom, justice, and democracy.
The sincerity of the United States in this respect will
be judged by its deeds as well as by its words (Brief of
the United States as Amicus Curiae, in Kurland and Cas
per, 1975, 121; 123).
As we have seen, America's view of itself as a "City on
a Hill" was not new - in fact,
history.

this metaphor had a long

What was new was that the United States,

ideological

environment of the

Cold War,

was

in the

consciously

exporting this vision to the rest of the world (Hartz, 1955;
Huntington,

1968; Moses, 1993; Dudziak, 1995). As a conse
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quence, black leaders capitalized on America's new role in
the world to justify their claims against the state.91
Because African Americans and liberal whites have found
the nation's first principles useful, revolutionary theorybuilding has been rendered less necessary. "Like most Ameri
cans," Harold Cruse lamented, "Negroes are profoundly antitheoretical"

(1967,

92) . Black

liberation

movements

have

concentrated primarily on pragmatic solutions to the problems
faced by blacks. Brown illustrates the pragmatism of American
liberals because it represents two tendencies which flow out
of America's philosophical consensus: the belief in the power
of law and science to solve major policy issues.
The resilience of the American Constitution after over
two hundred years cannot be explained without reference to
the

nation's

unanamity on first principles.

The American

concept of judicial review, for example, could only exist in
a society with fundamental ideological consensus. As Hartz
argues," the removal of high policy to the realm of adjudi
cation implies a prior recognition of the principles to be
legally

interpreted"

(1955,

9) . Having

settled

society's

fundamental moral problem, the American is free to concern
91For example, King compared the "jet-like speed" that
the
nations
of
Africa
and Asia
were
moving
toward
independence with the "horse and buggy pace" that African
Americans were moving toward gaining a cup of coffee at a
lunch counter (King, 19 64). In another example, Malcolm X's
threat to charge the United States with human rights
violations before the United Nation was no doubt motivated in
part
by
a desire
to embarrass
America
in
its new
international role (Moses, 1993, 231-232).
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himself with concrete cases. Moreover, the natural law tra
dition has further magnified the importance of law in America
(Corwin, 1928; Myrdal, 1944). Thus, the reverence for law in
America largely substituted for the Old World's preoccupation
with political philosophy (Myrdal, 1944; Hartz, 1955).
Thus,

when the NAACP opted for the legal approach to

remedy the problem of racial discrimination

(as opposed to

other alternatives that could have been pursued) they testi
fied to their basic faith in the legitimacy of the American
constitutional

order.

As

a

result,

when

leftist

critics

challenged the NAACP's legal program during the 1930's, the
organization countered by romanticizing the law. The NAACP
and its allies conceived of the courts as "objective" and
"dispassionate" arenas; hence,

judicial interpretations of

the law carried the same force as the laws of science. They
reasoned

court

decisions that undermined the

premises

of

Plessv could rise above tyrannical nature of public opinion
(which tended to be very hostile to civil rights) because,
unlike executive or legislative acts, judicial decrees were
"above politics" (Thompson, 1935; Locke, 1935; Kluger, 1975;
Tocqueville, 1988; Smith, 1996).
Not only does Brown reflect the NAACP's faith in the
law, but it represented the faith in the power of science (in
this

case

social

psychology)

as

a

legitimator

of public

policy. It also reflected the basic pragmatic orientation of
the NAACP. Indeed, Thurgood Marshall invited the social sci
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entists to participate in the deliberations for the Brown
cases because he considered their testimony an effective way
to demonstrate the harms of segregation (Kluger, 1975; Cross,
1989) . Even more so than reliance on law, science is reputed
as

being

"objective,"

"value-free,"

and

"dispassionate"

(Kuhn, 1962). What better way, the NAACP reasoned, to make
a

controversial

objective

legal

source?

In

argument
doing

so,

than
the

by

appealing

NAACP's

to

lawyers

an

were

behaving like Americans. After all, America's reverence for
science can be traced back at least to the bold claim of the
Declaration of Independence that the new nation would build
its political foundation on reason (as opposed to Old World
"tradition").
In relying on the

social sciences

to buttress

their

legal arguments, the NAACP was helped immensely by the poli
tical tenor of the times. In the first place, Roosevelt's New
Deal, by relying on economic experts to shape economic poli
cies geared to fight the Great Depression,
use of social science expertise

legitimized the

in formulating matters of

high policy. Second, World War II and the emerging Cold War
witnessed

the

institutionalization

of

a

"foreign

policy

establishment" which consisted of a class of experts which
revolved between Wall Street, the Pentagon, and the nation's
Ivy League universities

(J. Patterson,

1997).

In addition,

America had just fought a war against the horrors of fascism,
most vividly personified by Hitler's atrocities against the
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Jews. While Social Darwinism had once provided a rationale
for Jim Crow segregation and the science of eugenics (and its
racist

implications), the horrors

of Auschwitz made

such

theories appear intellectually and morally indefensible to
many Americans. In short, the post-World War II period was an
ideological

boon

for

liberals:

with the memories of Nazi

concentration camps still fresh on American minds, they were
able to discredit "scientific racism" and portray prejudice
and discrimination as social problems that were rooted in
ignorance and irrationality (Arendt, 1958; D /Souza, 1995).
With the nation exporting its version of Lockianism, the
nation focused on the problem of legal segregation at home.
This led many Northern whites to render a rather harsh cri
tique of the South. Since America truly was "the light of the
world," the South, according to this view, simply was on the
"wrong

side

of history."

Northern

liberals

conceived

the

South as a strange place in desparate need to be saved from
itself. Peller (1997) makes this point rather forcefully:
Brown was part of a broad critique of and intervention
into the status quo culture of southern life; in general
terms, the trajectory of northern regulation was to
replace the all-white, Old South patriarchial ruling
class with a somewhat integrated, rationalist, and tech
nocratic New South leadership, both literally in terms
of political office, and more generally in terms of
everyday cultural and ideological legitimacy in diverse
institutions (199).
But this intervention went deeper than the sense that
Northern culture was more
South.

"enlightened"

than that of

the

Social science lent support to the notion that the
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experience of slavery and discrimination had psychologically
damaged

the black man's personality.

The

assumption

that

blacks had "low self-esteem" and/or actually "hated them
selves" served as the dominant paradigm in social psychology
until the mid-1960's (Cross, 1991) . The assumption that black
children were "culturally deprived" not only served as an
underlying

rationale

for

integration,

but

for

a host

of

enrichment programs that were instituted during the War on
Poverty such as Head Start (Peller, 1997, 206).
As a consequence of slavery and segregation,

African

American culture, according to many social scientists, either
did not exist at all, or to the extent that it did, merely
represented

a pathetic,

cultural norms

(Frazier,

dysfunctional
1939; Myrdal,

imitation

of white

1944; Kardiner and

Ovesey, 1951; Clark and Clark, 1939; 1947; 1950; Silberman,
1964; Moynihan,

1965; Cruse,

1986; W. Cross,

1991; Peller,

1997). At any rate, the "liberal party line" was that race
and culture should make no difference: the sin of segregation
lay in its refusal to treat African Americans as individuals.
Furthermore, since liberals defined racism as irratio
nal, they reasoned that the problem could thereby be solved
by education.

If segregation caused personality damage in

black children,

as the doll tests

alleged,

the NAACP and

other liberals reasoned that integration was the solution.
Public school integration, by increasing interracial contact,
would prove that racism was merely based on irrational fears
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that have no basis in fact (Arendt,

1958; Wilkinson,

1979;

Cruse,

1995). Moreover,

since

1986;

Armor,

1995; D'Souza,

education in America has historically embodied the hope for
the future, the public schools seemed the natural place to
start the process of confronting the nation's racial problem
(Myrdal, 1944; Arendt, 1958; Reitman, 1992). Once it became
abundantly

clear

that

merely outlawing

segregated

schools would not move the South to yield,

public

liberals argued

that activist government (legitimized by Franklin Roosevelt's
New Deal), should now be applied to protect and expand the
rights

of

southern

gained momentum,

blacks.

some

treated the South

As

the

civil

rights

movement

Northern elites and opinion makers

(the "Great Perpetuator" of legal segre

gation) as if it were not even part of America (Rowan, 1951;
Wilkinson, 1979; Williams, 1987; Peller, 1997).
Thus, Brown united two of America's deities: its reve
rence for law and its uncritical faith in science and reason.
Because

the

Lockian

settlement has

weakened the

American

philosophical tradition, law and science are adhered to with
religious-like conviction. This explains three characteris
tics of Anglo-American legal jurisprudence that legal scholar
Patricia

Williams

identifies:

(1)

the tendency

to

define

mutually exclusive categories that purport to simplify the
complexities

of

public/private,
tence

of

life

(e.g.

rights/needs,

moral/immoral,

white/black); (2) the belief in the exis

transcendent,

acontextual

legal

truths

or

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Fu rther reproduction prohibited without permission.

pure

304

procedures; and (3) the a priori assumption that there exist
objective "unmediated" voices by which those transcendent,
universalist truths find their expression,

such as judges,

lawyers, logicians, and scientists (1991, 8-9). Consequently,
American law and science, in that their legitimacy is based
on

their claims

to universality

and

neutrality,

mutually

reinforce each other. Thus, the belief that law and science
provide

an

questions

objective

arbiter to settle

morally troubling

(such as the legitimacy of racial segregation) is

another way of restating the basic faith of American liberals
in the American Creed.
Finally, the legitmacy of integration was further under
scored

by

unanimous.

the

fact

that

the

decision

of

the

Court

was

The unanimity of the Court reinforced the view

among liberal integrationists that they were right and the
South was wrong.
moral

crusade:

Implementing the Brown decision became a

the

confrontation

was

between

enlightened

integrationists and traditional, backward Southern racists.
In summary, Brown personified the American Creed itself.
It incapsulated the ancient millenial visions of liberty and
perfectibility that Europeans brought to the New World that
allowed America to become the revolutionary symbol of the
overthrow of the class and clerical tyrannies that had so
bedeviled the Old World. It also recognized that, in marked
contrast to Justice Roger Taney's infamous remark that the
black man has "no rights a white man is bound to respect,"
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the Court affirmed that African Americans did have rights,
and states could not arbitrarily abridge them. Brown. and the
civil rights movement which followed it, was seen as both a
reaffirmation of America's first principles and an extension
of those principles to new contexts

(McCloskey and Zaller,

1984). Furthermore, America's new international role made it
more difficult for the nation's long-standing racial divide
to be put on "the back burner." Just as Cold War liberalism
motivated American initiatives like the Alliance for Progress
and the Peace Corps, it inspired Northern whites to join the
"Freedom Rides" and to work side-by-side with Mississippi
blacks during "Freedom Summer." Brown appealed to the reputa
tion of law and science as "value-neutral arbiters of truth"
to legitimize federal intervention aimed at overturning the
South's system of legal segregation.
Nevertheless,

despite the fact that supporters could

easily interpret Brown as consistent with American princi
ples, questions arose immediately about the Court's reasoning
in the Brown decision.

As Chapter Three noted,

Brown left

many significant questions unanswered, including whether the
existence of state-supported black colleges and universities
necessarily offended the Constitution. The fact that many of
these criticisms were largely dismissed as "legalistic" and
not taken seriously underscores the extent to which the Brown
decision embodies the American Creed. However, it left many
integrationists unprepared for the assault

from the Black
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Power insurgency from the left as well as Nixon's "southern
strategy" from the right. The next section discusses some of
the shortcomings of Brown that were identified by many legal
scholars and why these critiques were largely ignored.
Brown and its Critics
Not
decision
simply

surprisingly,

Southerners

in Brown: however,
die-hard

lambasted

the

criticism was not

segregationists

determined

Court's

limited to

to

maintain

"segregation now, segregation forever" (a slogan made famous
by Alabama Governor George Wallace); on the contrary, many
friendly critics also came forward who were sympathetic to
the ruling in Brown but who nonetheless voiced grave doubts
about the Court's reasoning. The critiques of Brown can be
grouped in four categories: (1) the view that Brown's reading
of the historical context of the Fourteenth Amendment was
inaccurate;

(2) serious questions about the social science

evidence upon which the Court depended; (3) the view that the
Court's legal reasoning in Brown left much to be desired; and
(4) the sense that Brown's declaration that "separate educa
tional facilities are inherently unequal" made black colleges
constitutionally suspect at best, and ripe for extinction at
worst.
Graham (1954) criticized the Court for concluding that
the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment "could not be deter
mined with any degree of certainty"

(347 U.S.

483,

489),

maintaining that the justices interpreted the congressional
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debates

in terms of the issues of the 1950's and not the

1860 's . In Chapter Two, it was shown that while some Northern
Republicans, most notably Charles Sumner, wanted to integrate
the schools, that position never held a majority during the
Reconstruction debates from 1865 to 1875 (Avins, 1967; Kluger, 1975; Kaczorowski, 1987) . Consequently, a strict adhe
rence

to

"original

intent"

would

have

yielded

a

result

unfavorable to the NAACP's position. Rather, he maintained
that the Fourteenth Amendment was written in "declaratory"
terms; in other words, rather than the government conferring
rights on the freedmen (which meant conceivably that Congress
could take those rights away if it wished)

it had merely

declared the rights that they already had. Graham argued that
the "declaratory" nature of the Fourteenth Amendment had been
modeled after the Declaration of Independence; thus, he con
cluded that it was Congress' intent to extend the protections
of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution to
the newly freed slaves. Had the Court chosen to emphasize the
declaratory nature of the Fourteenth Amendment Court, Graham
reasoned, it could have put forth a rationale for Brown that
was more faithful to the facts as opposed to pondering about
the differences between the role of education in the 18 6 0 's
as opposed to the 1950's.
Other commentators concentrated on Clark's study which
appeared to provide much of the underpinnings for the Court's
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decision.92 B row n. by

relying

heavily

on

social

science

evidence seemed to imply that its legitimacy hinged on the
quality

of

that

testimony.

Thus,

if

the

findings

NAACP's social scientists were later disproved,

of

the

should the

result in Brown be dismissed as well? Because Brown relied on
social science evidence, it also followed that the opponents
^Cahn (1955) questioned the science behind Clark's
study. He thought that the Court's conclusions in Brown were
based on a common sense application of equal application of
the laws rather than the social science evidence. He thought
it rather silly to try to prove that segregation harms black
children; Cahn likened it to theorizing about whether "fire
burns." He wondered if the sample size was large enough to
make the sweeping conclusions that the NAACP drew. Ernest van
den Haag (1957; 1960) went much further in his criticism of
the doll study. Like Cahn, he questioned the size of the
sample, Clark's failure to account for sample bias, and the
lack of a control group. However, he also pointed to an
apparent contradiction between the results of the doll tests
and an earlier study conducted by Clark and his wife Mamie
which employed similar methods as the ones used in the
segregation cases (Clark and Clark, 1952). The Clarks
surveyed two sample populations of black children (one in
Arkansas and one in Massachusetts) and found that the
behavior which
allegedly proved personality
damage
rejection of colored dolls by black children - actually
occurred
more
often
among
northern-born
children
in
nonsegregated schools than southern children attending
segregated schools (165). More pointedly, van den Haag
doubted whether Clark's studies reveal anything meaningful
about the issue of personality damage anyway. If a child
identified "white" with "nice," might he identify himself
with white if he thought of himself as nice? Clark apparently
did not consider that possibility. Furthermore, Western
culture, as well as other cultures where the terms "black"
and "white" do not have racial overtones, associate black
with evil and white with purity. Though conceding that
segregation may have reinforced those impressions, van den
Haag maintained that Clark's findings simply did not prove
that the reactions of the children were attributable to
school segregation and not some other cause. His review of
the social science testimony left him "disturbed about the
disrepute his [Clark] 'evidence' could not fail to bring
social science if it were taken seriously. And it seems to
be" (1960, 69).
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of remedies hailed as the logical derivatives of B rown. such
as mandatory busing orders, would enlist the tools of social
science to determine if integration actually "delivered" the
academic and social benefits that it promised. Therefore, by
appealing to the social sciences,
politicize

scholarly

discourse

Brown served to further

of

the

study

of

academic

achievement, particularly as it related to minorities (Armor,
1995; D'Souza, 1995; Orfield, 1996).
Some critics pointed out what they perceived to be as
deficiencies in the legal reasoning itself that were distinct
from its reliance on the doll tests. For example, why did the
Court neglect to cite Harlan's dissent from the Plessv case?
Brown's rationale implied that Plessv was based merely on
"bad sociology" and not "bad law," as these critics main
tained

(Kluger,

1975; Wilkinson,

1979).

In addition,

Chief

Justice Warren claimed that it was unnecessary to determine
whether compulsory racial segregation also violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the issue of
racial segregation in public schools was disposed on equal
protections grounds. But why not? The Court did not say. The
justices were also criticized because the Brown opinion made
scant reference to legal precedents concerning the issue of
racial discrimination; by 1954, a fairly impressive number of
legal

precedents

had

accumulated

with

respect

to

racial

discrimination that the Court could have easily referred to
as it set forth to explain Brown to the country. Weschler
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(1959)

complained

articulate

a

that

neutral

the

Warren

principle

for

Court
its

failed

both

conclusion

to

that

racially segregated public schools were unconstitutional and
a standard by which other types

of statutory segregation

could be judged.
They were also disturbed by what they saw as the Court's
remedy to the problem of compulsory segregation: compulsory
congregation (van den Haag, 1957; Weschler, 1959). Ernest van
den Haag saw Brown as an attempt to compel whites to esteem
blacks equally, an effort he predicted would never succeed.
Instead,

the Court's

logic implied that segregation would

become a privilege for the rich who would be able to enroll
their

children

in private education whereas

poor whites,

lacking this option, would resent being forced to associate
with blacks against their will (1957, 165). Weschler asserted
that the only "neutral" principle which he could conceive of
basing Brown on was the idea that racial segregation violated
the individual's freedom of association. However, Weschler
confessed his uncertainty about whether this position was
logically

consistent:

the

rights

of African Americans to

associate with whomever they choose

regardless

of racial

considerations had to be balanced against the rights of white
Americans

to

refuse

such

associations.

Hence,

Weschler

remained unclear about whether Brown could be sustained on
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freedom of association grounds; nevertheless, he was con
vinced that Brown was the correct result but was incorrectly
decided.
Taken together,

these

criticisms

exposed significant

flaws in Brown's reasoning, some of which would continue to
haunt the effort to implement the Court's mandate for many
years to come. It appeared that the Court assumed that its
logic was "self-evident." Lengthy dissertations on the evils
of the segregated system of the South were not necessary;
everybody knew what the Court meant. The more the justices
elaborated,

the

more

they

would

alienate;

Chief

Justice

Warren wanted to preserve the unanamity of the Court. Many of
the broader social implications of the decision, such as the
fate of majority-black institutions, were either avoided or
ignored.

Hence,

Brown. in opting

for brevity,

masked the

nature of the complicated issues that lay ahead:
. . . Brown never explained - indeed, never tried to
explain - its crucial conclusion that segregated
schools, however equal their facilities, still intan
gibly harmed black children. True, Brown kept repeating
this conclusion, at least five separate times. But the
Court essentially asked the country to take it on faith:
that because nine justices thought segregation wrong,
it must be so (Wilkinson, 1979, 35).
The fact that many of these criticisms were dismissed as
"legalistic"

and

not

taken

seriously

was

central

to

the

entire history of the effort to implement Brown. After all,
Brown represented the reaffirmation of the national faith in
the dignity of the individual and his right to "pursue happi
ness," a moral question that had been settled long ago. This
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"old principle" was simply being applied to an "old problem"
- the issue of race. Thus, the ease with which Brown could be
assimilated with the national narrative and American ideas of
progress gave its advocates a much lower burden of proof.
Brown was just as "self-evident" as the Declaration of Inde
pendence itself. The Court could be forgiven if its logic was
sloppy or inconsistent - the fact that the justices' opinion
reaffirmed some of the nation's most cherished values over
shadowed any shortcomings in Brown's prose. As a result, some
of Brown's defenders behaved as if the Court's opinion - as
well as their interpretations of its meaning - were logically
self-evident and did not need to be defended at all.93
93A few examples will suffice to make the point. While
conceding that Brown was not "tightly reasoned," Bender
(1972) argued that the Court's decision was "right. . . . if
the Court had waited until an airtight opinion could be
written (I still couldn't write one), it would have sadly
failed the country and the Consti-tution" (26). Beiser (1976)
took his Bender's pragmatism one step further: he suggested
that racial segregation was such a grievous evil that the
Court need not apologize for its ruling,
so long as
"desirable results" were achieved. Bender wrote, "Does anyone
doubt today. . . . that legally enforced racial segregation
in Southern public schools hurt blacks more than it did
whites" (1976)? He typified the view that Brown represented
the
common
sense
prin-ciple
that
segregation
unconstitutionally harmed African Americans and therefore
hardly needed to be explicitly defended since it was so
obvious (Wilkinson, 1979, 35). When asked whether segregation
offended the American principle of equality, Black wrote:
I think we ought to exercise one of the sovereign
prerogatives of philosophers - that of laughter. The
only question remaining (after we get our laughter under
control) is whether the segregation system [in the
South] answers this description. Here I must confess
a tendency to start laughing all over again (1960, 424) .
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In addition, it was demonstrated in Chapters Three and
Chapter Four that the 1950's and 1960's were characterized by
massive resistance to the Brown decision in the South. The
images

of nine

frightened black students

in Little Rock,

Arkansas being escorted to class by National Guardsmen over
the protests of an angry white mob simply made a much deeper
impression on national consciousness than the dispassionate
critiques of the Brown decision by legal academics. Indeed,
the South's response to integration fortified the conviction
of integrationists that they were right and white Southern
segregationists were wrong. In the highly charged ideological
climate of the 1950's and early 1960's, the high priests of
academia probably never had a chance. Now was the time for
action, not philosophying. The real question seemed to be how
much political capital would the federal government and the
political

parties

be

willing

to risk on

behalf

of

civil

rights.
Moreover, the fact that these critiques were dismissed
by the NAACP and other civil rights activists as "technical"
and "legalistic"

is precisely the point - because that is

what they were. Brown's early critics challenged its legal
reasoning,

its

fidelity to the historical

context of the

Fourteenth Amendment, the social science testimony, and some
of its practical implications.

They failed to address its

most basic assumption - whether the American Creed itself
could adequately deal with the problem of race. As a conse
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quence, Brown's belief in the universality of the American
Creed was allowed to go unchallenged.
Not only did Brown's early critics not challenge the
Creed, their "ivory tower critiques" revealed that they were
trapped in an intellectual dungeon of their own making. Brown
challenged an established view of liberal legal jurisprudence
that began in the late nineteenth century and crystallized in
19 05 with Lochner v. New York94 concerning the proper role of
the courts. Liberals denounced Lochner. maintaining that the
Court's

"liberty

of

contract"

doctrine

presupposed

that

workers and capitalists had equal bargaining power.

In a

period when workers' strikes were often stamped out by the
police and "company goons," such thinking was incredibly out
of step with the reality of the labor market, liberals fumed.
In dissent, Justice Brandeis wrote that Lochner was not based
on a correct understanding of the law, but rather "upon an
economic theory which a large part of the country does not
entertain" (198 U.S. 45, 75). Accusing the Supreme Court of
enacting its own economic and social preferences into law,
liberals countered by developing the doctrine of judicial
restraint - the view that courts should ordinarily defer to
the policies of the legislature (Horwitz, 1979, 600; Peller,
1997, 204) . Arguing that the Constitution created only one
^lOS U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner. the Supreme Court
invalidated a New York minimum wage law, arguing that the
state law violated the Fourteenth Amendment by abridging the
rights of workers and capitalists to contract with respect to
wages and working conditions.
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branch - the legislature - with the mandate to make political
choices, the theory of judicial restraint became a staple of
liberal theories of jurisprudence for half a century.
The consequence of the doctrine of judicial restraint
was the loss of faith in the courts as a vehicle for social
change.

The

post-Lochner

era

led many

legal

scholars

to

conclude that the law merely reflected social forces. Law had
become too formalistic and legalistic,

and had lost touch

with social realities. By the 1920's, this thinking had given
rise to the only native American school of legal jurispru
dence - legal realism

(Horwitz,

1979,

602). Legal realists

assumed that since law reflected social forces, it was both
impossible and undesirable for it to serve as a catalyst for
social reform

(Ibid,

602). Under the tutelage of the legal

realists, law was stripped of its traditional moral content.
Having rejected the natural law tradition, many liberals lost
faith in the capacity of law to

articulate the

"dreams,

hopes, and aspirations of a community" (Ibid). Indeed, one of
the consequences of this view (which was discussed in Chapter
Two)

was

that

many

leftist

intellectuals

considered

the

NAACP's proposed legal campaign against segregation as wellintentioned but doomed to fail. Taken together, the doctrine
of judicial restraint and legal realism contributed to the
view that the courts were an improper place to initiate any
mass movement for social change.
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Brown. however, called into question matters that many
liberal legal scholars thought were settled. To them, what
was unforgivable about Lochner was that the Supreme Court had
enacted its own social and economic preferences into law;
now, the Brown court appeared to have done the same thing.
Even worse, liberals based their opposition to decisions like
Lochner on abstract theories about the proper role of the
courts within American constitutionalism; what they failed to
acknowledge was that the doctrine of judicial restraint and
the school of legal realism emerged principally as a reaction
to a series of judicial decisions that liberals opposed on
political grounds.95 But Brown was a decision in which many
liberals favored the result; however, the Court's ruling in
the segregation decisions resembled the very brand of legal
jurisprudence that they despised. Trapped in an intellectual
web that they had spun themselves, some of the liberal legal
scholars who criticized the Brown decision were, in reality,

9SFurther evidence that liberal arguments for judicial
restraint emerged more as a result of the political context
of the times than the Founders' original understanding of the
courts' role lies in the fact that liberals such as Justices
Holmes, Brandeis and Frankfurther considered Chief Justice
John Marshall one of their heroes. Justice Marshall, however,
could not be accused of modest uses of judicial power.
"Heroic judges," the proponents of judicial restraint seemed
to be saying, "should be confined to the mythic past when
judges were larger than life" (Horwitz, 1979, 600). While
Marshall's exercises of judicial authority may have been
necessary during those embryonic years to carve out a special
role for the Supreme Court within America's constitutional
order, many liberals acted as if "the age of heroic judges
had passed and judicial modesty remained the only virtue"
(Ibid, 600).
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"fighting the last war" (Ibid, 603) . Thus, it was no wonder
that many of their criticisms centered on Brown's lack of a
"neutral" principle or the search for an unambiguous purpose
for the

Fourteenth Amendment which

ostensibly would

have

provided a better rationale for the Court's decision (Graham,
1954; Weschler, 1959; Poliak, 1959).
Further,

the sense that the South's determination to

circumvent Brown had created a constitutional crisis also
meant that for these "doubting Thomases" some of their best
arguments would

be used to

justify a degree

of

judicial

intervention in the South that their own theories of judicial
restraint could not have tolerated. Indeed, in a climate of
massive resistance to desegregation,

strict adherence to a

theory of judicial restraint seemed to make little sense to
Brown's

defenders.

It

soon

became

apparent

that

merely

striking down Plessv in education and allowing blacks and
whites to go to whatever schools they liked - the so-called
"freedom of choice" plans - would not integrate the schools;
this view was crystallized by the Supreme Court's opinion in
Green when it announced that Brown did not simply require
school districts to outlaw segregation, but it placed on them
an "affirmative duty" to desegregate. Thus, the view that the
state act as a neutral arbiter - neither unjustly favoring
blacks or whites - was labeled as "naive" or "impractical" at
best (Meuller and Schwartz, 1960; Miller and Howell, 1960) or
"reactionary," "racist," at worst (Peller, 1997, 204).
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In addition,

Green defined compliance with Brown

in

terms of whether states and school districts had made accep
table, measurable progress toward integration (391 U.S. 430
[1968]). Increasingly, the principle that Brown represented
simply "color-blindness" - that Brown meant blacks and whites
were equal before the law but race should not be taken into
account - was rejected by many liberals.

"Color-blindness"

was linked with the equality that the Lochner court alleged
existed

between

labor

and

capital;

in theory,

labor

and

capital might have equality, but the theory did not work in
the real world (Peller, 1997, 204). Similarly, laws banning
racial discrimination against African Americans made them the
equals of whites in theory, but the consequences of slavery
and segregation meant that they were not the equals of whites
of whites in fact. Many liberals concluded that remedies to
address racial discrimination had to be "color-conscious" in
order to identify whether racism was still being practiced
and thus avoid the Lochner problem (Ibid, 2 04). Moreover, the
social science component of Brown represented the ideal for
which the legal realists had strived for - the goal of making
law conform to "the actual social conditions to which it was
applied rather than to an abstract idealization of formal
equality in the face of empirical inequality"

(Ibid,

205) .

Thus, the period between 1954 and 1968 was characterized
by a major transformation in the thinking of many liberals on
civil rights.

At the time

of Brown. the NAACP

and
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liberals were arguing that racial segregation unconstitutio
nally used color as a basis for denying African Americans
equality under the law.

The principle that blacks not be

judged by the color of their skin, "but the content of their
character" easily harmonized with traditional American under
standings of individualism (McCloskey and Zaller, 1984) . By
the time Green was decided in 1968, the country had witnessed
more than a decade of Southern attempts to delay, circumvent,
and outright defy Brown's mandate. Many liberals saw "color
blindness" as naive and unrealistic in light of the diffi
culties encountering in trying to make integration a reality.
Rather than arguing that color should make no difference, as
liberals had traditionally maintained, it would be necessary,
at least in the short run,

to take color into account in

order to effectively monitor the process of redressing racial
discrimination. Thus, they jettisoned theories of a limited
role of the courts in favor of proactive government interven
tion to bring about desegregation. The courts' more activist
posture toward desegregation during the late 1960's and early
1970's reflected the application of New Deal liberalism to
civil rights (Carmines and Stinson, 1989; Edsall and Edsall,
1991; Crump, 1993; Orfield, 1996; Smith, 1996; Peller, 1997).
However,

this transformation in liberal civil

rights

advocacy sowed the seeds for the undoing of Brown. As libe
rals began to steadily move away from "color-blindness" to
"color-consciousness," conservatives accused them of aban
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doning

the

American

Creed.

It

was

inappropriate

for

the

government to take race into account, it was argued. As the
images

of

nonviolent

black demonstrators

being

beaten

by

racist white Southern policemen gave way to the urban riots
of Watts, Detroit, Cleveland, and Newark, African Americans
no longer appeared like sympathetic victims to many white
Americans (Edsall and Edsall, 1991). The tumultuous combina
tion of urban unrest and anti-Vietnam protest effectively
weakened the New Deal coalition, paving the way for Richard
Nixon's narrow victory in the presidential election of 1968.
One of Nixon's

campaign promises was to slow the pace of

"forced desegregation"; though not rejecting Brown in prin
ciple (as racist Southern politicians had), Nixon denied that
the federal government should play an activist role in brin
ging integration about.
that

an

earlier

The "judicial restraint" arguments

generations

of

liberals

had

erected

in

response to an economically conservative Court were now being
employed to curb judicial activism in school desegregation.
Nixon's

message

of

allowing

desegregation

"conforming

to

local conditions" was just what many Southerners wanted to
hear

(Preer,

1982;

Carmines and Stinson,

Edsall, 1991; Orfield,

1989;

Edsall and

1996; Smith, 1996).

Second, the more activist posture of the federal courts
raised the specter that the implementation of Brown would
mean that historically black colleges had no place in the new
dispensation. Chapter Three discussed the debate among many
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leading black educators during the 1950's and early 1960's,
many of whom were gravely concerned that the implemenation of
a desegregation-only remedy would have disastrous implica
tions for African American students, faculty, and administra
tors. However, the South's massive resistance to any kind of
integration meant that the debate about the future of black
colleges was largely confined to the intelligentsia until the
mid-1960's. With the full force of Southern state governments
united against integration of the public schools and the uni
versities,

bold assertions of "black autonomy" would have

played into the hands of the segregationists. The political
imperatives of the 1950's and early 1960's, thus, postponed
the

"black

backlash"

1960's . Even when

against

integration

black educators

voiced

until

the

late

fears about the

implications of integration, they were very careful not to
directly criticize Brown (Thompson, 1958; Nabrit, 1958; Moon,
1962; Kujovich, 1987).
With the rise of the Black Power movement, many blacks
began to have second thoughts about integration. The Supreme
Court's statement that "separate is inherently unequal," as
well as the

efforts

of the NAACP's social

scientists and

lawyers may have unwittingly injured the pride of African
Americans. Brown asserted that even if school facilities were
equal,

racial

segregation

still

intangibly

harmed

black

children. Thus, the Court seemed to equate separate education
with unequal education. The most militant advocates of Black

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited without permission.

322

Power equated integration with cultural genocide. However, as
noted in Chapter Three, Brown failed to specify if the "harm"
of segregation was caused by the state's imposition of it, or
if racial segregation "harmed" blacks and offended the Con
stitution irrespective of whether it was freely chosen or
not. Thus, black college presidents interpreted Brown as not
requiring the merger or elimination of black institutions but
forbidding states from legally restricting the schools which
African

Americans

could

attend.

At

the

same

time,

they

coopted the liberal embrace of "color-consciousness" to argue
that historically black colleges still served a critical need
for black students during this critical period of transition
from Jim Crow segregation to

integration.

In calling for

states to enhance black colleges, they were not only trying
to remedy past underfunding of black institutions; in addi
tion, many African Americans were advocating an activist role
for the government in remedying the "vestiges of segrega
tion." However, by insisting that the desegregation process
did not necessarily preclude the existence of black colleges,
they were destined for a head-on collision with black and
white liberals who saw black colleges as an artifact from the
Jim Crow past that must now be eliminated.
Thus,

the attempt to apply Brown to higher education

raised doubts about whether the Supreme Court's decision was
based on an adequate understanding of the problem of unequal
educational opportunity in the first place. Furthermore, the
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fact that efforts to extend Green's "affirmative duty" to
desegregate in higher education occurred in the midst of an
increasingly conservative political and legal climate seemed
to indicate that the old legal realists had been right all
along - the courts indeed were the wrong place to attempt an
effort at massive social reform. However, the journey from
Brown and Fordice does more than merely confirm the doubts of
the

legal

realists about efficacy of the courts.

Because

desegregation in higher education cannot avoid the issue of
state-supported black universities,
Questioning the relevance

of Brown

policy question is another way of
Creed provides an adequate

is Brown even relevant?
to solving this major
asking if the American

analytical

lens to remedy the

problems associated with race. As noted earlier,

Brown has

become an American cultural icon precisely because it can be
readily harmonized with the nation's traditional understan
dings of liberty, equality, and individualism.
However, key aspects of America's historical development
raise serious questions about the efficacy of the American
Creed to deal with problems associated with race. The next
section discusses these matters in greater detail.
The Limitations of the American Creed to the Black Experience
As noted in Chapter One, the American Creed, by proclai
ming the "self-evident truth" of the fundamental equality of
all

men,

unites African Americans

and other historically

"outgroups" into the American fold in a manner that is truly
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extraordinary (Myrdal, 194 4, 13). The beauty of the American
Creed for African Americans

is that

it unites

Protestant

evangelical piety, Enlightenment rationalism, and natural law
into a cohesive worldview. They were not forced to resolve
any of the tensions between these frameworks; hence, blacks
never needed to "import" a theory of revolution from abroad
(such

as

Marxism)

to

justify

their

protest movements;

a

ready-made rationale was already available.
However, Tocqueville also noted that Americans have the
luxury of living in a democratic society "without having to
endure a democratic revolution"
mind

the

revolutions

in

Europe,

([1835]:
in

1988),

particular,

he had in
the

most

recent one in his native France. The Americans did not have
to rebuild a new society on the ashes of an old one. The
image of America as a redemptive force in the world and the
sense that it was the carrying out of modernity's rejection
of tradition in favor of reason as the basis for politics was
so taken for granted that it was not hard to

imagine why

Jefferson could declare certain "truths" to be self-evident.
Unlike Locke, Jefferson had no one comparable to a Filmer as
an opponent; there simply was not an entrenched aristocracy
in America which had to be demolished. Neither was there an
ancient social order which counterrevolutionaries could

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

325

nostalgically point to in the event that America's democratic
experiment encountered a serious crisis.96
Agreeing with Tocqueville's observation,

Hartz asked,

"Can a people that is born equal ever understand peoples
elsewhere that have become so? Can it ever lead them?. . . .
Can it understand itself"

(1955,

66, 3 09)? Hartz' question

cuts to the core of the dilemma which Brown presents because
it challenges the presupposition that the American Creed has
universal applicability.

In addition,

it must be recalled

that Brown occurred in a political climate when the United
States was evangelistically spreading the gospel of demo
cratic capitalism as if its institutions could be applied
universally all over the world. If America's social norms are
not as "self-evident" as the Creed implies, then not only may
it not necessarily inhere within it universal lessons for the
world, but it may have difficulty addressing some of Ameri
ca's own problems. Therefore, to the extent that the Brown
decision was partly motivated as an "object lesson" for the

96Hartz argues that the lack of an "old regime" in
America was precisely the intellectual problem that Southern
apologists for slavery from 183 0 onward had, a problem that
they never solved. Lacking a true American feudalism, some
Southern aristocrats turned to Europe as a model - which,
from the standpoint of the dogmatism of the American Creed,
was a fruitless exercise. Trying to defend slavery as a
"right to property" while pointing to European feu-dalism
could not work because America theoretically personified what
Europe was not - particularly freedom. The fact that the
arguments of the Southern apologists have largely been
forgotten, Hartz concludes, is a powerful testament to the
tyrannical hold that the liberal tradition has on the
American mind (1955, 145-200).
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rest of the world,

it may be an inadequate

instrument to

address the problem of unequal educational opportunities for
African Americans (depending on how it

is interpreted and

implemented). More fundamentally, Hartz implied that it is
America's

absolute

moral

inheres

within

experience

certainty
it

that

universal

its

historical

lessons

for

the

nations of the world that is precisely the problem.
While

this

dissertation

has

argued

throughout

that

African Americans subscribe to the same American Creed that
white Americans do,
different

historical

both groups have been conditioned by
experiences.

These

experiences

have

produced distinct differences in cultural perspective between
whites and blacks. Thus, the belief that the Creed is "selfevident" poses three specific problems which have handicapped
the effort to implement desegregation which will be explored
in the remainder of this chapter:
(1)

America's historical experience has given rise to

the view that "the government that governs best is the one
which governs least." However, African Americans associate
their greatest political,
histo-rical

periods

social,

characterized

and economic gains with
by

significantly

more

interventionist government than traditional understandings of
the American Creed idealize. These differences in historical
perspective often cause whites and blacks to have starkly
different views about the proper role of government.
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(2)

The

fact

that

the

American

Creed

idealizes

the

limited state (without adequately justifying its legitimate
role)

particularly weakens the courts, which is inherently

the weakest

branch of

government.

Courts must ultimately

depend on the cooperation of the other branches of government
as

well

as

the willingness

of

the

populace

in

order

to

implement its decisions.

They have little power to enforce

decisions on their own,

particularly politically unpopular

ones

(such as school desegregation) . Consequently,

because

African Americans have concentrated a disproportionate amount
of their energies trying to achieve desegregation through the
courts, the institutional weaknesses of the judicial branch
become especially problemmatic.
(3) Liberals based their support for integration in the
1940's

and

1950's on the reputed

"objective"

and

"value-

neutral" pillars of law and science, two of the major deri
vatives of the Creed.

By assuming the universality of the

American Creed, the liberal consensus of the late 1940's and
1950's failed to consider if its so-called "value-neutral"
consensus
racist)

about race was rooted

assumptions.

Viewed

in

in Eurocentric
this

light,

it

(and even
begs

the

question of whether the Supreme Court in Brown adequately
considered

the

distinctive

nature

of

African

American

political culture when it made its decision.
The next section focuses on the historical origins of
America's

limited

view

of

the

state

and

the

formidable
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obstacles that it poses for implementing what are perceived
as "big government" solutions (such as desegregation).
The American Creed and the Role of the State
For the purposes of this study, what is especially note
worthy about the American Revolution is its uniqueness, not
its universality. What distinguished America from Europe was
its lack of a feudal past, and this fact profoundly shaped
the nature of its revolution and political culture

(Hartz,

1955; Huntington, 1968). The distinction betweem America and
Europe

implies

that certain aspects of

the American

case

either cannot be applied to other contexts, or if it can, it
cannot be applied in the exact same manner. Moreover, it also
means that the details of America's historical development do
not necessarily inhere within them a blueprint for solving
contemporary domestic issues, such as the problems that the
modern civil rights movement confronted the nation with in
the 1950's (some of which remain largely unsolved). In this
section,

it will be argued that America's lack of a feudal

past has caused Americans to ascribe a significantly more
limited role for the state than in other countries - and this
predisposition directly affects racial politics in America.
Without a feudal order to destroy, the American was free
to define his revolution as a struggle to limit government.
Indeed, the American republic premised itself upon a profound
distrust of government. The separation of powers between the
executive,

legislative, and judicial branches and the divi
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sion of sovereignty between the central government and the
states stood out as a monument to the Founders' distrust of
centralized authority. At the heart of the colonists' dispute
with Britain was their rejection of Parliament's claim to
absolute sovereignty, particularly in the area of taxation.
British policies during the 1760's and 1770's were viewed by
their subjects as "usurpations" of the powers traditionally
exercised by their local assemblies (Hartz, 1955; Huntington,
1968; Peterson, 1976).
By contrast, the European liberal faced the dual problem
of checking the arbitrary use of power by government while
simultaneously

preserving

democratic

reforms

against

any

potential restoration of the old regime by the aristocratic
classes. The American only needed to limit power; the Euro
pean liberal had to both limit power and keep it at the same
time. Thus, they could not challenge the absolute monarchies
of their day without dreaming of centralizing power them
selves

(Tocqueville,

1988; Hartz,

1955).

European liberals

talked about "enlightened despots" who would "reorder society
along rational lines" (Hartz, 1955, 44), language which many
Americans

would

have

found to

be

"dishonest

doubletalk."

While Americans praised Montesquieu's scheme of checks and
balances because it divided sovereignty,

European liberals

blasted him for precisely that reason - that is, it shattered
the very unity of power upon which liberals had placed their
hope.
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Therefore,
caused Americans

the absence of a preexisting feudal order
and Europeans to define the role of the

state in a liberal society very differently:
There are two sides to the Lockian argument: a
defense of the state that is implicit, and a limitation
on the state that is explicit. The first is found in
in Locke's basic social norm, the concept of free indi
viduals in a state of nature. This idea untangled men
from the myriad associations of class, church, guild,
and place, in terms of which feudal society defined
their lives; and by doing so, it automatically gave the
state a much higher rank in relation to them than ever
before. The state became the only association that might
legitimately coerce them at all. . . .When Locke came to
America, however, a change appeared. Because the basic
feudal oppressions of Europe had not taken root, the
fundamental social norm of Locke ceased in large part
to look like a norm and began, of all things, to look
like a sober description of fact. When the Americans
moved from that concept to the contractual idea of
organizing the state, they were not conscious of doing
anything to fortify the state, but were conscious only
that they were about to limit it. One side of Locke
became virtually all of him [author's emphasis] (Hartz,
1955, 60).
In other words, the European liberal needed to expli
citly defend the legitimacy of the state's role in society
while simultaneously limiting its role in certain areas in
order

to

make his

case

against

absolute

monarchies.

The

American version of Lockianism, by contrast, has only been
concerned with limiting the state. The American revolutionary
never bothered to defend the legitimacy of the state because
he considered it a necessary evil that must be limited. The
Founders'

preoccupation with designing a political system

which renders swift political change virtually impossible was
a testament to their desire to weaken government. Moreover,
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this framework could not have worked in a society where there
existed fundamental disagreement on the notion of limited
government.
Having defined their revolution in this manner, slogans
such as "less government," "states' rights," and "laissezfaire

economics"

have

become,

for

some

Americans,

the

National Holy Writ. However, rather than seeing this view of
the state as the product of the political struggles of the
17 60's and 1770's, the American view of the limited state is
defined in universal, transcendent terms. The Creed is lifted
out of its political and historical context and becomes one
of the "laws of nature and the laws of God."
This aspect of the American Creed creates significant
political

obstacles

for the majority of African American

political leaders, who tend to favor more activist government
intervention on issues pertaining to civil rights.

Blacks

have consistently given the Democratic party, which tends to
favor more
rights,

activist

government

than Republicans

on civil

approximately 90 percent of their vote since 1964

(Cross, 1987; Carmines and Stinson, 1989; Edsall and Edsall,
1991) . When conservatives argue against affirmative action,
minority set-asides, busing to achieve desegregation, court
orders reguiring school districts to equalize funding between
rich and poor schools, and the requirement that states make
massive investments in historically underfunded black univer
sities, they appeal to the nation's ancient distrust of the
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federal government. African Americans and liberal whites, on
the other hand, interpret the hard-fought struggles to secure
the civil rights victories of the 1950's and 1960's as evi
dence that the rights of minorities cannot be left to the
states and the private market. Hence, African Americans, firm
believers in the American Creed, find themselves appealing to
the very federal government that the Creed says cannot be
trusted.
However,

the problem for African Americans

is deeper

than merely the fact that they tend to be politically more
left-of-center than the majority of the nation's population.
Given America's predisposition toward defining the whole of
Locke as limiting the state (without defending its legitimate
role), political gains by African Americans that are based on
expansions of federal power rest on an unstable foundation.
This is because the liberal rationale for "activist govern
ment"

has been based on a pragmatic response

to specific

shortcomings of laissez-faire capitalism and the doctrine of
"states' rights," rather than on a philosophical defense of
the state. Hence, the fundamental problem with Bro wn . and by
extension, for the civil rights movement, is that it appealed
to the American Creed for intellectual and moral support in
order

to

expand

the

role

of

the

federal

protecting the rights of blacks; however,

government

in

the civil rights

community has largely failed to understand that the Creed
itself is a theory of limited government. It must be recalled
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that many of the civil rights victories of the 1950's and the
1960's represent the redefinition of New Deal liberalism to
encompass African American concerns

(Carmines and Stinson,

1989; Edsall and Edsall, 1991). Consequently, it also follows
that the

collapse of the traditional Democratic New Deal

coalition means that policies predicated on the civil rights
consensus of the mid-19 60's might have trouble sustaining
themselves as the American political pendulum swings back to
its more natural position. Viewed in this light, the conser
vative assault on affirmative action is not simply an example
of "white backlash" as many liberals insist

(Curry,

but stands as a testament to the failure of the

1996),
left to

ground its agenda in a philosophical defense of the state.
Liberals have neglected to defend the

state for one

basic reason: they are Americans. As the intellectual hiers
of Jefferson, Americans have a tendency to view the American
Revolution not as an event, but as a "process" that had "only
fairly begun in 1776, nor had it ended in 1783"

(Peterson,

1976, 27). Consequently, the principles of the American
Revolution

in

need

of

constant

reinterpretation

by

each

succeeding generation. This dynamic dimension of the Ameri
can Creed allows politicians, activists, and social reformers
of various ideological stripes to rationalize their agendas
as consistent with either the "true intent"

or a "modern

construction" of the American Dream or both. Brown consti
tuted this

very type of

reinterpretation;

in effect,
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Court said that it did not matter what the framers intended
the Fourteenth Amendment to mean in 1868. What mattered was
what the

Court

thought

in

1954.

As

a

consequence,

civil

rights liberals portrayed themselves as carriers of the "spi
rit" of the American Revolution
Zaller,
1950's

(Cahn,

1955; McCloskey and

1984). In addition, the Cold War atmosphere of the
encouraged

Americans

to

think

that

they,

not

the

Soviets, were "the most revolutionary society in the world"
(Hartz, 1955, 305-306). Thus, the nation's historic spirit of
social experimentation embodied in the American Creed com
bined

with

the

politics

of

the

times

to

"sanctify"

the

mission of implementing the Brown decision and discouraged a
thorough critique of the American view of the state and its
relationship to society.
Moreover, when American liberals (like their conserva
tive counterparts) start from the premise that their system
is already the best in the world, why would they be expected
to attack one of the "sacred cows" of American politics - the
limited view of the state? When one conceives of his country
as the example the world should follow, even the most zealous
of reformers (regardless of whether they are from the left or
the right), would not propose a fundamental restructuring of
the American house.

Instead, they would rather remodel it,

add an extra room or put on a "fresh coat of paint" on it.
The New Deal liberal has been a reformist, not a revolutio
nary. With that thought in mind, the New Deal liberal objects
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to "laissez-faire economics" because the stock market crash
of 192 9 reveals the excesses of unregulated capitalism, not
because

it

is a distortion

of the

Lockian theory

of the

state. In America, the greatest expansions in federal power
have been in response to crises:

the Civil War,

the Great

Depression, World War II, and the civil rights movement. On
one score, these crises reveal that the pragmatic nature of
the American Creed gives it a unique advantage over European
ideological systems; that is, it allows the American Creed to
"reinvent itself" to respond to changed circumstances that
those trapped in more rigid ideological categories cannot
possibly do.-97
However, when the crises begin to fade from the nation's
collective memory, policies which were legitimized by those
circumstances can sometimes fall out of favor as the public
^Hartz argues that the New Deal constitutes a shining
example of American pragmatism and the ability of the Creed
to reinvent itself conveniently to deal with political and
economic crises. He points out that the New Deal shows the
dogmatism of America's devotion to Locke. Not only was
Roosevelt able to coopt much of the agenda of the socialists
and the communists, he was able to do it without acknowled
ging the leftists' critique of his program at all. Had
Roosevelt been in Europe, he could not brought about an
unprecedented increase in the size of the federal bureaucracy
without qualifying himself. For example, Roosevelt would have
had to say that though the New Deal was increasing the size
of the state, he still believed in the sanctity of private
property and opposed government collectivization of major
industries. True enough, many of his conservative opponents
branded his proposals as "socialist" and "un-American," but
Roosevelt was hardly a spokesperson for the socialist themes
of "class solidarity." Indeed, his demonization by conser
vatives and the weakness of the radical left made Roosevelt's
New Deal program "the only game in town" for the practical
liberal (1955, 259-283).
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shifts its attention to other matters. This fact partially
explains

Northern

lack

of

political

will

to

vigorously

intervene in the South on behalf of civil rights during the
1880's

and

1890's,

which

helped

to

create

the

judicial-

political climate for Plessv (Kluger, 1975; Wilkinson, 1979;
Cruse, 1986; Lofgren, 1987; Franklin and Moss, 1987; Kousser,
1990; Orfield, 1996). But the shift in public opinion points
to the more basic problem: the reforms enacted during the
Reconstruction debates presumed that the freed slaves could
be

fully

incorporated

as

citizens

without

fundamentally

redefining the role of the American state.
African

Americans,

the

one

ethnic

group

with

the

greatest potential to pose a revolutionary threat to American
democracy (as well as the greatest need to think beyond the
Creed's view of the state) have historically been among the
greatest apostles of the American version of Lockianism. Even
when African American thinkers have bitterly protested the
treatment

of their people in America,

they have

found it

difficult to think beyond the American frame of reference;
indeed,

it has been the inability,

in the main,

of African

American intellectuals to think beyond the American perspec
tive that is for Cruse "the crisis of the Negro intellectual"
(1984) . Moreover, African Americans have been the most faith
ful members of the New Deal liberal constituency (T. Cross,
1987; Carmines and Stinson, 1989; Edsall and Edsall, 1991;
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Smith, 1996); hence, their political strategies suffer from
the same liabilities that have afflicted American liberals
more generally.
Fundamentally, the only grievance that the majority of
black Americans have against America is racism; thus, rather
than challenging the relationship the Creed expouses between
the state and society, African Americans leaders have princi
pally concerned themselves with the practical consequences of
racial discrimination against their people. Those few black
leaders who have espoused revolutionary theories have been no
more successful than white radicals at attracting a large
following to their cause because the black masses have been
largely uninterested in programs calling for the revolutio
nary restructuring of American society; rather, they simply
want what they believe is their "fair share" of the American
Dream of economic and social mobility

(Cruse,

1984; Hochs-

child, 1995; R. Smith, 1996).
In summary, the facts of America's historical develop
ment have given rise to a limited view of the state that is
uniguely American. The uniqueness of the American experience
raises doubts about the ability of America's past to instruct
not only other nations of the world - which is precisely what
America's Cold War ideology was attempting to do - but her
self. The Lockian settlement, because of its predisposition
toward viewing the state as a "necessary evil" rather than a
"positive good,"

only illustrates the critical need for a
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philosophical defense of the state by liberals. However, this
has been precisely what liberals have failed to do. Because
black and white liberals adhere to the faith of the same
American Creed as their political

adversaries,

they have

largely failed to see the need for a fundamental critique of
the American version of Lockianism. Since America's ascent to
the apex of world power has "validated" American Lockianism,
strategies favored by the left have the highest burden of
proof. Yet, as the largely pragmatic justification for Brown
illustrates, the political groups in America with the grea
test need for political philosophy seem to be the very ones
least interested in it.
The failure of African Americans and their white liberal
allies to ground Brown in a philosophical defense of the role
of the state draws attention to the efficacy of one of the
principal

tactics

employed

by

the

left:

the

reliance

by

liberals on the courts and the tools of social science to
affect broad social change. Brown. as noted earlier,

is an

example of the American tendency to appeal to law and science
- which are purportedly "value-free" and "objective" - as a
substitute

for political philosophy.

But

if the American

Creed itself is not universal (but is, in fact, the product
of a particular historical experience), then it raises the
question of whether two of the concrete ways the Creed mani
fests itself

(America's reverence for law and science)

are

also problemmatic. That is the subject of the next section.
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Brown and the Relationship Between Science, Law, and Culture
Since the American Creed itself has legitimized the view
that the state's role should be limited, then it follows that
this orthodoxy weakens the power of the courts, which must
depend on the other branches of government to enforce its
decisions. Rosenberg (1991) has shown that the courts are an
especially

blunt

instrument

with

which

to

effect

social

change. Courts, he explained, generally lack effective tools
(whether they include positive inducements to encourage com
pliance or punitive measures to punish parties who refuse to
cooperate) to force compliance in the absence of the willing
ness of the parties to honor judicial decrees. Because courts
depend on the other branches of government for enforcement,
they do not propose radical social reforms very often; hence,
the Supreme Court is an inherently conservative institution.
Also, the judicial system affords the opportunity for consi
derable

delay

of

social

reform

through

endless

motions,

appeals, motions, and other measures (18). Using desegrega
tion

in education,

studies,

abortion,

and environmentalism as case

Rosenberg concludes that the courts

are actually

better at mobilizing those opposed to major social reforms
than they are at promoting social reform.98
98In his examination of the Brown decision, Rosenberg
found that the period between 1954 and 1964 - when the
Supreme Court was the principal arm of the federal government
that was squarely on the side of desegregation - little
actual integration occurred. He attributed the rapid progress
of desegregation in the South after 1964 to massive infusions
of federal aid to education, the threat of federal aid cut-
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Not only does Rosenberg's account raise serious ques
tions about Brown's significance (as popularized by the media
and legal scholars), but it calls into question the long-term
efficacy of relying on legal strategies to expand the rights
of

African

Americans

since

Brown.

The

basic

difference

between the Black Mississippians' Council for Higher Educa
tion and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund during the 1970's was
on the role of black colleges;

both organizations believe

that the courts offer a promising avenue for pursuing their
agendas. While many African American activists regretted that
the Court refused to order the state of Mississippi to make
dramatic improvements at the state's black universities, the
real

question

is whether

a court

decision more to

their

liking, in and of itself, would have actually mattered. As

offs to school districts that refused to desegregate, and
Southern business interests who saw integrated schools as a
means of attracting out-of-state industries to their communi
ties. These changes, Rosenberg reasoned, should be attributed
to the convergence of the coercive power of the legislative
and executive branches of the federal government and Southern
business interests (in response to the direct action cam
paigns in the South by blacks). The courts, he concluded,
were largely ineffective at overcoming the deep-seated racial
prejudices that were at the heart of school segregation. In
fact, he pointed out that Brown was more effective at mobi
lizing Southern opposition than it was at bringing about
positive change. Rosenberg added that there is little evi
dence to support the commonly held belief that the Brown
decision served as an inspiration for black civil rights
workers; he countered that the Montgomery bus boycott, the
charismatic leadership of Martin Luther King, the sit-ins,
the demonstrations, and the Freedom Rides exerted a far
greater influence on the decisions of African Americans to
participate in the movement than the symbolism of Brown.
(131-142).
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the history

of Brown has made

abundantly clear,

judicial

decision and judicial implementation are two fundamentally
different things.
Tocqueville

(1988)

noted the tendency in America for

political problems to be transformed into legal ones. How
ever, there is evidence that the "legalization" of political
problems carries with it its own set of difficulties. Horwitz (1979) has argued persuasively that Brown. by judicializing the problem of race relations, has also distorted the
nature of the dilemma and frustrated efforts toward finding
equitable remedies.

First of all,

he points out that the

American legal system is "overwhelmingly geared to a concep
tion of redressing individual grievances, not of vindicating
group rights or generalized patterns of injustice"

(610).

This perspective, flowing from the atomistic individualism of
Locke, strips minority plaintiffs of their group identity. As
a result, they have little basis with which to raise claims
that have resulted from injustices that society has inflicted
on their ancestors. Viewed from this angle, the decision in
Bakke makes perfect sense. Thus, it was not surprising that
the

state of Mississippi

claiming

"group

required

to

rights"

financially

accused the Avers plaintiffs
for advocating that
and

the

programmatically

of

state be

compenstate

black universities for its unconstitutional actions in the
past. The plaintiffs had no choice but to try to demonstrate
that their claims were not inconsistent with a traditional
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American conception of individual rights. Constrained by the
premises of American constitutionalism, the Avers plaintiffs
were forced to portray black Mississippians as an abstract
collection of individuals,

divorced from their context of

historical oppression, but who nevertheless have constitu
tional

grievances

against

the

radical distinction between

state.

By

individual

insisting

on

a

identity and group

identity (and extending constitutional sanction to the former
and not the latter), the liberal tradition often has immense
difficulty conceptualizing the social consequences of racial
discrimination.
Secondly, Williams (1991) contends that the ability of
African Americans to combat racial discrimination through the
courts is hampered by another basic tenet of Anglo-American
jurisprudence: its search for, and the assumption that there
exist "transcendent,

acontextual,

universal truths or pure

procedures" (8) . This perspective helps explain the American
reverence for "the rule of law"

(Myrdal, 1944) . This world

view is problemmatic, Williams argues, because of it tends
"to disparage anything that
historical),

or

nonuniversal

is nontranscendent
(specific)

'literary,''personal,' or just Not True"

as

(temporal,

'emotional,'

(9). Coupled with

the orientation of courts to conceptualize rights only in
individualistic terms, the penchant of courts to search for
universalistic

principles

implies

that

judges

need

not

necessarily take the special history of African Americans
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into account. Thus, Justice Powell could write the majority
opinion

in

Bakke

as

special

historical

if

the

meaning

Fourteenth

for

Amendment

African

Americans.

had

no

Claims

rooted in history have a more difficult burden of proof in
the courts.

Therefore,

this bias represents a significant

challenge for the Avers plaintiffs because they have based
their case for enhancements of black universities largely on
the state of Mississippi's past conduct.
Third, courts, by nature, tend to limit the nature and
scope of conflicts based on fundamental disagreements over
principle

(Horwitz,

1979,

610).

In some

cases where

such

basic disagreement exist, courts may even struggle to define
the problem - such as the problems that federal courts have
had

in

defining

desegregation

as

well

as

specifying

the

remedial measures necessary to eradicate the remnants of de
jure discrimination. The tendency of courts to constrict the
nature

of

further

controversial

political

and

legal questions

aggravated by the proclivity of

judges

to

is

decide

issues on the narrowest possible grounds for decisionmaking
(Ibid). In Fordice. the Supreme Court, while finding Missis
sippi's policies governing higher education constitutionally
suspect, avoided one of the most contentious issues - whether
the state was constitutionally required to make substantial
improvements at the black universities. Because courts often
decide deeply divisive issues based on narrow principles,
this

not

only prolongs

legal

controversies

for years;
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creates the paradoxical situation where parties can "win" on
principle

but

"lose"

in reality

if

the

court ultimately

rejects the remedies that the parties favor. Thus,

it took

seventeen years for the Avers plaintiffs to win a judgment by
the nation's highest court against the state; however, the
goal which motivated the suit in the first place - the desire
to enhance Mississippi's black universities as black univer
sities - remains incomplete. Fordice illustrates how parties
involved in a lawsuit can "win" and "lose" at the same time
because of the way judges makes decisions.
Brown and its progeny points to a fourth problem that
the

legalization

of racial

problems

presents:

by

concen

trating on public schools and state universities, the legal
battles over desegregation have discouraged a more systemic
approach
public

to

educational

schools

segregated

since

housing

policymaking.
Brown

patterns

is

which may

be

related

to

highly

(Horwitz,

Denton, 1993; Armor, 1995; Orfield,

Segregation

in the

correlated
1979;

Massey

with
and

1996; Patterson, 1997),

job discrimination.

By

defining

desegregation as principally a legal problem, the fact that
African Americans disproportionately are more likely to have
inferior educational opportunities than whites is not seen as
one of the consequences of social and economic inequality
more broadly.

Educational problems are confused with legal

ones, problems which ultimately have political and economic
origins

(Preer, 1982; Armor, 1995).
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Nonetheless,
sities

are

because public schools and state univer

"public,"

judicial

scrutiny

is

seen

as

more

legitimate; whereas, housing and job discrimination involves
areas considered "private" and best left to the free choices
of individuals

(Horwitz,

1979,

612). This "public-private"

distinction discourages courts from taking a more systemic
view of the problem of unequal educational opportunities.
Instead, courts focus on those institutions for which they
can more readily exercise judicial control - in this case,
public

schools

and

state universities.

Brown presents

no

basic challenge America's traditional attachment to capita
lism and the belief that government should intervene in the
marketplace as little as possible. Since American capitalist
ideology

accepts

inequality as not only

inevitable

necessary incentive for industry and hard work,

but a

courts are

reluctant to be involved in directly attacking social and
economic inequality. Thus, by concentrating on public schools
and state universities,

courts merely address the symptoms

and not the sources of the inequalities that Brown was osten
sibly meant to remedy.
The irony of Brown, then, is that it targets the public
schools, "the weakest and most vulnerable of American insti
tutions"

(Horwitz,

1979,

612) with the weakest branch

(the

judiciary) of an American state which is also weak (because
of the American Creed, the fragmenation of American political
institutions,

and

federalism). As a result

of

Brown,
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public schools and the state universities have been called
upon to shoulder the greatest burden for solving the problem
of racial injustice.
This is a hope which the public schools and the state
universities never had a possibility of fulfilling. Brown not
only embodied the historic faith in education that was shared
by black and white Americans, but occurred in an age where
the post-World War II economic boom had generated the grea
test expansion in educational opportunities in the nation's
history.

Communities

across

the

nation were

building

new

schools and improving existing ones to meet demand. The G.I.
bill had made a college education accessible to many working
class Americans for the first time. Even the international
climate

served to

strengthen public

education;

when,

the

Soviets launched Sputnik, Americans panicked at the thought
that the Soviet Union might have technological superiority
over the United States (K. Alexander and M. Alexander, 1985;
Cremin, 1989; Patterson, 1997).
However, Arendt (1958) observed that while faith in the
power of education generally characterized Western democra
cies,

no nation more literally believed in the culturally

redemptive power of education than the United States.

She

warned that the Brown decision reflected an American over
confidence in the power of education or "enlightenment" to
solve difficult social problems such as racism. The faith in
"enlightenment" manifests itself in the Court's reliance on

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

347

arguments rooted in social science reasoning for its ruling
in Brown. Embodied in the Court's rationale is the Enlighten
ment's confidence that the vices of human civilization (such
as

racism)

must

eventually

crumble

under

the

weight

of

advances in scientific knowledge.
Arendt predicts that desegregation as a solution to the
race problem could never work, no matter how well intended.
Forcing black and white children to attend the same schools,
she continued,

could not solve the race problem because the

children would have to grow up

in a world with the very

adults who could not solve the problem in the first place.
Arendt's criticism directly contradicts the traditional view
of

the

efficacy

of

public

education

-

most

explicitly

expoused by Dewey, and the use of the courts to bring about
the desired end. Cruse (198 6) agrees: "As an institution, a
public school is created by and reflects the dominant values
of the surrounding adult society, not the other way around"
(73) .
Nevertheless, the view that integration has an inherent
"social enlightenment benefit" has profoundly influenced the
debate over desegregation. Similar arguments are relied upon
to justify affirmative action in the workplace and at state
universities." Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall expressed
"Proponents insist that "diversity" has an inherent
educational and economic benefit. However, these arguments
"do not fly" with many Americans because the practical and
scientific orientation of the American Creed gives greater
legitimacy to positions which can be easily quantified or
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this viewpoint in his dissent in Milliken when he wrote, ".
. . . unless our children begin to learn together, there is
little hope that our people will ever learn to live together"
(418 U.S. 717, 783 J. Marshall, dissenting). Arendt suggests
that the American faith in the power of education, which is
clearly reflected in Brown. is tragically misplaced. Reitman
(1992)

echoes

Arendt's

assessment

of

American

culture,

arguing that America suffers from an "educational messiah
complex" - the belief that every social problem, ranging from
racism, to environmental degradation, to teenage promiscuity,
to AIDS - can be solved by the schools.100
explained in "cost-benefit" terms.
It is difficult to
"quantify" the educational benefits of diversity when African
Americans score significantly below whites and Asians on
standardized tests. Government policies which appear to favor
individuals or groups seen as "less qualified," according to
the American Creed, come to be seen as abuses of state power.
However, it usually does not occur to many Americans that the
standards themselves which are used to decide who is "quali
fied" may actually be culturally biased (Gardner, 1993;
D'Souza, 1995; Delpit, 1995).
100But Reitman carries his analysis even further. He
concludes that the American cultural tendency to "dump
problems on the schools" not only has the effect of poli
ticizing education - but rather, it is actually a form of
social avoidance whereby one generation "passes the buck" for
dealing with difficult political issues to its children. Not
only do Americans fail to tackle these issues, Reitman
continues, but they convince themselves that by placing everincreasing demands on the schools that they are in reality
handling their problems. Thus, engaging in bruising battles
over educational reform, sex education, after school pro
grams, censorship of books, and the content of the curriculum
substitute for the irreplacable activity of citizens and
other social institutions in confronting pressing issues.
Moreover, the schools offer a convenient "scapegoat" for
nearly every social problem. For example, the Education
Department's "Nation at Risk" report on the status of public
education in 1983 blamed the schools for the fact that the
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The

tendency

to

divorce

the

problem

of

educational

inequality from its social and economic context affects not
only federal judges. For example, many liberals who favor the
continuation of mandatory busing to achieve desegregation
emphasize its purported social and educational benefits.101
Advocates of busing maintain that the problem with segregated
schools is one of poverty and not race (Orfield, 1996). But
if the root of the problem

is poverty,

then it does not

necessarily follow that the solution is a one-hour ride on a
school bus to an entirely different neighborhood. It might
actually be more reasonable to

argue that remedies which

attack the underlying

inequalities

economic

of

inner-city

United States appeared to be losing its economic supremacy to
Germany and Japan. However, while the 1990's have witnessed
an economic expansion in the United States (while other
Western economies have not performed nearly as well) it is
interesting that public education gets none of the credit for
the good economy. Americans seem to have a love-hate rela
tionship with the public schools; on one hand, they are
supposed to save us and conversely, they are the source of
all of our problems.
101Liberals such as Gary Orfield (1996) maintain that
mandatory busing that involve the more affluent suburban
districts should be continued (and expanded in some areas).
Busing is needed not because black or Latino-majority schools
are inferior not because of their racial composition; rather,
integration exposes minority students to a superior "oppor
tunity structure." That is, desegregated schools tend to have
better resources, a stronger curriculum, and produce gra
duates who are more likely to go to college. Segregated
schools are "inherently unequal" because race is highly
correlated with poverty. Similar arguments are advanced to
discourage blacks from enrolling in black universities:
predominately white universities have better facilities,
superior resources, a stronger curriculum, and graduates of
these institutions are more likely to get a job or admitted
to graduate or professional school.
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neighborhoods vis-a-vis the suburbs may be more fruitful than
concentrating on the schools alone. As recent judicial trends
have placed busing on an increasingly slippery foundation,
many African Americans have become more vocal in insisting
that their neighborhood schools should be strengthened and
enhanced, even if they are segregated (Steele, 1993; Shujaa,
1996). However, many of the remedies proposed (such as Afrocentric curricula, all-black male schools, increased funding
for inner-city schools) are no more systemic than the busing
remedies that they would like to replace. Thus, the tendency
to overemphasize the virtue of the public school, histori
cally an American problem,

has been further aggravated by

Brown.
When the NAACP rejected DuBois' argument that some forms
of segregation are not only not harmful,

but may even be

necessary for African American advancement, the organization
was also rejecting a systemic approach to the problem of
racial inequality. DuBois felt that what African Americans
really

needed

were

independent

bases

of

political

and

economic power. However, the dispute with DuBois seved only
to harden the NAACP's belief in the rightness of the legal
approach. However, the danger of the legal approach is that
it provides a tempting alternative to the democratic process.
Thayer

(quoted

in

Rosenberg,

1991,

12)

warned

long

ago

against the "tendency of the common and easy resort" to the
courts, particularly to invalidate acts of the democratically
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accountable branches would "dwarf the political capacity of
the people"

(Ibid, 12). More recently, McCann, in studying

litigation-prone activists has found that the "legal rights
approach to expanding democracy has significantly narrowed
their

conception

Rosenberg,

1991,

of

political

action

itself"

(quoted

in

12). The legal approach, when linked with

New Deal liberalism,

further institutionalized the protest

tradition in black America. Consequently, African Americans,
by appealing to the federal government (and particularly the
courts) are saying, implicitly, that the solutions to their
grievances

lie

outside

their

community.

Furthermore,

the

sense that white America has "wronged" black people implies
that

it

is

the

larger

society

that

needs

to

change.

In

choosing the legal approach, the NAACP unwittingly tilled the
soil for the "system-blame" mentality of the 19 60's, much of
which is still present today

(0. Patterson, 1997).

By the mid-1930's, DuBois believed that it was humili
ating for blacks to continue to try to force themselves into
institutions where they were not wanted. DuBois' detractors
portrayed him as a bitter old man who had become disillu
sioned.

Still

branded as

fighting

the

last

war,

DuBois'

views

"Washingtonism"102 and the worst sort of

were

"Uncle

102DuBois' call in the mid-1930's for black self
segregation evoked memories of Booker T. Washington's program
of economic uplift for blacks at the turn of the century.
Because Washington did not place the struggle for political
and social equality on the same plane as other black acti
vists (like DuBois) , he was accused of "selling out" the
black race. Washington's famous "Atlanta Exposition" speech
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Tomism" (Cruse, 1986; Moses, 1993) . The speed with which the
NAACP dispensed with DuBois revealed

its fidelity

to the

liberal tradition.
However, at the same time, the NAACP also rejected two
components of the American Creed with a long tradition in the
African American community - pragmatism and self-determina
tion.

DuBois'

call

for voluntary segregation implied that

African Americans could not afford to wait for "the hearts of
white men to change" before they developed their own strategy
for economic survival. The Great Depression, in DuBois' mind,
had made it crushingly apparent that African Americans had no
viable

strategy

of

economic

survival

in America.

As

the

history of African American churches and schools indicated,
the black self-help tradition could be traced back to the
antebellum period. In summary, it was not necessary to con
clude, as the NAACP's leadership did, that racial segregation
was inherently harmful.
However, DuBois represented a viewpoint which the NAACP
had rejected as heresy:
Moreover's

Hitler's

that race does and should matter.

atrocities and liberal

social science

opinion seemed to vindicate them: the belief that race makes
in 1895 was dubbed the "Atlanta Compromise" by his detrac
tors. Dissastifaction with Washington's program led DuBois
and others to found the Niagara Movement, and eventually the
NAACP. Thus, by 193 5, a generation of black civil rights
leaders had grown up with a derisive view of Booker T.
Washington. Consequently, when DuBois himself argued for
black self-segregation in the 1930's, he was accused of high
treason. In a sense, DuBois was "reaping what he had sown"
(Cruse, 1986).
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a difference was
opposed

to

inherently racist,

American

notions

of

irrational,

individual

ignorant,

equality,

and

ultimately dangerous. Anyone who thought that race did matter
was

no

better

than

a

Southern

racist

(Wilkinson,

1979;

D'Souza, 1995; Peller, 1997).
Thus, Brown created the very dilemma which DuBois prophesized: the belief among many African Americans that inte
gration,
itself

supposedly
inherently

a

strategy for their

racist.

Brown

assumed

liberation,
that

was

educational

equality would be achieved by a legal remedy. It apparently
had not occurred to many of the liberal lawyers and social
scientists who concluded that racially segregated schools
were inherently unequal that this conviction had any racial
connotations. Brown. as well as the Coleman report and other
studies afterwards, was based on a rational interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and was supported by value-neutral,
dispassionate social science, or so it was argued. Thus, by
defining

the

issue

in

"legal"

and

"sociological"

terms,

liberals did not see themselves acting as "racists." White
public schools and state universities were superior to black
ones on neutral, acultural grounds.
This view was premised, in part, on the mistaken notion
that the Constitution "usually provides clear, self-executing
commands"

(Horwitz, 1979, 603). But the very nature of con

stitutional provisions

and

laws

is that their meaning

is

subject to interpretation, debate, and reinterpretation. Most
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searches for a clear and unambigous "intent of the framers"
prove to be inconclusive,

especially when the focus is on

intentionally ambiguous terms such as "due process" or "equal
protection under the laws" (Ibid, 603) . Moreover, the process
of crafting laws and constitutional amendments, because it is
inherently a political one, requires compromises and conces
sions in order to be accomplished;
discover

the

"clear

intent

of

the

therefore,
framers"

attempts to
are

usually

futile. This fallacy encourages litigants to emphasize the
parts of the historical record that seem to strengthen their
case and minimize or explain way contradictory evidence. For
this reason,

the NAACP's lawyers focused on evidence that

seemed to imply that the framers envisioned the Fourteenth
Amendment would give Congress broad discretion to strike down
state

laws that

unequal caste.

treated

The

the

South's

ex-slaves

attorneys,

as

a

separate

and

on the other hand,

emphasized those parts of the record that could be construed
to mean that Congress could have never intended the Four
teenth Amendment to forbid states from establishing racially
segregated schools

(including the prejudices of members of

the 39th Congress).
Any system of judicial review ultimately involves judges
making choices among competing values. Moreover, the choices
made by judges are not necessarily "the last wrord;" rather,
their meaning and their validity are interpreted,

debated,

reinterpreted, or even rejected. The conservative and black
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nationalist critiques of desegregation are excellent examples
of this process at work. Therefore, it is not surprising that
Brown

is

a cultural

icon

that

sometimes means

radically

different things to different people. The basic fallacy of
the NAACP's reliance on the courts is that it overlooked the
fact that the judicial branch is, in the final analysis,
political

institution.

The

ideological

and policy

a

prefe

rences of federal judges can never be "neutral principles of
constitutional

law"

(Weschler,

1959);

instead,

they

are

inherently political with political consequences. Also, fede
ral judges are not immune from the political pressures which
affect

the

other

branches

of

government.

Therefore,

belief that the courts

represent a neutral

redress

is

of

grievances

a

myth.103 It

the

forum for the

was

the

Supreme

Court's narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in
103Smith (1996) recounts an incident which illustrates
that how this view manifested itself politically. Between
1969 and 1974, Presidents Nixon and Ford introduced several
resolutions designed to restrict the power of federal courts
to order mandatory busing as a means of achieving school
desegregation. Several bills and amendments were passed by
the House but were either defeated or significantly watered
down by the Senate. All of these measures were vigorously
opposed by the NAACP and other traditional civil rights
organizations. During the controversy, several members of the
Congressional Black Caucus proposed a compromise whereby, in
exchange for restrictions on court-imposed busing orders,
that Congress would substantially increase funding for urban
school districts with high minority populations. However, the
NAACP and other traditional civil rights leaders successfully
blocked these initiatives, arguing that such remedies should
not be pursued in Congress. Rather, blacks should rely on the
courts to protect their rights for fear that it would set a
precedent that
legitimized
the interference with
the
constitutional rights of African Americans by the so-called
"political branches" of government (168-169).
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The Slaughterhouse Cases which paved the road for the doc
trine of "separate but equal;" similarly, the same Supreme
Court, in Milliken v. Bradley made desegregation of Northern
metropolitan

school

achieve.

courts,

The

districts
far

from

practically
being

impossible

a neutral

to

tribunal,

represent temporay political majorities that are subject to
change.
Moreover, this perspective did not account for the fact
that the social science paradigms which they relied on for
their

"unbiased"

conclusions

about black culture and the

white South were themselves Eurocentric and culturally biased
(Blassingame, 1972; Wilkinson,

1979; Preer, 1989; W. Cross,

1991; Peller, 1997). Even worse, Brown was premised on "bad
science."

William Cross (1991), in a devastating critique,

showed that Kenneth Clark committed serious methodological
errors.104 More recent scholarship has found little evidence
that African

Americans

have

more

psychologically

damaged

personalities than whites; in fact, African Americans often
score higher than whites on measures of personal self-esteem

104Three fundamental errors the Clarks (as well as other
social
scientists
made
during
similiar
studies)
are
identified by Cross. First, the subjects in the studies are
small children (ranging from ages three to seven), yet
conclusions are drawn about the psychological health of
African American adults. Second, although only one attitude
was measured (racial preference), conclusions are drawn about
the personalities of the subject, as if both racial prefe
rence and personality development had been measured. Third,
anecdotal evidence from the children's behavior and speech
was interpreted as "proof" of "mental health," or more
precisely, "psychological damage" (Cross, 1991, 10).
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(Armor, 1995; 0. Patterson, 1997). Brown argued that racial
segregation was wrong partly because it made blacks feel bad
about themselves; however,

recent studies demonstrating no

significant self-esteem gap between black and white Ameri
cans

undermines

addition,

one

of

the

basic

premises

of

Brown. In

a number of scholars have found that black uni

versities serve many beneficial psychosocial roles for their
predominately black clientele; indeed, some African Americans
exhibited higher academic performance

in a majority-black

setting (Fleming, 1981; Allen, 1987; 1991; 1992; Harvey and
Williams, 1989; Rosenwald and Murty, 1993).
Consequently, though there was no specific language in
the Brown opinion which required that desegregation be imple
mented by closing all-black schools and firing black teachers
and

black

administrators,

many

liberals

pressed

forward

without recognizing how these actions might be interpreted in
the African American community. Moreover, even if one assumes
that these policies were the "right" ones to pursue at the
elementary and secondary level, that did not mean that they
necessarily applied to higher education. Yet, the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund in the early 1970's seemed determined to imple
ment desegregation in higher education, even if it meant the
elimination of black universities. Often, many liberals acted
as if either African American culture did not exist at all,
or if it did, there were few if any redemptive qualities of
black culture that were worth preserving. Consequently, the
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fears that many blacks expressed about the implications of
eliminating
(Frazier,
Cruse,

black

colleges

1939; Myrdal,

1986; Cross,

were

not

1944; Stamp,

1991; Shujaa,

seen

as

legitimate

1956; Moynihan,

1996; Peller,

1965;

1997). The

failure of many liberals to understand or appreciate African
American culture was partly a function of their tendency to
condemn Southern culture generally as inconsistent with the
American Creed and an embarrassment to the nation's inter
national

image

(Wilkinson,

1979;

Cruse,

1986;

Rosenberg,

1991; Moses, 1993; Dudziak, 1995; Peller, 1997). Convinced of
their

own objectivity,

interpretation

of

many

Brown

was

liberals
the

insisted that their

only

correct

one

and

dismissed the concerns voiced by some blacks about the manner
in which Brown was being implemented. Thus, liberals unwit
tingly

created

the

circumstances

for

the"black

backlash"

against integration of the late sixties and the seventies.
Furthermore,

this view also acted as if schools them

selves were acultural

institutions

and a policy of

inte

grating black children into all-white schools did not raise
significant issues of cultural assimilation

(Peller,

1997,

2 06). A number of scholars have demonstrated that there are
significant cultural differences between African Americans
and whites which must be taken into account in a classroom
setting (Smitherman, 1977; Kochman, 1981; Heath, 1983; Shade,
1981; 1982;

1997;

Delpit,

1995).

But the orthodox view of

liberal social scientists in the 1950's (which still has many
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adherents)

is that,

even if cultural differences do exist

between whites and other minorities,

it is illegitimate to

take them into account. All students, after all, should be
held to the same standard.
forced

by

"universal

the

increasing

methods"

such

This tendency is further rein
confidence
as

in

the

standardized

efficacy

of

testing105

to

measure academic achievement and "hold schools accountable
for results"

(Chubb and Moe,

1993; Murray and Herrstein,

1990;

Fiske,

1994; D' Souza,

1991;

Gardner,

1995; Orfield,

1996).
Fordice is the product of the "black backlash" to inte
gration, as -defined by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in the
seventies. The LDF in Adams seemed to assume that the Green
standard, announced in elementary and secondary education,
should be applied to higher education.

In fact,

the LDF's

lawyers pursued the extension of the Green mandate to higher

losSince the national scare generated by the Education
Department's "A Nation at Risk" report on the status of
public education, the use of standardized testing as a means
of measuring academic progress has intensified. The premise
behind testing is that "academic progress" of all students,
regardless of race, can be readily quantified in ways which
are objective and nondiscriminatory. Those subjects which
lend themselves readily to this type of assessment, such as
science and mathematics, are seen as accu-rate barometers of
what students actually know; with respect to other subjects,
"value is assigned to those aspects which can be efficiently
assessed (grammar rather than "voice" in writing; facts
rather than interpretation in history)" (Gardner, 1993, 165) .
What is usually ignored, however, is the rather arbitrary
nature of what is considered "useful knowledge" and whether
the content of these assessments (as well as the skills these
instruments claim to measure) tell us anything meaningful
about what children know anyway (Ibid, 161-183).
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education before
education

its effects

on

elementary

could be assessed and without

and

secondary

consulting black

educators in the planning of the suit (Preer, 1982, 199). The
LDF seemed unable to adequately distinguish between legal
issues

and

questions

of educational

substance.

The NAFEO

countered that the LDF had not considered whether the con
text of higher education warranted different solutions than
the remedies that had been tried in elementary and secondary
education (especially as they related to historically black
colleges). The Black Power ethos, which has persisted long
after

the

movement

itself

has

fallen

out

of

vogue,

had

encouraged many blacks to believe that the schools were being
desegregated

on white terms

(Wilkinson,

1979;

Dempsey and

Noblit, 1996) . Many African Americans who were not satisfied
with

the way desegregation was

implemented

in the public

schools were determined that historically black universities
not undergo the same experience (Bell, 1979; Preer, 1982).
Hence, an ironic confluence of forces has coalesced to
preserve historically black universities. Many conservatives
viewed HEW's attempts to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 during the 1970'as an example of "unwarranted
federal

intervention in the affairs of the states." Thus,

they have tended to endorse a less

agressive approach to

desegregation enforcement from the federal level. Therefore,
if significant levels of segregation persist in the univer
sities, s<? be it. The mere fact that universities are predo
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minately of one race does not constitute prlma facie evidence
of a constitutional violation,

the Fordice court declared.

The issue is whether the state has fettered the choices of
individuals in such a manner that produces racial segrega
tion (505 U.S. 717; United States v. Fordice. 505 U.S. 717,
745 J. Thomas, concurring; United States v. Fordice. 505 U.S.
717, 749 J. Scalia, dissenting). Hence, conservative notions
of individual freedom end up supporting the continuation of
historically black universities. This is the identical argu
ment that Isiah Madison,
pians'

Council

convenor of the Black Mississip-

on Higher

Education made

pursuant

to

the

filing of the Avers lawsuit, though from a completely diffe
rent

political

persuasion.

Brown. Madison

argued,

freed

African Americans to choose whatever institutions of higher
education

they

wished.

If

that

meant

historically

black

universities, then so be it.
The Court's decision in Fordice is a clear reaffirmation
of Brown. In fact, the legitimacy of Brown was never in dis
pute by any of the parties. What is in dispute is what Brown
means in higher education - and specifically, how much power
do federal judges (as representatives of the state) have and
what remedies satisfy a state's constitutional duty to elimi
nate the vestiges of segregation in higher education. How
ever, Fordice applies the Green standard to higher education
without specifying whether remedies developed at the elemen
tary and secondary level fit the postsecondary context. Also,
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the Supreme Court, during the same term, continued the trend
of restricting the power of federal courts in public school
desegregation cases (Freeman v. Pitts. 503 U.S. 467 [1992]).
Thus, the Court failed to consider colleges and universities
on their own terms, and how (or if) Brown even applies to the
question of desegregating state systems of higher education
at all.
Furthermore, the Avers plaintiffs, by insisting on the
enhancement of black universities, are arguing for the very
type of "big government" solution that conservatives adhor.
Justices Thomas and Scalia, the two most conservative members
of the Court, express sympathy for the plight of black uni
versities.

However,

they argue that there is no authority

under the Constitution to require the state of Mississippi to
enhance Jackson State, Alcorn, and Mississippi Valley. True
to their conservative philosophy,

education is primarily a

state matter. Thus, if a state chose to remedy past funding
inequities at black colleges, it would have that right. But
the federal courts do not have the power to order states to
do

so.

courts,

Considering
Fordice

the

fairly

conservative

implies that there might

be

mood

of

the

considerable

state-by-state variation on this question, and a precedent in
one state may not necessarily be binding on another. In light
of the "track record" of Southern states with respect for
providing for black higher education, it remains to be seen
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whether Fordice's implicit trust of the states can resolve
the thorny issues that continue to characterize desegregation
in higher education.
The American Creed as a Double Edged Sword
This dissertation has argued throughout that African
Americans and whites share the same American Creed but for
different reasons. For the white majority, the Creed captures
the essential meaning of the American Revolution - the dig
nity of the individual human being, the fundamental equality
of all men, certain unalienable rights to freedom, justice,
and, and equal opportunity. These values represent the high
est law of the land. The fact that the Declaration of Inde
pendence was written and signed by slaveholders - especially
in view of America's image in the European mind as the "hope
for the world" - constituted the greatest moral problem of
American democracy. However, African Americans have endorsed
this same creed, and have coopted its values to struggle for
political,

social,

and

economic

equality

in

the

United

States. Thus, in one of history's greatest ironies, the very
population with the greatest interest in debunking American
democracy has been among the most ardent apostles of Ame
rica's version of Lockianism.
It has

also

been argued

that American

faith

in the

central importance in education represents one of the most
powerful deductions from the Lockian settlement. Education in
America is deemed essential to foster the values of citizen
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ship consistent with democratic self-government and to equip
students to successful compete in a market economy. For Afri
can Americans, education takes on an additional significance:
historically it had been denied them. Education, in the black
community, has been intimately connected with freedom. The
legal struggle for desegregation represents a chapter in that
struggle.
Brown v. Board of Education embodies the American Creed
and the sense that its principles had not been extended to
African

Americans

on the

same

basis.

Four decades

later,

Brown is now considered one of the heroic moments in American
history.
spectrum.

Its principles are endorsed across the political
However,

as our study of desegregation in higher

education has shown, Brown is a highly contested political
icon which means different things to different people, depen
ding

on their political persuasion.

The

attempt to

apply

Brown to higher education unavoidably raising the question of
the constitutional status of historically black universities.
The resolution of this issue is intertwined with a deeper
debate about the role of government and whether the ideal of
"color-blindness"

can

be

reconciled

with

policies

which

explicitly take race into account.
It is at this point where the historical experiences of
whites and blacks radically diverge.

The American Creed is

fundamentally a theory of a limited state; Locke in America
has been about limiting the state rather than defining its
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legitimate role. African Americans associate their greatest
gains with a more
they adhere

interventionist state;

to the

same

liberal

however,

tradition,

because

they tend

to

neglect to philosophically defend the state's role. Hence, as
the period of legal segregation recedes further and further
into

the

past,

policies

premised

on

past

discrimination

against African Americans have been more difficult to justify
politically.
This is one of the fundamental problems with Brown. The
Court, in a sense, could almost be forgiven for assuming that
everyone knew what it meant. After all, segregation was still
a very pervasive reality in the 1950's.

The supporters of

Brown could easily say: of course, separate schools are bad
all

under

logical.

circumstances.

However,

Therefore,

Brown

is

inherently

the problem of defining the appropriate

remedies to implement Brown. particularly in higher educa
tion, remains. Brown implied that the problem of racism could
be solved without any fundamental changes
view

of

the

state's

legitimate

role.

in the American

Consequently,

the

struggle to remedy past racial discrimination has occurred in
a legal context of individualism which has no conception of
"group

rights"

and

is,

in the

long

term,

biased

against

claims rooted in history. This predisposition of the American
Creed raises the question of whether Bellah is right: despite
considerable "lip service" to toleration for individual and
cultural differences, the American Creed does not provide its
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citizens with adequate analytical tools to understand those
who are historically,

economically,

and socially different

(1985, 206).
Thus, though African Americans share the same belief in
the Creed as white Americans,

it frequently leads to quite

different policy preferences and ideological positions. But
the

fact

that

whites

and

blacks

adhere

to

the

liberal

tradition does not necessarily mean that a solution to the
problem is easy. This point is illustrated by an analogy from
Hartz' comparison of the differences between the American and
European perspective on democratic revolution:
This is not a problem of antitheses such, for example,
as we find in Locke and Filmer. It is a problem of
different perspectives on the same ideal [my emphasis].
But we must not for that reason assume that it is any
less difficult of solution; it may in the end be more
difficult since antitheses define each other and hence
can understand one another, but different perspectives
on a single value may, ironically enough, lack this
common ground of definition [my emphasis] (1955, 66).
In other words, the fact that white and African Ameri
cans share the liberal tradition may be precisely the pro
blem.

By the 1980's,

nearly all whites agreed that blacks

"should be able to attend the same schools as whites, have
the same chanes for jobs as whites,

live where they choose,

and otherwise have the same freedom of movement and personal
choice" (Hochschild, 1995, 56) . This represents a significant
change in public opinion from the 1950's, when less than a
majority of white Americans believed these same things (Hoch
schild, 19 95; D'Souza, 1995; S. Thernstrom and A. Thernstrom,
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1997). However,

as the period of legal segregation recedes

further into the past, white Americans see racial discrimi
nation steadily decreasing in America; consequently, whites
sometimes ask "what's all the fuss about" (Hochschild, 1995,
61) .
Black Americans,

on the other hand,

see considerably

more racial inequality (Hochschild, 1995, 60-61). Blacks have
tended to favor policies that proactively intervene in the
marketplace
Lockian

to

race,

discriminatory

help

them

insisting
practices

"catch

that
are

up"

with

policies

whites

outlawing

insufficient

to

in

the

racially

remedy

the

cumulative effects of slavery and segregation. In doing so,
the majority of black political leaders has "bucked the tide"
of a conservative political climate which emphasizes tra
ditional American notions of limited government intervention
in the economy and society. However, by largely failing to
philosophically defend the state, liberals, in effect, assume
that,

in light of America's racial past, that their policy

preferences are self-evident.

Therefore,

when conservative

disagree with them, liberals ("still fighting the last war")
find it easy to label their political opponents as "racists"
or

"intolerant." However,

many conservatives also believe

that African Americans should be treated as the equals of
whites;

they disagree with liberals about the best way to

achieve a racially just society. Conservatives charge libe
rals with deserting the American Creed by embracing policies
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that favor "special groups," require "proportional represen
tation," and "undermine merit." Thus, all sides lay claim to
the American Creed, but each group insists that its inter
pretation - and its alone - is the only morally correct one.
Thus, the American Creed is a mixed blessing for African
Americans: on one hand, it has been a very useful ideological
underpinning for black protest. At the same time, it avails
their political opponents powerful ammunition to delegitimize
black political movements. Consequently, the same arguments
that the NAACP relied on to strike down state laws requiring
segregation of the public schools have been appropriated by
the state of Mississippi to argue that the Constitution does
not

require

it to make massive

investments

at

its

black

universities to compensate them for its past conduct during
the Jim Crow era.
Another development which raises questions about the
efficacy

of the American

Creed to

deal with

race

is the

secularization of American culture (Hunter, 1990; McCullough,
1991;

Moses,

1993;

Whitehead,

1994).

observed that religion acted as an
American

democracy

(287-301).

Tocqueville

(1988)

important bulwark for

Indeed,

America's

historic

sense of Divine Providence has provided the moral ammunition
to

challenge

the

nation's

King,

1986;

treatment
Moses,

of African Americans

(Davis,

1966;

1993;

Walker,

1992).

However,

American individualism encourages each citizen to

develop his own morality; the result, McCullough concludes,
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is that ethical questions in American politics become excee
dingly problematic in an environment with no shared moral
consensus.

This

breakdown

of moral

consensus,

McCullough

argues, along with a loss of a sense of community, erodes the
basis for both rational political discourse and collective
action on the part of citizens. Moreover, atomistic indivi
dualism,

the

presupposition

of

American

political

life,

undermines the society's capacity to critique itself. This is
true, McCullough argues, whether the specific social criti
cisms originate on the political left or right:
Liberals who undertake to go beyond description
to prescription are at a loss for conceptual categories
adequate to the task, for their dependence on the
unstable combination of the assumptions of economic
individualism and welfare statism give them no grounds
for critical transcendence of the society as it exists.
Indeed, the problem is more fundamental: They have no
grounds for value judgements at all. By assuming a
separation between description ("fact") and prescrip
tion ("value"), they undercut any basis for anything
they would say in prescription.
Conservatives can denounce society from the per
spective of the ideal of moral community, but without
breaking with classical economic liberalism (the core
of modern conservatism), they are unable to offer much
more than a utopian appeal to adopt a pure form of
laissez-faire capitalism. Radicals attack capitalism
with moral fervor; their critique of institutional
structures and processes is often penetrating and
difficult to refute. In "unmasking" morality, however,
they cannot account for their own moral passion or
give more than an ideological (class-interest bound)
explanation of society, which must include the critics
themselves (42-43).
The
politics
general

implications

of

McCullough's

in general and the politics
are

quite

serious.

First

of

analysis

on

black

of desegregation
all,

a

culture

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

in
of

370

individualism lacks the conceptual tools to discern the moral
legitimacy of competing claims on the political system; in
the absence of such criteria,

only the most powerful and

influential prevail in the political game. African Americans,
who

tend

to

have

less

political

influence,

heavily on morally-based political appeals;

have

relied

indeed, under

neath the legal and social scientific arguments put forth in
desegregation lawsuits are moral appeals to the values of the
American Creed.

However,

a climate that

either

lacks the

interpretive skills to process such appeals or assigns them
to the

"trash bin of

interest group

liberalism"

severely

diminishes the effectiveness of moral suasion as a political
strategy.
Yet, the "saving grace" of the American Creed may be its
pragmatic orientation. The New Deal, as was argued earlier,
illustrates
"reinvent

the

unique

itself"

ability

of

the American

to deal with a national

Creed

emergency.

to
The

Creed's fundamental pragmatism means that it inheres within
it a dynamism that enables its values to be appropriated to
meet new exigencies. And the changes in the global economy
may provide those very circumstances for a reinvention of the
American Creed.
The Information Age, with the revolutionary changes it
is bringing about in the workplace, requires a more educated
and highly-skilled population than at any time in history
(Wilson, 1978; Johnston and Packer, 1987; Reich, 1991; Fiske,
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1991;

Gill,

1992; Obiakor and Barker,

1993;

0. Patterson,

1997) . At the same time, income inequality between the rich
and poor

of all

(Harrington,

races has

1984; Phillips,

been

growing

1990; Reich,

since the

1970's

1991; Edsall and

Edsall, 1991; Schwartz and Volgy, 1992). In addition, African
Americans,

Latinos,

and

immigrant

fastest growing sectors of the

groups

labor force,

represent

the

but are more

likely to be at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder. The
new information economy represents a historic opportunity to
redefine the role of the federal government in a twenty-first
century capitalist economy. As part of this larger debate,
the supporters of historically black universities could argue
for the existence and strengthening of their institutions as
a valuable source of integrating African Americans and others
into the mainstream of the global economy.

The

future of

black colleges could be linked to the exponential rise in the
importance of education in the new economy.

Chief Justice

Warren's observation in Brown that a child denied the right
to an education cannot "reasonably be expected to succeed in
life"

(347 U.S. 483, 494) is more true now than when it was

written in 1954. For this reason, the view that Brown was, or
is,

inherently flawed

harsh

judgment.

(Johnson,

Brown. because

1993)
it

is an unnecessarily

embodies

the

American

Creed, can be reinterpreted to fit realities not contemplated
by the Court or the NAACP's lawyers and social scientists.

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

372

However, though the pragmatism of the Creed constantly
keeps the door open for an expansion and redefinition of the
state's

role,

it

is

not

inevitable

that

it will

do

so.

Indeed, there are other developments which suggest just the
opposite.
sioned

The collapse of the Soviet Union has been occa

with

a

chorus

of

celebration

-

a

vindication

of

America's Cold War strategy and even the declaration of "the
end of history." The spread of democratic regimes throughout
Latin America, Eastern Europe, and in some parts of Asia and
Africa only confirm this confidence.

Furthermore,

the fact

that America's economy in the 1990's has significantly out
performed those of Western Europe and Japan only strengthen
America's

self-confidence:

America's

economic

it is hard not to notice that

competitors have

significantly greater

social entitlement programs, which make it more difficult for
them to compete with the United States in the new environ
ment. The recent economic downturns in Asia only reinforce
the age-old American tendency of believing that the world's
problems would be solved if other countries would be more
like America. The United States' position vis-a-vis its major
economic

rivals

only

strengthens

the

hand

of

those

who

believe in the further devolution of power from the federal
government to the states

- particularly

as

it relates

to

education. Fordice is an example of the faith in devolution
of

power

to

the

states.

Furthermore,

while macroeconomic

change affects all Americans regardless of race (and creates
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the potential for multi-racial political coalitions), there
still remain powerful incentives to emphasize the "politics
of racial

identity"

and to use

race

as a wedge-issue

in

American politics,106 even if some of these tactics corrode
political discourse (Edsall and Edsall, 1991; D'Souza, 1995;
Curry, 1996; 0. Patterson, 1997; S. Thernstrom and A. Thern
strom, 1997).
Thus, as Louis Hartz observes, a "liberal society analy
sis" of American politics,

in contrast to the Progressive

scholarship that dominated the first half of the twentieth
century,

cannot guarantee a "happy ending" to the American

story:
The Progressives, for one thing, always had an American
hero available to match any American villian they found,
106The fact that race is intimately intertwined with the
philo-sophical dispute between conservatives and liberals
about the role of government sometimes give rise to perverse
political incentives on both sides. Liberals sometimes feel
compelled to deny the fact that considerable racial progress
has occurred since the 1950's and 1960's; listening to the
rhetoric of many liberal intellectuals, one would sometimes
think almost no progress has been made in American race
relations at all (D'Souza, 1995; S. Thernstrom and A.
Thernstrom, 1997; 0. Patterson, 1997) . Liberals emphasize
what they see as the continued effects of racial inequality
as the rationale for more government programs. Conservative
intellectuals, on the other hand, emphasize race because it
provides an effective way of demonstrating the failure of
Great Society programs of which they are ideologically
opposed to (Murray, 1984; Steele, 1986; Edsall and Edsall,
1991; Murray and Herrstein, 1994; D'Souza, 1995; S. Thern
strom and A. Thernstrom, 1997; O. Patterson, 1997). However,
some versions of the conservative critique of New Deal
liberalism overemphasizethe failure of government programs
and come close to outright denying that government inter
vention on issues related to race has had any positive effect
at all (Harrington, 1984; Jones, 1987).
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a Jefferson for every Hamilton. Which meant in their
demonology the nation never really sinned: only its
inferior self did, its particular will, to use the lan
guage of Rousseau. The analyst of American liberalism
is not in so happy a spot, for concentrating on unities
as well as conflict, he is likely to discover on occa
sion a national villian, the tyrannical force of Lockian sentiment, whose treatment requires a new experi
ence for the whole country rather than the insurgence
of part of it. . . . S o that the liberal society ana
lyst is destined in two ways to be a less pleasing
scholar than the Progressive: he finds national weak
nesses and can offer no assurances on the basis of
the past that they will be remedied (1955, 31-32).
The American Creed provides a powerful source of natio
nal unity for black and white Americans. However, fundamental
differences rooted in history create an ideological gulf as
to what its practical implications are for the role of the
state in American society. There is a tendency to appeal to
the past to

answer questions

about

the present - either

because it represents some ideal state of equality or because
the shortcomings of the past have policy implications in the
present. But the key test for the American Creed's ability to
deal with race may be whether or not it enables blacks and
whites to transcend the limitations of their national experi
ence. As Hartz concludes, " . . .

instead of recapturing our

past, we have got to transcend it. As for a child who is lea
ving adolescence, there is no going home again for America"
(1955, 32). Whether twenty-first century America is "up for
the task" remains, of course, an open question.
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